State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
1. Icici Lombard General Insurance Co. ... vs 1. Mohit Verma on 27 March, 2014
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION, U.T., CHANDIGARH First Appeal No. : 99 of 2014 Date of Institution : 19.03.2014 Date of Decision : 27.03.2014 1. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Limited through its General Manager Office at SCF No. 24-25, 1st Floor, Sector 8, Chandigarh. 2. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Limited through its General Manager Office at Interface Building No.11, 401/402, 4th Floor, New Link Road, Malad (W), Mumbai 400064. Second Address:- ICICI Bank Towers, Bandra Kurla Complex, Mumbai 400051, through its Manager. 3. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Limited, ICICI Lombard House, 414 Veer Savarkar Marg, Near Siddhi Vinayak Temple, Prabhadevi, Mumbai 400025 (Policy Issuing Officer) through its General Manager. Appellants/Opposite Parties No.1 to 3. V e r s u s 1. Mohit Verma s/o Sh.Chetanya Kumar Verma, R/o #1202, Sec.44-D, Chandigarh and presently residing at H.No. 1145, Sector 68, Mohali. ....Respondent No.1/complainant 2. Krishna Auto Sales office at 177-E, Indl. Area, Phase-I, Chandigarh, through its Manager ....Respondent No.2/Opposite Party No.4 Appeal under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. BEFORE: JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER (RETD.), PRESIDENT. MR. DEV RAJ, MEMBER.
MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER.
Argued by: Sh. Sandeep Suri, Advocate for the applicants/appellants.
PER JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER (RETD.), PRESIDENT This appeal is directed against the order dated 10.10.2013, rendered by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-II, U.T., Chandigarh (hereinafter to be called as the District Forum only) vide which, it accepted the complaint, filed by the complainant (now respondent no.1), and directed Opposite Parties No.1 to 3 (now appellants), as under:-
In the light of above observations, we are of the concerted view that the Opposite Parties No.1 to 3 are found deficient in giving proper service to the complainant. Hence, the present complaint of the Complainant deserves to succeed against the Opposite Parties No.1 to 3, jointly and severally, and the same is allowed, qua them. The Opposite Parties No.1 to 3 are directed to:-
[a] To indemnify the Complainant the amount of Rs.3,73,313/- as assessed by the Surveyor in his report dated 20.06.2012 (Annex.R-1) [b] To pay Rs.35,000/-on account of deficiency in service and causing mental and harassment to the Complainant;
[c] To pay Rs.11,000/- as cost of litigation;
The above said order shall be complied within 45 days of its receipt by the Opposite Parties No.1 to 3; thereafter, they shall be liable for an interest @18% per annum on the amount mentioned in per sub-para [a] & [b] of para 11 above, apart from cost of litigation of Rs.11,000/-, from the date of institution of this complaint, till it is paid.
2. However, the complaint qua Opposite Party No.4 (now respondent no.2), was dismissed by the District Forum.
3. The facts, in brief, are that the complainant being the owner of SKODA SUPERB car bearing Regn. No.CH-01-AK-2383, got the same insured from Opposite Parties No.1 to 3, for the Insured Declared Value of Rs.18,99,050/-, on payment of total premium of Rs.50,750/-, valid for the period from 24.10.2011 to 23.10.2012. On 25.05.2012, when the complainant was coming from Sector 40, Chandigarh, to Sector 38, Chandigarh, one motorcyclist, who was riding the motorcycle at a very high speed, suddenly came in front of his car, and with a view to save him, he (complainant) turned the steering of the same (car), towards left side and hit the electricity pole. According to the complainant, he was unable to note down the number of the said motorcycle, as it was a sudden incident. The Police came to the spot, and arrested the complainant. F.I.R. No. 223 dated 25.05.2012, under Sections 279, 427 IPC and 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1989, was registered against the complainant, in Police Station, Sector 39, Chandigarh. The car of the complainant, was also taken, in Police custody.
