Jharkhand High Court
Abhimanyu Singh @ Sintu Singh vs The State Of Jharkhand on 10 December, 2024
Author: Ananda Sen
Bench: Ananda Sen, Gautam Kumar Choudhary
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(Cr.) No.868 of 2024
-----
Abhimanyu Singh @ Sintu Singh, aged about 36 years, son of Raj
Kumar Singh, resident of Sanjay Path, Subhash Colony, PO Mango,
PS Olidih, District East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur ... Petitioner(s).
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Jharkhand,
Project Bhawan, PO Dhurwa, PS Jagannathpur, District Ranchi
3.The District Magistrate cum Deputy Commissioner, East Singhbhum
at Jamshedpur Office at Old Gandak Road, PO and PS Sakchi,
Jamshedpur, District East Singhbhum
4. The Superintendent of Police, Jamshedpur, Office at near Jubliee
Park, PO and PS Sakchi, Jamshedpur, District Jamshedpur
... Respondent(s).
CORAM : SRI ANANDA SEN, J.
SRI GAUTAM KUMAR CHOUDHARY, J.
------
For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Jitendra Shankar Singh, Advocate
For the State : AC to Mr. Manoj Kumar, APP
.........
07 /10.12.2024: Both the parties agrees for disposal of this case at the stage of Admission. Considering the fact that this case involves personal liberty, we are disposing of this case at the Admission stage itself.
2. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the State at length.
3. In this writ application the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 04.09.2024 contained in Memo No. 322(A)/Law passed by the District Magistrate, East Singhbhum at Jamshedpur by which he has been detained in terms of Section 12 of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. Further for quashing the order dated 13.09.2024 passed by Under Secretary, Department of Home, Prison and Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand by which the prevention order was confirmed. Further the order dated 19.11.2024 passed by District Magistrate, East Singhbhum by which his detention has been extended, has also been challenged in this case by way of amendment.
4. Mr. Jitendra Shankar Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is neither a habitual offender or anti-social, nor it can be said that he is a threat to the public order. The reference of cases which has been given in the impugned order would suggests that at best there is a law and order problem in the area. He further submits that the petitioner is not an anti-social as defined under the Act. The cases which are pending against the petitioner are personal in nature. In 5 cases he is already on bail and in one case he has already been acquitted. So far as sanha's (Station Diary Entry) are concerned, he submits that those have not fructified into any criminal case. Thus, he prays for quashing of the impugned orders.
5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State submits that there are 6 cases against this appellant which are reflected in the impugned order. It is submitted that the petitioner has indulged in anti-social activities and is a threat to the society. He further submits that if the petitioner is kept in custody, the law and order problem and the criminal cases in the area will definitely be reduced.
6. The impugned order has been passed in terms of Section 12 of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. Right to life and personal liberty is kept at the highest pedestal in this country. Article 22 of the Constitution guarantees a person protection of his liberty.
7. Section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act gives power to the State Government to detain certain persons. It is necessary to quote Section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, which reads as under: -
"12. Power to make orders detaining certain persons.- The State Government may.-(1) If satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person, make an order directing that such anti-social element be detained."
8. As per Section 12 of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 if a person acts in any manner which is prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order (emphasis supplied by us), he can be detained. Further if a person is an anti-social element, he also can be detained.
9. The phrase "anti-social element" has been defined under the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 at Section 2(d) thereof. Section 2(d) of the Act reads as under: -
"2. Definition.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires 2(a) ...
2(b) ...
2(c) ...
2(d) "Anti-social Elements" means a person who- 2d(i) either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code: or 2d(ii) habitually commits or abets the commission of offences under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956; or 2d(iii) who by words or otherwise promotes or attempts to promote on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community or any other grounds whatsoever, feelings of enmity or hatred between different religions, racial or language groups or castes or communities; or 2d(iv) has been found habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing women or girls; or 2d(v) who has been convicted of an offence under sections 25, 26, 27, 28 or 29 of the Arms Act of 1959."
10. As per the aforesaid definition, a person, who is sought to be detained, must commit or attempt to commit or abets commission of offence punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code, either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang or that person habitually commits and abets offences under the Suppression of Immoral Trafficking of Women and Girls Act, 1956. Further a person, who by his words or otherwise promotes or attempts to promote enmity or hatred between different religions, racial or language group or castes or communities, will also be termed as "anti-social Element".
11. In the case of "Haradhan Saha vs. State of West Bengal"
reported in (1975) 3 SCC 198, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the purpose of preventive detention is to prevent the greater evil of elements imperiling the security and safety of a State, and the welfare of the Nation.
12. Section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 provides for detention of a person, if in any manner he is prejudicial to maintenance of public order. There is a difference between "public order" and "law and order". The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of "Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana and Others" reported in (2023) 9 SCC 587, while referring to various earlier judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, has distinguished between disturbances relatable to law and order and disturbances caused to public order. At paragraph 37 to 40 thereof, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has distinguished between the phrases "public order" and "law and order". Paragraphs 37 to 40 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under: -
"37. We may refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, where the difference between "law and order" and "public order" was lucidly expressed by Hon'ble M. Hidayatullah, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) in the following words: (SCR pp. 745-46, paras 54-55) "54. ... Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. ...
