Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Rajendra Marothiya vs Raj Gramnin Bank on 26 August, 2025
Author: Anand Sharma
Bench: Anand Sharma
[2025:RJ-JP:33377]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17146/2010
Rajendra Marothiya S/o. Shri Hanuman Ji Age 24 years, resident
of Shastri Nagar, Sikar, Tehsil and Distrit Sikar.
----Petitioner
Versus
Rajasthan Gramin Bank, Head Office, 13, Lajapat Nagar, Scheme
Number-2, Alwar, Tehsil and District Alwar.
----Respondent
For Petitioner : Mr. Ashok Mishra Advocate.
For Respondent : Mr. Ajay gupta Advocate with Mr.
Sampti Sharma Advocate.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
RESERVED ON :: 21.08.2025
PRONOUNCED ON :: 26.08.2025
1. In the instant writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for a direction against Respondent-Bank to extend benefit of appointment to the petitioner on the post of Clerk-cum-Cashier, from the date other candidates have been appointed on the said post along with all consequential benefits, treating the petitioner more meritorious than the selected candidates. The petitioner has also sought a declaration for declaring the selection process adopted by the respondent-Bank, while making selection and giving appointment to other persons, as improper, unfair and illegal.
2. It is stated that the respondent-Bank published an advertisement in August, 2009, whereby, applications were invited (Downloaded on 27/08/2025 at 10:15:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:33377] (2 of 9) [CW-17146/2010] from all eligible persons for recruitment on the post of Clerk-cum- Cashier. As per the aforesaid advertisement, the process of selection was divided into different stages. Firstly, the candidates were required to appear in written examination and on the basis of the result of written examination, the successful candidates, on the basis of merit list, were to be called for interview in the ratio of four times of the vacancies advertised.
3. The petitioner participated in the selection process and appeared in written examination. After finding suitable place in the list prepared on the basis of written examination, the petitioner was allowed to appear in the interview. As per the petitioner, he obtained 139 marks out of maximum 160 marks in written examination and also secured 19.75 marks out of maximum 40 marks in viva voce/interview. It has been submitted that other candidates, who also appeared in the interview, although secured much lesser marks than the petitioner in written examination, yet they were awarded excessively higher marks in the interview and, therefore, only on account of having secured higher marks in interview, their aggregate marks became more than the aggregate marks secured by the petitioner. It was also submitted that although the recruitment process in the respondent-Bank is regulated by Regional Rural Banks (Appointment and Promotion of Officers and Other Employees) Rules, 1998 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Rules of 1998'), which specifically provide that in the process of recruitment, there shall be no minimum qualifying marks in the interview, yet contrary to the afroesaid provision in the Rules of 1998, in the advertisement (Annexure-1), in Note (ख) appended to Clause 7 of the advertisement, it has been prescribed (Downloaded on 27/08/2025 at 10:15:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:33377] (3 of 9) [CW-17146/2010] that maximum marks for interview shall be 40 and the candidates were required to secure minimum 50% marks out of the maximum marks prescribed. Since maximum marks of interview were 40, therefore, as per condition of the advertisement, all the candidates appearing in the interview were required to secure minimum 20 marks.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on one hand, aforesaid condition with regard to securing minimum 20 marks in the interview is contrary to the Rules of 1998, on the other hand, only in order to disqualify the petitioner, quite intentionally, he was awarded 19.75 marks, which were having a short fall of 0.25 marks in pursuant to prescribed minimum 20 marks in interview.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner emphasised that by putting a condition contrary to the Rules of 1998 as well as by intentionally disqualifying the petitioner, who obtained sufficiently higher marks in the written examination, marginally lesser marks than the minimum qualifying marks in interview were awarded and on account of such illegal act of the respondent, the petitioner could not be appointed. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his arguments, has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Ashok Kumar Yadav Vs. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 417 and decision of this Court in the case of Bhawani Singh Charan Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others, 2009 (5) WLC 252.
6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent raised following preliminary objections: (Downloaded on 27/08/2025 at 10:15:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JP:33377] (4 of 9) [CW-17146/2010]
(i) The entire selection process was over in February, 2009 and the petitioner, if at all aggrieved, could have challenged the process immediately, yet he has filed the present writ petition on 22.12.2010, i.e., after delay of more than 17 months. Hence, writ petition filed by the petitioner is suffering from vice of delay and latches.
(ii) Terms of advertisement were quite unambiguous and explicitly clear wherein it was prescribed that the candidates, participating in the recruitment process, shall be required to possess minimum 50% marks (i.e., 20 marks) in the interview. Thus, the petitioner was fully aware of the condition of recruitment process and quite consciously, despite there being such condition, the petitioner knowingly participated in the selection process and after remaining unsuccessful, the petitioner has filed instant writ petition. Under these circumstances, the moment the petitioner has participated in the selection process, he has waived and acquiesced his rights to challenge the process.
(iii) Although, the petitioner himself has stated in the memo of writ petition that persons allegedly less meritorious than him were given appointment ignoring his merit, yet he has not impleaded those alleged less meritorious persons as party to the writ petition. Hence, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.