4. The complainant was taken to the Government Multispeciality Hospital, Sector 16, Chandigarh, for medical examination. The Doctor concerned after medically examining the complainant, gave report that there was a smell of liquor, but he (complainant) was not under its influence. Later on, the complainant was released on bail. The vehicle was got released on supardari, whereafter, it was taken to Krishna Auto Sales, Industrial Area-1, Chandigarh, for repairs. Since, the accident took place, during the currency of the Insurance Policy, claim was lodged by the complainant. However, to the utmost surprise of the complainant, his claim was repudiated, by Opposite Parties No.1 to 3, vide letter dated 29.06.2012 Annexure C-7, on the ground that, at the time of accident, he was under the influence of alcohol. It was stated that the ground of repudiation taken by Opposite Parties No.1 to 3, was contrary to the report of the Doctor, aforesaid. It was further stated that, even the complainant made so many requests, to the Opposite Parties, to settle his claim, but no heed was paid to the same.
5. Left with no other alternative, the complainant had to make the payment of Rs.4,17,991/-, demanded by Opposite Party No.4, vide retail invoice dated 16.06.2012 Annexure C-8, towards repair of the car, in question, which was damaged in the accident. It was further stated that the repudiation of genuine claim of the complainant was illegal and arbitrary. It was further stated that the aforesaid acts of the Opposite Parties, amounted to deficiency, in rendering service, as also indulgence into unfair trade practice. When the grievance of the complainant, was not redressed, left with no alternative, a complaint under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter to be called as the Act only), was filed, directing Opposite Parties No.1 to 3, to pay the amount of Rs.4,17,991, incurred by him, towards repair of the car, in question, which was damaged in the accident, during the currency of the Insurance Policy; compensation, to the tune of Rs.50,000/-, for mental agony and physical harassment; and cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.20,000/-.
6. Opposite Parties No.1 to 3, in their joint written version, admitted that the complainant being the owner of SKODA SUPERB car bearing Regn. No.CH-01-AK-2383, got the same insured from them, for the Insured Declared Value of Rs.18,99,050/-, on payment of total premium of Rs.50,750/-, valid for the period from 24.10.2011 to 23.10.2012. It was stated that the accident took place, on account of the reason, that the driver thereof, was under the influence of liquor, at that time. It was further stated that the complainant was taken to the Government Multispeciality Hospital, Sector 16, Chandigarh, for the purpose of medical examination, where the Doctor concerned found that he was under the influence of liquor, at the time of accident. It was further stated that since the complainant was under the influence of liquor, at the time of the accident, no claim was payable under the Insurance Policy, and, as such, the repudiation of his claim was legal and valid. It was further stated that neither there was any deficiency, in rendering service, on the part of Opposite Parties No.1 to 3, nor they indulged into unfair trade practice. The remaining averments, were denied, being wrong.
7. Opposite Party No.4, in its written version, pleaded that no cause of action, whatsoever, arose to the complainant, for instituting the complaint against it. It was stated that damage to the car, in question, was caused due to an accident on 25.05.2012. It was further stated that Opposite Party No.4 was only responsible to repair or replace the damaged part(s) of the vehicle, during the warranty period, if required, on account of any manufacturing defect. It was further stated that since, in the present case, repair of the car, in question, was carried out, on account of the damage caused to the same, in an accident, there was no liability of Opposite Party No.4. It was further stated that neither there was any deficiency, in rendering service, on the part of Opposite Party No.4, nor it indulged into unfair trade practice. The remaining averments, were denied, being wrong.
8. The Parties led evidence, in support of their case.
9. After hearing the Counsel for the parties, and, on going through the evidence, and record of the case, the District Forum, accepted the complaint, against Opposite Parties No.1 to 3, in the manner, referred to, in the opening para of the instant order.
10. Feeling aggrieved, the instant appeal, has been filed by the appellants/Opposite Parties No.1 to 3.
11. Alongwith the appeal, an application for condonation of delay of 111 days, as per the applicants/appellants (as per the office report 117 days), in filing the same (appeal), has been moved. In the application, it was stated by the applicants/appellants, that, no doubt, certified copy of the order dated 10.10.2013, was received by their staff, posted at Chandigarh Office, on 23.10.2013, and the appeal could be filed by 23.11.2013, yet, it (staff, posted at Chandigarh Office), did not inform about the same (order impugned), to their (applicants/appellants), Regional Office and Head Office, located at Delhi and Mumbai, respectively. It was further stated that, it was only in the last week of December 2013, that the applicants/ appellants, came to know that the complainant/respondent no.1 had filed the execution application, for compliance of the order impugned, notice whereof was received from the District Forum, for 29.01.2014. It was further stated that, thereafter, the case file was sent to the Regional Office at Delhi, and then to the Head Office of the applicants/ appellants, at Mumbai, for taking necessary approvals/ permissions of the Competent Authorities, for filing an appeal, which, however, were granted, in the last week of January, 2014, whereafter, the case file was sent to the Counsel, for the purpose. It was further stated that, when the appeal was about to be filed, certified copy of the order impugned was misplaced, during shifting of the store/Record Room of the applicants/appellants, and, finally, the same (certified copy of the order impugned) was traced on 11.03.2014. The appeal was, accordingly, filed on 19.03.2014. It was further stated that, on account of the reasons, aforesaid, the delay of 111 days (as per the office report 117 days), in filing the appeal occurred. It was further stated that the delay, in filing the appeal, was neither intentional, nor deliberate. Accordingly, the prayer, referred to above, was made.
