Bombay High Court
Mumbai Shramik Sangh And Ors. vs N.D. Rathod, Conciliation Officer And ... on 24 January, 1991
Equivalent citations: (1995)ILLJ273BOM
JUDGMENT A.V. Sawant, J.
1. The petitioner - Mumbai Shramik Sangh -has by this petition challenged the settlement arrived at on November 25, 1987 under Section 12(3) read with Section 18(3) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (for short " the said Act"). The first respondent is the concerned Conciliation Officer, the second respondent - The Bombay Tyres International Ltd is the employer and the third respondent - General Secretary, Modistone Tyre Employees Union is the Union representing majority of the workmen.
2. It appears that there was a negotiated settlement under Section 12(3) read with Section 18(3) of the said Act which was reached on January 3, 1983. However, certain disputes arose as a result of demands made on October 23, 1985, May 15, 1986 and July 4, 1987. The first respondent - employer declared a lockout on October 8, 1986. In the course of conciliation, meetings were held on October 12, 1987, October 16, 1987, November 6, 1987, November 18, 1987, November 23, 1987, November 24, 1987 and finally on November 25, 1987. As a result of the settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3) of the said Act, the lockout was lifted in two phases namely on November 28, 1987 for the maintenance staff and on January 9, 1988 for the rest of the employees. However, before the lockout was actually lifted, a majority of the workmen had signed the necessary undertakings on October 10, 1987.
3. Initially, the writ petition was summarily rejected on October, 13, 1988. However, on an appeal, Division Bench admitted the petition on March 16, 1989.
4. I have heard the learned Counsel Smt. D'Souza for the petitioners, Shri Chogle for the first respondent, Shri Rele for respondent No. 2 and Shri Ganguli for the third respondent. Smt. D'Souza for the petitioner has raised the following contentions:
(i) The settlement arrived at on November 25, 1987 was not a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3) of the said Act but was merely a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and some of the workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation and was, therefore, a settlement falling under Section 18(1) of the said Act.
(ii) There was no proper notice of the conciliation proceedings which culminated in the settlement dated November 25, 1987. Display of the notice dated November 19, 1987 at the gate of the factory on November 20, 1987 where there was a lockout was not a proper intimation as contemplated by Rule 11 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957.
(iii) The display of notice on November 20, 1987 gave a very short notice inasmuch as the settlement was arrived at on November 25, 1987.
(iv) The first respondent - Conciliation Officer did not actively participate in the conciliation proceedings and hence this was not a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings falling under Section 18(3) of the said Act but was merely a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings and was, therefore, only Section 18(1) settlement.
5. Apart from the above contentions challenging the character of the settlement and the points regarding the manner and duration of the notice, on merits the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the settlement arrived at was unfair and oppressive. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on some of the clauses in this settlement which, according to the learned Counsel, strictly did not form part of the charter of demands or were not as such referred to conciliation and were, therefore, outside the scope of the conciliation. My attention was invited to Clause (v) dealing with bonus, Clause (vi) dealing with production and productivity and particularly the aspect of the consultation falling under Clause (vi) (c)(i) of the settlement, Clause (viii) dealing with discipline and particularly Clause (viii)(i) regarding the annual leave programme and Clause (ix) dealing with canteen and particularly Clause (ix) (c) dealing with the right of the management to have the option to run the canteen in future through the contractors resulting in possible retrenchment of some workmen.
6. As against this Shri Rele, Shri Chogle and Shri Ganguli appearing for the respondents, contended that, in the first place, the settlement was one falling under Section 18(3) of the said Act and was a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under the said Act and was not merely a settlement arrived at by an agreement between the employer and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation. Relying upon certain decisions of the Supreme Court, it was contended on behalf of the respondents that in the light of the fact that there was a lockout for more than 13 months, that is to say, from October, 8, 1986 till November 25, 1987, one has to visualise the position of the parties as of that day viz. November 25, 1987. The conciliation has to be judged not from the touchstone of adjudication but from the fact that after all it was conciliation. One cannot pick and choose some items from out of the settlement and compare them with the existing conditions but that one has to look at it in the totality of the circumstances as a package deal. The fact that industrial peace had to be restored cannot be lost sight of. The fact that after nearly 14 months of lockout both the parties wanted to get going is a relevant circumstance. The fact that undertakings were submitted on October 10, 1987 by the majority of the workmen has also a bearing on the issue. Further the important feature that the third respondent represented as many as 1835 workmen out of nearly 2000 workmen also assumed importance.