55. It will thus appear that just as "public order" in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of State", "law and order" also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "public order". One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State."
(emphasis supplied)
38. For an act to qualify as a disturbance to public order, the specific activity must have an impact on the broader community or the general public, evoking feelings of fear, panic, or insecurity. Not every case of a general disturbance to public tranquility affects the public order and the question to be asked, as articulated by Hon'ble M. Hidayatullah, C.J. in Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B., is this: (SCC p. 100, para 3) "3. ... Does it [the offending act] lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed?"
39. In Arun Ghosh case, the petitioning detenu was detained by an order of a District Magistrate since he had been indulging in teasing, harassing and molesting young girls and assaults on individuals of a locality. While holding that the conduct of the petitioning detenu could be reprehensible, it was further held that it (read: the offending act) "does not add up to the situation where it may be said that the community at large was being disturbed or in other words there was a breach of public order or likelihood of a breach of public order. (Arun Ghosh case, SCC p. 101, para 5)"
40. In the process of quashing the impugned order, the Hidayatullah, C.J. while referring to the decision in Ram Manohar Lohia also ruled: (Arun Ghosh case, SCC pp. 99-100, para 3) "3. ... Public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. ... It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community. ... This question has to be faced in every case on facts. There is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another."
13. Based on the aforesaid proposition of law, we have to decide the case of the petitioner. In this case, we find that there are reference of 6 cases against the petitioner, those are as follows:
i. Mango P.S. Case No. 160 of 2014 dated 16.03.2014 under section 147/148/149/341/323/324/307/379 IPC and section 27 Arms Act.
ii. M.G.M. P.S. Case No. 491 of 2014 dated 05.09.2014 under section 147/452/504/506/427 IPC.
iii. Mango (Olidih) P.S. Case No. 368 of 2016 dated 23.09.2016 under section 147/148/149/326/307 IPC and Section 27 of Arms Act.
iv. Bodam P.S. Case No. 11 of 2020 dated 17.03.2020 under section 420/406/467/323/384/427/506/120B/34 IPC and section 3(1)(i)(iv)(x) SC/ST Act.
v. Mango (Olidih) P.S. Case No. 176 of 2021 dated 29.06.2021 under section 302/120B/34 IPC and section 25(6)/25(1- B)(a)/25(1-A)/26/27 Arms Act.
vi. Olidih P.S. Case No. 94 of 2024 dated 04.04.2024 under section 147/148/149/452/458/307/504/506/120B IPC and 25(1-B)(a)/25(1-A)/26/27/35 of Arms Act.
14. It is an admitted case that the petitioner has been acquitted in Mango (Olidih) PS Case No. 368 of 2016. Thus, there are only 5 cases pending against the petitioner and admittedly the petitioner is on bail in those cases. The State has not taken any step for cancellation of his bail. All these cases suggest that these are personal in nature. We could not find any material from the impugned order to suggests that there is a problem in respect of public order because of this petitioner.
15. Further the first two cases which are pending originated sometime in the year, 2014 i.e. Mango P.S. Case No. 160 of 2014 in 16.03.2014 and M.G.M P.S. Case No. 491 of 2014 in 05.09.2014. Thereafter the next case which was registered against the petitioner is the case in which he has already been acquitted which is of September 2016. The other case i.e. Bodam P.S. Case No. 11 of 2020 is dated 17.03.2020 and Mango Olidih PS Case No. 176 of 2021 is of 29.06.2021 and the latest is Olidih P.S. Case No. 94 of 2024 dated 04.04.2024. The proximity of these cases against the petitioner is not such, based on which, we can say that the petitioner is a "habitual offender". To be branded as a habitual offender, the person has to commit offence in close proximity, which is not the case here.
We are making this observation considering the definition of the word "anti-social elements" as defined under Section 2(d) of the Act. To become an anti-social element the person has to habitually commit or attempt to commit the offence. The offences committed after a long gap of period i.e. after one or two years cannot make a person habitual offender. To become a habitual offender one has to commit the offence in quick repeated succession, which is not the case here. Thus the petitioner cannot be termed to be a habitual offender to attract Section 2(d) of the Act.
16. The cases which have been lodged against the petitioner relates to maintenance of law and order. There may be law and order problem because of the act of the petitioner but the same is not related to public order. Merely putting some words like "public order", "habitual offender" and "anti-social elements" in the impugned order is not sufficient, rather those words must be backed with sufficient facts to suggest that the petitioner come within the aforesaid category, which is missing in the instant case. The impugned order fails in this aspect.
17. Considering the aforesaid facts, we find merit in this writ application.
18. The impugned detention order dated 04.09.2024, confirmation of detention order dated 13.09.2024 and extension of the detention order dated 19.11.2024 are hereby quashed and set-aside. This writ application stands allowed.
(ANANDA SEN, J.) (GAUTAM KUMAR CHOUDHARY, J.) Tanuj/