12. We have heard the Counsel for the applicants/appellants, on the application, for condonation of delay, as also, in the main appeal, at the preliminary stage, and have gone through the record of the case, carefully.
13. The question, that arises for consideration, is, as to whether, there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 111 days, as per the applicants/appellants (as per the office report 117 days), in filing the appeal, under Section 15 of the Act. It was held in Smt.Tara Wanti Vs State of Haryana through the Collector, Kurukshetra AIR 1995 Punjab & Haryana 32, a case decided by a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, that sufficient cause, within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, must be a cause, which is beyond the control of the party, invoking the aid of the Section, and the test to be applied, would be to see, as to whether, it was a bona-fide cause, in as much as, nothing could be considered to be bonafide, which is not done, with due care and attention. In New Bank of India Vs. M/s Marvels (India): 93 (2001) DLT 558, Delhi High Court, it was held as under:-
No doubt the words sufficient cause should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. However, when it is found that the applicants were most negligent in defending the case and their non-action and want of bonafides are clearly imputable, the Court would not help such a party. After all sufficient cause is an elastic expression for which no hard and fast guide-lines can be given and Court has to decide on the facts of each case as to whether, the defendant who has suffered ex-parte decree has been able to satisfactorily show sufficient cause for non- appearance and in examining this aspect, cumulative effect of all the relevant factors is to be seen.
14. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Kailash Devi & Ors. AIR 19107 Punjab and Haryana 45, it was held as under:-
There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice, but that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or want of bonafides is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judicially i.e. one is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence.
15. In R.B. Ramalingam Vs. R.B. Bhuvaneswari, 2009 (2) Scale 108, the Supreme Court observed as under:-
We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the Special Leave Petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.
16. In Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors, V (2010) SLT 790=III (2010) CLT 201 (SC), it was held as under:-
The partyshould show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]
17. In Mahant Bikram Dass Chela Vs. Financial Commissioner and others, AIR 1977, S.C. 2221, it was held as under:-
Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of case-law has grown around Section 5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigation who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every days delay
18. In Ansul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, 2012 (2) CPC 3 (SC) it was held as under:-
It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in Consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the Consumer disputes will get defeated, if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras
19. A bare reading of the first proviso, engrafted to Section 15 of the Act, makes it clear, that the material part of the language thereof is pari-materia to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It may be stated here, that the order impugned was passed on 10.10.2013, and, its certified copy was received by the applicants/appellants, on 23.10.2013. The Officials of the applicants/appellants, just slept over the matter, for about more than two months, and, ultimately, woke up from their deep slumber, in the last week of January 2014, when they allegedly sought approvals/permissions, after sending the case file to the Regional Office at Delhi, and then to their Head Office at Mumbai. Even, after receipt of the alleged approvals/ permissions, from their Delhi and Mumbai Offices aforesaid, in the last week of January 2014, the appeal was filed on 19.03.2014 i.e. after about two months. Nothing has been produced, on the record, by the applicants/ appellants, to prove that after January 2014, any alleged shifting of the store room took place, as a result whereof, certified copy of the order impugned was misplaced, which was finally traced on 11.03.2014. It appears that the applicants/appellants started taking steps, for filing an appeal, only when they came to know that the complainant/respondent no.1, had initiated proceedings, under Section 27 of the Act, against them, in the District Forum, for compliance of the order impugned. Since, the instant appeal, has been filed, after a long delay of 111 days (as per the office report 117 days), without furnishing any plausible explanation, it could be said that the applicants/appellants were not diligent in pursuing the matter. The prescribed period of limitation, as envisaged by Section 15 of the Act, for filing an appeal is 30 days, from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The applicants/appellants did not act, with due diligence, resulting into delay of 111 days (as per the office report 117 days), in filing the appeal, which is about four times, beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The cause, set up by the applicants/appellants, in the application, for condonation of delay, does not merit acceptance. The mere fact that the applicants/appellants, acted in a leisure mood, without envisaging the consequences, which could ensue, on account of non-filing of an appeal, within the period prescribed, under Section 15 of the Act, does not mean that they could be shown undue indulgence. The delay, in filing the appeal was, thus, intentional, willful and deliberate. Since, no sufficient cause is constituted, from the averments, contained in the application, the delay of 111 days, (as per the office report 117 days), cannot be condoned. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is fully applicable to the facts of the instant case. The application is, thus, liable to be dismissed.