7. On merits, it was further contended that on each pf the items such as bonus, production and productivity, consultation, discipline and canteen, there was nothing unfair or oppressive in the terms of the settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation.
8. In addition to the above, it was further contended on behalf of the respondents that the settlement was arrived at on November 25, 1987 and that the benefits under the settlement were accepted in January 1988, March, 1988 and finally in July, 1989 by almost all the workmen. The petition was filed as late as in October, 1988. The settlement had already worked itself out for the stipulated period of 3 years ending with November, 1990. It was also pointed out that a fresh charter had already been submitted now on January 7, 1991. It was finally contended that this was not a fit case for interference by the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance has been placed by the respondents on certain decisions of the Supreme Court in support of their contentions.
9. As far as the first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner Smt. D'Souza is concerned, it relates to the question as to whether the settlement falls under Section 18(3) or can be treated as a settlement under Section 18(1) simplicitor. Smt. D'Souza has laid great stress on the fact that what was initially referred to conciliation were the demands of October 23, 1985, May 13, 1986 and July 4, 1987. As far as the lockout and the lockout wages demand was concerned, it was made as late as on July 13, 1987. Reliance was placed on the affidavit of the first respondent and the annexures to the said affidavit to contend that some of the items in the settlement did not form part of the charter of demands summarised in Annexure (2) to the affidavit of the first respondent. It was further contended that after the display of the notice dated November 19, 1987 at the gate of the factory on November 20, 1987 the only meeting that was held was on November 25, 1987. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, therefore, the settlement arrived at on November 25, 1987 cannot be regarded as settlement arrived at in the courses of conciliation. Reliance was further placed on the demands contained in the letter dated July 13, 1987 to contend that the settlement dated November 25, 1987 cannot be regarded as settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation. Smt. D'Souza has placed strong reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the case of The Bata Shoe Co. (P) Ltd. v. D.N. Ganguly and Ors. reported in (1961-I-LLJ-303). In particular reliance was placed on the observation in at page 312 of the report. The question in Bata Shoe Co's case related to the enquiry against the workmen who were charge-sheeted but who could not be served despite the notice being sent by registered post. Since the workers were not found in their villages the notices were returned un-served. On the same day on which charge-sheets were sent by registered post, notices were issued in ertain newspapers informing the workmen, without mentioning their names, that the charge-sheets were sent individually to the workers who had taken part in the illegal strike and that had also been displayed on the notice boards both inside and outside the office gates of the factory. The workers concerned were required to submit their explanation by certain date. In these facts, the Supreme Court held that it could not be said that the workmen would have a notice that they were amongst those to whom the charge-sheet had been sent or about whom charge -sheet had been displayed on the notice board. The proper course was, when the registered notice had come back unserved in the case of those workmen, to publish the notice in their names in some newspapers in the regional language with wide circulation in the State along with the charges framed against them. I do not think that the ratio of judgment in Bata Shoe Co's case can have any application here.
10. As against this, the respondents have placed reliance on the provisions of Rule 11 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957 (for short "Bombay Rules") which reads as under:
Rule 11: Conciliation proceedings in other cases:
"Where the conciliation officer receives any information about the incident or apprehended industrial dispute that relates to the public utility service but no notice of strike or lockout is given under Rule 76 or Rule 77 where the industrial dispute does not relate to public utility service and he considers it necessary to interfere in the dispute, he shall give formal intimation in writing to the parties concerned intimating his intention to commence conciliation proceedings with effect from the said date as may be specified therein".
Respondents have also placed reliance on the scheme of the said Bombay Rules where the notice to the parties can be given in more than one way. For instance under Rule 6(2)(b) an order of reference of the dispute can be brought to the notice of the employees by displaying it conspicuously on the notice board in the establishment. This is considered as sufficient notice under Rule 6(2) (b). Under Rule 7(3) (b) dealing with the notice to the parties to nominate their representative to represent them in the meeting, notice can be displayed on the notice board in a conspicuous manner at the main entrance of the premises of the establishment. This is considered as sufficient notice. My attention was also invited to the provisions of Rule 13 which reads as under:
Rule 13:
(1) The proceeding before a Conciliation Officer shall be held in camera.