(iv) Although, it has been stated by the petitioner that he is aggrieved by the aforesaid Note (ख) appended to condition no. 7 of the advertisement, relating to secure minimum qualifying marks in interview, yet the petitioner has not chosen to challenge (Downloaded on 27/08/2025 at 10:15:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:33377] (5 of 9) [CW-17146/2010] that part of the advertisement. Hence, no relief can be granted to the petitioner without there being any challenge to the said condition of the advertisement.
7. After raising the aforesaid preliminary objections, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the selection process by stating that conditions of the advertisement were transparent and similar for all the candidates participating in the recruitment process. It is not always possible that the candidate securing more marks in written examination shall also obtain more marks in interview. The criteria and pattern for written examination and interview are totally different. In written examination only knowledge of the candidate is assessed whereas during interview, in addition to knowledge, skills of communication, personality and other qualities of the candidate are also examined by the interview board and marks are awarded on overall assessment. Thus, there can be variations in the marks awarded in written examination and interview. Therefore, merely the fact that the petitioner secured more marks in written examination, cannot be a ground to level an allegation that he was intentionally awarded lesser marks in interview to defeat his rights. Learned counsel for the respondent reiterated that after expiry of 16 years from the date of completion of process, the issue raised by the petitioner cannot be re-examined.
8. I have considered the submissions made by learned for the parties and meticulously examined the record. (Downloaded on 27/08/2025 at 10:15:18 PM)
[2025:RJ-JP:33377] (6 of 9) [CW-17146/2010]
9. Before adverting to the merits of the case, this Court deems it just and proper to firstly examine the preliminary objections raised by the respondent.
10. As regards the objection that despite completion of selection process in February, 2009, writ petition has been filed by the petitioner in December, 2010, i.e, after lapse of more than 17 months after completion of selection process, learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to justify the delay by stating that the petitioner was not aware of either his own marks or marks of others. Hence, he filed application dated 03.04.2010 under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act of 2005') for obtaining the marks which were made available to him vide letter dated 21.04.2010. Hence, only after obtaining such details under the Act of 2005, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. However, no justification whatsoever has been put forward by the petitioner for submitting application under the provisions of the Act of 2005, after lapse of around 14 months from the date of completion of process of recruitment, for the first time in April, 2010. Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to show any past effort of the petitioner to obtain details of his marks prior to filing of application dated 03.04.2010 under the Act of 2005. Thus, in the matter of recruitment and selection, where in the event of completion of selection process, third party rights are bound to accrue, the delay of 17 months in filing writ petitioner can be said to be fatal and, therefore, the writ petition filed by the petitioner deserves to be rejected on the ground of delay and latches.
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[2025:RJ-JP:33377] (7 of 9) [CW-17146/2010]
11. The second objection raised by learned counsel for the respondent is that the petitioner appeared in the recruitment process including interview consciously, having knowledge of requirement of securing minim 50% marks (i.e. 20 marks) in the inteview, hence, after remaining unsuccessful, whether he could have challenged the selection process in which he has already participated. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that mere participation in an illegal process would not disentitle the petitioner from challenging the same.
12. In this regard, it would be relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manish Kumar Shahi Vs. State of Bihar & Others, (2010) 12 SCC 576 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered similar issue and held that a candidate after participating in the selection process, waives and acquiesces his rights to challenge the same process. Hence, in view of above, on the ground of waiver and acquiescence, the plea raised by the petitioner by way of instant writ petition cannot be entertained.
13. As regard the third objection raised by learned counsel for the respondent with regard to non-joinder of selected candidates in the instant writ petition, who were otherwise necessary parties, learned counsel for the petitioner has attempted to justify by stating that number of persons selected were lesser than the number of vacancies, therefore, in the event of the writ petition is allowed, then also no other selected candidate is likely to be adversely affected. Hence, there was no requirement to implead those selected candidates as parties to the (Downloaded on 27/08/2025 at 10:15:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:33377] (8 of 9) [CW-17146/2010] writ petition. This Court, although, finds some substance in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, yet in the cases where petition is allowed with the finding that less meritorious persons have been given appointment, ignoring the merit of the petitioner, then in all such cases, the question of interse seniority is bound to arise and inclusion of non-selected person in the list of already selected persons, may disturb the interse seniority. Hence, it is always in the interest of justice to pass any such order after hearing the affected parties. However, in the instant case, where the relief prayed by the petitioner is likely to affect the rights and interest of affected parties, yet he has not impleaded them in the writ petition, it is deemed just to observe that the petition is also suffering from non-joinder of necessary parties.
14. The fourth and last preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent is that although, the petitioner is dissatisfied with Note (ख) appended to condition no. 7 of the advertisement, yet the same was not challenged by him. No justification whatsoever has been given by learned counsel for the petitioner for not challenging the said condition. It is settled proposition of law that no relief can be granted without there being any specific prayer. In the instant case, when the alleged part of condition of the advertisement has not been prayed to be quashed by the petitioner, no relief can be granted by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
15. Since all the four preliminary objections have been decided in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner, (Downloaded on 27/08/2025 at 10:15:18 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:33377] (9 of 9) [CW-17146/2010] this Court does not deem it fit and proper to enter into merits of the instant writ petition.
16. In view of foregoing discussions and observations on preliminary objections, no interference is called for in the instant writ petition and the same is, hereby, dismissed.
17. Pending application, if any, also stands dismissed.
(ANAND SHARMA),J MANOJ NARWANI (Downloaded on 27/08/2025 at 10:15:18 PM) Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)