20. The next question, that arises, for consideration, is, as to whether, even if, sufficient cause is shown, it is obligatory, on the Commission, to condone the delay. The answer to this question, is in the negative. In Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it was held as under:-
It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.
21. It is evident, from the principle of law, laid down in Ram Lal & Ors.s case (supra), that even if, sufficient cause is shown, then the Court has to enquire, whether, in its discretion, it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter, requires the Commission, to take into consideration, all the relevant factors, and it is, at this stage, that diligence of the party(s) or its/their bonafides, may fall for consideration. In the instant case, as stated above, it was obligatory, on the applicants/ appellants, to take immediate steps to ensure that the appeal was filed within the prescribed period, as envisaged by Section 15 of the Act. However, the applicants/ appellants, just slept over the matter, and did not take the requisite steps to file the appeal, in time. It was, thus, a case of complete lack of bonafides and inaction, on the part of the applicants/appellants. The principle of law, laid down in Ram Lal & Others case(supra) is fully applicable to the instant case. This is, therefore, not a fit case, in which this Commission, should exercise its discretion, in favour of the applicants/appellants, in condoning the delay.
22. Now coming to the merits of the case, it may be stated here, that the appeal is also liable to be dismissed, at the preliminary stage, for the reasons to be recorded hereinafter. The factum of insurance of the vehicle, and its accident, on 25.05.2012, during the currency of the Insurance Policy, was admitted by the Opposite Parties. The question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant, at the time of accident of the vehicle, in question, was under the influence of liquor or not. Immediately, after the accident of the vehicle, which was being driven by the complainant, took place, the Police reached the spot and registered FIR. In the FIR, it was, no doubt, mentioned that the complainant had consumed liquor, at the time of accident. The Police of Police Station concerned, moved an application to the Duty Doctor, Government Multispeciality Hospital, Sector 16, Chandigarh, copy whereof is Annexure C-5, for medical examination of the complainant. The Doctor concerned of the Government Multispeciality Hospital, Sector 16, Chandigarh, examined the complainant, on 25.05.2012, and submitted his report of the even date, wherein, it was, in clear-cut terms, stated by him (Doctor), that he (complainant) was not under the influence of liquor, though, he had consumed alcohol. Thus, the report of the Medical Officer/Doctor to the effect that the complainant was not under the influence of liquor, by no stretch of imagination, could be disbelieved. No cogent and convincing evidence, was produced by Opposite Parties No.1 to 3, that the complainant was under the influence of liquor. Opposite Parties No.1 to 3, had an opportunity to produce the forensic evidence, with regard to the test report of blood of the complainant, to the effect, as to the quantity of liquor, he had consumed, at the time of accident; and whether he could be said to be under the influence of liquor, or not, at the time of accident. In the absence of forensic/scientific evidence, having been produced by Opposite Parties No.1 to 3, that the complainant was under the influence of liquor, at the time of accident, the evidence/report of the Doctor, that he was not under the influence of liquor, could certainly be said to be correct, and was rightly relied upon by the District Forum. In Jagdish Rana Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., Revision Petition No.178 of 2011, decided on 15.02.2013, by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, in similar circumstances, the accident of the vehicle, took place, but it was not proved by the Opposite Party/Insurance Company, that the driver of the vehicle was under the influence of liquor, at the time of accident, by leading cogent and convincing evidence. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, held that, on that ground, the claim could not be repudiated. Since, in the present case, the complainant was not under the influence of liquor, at the time, the accident took place, repudiation of his claim by Opposite Parties No.1 to 3, was illegal and arbitrary. By repudiating the genuine claim of the complainant, illegally and arbitrarily, Opposite Parties No.1 to 3 were deficient, in rendering service.