(2) The Conciliation Officer shall conduct the proceedings expeditiously and in such manner as he may deem fit.
It is but natural to expect an expeditious disposal of such a matter, Reliance is also placed on the provisions of Rule 22 Sub-rule (2) of the said Bombay Rules dealing with the manner of service in the case of numerous persons as parties to a dispute. The mode of giving notice is requiring the employer to display prominently the said notice together with its translation in Hindi and in the language understood by the majority of the workmen in the establishment at or near the main entrance of the said establishment. In the light of the above position, if one peruses the notice dated November 19, 1987 which was displayed at the entrance of the factory premises on November 20, 1987 in respect of the meeting to be held in the office of the first respondent on November 25, 1987 it is difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that there was not proper or sufficient notice of the conciliation proceedings. Admittedly, the majority of the workmen were represented by the third respondent - Union. It is doubtful as to whether the petitioner has support of even a sizeable number of workmen. Perhaps the petitioner was not interested in taking part in the conciliation proceedings. However, apart from this, I am of the opinion that in view of the provisions of Rule 11 of the Bombay Rules and in the light of the scheme of the said Bombay Rules as reflected in the different provisions, the display of the notice at the entrance of the premises on November 20, 1987 in respect of the conciliation proceedings to be held on November 25, 1987 was a proper and also sufficient notice in accordance with law.
11. On merits of the main contention as to whether the settlement can be regarded as 18(3) settlement or merely a 18(1) settlement, Smt. D'Souza for the petitioner has also invited my attention to the Supreme Court decision in the case of The General Manager, Security Paper Mill, Hoshangabad v. Shri R.S. Sharma and Ors.
reported in (1986-I-LLJ-432). The Supreme Court while pointing out the distinction between a settlement arrived in the course of conciliation proceedings and a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings, has observed that law attaches great importance and sanctity to a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings since it carries a presumption that it is just and fair and makes it binding on all the parties as well as the other workmen in the establishment or the part of it to which it relates. It was further pointed out by the Supreme Court that any other settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings is binding only on the parties to the agreement. It was, therefore, observed in the facts of the case before the Supreme Court that respondents who were entitled to receive certain benefits under the settlement dated June 29, 1973 arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings, could not be deprived of their right to the said incentive benefit under the said settlement by a subsequent agreement dated April 11, 1979 arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings which was, therefore, not binding on them. The Supreme Court was, therefore, dealing with a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation on June 29, 1973 as against the subsequent agreement dated April 11, 1979 arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings. I do not think, the ratio of this judgment can apply here.
12. As against this, the respondents have placed strong reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Herbertsons Ltd. v. The Workmen of Herbertson Ltd. and Ors. reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 322. The Supreme Court has indicated that a settlement cannot be judged on the touchstone of the principles applicable in adjudicating the disputes by the Tribunal. Where negotiations take place, which have to be encouraged particularly between the labour and employer in the interest of general peace and well being there is always give and take. The Supreme Court further pointed out that the settlement has to be taken as a package deal. When a recognised union negotiates with the employer, the workers as individual do not come in the picture. It is not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement. There may be exceptional cases where there may be allegations of malafides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But in the absence of such allegations a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and considerations. The Supreme Court has further pointed out that justness and fairness of the settlement has to be reconsidered in the light of the conditions that were in force at the time of the reference. In para 21 of the judgment, the Supreme Court referred to the fact that the parties may have regard to the uncertainty with regard to the result of the litigation and, therefore, a voluntary settlement has to be distinguished from adjudication. In para 25, the Supreme Court observed that once cordiality was established between the employer and labour in arriving at a settlement which operates well for the period that it is in force, there is always a likelihood of further advances in the shape of improved emoluments by voluntary settlement avoiding friction and unhealthy litigation. This, as the Supreme Court observed, is the quintessence of settlement which courts and tribunals should encourage. In para 27 the Supreme Court states that it is not possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold some parts good and acceptable, and others bad. It is true that in Herbertsons case the Supreme Court was dealing with a case of a recognised union. However, I cannot lose sight of the fact that almost all the employees are the members of the third respondent union here. It is really doubtful as to whom the petitioner union represents. Admittedly, there are no allegations of fraud, corruption or inducements.
