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[Cites 8, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

Sri G Nanjappa vs Karnataka Industrial Areas on 5 October, 2012

Author: Anand Byrareddy

Bench: Anand Byrareddy

                                  1



 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE

      DATED THIS THE 05TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2012

                           BEFORE

    THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND BYRAREDDY


    WRIT PETITION Nos.45794-795 OF 2011 (LA-KIADB)


BETWEEN:

1. Sri. G. Nanjappa,
   Son of Late Girigowda,
   Aged about 73 years,
   Kalinganahalli Bellur Hobli,
   Nagamangala Taluk,
   Mandya District.

2. Sri. Mudugeregowda,
   Son of Late Mudugeraiah,
   Alias Thimmegowda,
   Aged about 65 years,
   Hosahakki Palya,
   Bellur Hobli,
   Kalinganahalli Post,
   Nagamangala Taluk,
   Mandya District.                     ....PETITIONERS

(By Shri. Rameshchandra and Shri. S.N.Basavaraju, Advocates)
                                  2



AND:

1. Karnataka Industrial Areas
   Development Board (KIADB),
   No.143/3, 2nd Floor,
   R.P.Building,
   Nrupathunga Road,
   Bangalore - 560 001,
   Represented by its
   Chief Executive Officer.

2. Karnataka Industrial Areas
   Development Board (KIADB),
   Mysore Office, Methalli,
   KRS Road, Mysore - 570 016.
   By its Special and Acquisition
   Officer.

3. State of Karnataka,
   By its Principal Secretary,
   Commercial and Industrial
   Department,
   Bangalore.

4. M/s. Prem Sugars and Chemicals
   Corporation Limited,
   No.A 26, B-Colony,
   Nehru Street,
   Mahalingapuram,
   Pollachi - 642 002,
   Tamil Nadu,
   By its Managing Director.               ... RESPONDENTS

(By Shri. Gangi Reddy, Advocate for Caveator / Respondent No.4
Shri. Basavaraj V.Sabarad, Advocate for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2
                                    3



Shri. H.T.Narendra Prasad, Government Pleader, for Respondent
No.3)

                                *****

      These Writ Petitions are filed under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution of India, praying to quash Annexure-A dated
1.2.1997, passed by first respondent and quash the order dated
Annexure-A1, dated 10.6.1997 passed by the first respondent.


      These petitions coming on for Hearing this day, the Court
made the following:

                               ORDER

Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners.

2. It is the case of the petitioners that the first petitioner is the owner of land in Survey No.73/3 measuring 1 acre 31 guntas, of Kallinganahalli, Bellur Hobli, Nagamangala Taluk, Mandya District and the second petitioner is the owner of land bearing Survey No.90/1 measuring 4 acres 3 guntas of Hosahakki palya, Kallinganahalli, Bellur Hobli, Nagamangala Taluk, Mandya District.

4

It is contended that the fourth respondent, a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, had applied to the first respondent to make available about 99 acres of land in Kallinganahalli and Hosahakki palya as well as Hattna village for setting up a sugar factory and an agreement had been entered into with the first respondent dated 9th October 1996, whereby the fourth respondent had undertaken that employment opportunities would be provided to the kith and kin of the land owners and other local people. A State Level Single Window Clearance Committee had cleared the project, subject to the fourth respondent obtaining permission from the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (Hereinafter referred to as 'the KIADB' for brevity). Pursuant to the agreement entered into by the fourth respondent, the first respondent had commenced the process of acquisition of land under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the 'KIADB Act', for brevity) and it initially declared the area as an industrial area under Section 3(1) of the 5 KIADB Act and thereafter took up further proceedings. A notification under Section 28(4) of the KIADB Act was issued on 10.6.1997. The petitioners contend that they had not sought any compensation pursuant to the said acquisition proceedings as they continued to carry on operations notwithstanding the acquisition proceedings having been initiated under the said Act. On the other hand, the fourth respondent did not proceed further with its project though the land was acquired by the first respondent for purposes of setting up a sugar industry. The State Government having initiated acquisition proceedings, it is the contention of the petitioners that over the years, there was no development at all and the lands have been continued to be cultivated by the land owners including the petitioners, of their respective lands and therefore, the project having been abandoned for all purposes by the fourth respondent, the acquisition proceedings would lapse and since physical possession was never taken, it cannot be said that the acquisition proceedings had attained finality and therefore, seeks 6 that the notifications under Section 28(1) and 28(4) of the KIADB Act be quashed.

Incidentally, the learned Counsel for the petitioners would submit that the fourth respondent was required to set up a sugar industry within a time frame having regard to the conditions imposed under the provisions of the Sugarcane Control Order and the Industrial Entrepreneur Memorandum, which requires the fourth respondent to adhere to time schedules, failing which, the very sanction to establish a sugar factory would lapse and it is therefore one other ground, on which the petitioners would submit that the time frame having lapsed long ago and the petitioners having approached this court seeking extension of time and the extension granted also having lapsed, there is no reason as to how the acquisition proceedings can be sustained in the face of the project having not taken of and the valuable and fertile lands, which are irrigated by the Markonahalli Dam are lost to the petitioners. It is also brought to the notice of the court that establishment of any such sugar industry in the area concerned is a 7 futile exercise as there are no sugarcane growers in the area. That there is a mala fide exercise of power in enabling the fourth respondent to set up a so-called sugar industry, the actual intention is to convey the land in favour of the fourth respondent, who would ultimately deal with the land as real estate, is therefore, evident and it is one other ground on which the learned Counsel would seek to question the acquisition proceedings.

3. The learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, would submit that the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings at this remote point of time, when upon issuance of a notification under Section 28(4) of the KIADB Act, the land would vest absolutely with the State free from all encumbrances under Section 28(5) and with such vesting, the land owner, if any, cannot have any right to challenge the acquisition proceedings. In the instant case on hand, the petitioners have not been in a position to demonstrate that possession has not been taken on the other hand, the notification 8 itself indicates that the land has vested and the vesting can only be on taking possession of the land in question.

Further, insofar as the contention that the fourth respondent is no longer in a position to set up a sugar industry in question, on account of the time frame prescribed, is also not entirely correct as further extension has been granted to the fourth respondent and it would expire only by October 2013. Therefore, the learned Counsel would further submit that even if the Scheme, for the purpose of which, the land was acquired, is held to have lapsed, the acquisition itself would not lapse and therefore, the petitioners would not gain any advantage even if it is held that the project of the fourth respondent does not take-off and the object of the acquisition therefore was lost.

Further, the contention that the fourth respondent no longer has the authority to establish a sugar industry on the footing that permission granted by the State Government would not be sufficient unless extension is granted in terms of the 9 Sugarcane Control Order is concerned, it is a matter between the competent authority and the fourth respondent and the petitioner can have no say in the matter.

4. In the light of the above contentions, the main ground on which the petitioners seek to rest their case is that possession of the land has not been taken. As already pointed out in this regard, there is no material produced to indicate that they continued in possession except the photographs produced at Annexure -C Series. This by itself would not be sufficient to dislodge the statutory notification issued in terms of Section 28(4) of the KIADB Act. The second contention that the fourth respondent is no longer in a position to establish a sugar industry as statutory clearances are no longer current and that such extensions obtained are invalid, is a mater between the competent authorities and the fourth respondent. Even if that contention is upheld and any declaration is made, it would not enure to the benefit of the petitioners as the land has vested in the State absolutely and it 10 would be for the State to deal with the land otherwise, if the fourth respondent is no longer entitled to the same.

Therefore, there is no merit in this petition and the same stands dismissed.

Sd/-

JUDGE nv