23. The Counsel for the appellants, however, while referring to Jagdish Rana`s case (supra), submitted that, in that case, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, granted compensation, on non-standard basis, holding that there were two violations of the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy. On careful perusal of the facts of Jagdish Rana`s case (supra), it is evident, that, in that case, there were two violations of the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy i.e. six passengers, against the seating capacity of four passengers were sitting, in the vehicle, at the time of accident, and the same (car) was fitted with LPG Gas Kit, and in the Dicky (Boot), Gas Cylinder Belts were found, which depicted that, at the time of accident, it was being driven with Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), without authorization. On account of these violations of the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, came to the conclusion that it would be appropriate that compensation should be granted only on non-standard basis, and, ultimately, it (National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi), granted compensation, to the extent of 50% of the amount of claim. Since, the compensation, on non-standard basis to the extent of 50% of the claim amount was granted by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, prevailing in Jagdish Rana`s case (supra), no help can be drawn by the Counsel for the appellants, therefrom, as the facts thereof are clearly distinguishable, from the instant case. The submission of the Counsel for the appellants, therefore, being devoid of merit, stands rejected.
24. The Counsel for the appellants also placed reliance on Dharam Pal Vs. United India Insurance Co.Ltd. Revision Petition No.921 of 2012, decided on 03.12.2012, by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, to contend that since the complainant was under the influence of liquor, at the time of accident, the claim was legally and validly repudiated. The careful perusal of the facts of Dharam Pal`s case (supra), clearly reveals that, in paragraph number 9 of the order, it was, in clear-cut terms recorded by it (National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi), that in his statement, Mahender Singh stated that he alongwith Kuldip Singh, Mahipal and Vikas, had gone to Obera, in the vehicle of Anil and they all had consumed liquor. It was also recorded, in paragraph number 9 of the order, that there were five persons, in the vehicle. It was further recorded, in paragraph number 9 of the order, that they asked Anil to drive the vehicle, at a slow speed, because they were under the influence of liquor, and they could meet with an accident. Ultimately, the accident took place. It was, under these circumstances, that the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, came to the conclusion that, on the basis of admission, made by Mahender Singh, one of the occupants of the vehicle, it was proved that the driver of the vehicle was under the influence of liquor, resulting into accident. In the instant case, as stated above, it was proved that the driver of the vehicle, in question, was not under the influence of liquor. Since, the facts of the instant case, are completely distinguishable from the facts of Dharam Pal`s case (supra), no, help can be drawn by the Counsel for the appellants, therefrom.
25. The Counsel for the appellants, also placed reliance on M/s Suraj Mal Ram Niwas Oil Mills (P) Ltd. Vs. United Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr., 2011 CTJ 11 SC (CP), to contend that the parties being bound by the terms and conditions of the Policy, could not turn round, and say that, on account of violation thereof, the repudiation of claim was illegal. There is, no dispute, with regard to the factum that the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy are in the shape of a contract, between the insured and the insurer. The parties are, no doubt, bound by the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy. However, the question arises, as to whether, the insurer was able to prove violation of the terms and conditions or not. Had the insurer proved the violation of the terms and conditions of the Policy, certainly, repudiation of the claim could be held to be legal and valid. In the instant case, it has been held above, that there was no violation of the terms and conditions of the Policy, on the part of the insured, as it was not proved by Opposite Parties No.1 to 3, that the complainant was under the influence of liquor, at the time, the accident took place. Positive evidence of the Medical Officer/Doctor, who examined the complainant, immediately, after the accident took place, in the Hospital aforesaid, was to the effect that the complainant was not under the influence of liquor, though, he had consumed alcohol. Under these circumstances, no help can be drawn by the Counsel for the appellants, from M/s Suraj Mal Ram Niwas Oil Mills (P) Ltd.`s case (supra).
26. No other point, was urged, by the Counsel for the applicants/appellants.
27. For the reasons, recorded above, the application for condonation of delay of 111 days, (as per the office report 117 days), being devoid of merit, is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal, under Section 15 of the Act, is also dismissed, at the preliminary stage, with no order as to costs, being barred by time, as also, on merits.
28. Certified copies of this order, be sent to the parties, free of charge.
29. The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion Pronounced.
March 27, 2014 Sd/-
[JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER (RETD.)] PRESIDENT Sd/-
(DEV RAJ) MEMBER Sd/-
(PADMA PANDEY) MEMBER Rg