13. Reliance has been further placed by the respondents on the. Supreme Court decision in the case of New Standard Engineering Co. Ltd. v. N.L. Abhyankar reported in (1978-I-LLJ-487). In para 10 of the of the judgment at page 491 of the report the Supreme Court observed that the question of justness and fairness of a settlement should be examined with reference to the situation as it stood at the date on which it was arrived at. In para 11 of the Judgment, the Supreme Court says that it is well known that the possibility of an adverse decision by the Court operates as positive force in favour of deliberate and careful effort by both the sides to settle the dispute through direct negotiations. Further, in the case of Tata Engineering & Locomotive and its workmen reported in (1981-II-LLJ-429)(SC), it has been observed in para 10 as under (P 431):
" If the settlement had been arrived at by a vast majority of the concerned workers with their eyes open and was also accepted by them in its totality, it must be presumed to be just and fair and not liable to be ignored while deciding the reference merely because a small number of workers (in this case 71 i.e. to say 11.18% ) were not parties to it or refused to accept it, or because the Tribunal was of the opinion that the workers deserved marginally higher emoluments than they themselves thought they did. A settlement cannot be weighed in any golden scales and the question whether it is just and fair has to be answered on the basis of principles different from those which come into play when an industrial dispute is under adjudication".
The respondents further placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Barauni Refinery Pragatisheel Shramik Parishad v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Ors. reported in (1991-I-LLJ-46). The question there was relating to the retirement age, as to whether it should be 58 or 60. In para 9 of the judgment at page 50 of the report, the Supreme Court has referred to the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and in the light of Section 12(2) of the Act, it has been observed as under:
" Section 12(1) says that where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended the Conciliation Officer, may, or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under Section 22 has been given, shall hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 casts a duty on the Conciliation Officer to investigate the dispute and all matters connected therewith with a view to inducing the parties to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute,"
It has been further observed in Para 9 as under (at P.51):
"There is an underlying assumption that a settlement reached with the help of the Conciliation Officer must be fair and reasonable and can therefore, safely be made binding not only on the workmen belonging to the Union signing the settlement but also on others. That is why a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings is put on par with an award made by an adjudicatory authority."
Bearing the above principle in mind, it is not possible to accept the submission of Smt. D'Souza that the settlement in the present case is merely an agreement arrived at between the parties falling under Section 18(1) and is not a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation falling under Section 18(3) of the Act. As held by the Supreme Court, various aspects will have to be considered while appreciating the argument of the learned Counsel, such as,
(a) There was a lock-out for more than 13 months.
(b) The third respondent - Union represents 1835 out of a total of about 2000 workers.
(c) The number of workmen which the petitioner seeks to represent is itself in doubt.
(d) Undertakings were signed by the majority of the workmen on October 10, 1987.
(e) Benefits under the settlement were accepted first in January 1988, thereafter in March 1988 and finally in July 1988.
(f) The settlement has worked itself out for the full period of 3 years ending with November 25, 1990 and fresh charter has now been submitted.
(g) The petition was filed as late as in October, 1988.
(h) No allegation of fraud, corruption or inducement is made in the petition against any of the respondents,
14. Apart from the above, as observed by the Supreme Court in Herbertsons' case at para 27 of AIR 1977 S.C 322 I cannot be oblivious to the fact that almost all the workmen of the Company have accepted the settlement. Besides the period of settlement has since expired and I am informed that a fresh charter of demands has been now presented.
15. I am, therefore, of the view that there is no substance in the first contention raised by the petitioner that the settlement dated November 25, 1987 is not a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation falling under Section 18(3) of the Act and that it is merely an agreement between the parties falling under Section 18(1) of the Act.
16. Similarly the second and third contention raised by Smt. D'Souza will also have to be rejected in the light of the scheme of the provisions of Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957 as discussed in para 10 above. For the reasons set out in para 10 above, in my opinion at the gate of the factory was a proper and sufficient notice of the conciliation proceedings which culminated in the settlement on November 25, 1987. Similarly the fourth contention regarding the first respondent - Conciliation Officer not having actively participated in the conciliation proceedings has also no merit. The affidavit of the first respondent shows that he has actively participated at various stages of the conciliation proceedings. It may be that at times the parties may agree upon themselves on some of the points and then approach the Conciliation Officer with whose intervention they may be able to set at rest all the other points in dispute. The fact that a number of meetings took place before November 25, 1987 is admitted. As mentioned earlier, the meetings were held on October 12, 1987, Octoberl6, 1987, November 6th November 1987 November 18, 1987 November 23, 1987 November 24, 1987 and finally on November 25, 1987, What the petitioner is doubting is not the participation of the first respondent - Conciliation Officer but his "active" participation. In my opinion, having regard to the various steps taken by first respondent as would be evident from his affidavit, he had actively participated in the conciliation proceedings. He has verified the membership with the original record of the third respondent-union and has brought about the settlement which is just and fair. The argument that there was no active participation has therefore, no merit. The fourth contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner has also to be rejected.
17. Smt. D'Souza has further contended that the settlement was not fair but that it was unfair and oppressive. Assuming that the settlement was arrived at in the course of conciliation, the learned Counsel tried to find a fault with certain specific clauses forming part of the settlement. For instance, it was contended that Clause (v) dealing with bonus; Clause (vi) dealing production and productivity; with particular reference to the piece-rated workmen and duration; the clause of consultation with the workmen or their representative or their union; Clause (viii) dealing with discipline and in particular Clause (viii) (1) dealing with the annual leave programme and finally Clause (ix) dealing with canteen and in particular Clause (ix) (c). As stated earlier, in the light of the Supreme Court decisions, it would not be permissible for me to test a settlement on the touchstone of adjudication. Secondly, one must take into account the totality of the circumstances prevailing at the time of Settlement. One cannot pick and choose certain items and try to compare them with the earlier settlement of 1983. If one takes into account the fact that there was a lock-out for nearly 14 months, it is difficult to accept the contention of learned Counsel that in respect of some of the clauses referred to above, this settlement can be termed as unfair or oppressive. Assuming that there is some give and take, it is not possible to single out a particular clause in the settlement and thus reject the entire settlement. Such an approach would be contrary to what the Supreme Court has said in dealing with the settlements arrived at in the course of conciliation as against the approach in adjudicating the dispute. The fact that this settlement has worked itself out from November 1987 to November 1990 cannot be lost sight of.
18. With this approach, let me examine the criticism of the clauses selected by the learned Counsel Smt. D'Souza from out of the package deal. On the question of bonus though Clause (a) operates to secure minimum of 8.33% as per the payment of Bonus Act, 1965, Clauses (b) and (c) ensures an ex-gratia payment, subject to a total payment of Rs. 3,050/- for each year. On the question of production and productivity, a grievance was made about the target of 4000 tyres to be achieved. The 1983 settlement did contemplate a time bound programme to raise the production to an average of 4000 tyres 95,000 tonnes per day. If that was what was contemplated in the 1983 agreement, it is, difficult to style it as unfair. About dropping the clause of consultation, no grievance is made as to how this has worked oppressively between 1987 and 1990, nor any grievance is made about the misuse of the powers under Clauses (vi) (c) (i). As far as the disciplinary matters are concerned an argument was advanced that under the old settlement there was no restriction on the number of days of leave one could obtain during a particular period in a year; whereas under Clause (viii) (a) of the disputed settlement of November, 1987 an annual leave programme is contemplated in such a manner as to ensure that over-all absence will not exceed 75% in any department on any day. On behalf of the respondents my attention is invited to the old settlement where under standing order No. 13(1), grant of leave to workmen did depend on the exigencies of the establishment and was to be at the discretion of the manager. In fact, the argument of the respondents has been that the wider discretion under standing order 13(1) has been, to some extent, curtailed. Wider discretion of the employer under standing order No. 13 has been to some extent curtailed by Clause (viii) of the settlement. About the canteen , if there is a slight increase in the tariff between 1983 and 1987, it must be conceded as a part of general inflation. On the main grievance of the possible retrenchment because of the Management having an option to run the canteen through a contractor, the option has never been exercised between 1987 and 1990 and, therefore, there has been no occasion for the consequent retrenchment.
19. It is thus not possible to characterise any of the clauses of the settlement as either unfair or oppressive. In the light of what the Supreme Court has said, placed in the situation in which the parties were in November, 1987 if in the hope of lifting of the lockout subject to certain terms and conditions, as a result of the conciliation a settlement has been arrived at which has worked itself out. I find no reason, in the absence of any allegation of either fraud, corruption or inducement, to discard the said settlement and relegate the parties to the situation prevailing before 1987. Such an attempt, in my opinion, would be wholly impermissible in the light of the Supreme Court judgments, in the above referred cases.
20. My attention has also been invited by the respondents to two judgments of this court namely (1) in the matter of J.K. Chemicals Ltd. v. B.D. Borude and Ors. reported in (1990-I-LLJ-65) and (ii) in Writ Petition No. 2993 of 1988 in the case of Mohan Madhukar Ghate and Ors. v. N.D. Rathod and Ors. In the case of J.K. Chemicals Ltd., it has been held as under (at P. 67):
"The underlying object of Rule 62 the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957 is to assure that a settlement which has been arrived at by representatives who are not duly authorised is not foisted on the workmen. Such authorisation may most conveniently be given at a meeting, but that is not to say that it cannot be given otherwise. If it is found by the Tribunal that due authorisation has in fact been given, though not at a meeting, the Tribunal may not say that it will not pass an award in terms of the settlement reached by the authorised representatives with the employer only on the ground that the representatives were not authorised at a meeting. The Tribunal has to be careful to see that due authorisation has in fact been given. Such care must be exercised whether the authorisation has been given at a meeting or otherwise. In other words, Rule 62 in so far as it provides that the authorisation must be given "at a meeting of the workmen held for the purpose" must be read as being directory and not mandatory. I would be manifestly unjust to hold that the settlement reached by the committee duly authorised by 704 of 710 workmen, and accepted by them, should be discarded merely because the authorisation, though duly given, was not given at a meeting."
The High Court further held that to discard the settlement would mean that the reference should have to be proceeded with. It would have to be proceeded with regardless of the fact that 704 out of 710 workmen have no surviving dispute with the petitioner in the facts of that case. The respondents rely upon the observations in this judgment to show the attitude of the Courts in judging the settlement as against the attitude in the matter of adjudication. In the other case of Mohan Ghate (supra) case that similar controversy arose. The challenge in Mohan Ghate's case was also on the ground that the settlement arrived at was not a settlement in the course of conciliation but was an agreement between the parties falling under Section 18(1) of the Act. The learned Judge held that if Conciliation Officer had applied his mind to all the relevant aspects fully and assisted the parties to arrive at a settlement, merely because certain aspects of the settlement were finalised between the office bearers and management and at the last minute conciliation officer gave his approval, it cannot be said that it was not a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation. It has been said that some times it is better to act speedily and expeditiously rather than allowing the parties to scuttle the settlement. What has been referred to above in Rule 13 of the Bombay Rules in fact ensures this. The fact that the parties may have amongst themselves tried to sort out their differences and gone before the first respondent conciliation officer who finally helped them in arriving at the settlement would not render the settlement any the less one under Section 18(3). It is very much a settlement under Section 18(3) and cannot be called a mere Section 18(1) settlement. This Court accepted the contention that the settlement in the case of Mohan Ghate was a settlement falling under Section 18(3). I see no reason to take a different view in the facts of the present case. The criticism that before November 25, 1987 whatever transpired between the parties has to be ignored is, in my opinion, not justified. If the parties met amongst themselves with the active assistance of the first respondent - Conciliation Officer and if finally on November 25, 1987 the Conciliation Officer was able to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement, in my opinion, it is a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation under Section 18(3) of the Act. There is thus no substance in any of the contentions of the petitioner.
21. In the result the petition fails and the same is dismissed. No order as to costs. No order on the chamber summons.