Karnataka High Court
Gopal S/O Lingappa Malgiti vs State Of Karnataka on 13 February, 2025
Author: Hemant Chandangoudar
Bench: Hemant Chandangoudar
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:2967
WP No. 100261 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 13TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT CHANDANGOUDAR
WRIT PETITION NO. 100261 OF 2025 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
GOPAL S/O. LINGAPPA MALGITI
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS,
PRESENTLY WORKING AS
REGIONAL JOINT DIRECTOR OF LAND RECORDS
AND EX -OFFICIO PRINCIPAL,
REGIONAL SURVEY TRAINING INSTITUTE,
DHARWAD, R/AT. JANANI NILAYA,
KINNAL ROAD, NEAR FCI GODWAN,
J H PATEL NAGAR, BHAGYANAGAR,
KOPPAL (RURAL), KOPPAL-583231.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. P PRITHVI KIRAN SETTY, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ANTI-CORRUPTION BUREAU KOPPALA,
REPRESENTED BY THE SPECIAL PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
Digitally signed by B
K DHARWAD-580011.
MAHENDRAKUMAR
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
2. POLICE INSPECTOR
Date: 2025.02.19
13:15:54 +0530
ANTI-CORRUPTION BUREAU,
KOPPALA-583231.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. ANIL KALE, ADVOCATE)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA AND READ WITH SECTION
482 OF Cr.P.C., PRAYING TO, QUASH THE FIR DATED 15/06/2020
REGISTERED BY THE ACB POLICE, KOPPALA AGAINST THE
PETITIONER IN CR.NO.02/2020 FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE
UNDER SECTIONS 13(1)(b) AND 13(2) OF THE PREVENTION OF
CORRUPTION ACT, 1988, ON THE FILE OF THE HON'BLE
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:2967
WP No. 100261 of 2025
PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, KOPPALA AT
ANNEXURE-A.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN
'B' GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT CHANDANGOUDAR
ORAL ORDER
1. The petitioner challenges the registration of the First Information Report (FIR) for offences punishable under Sections 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act).
2. The prosecution alleges that the petitioner, who is serving as the Regional Joint Director of Land Records and Ex- officio Principal, Regional Survey Training Institute, Dharwad, is in possession of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income to the extent of 91%, for the check period from 1997 to 12.06.2020.
3. The petitioner challenges the registration of the FIR primarily on the following legal grounds:
a) The order passed under Section 17 of the PC Act by the Superintendent of Police is cyclostyled and mechanical in nature, lacking any indication of application of mind. The order does not contain any reasoning or justification for authorizing an investigation. Furthermore, the FIR has been registered only after the passing of the order under Section 17, rendering the entire process procedurally and legally unsustainable.
b) The respondents failed to conduct a preliminary enquiry before drawing the source report or registering the FIR.
No verification of the source report was carried out by the Superintendent of Police, which is a mandatory requirement before initiating proceedings under the PC -3- NC: 2025:KHC-D:2967 WP No. 100261 of 2025 Act. The absence of such an enquiry vitiates the entire process.
c) The check period considered by the respondents spans 23 years, from 1997 to 12.06.2020, which is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. A prolonged check period extending over two decades fails to account for economic fluctuations, inflation, and changes in asset valuation, and is thus contrary to established legal principles.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent/Lokayukta, through a statement of objections, has vehemently opposed the petition, contending as follows:
a) The petitioner has not specifically challenged the validity of the order under Section 17 of the PC Act.
b) Even otherwise, the Superintendent of Police has applied his mind and passed an order authorizing the Deputy Superintendent of Police (Dy.S.P.) to investigate the matter. The respondent argues that the order is administrative in nature and does not require a detailed reasoning.
c) The petitioner has no locus standi to challenge an administrative order or to demand the selection of an Investigating Officer of his choice.
d) The order of the Superintendent of Police is not mandatory, as the Dy.S.P. is independently empowered to investigate the matter.
e) The Superintendent of Police, upon receiving the source report, conducted a preliminary enquiry to assess its genuineness and then passed the order under Section 17 of the PC Act.
f) The mentioning of the check period in the FIR is not mandatory, as the FIR is not an encyclopedia. The details regarding the check period can be elaborated upon at the stage of filing the charge sheet.
g) The check period pertains to the petitioner's service tenure, and therefore, the Investigating Officer is competent to -4- NC: 2025:KHC-D:2967 WP No. 100261 of 2025 collect the relevant financial details during the course of the investigation.
h) The excess assets allegedly in possession of the petitioner are beyond his known sources of income, thereby warranting an investigation.
5. The issue involved in this petition was examined by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Crl.P.No.1019/2024, which was disposed of on 25.04.2024, wherein the following was held:
"17. Upon a perusal of the order purportedly passed by the Superintendent of Police on 30.05.2023, it is evident that there is no mention of any preliminary enquiry conducted before passing the order. The order does not contain any reference indicating that the Superintendent of Police had conducted an independent preliminary enquiry before granting authorization for investigation. Therefore, the contention of the learned Special Counsel for the respondent that the Superintendent of Police had conducted a preliminary enquiry before passing the order under Section 17 of the PC Act is untenable."
Even upon a careful reading of the order dated 30.05.2023, it is apparent that the Superintendent of Police has merely stated that he received the source report and, after applying his mind, was satisfied that a prima facie case was made out against the petitioner. Consequently, he proceeded to direct the registration of the FIR. However, a mere assertion that he has "applied his mind" is insufficient to demonstrate actual application of mind. Had the Superintendent of Police truly verified the source report, he would have at least recorded findings on essential aspects such as:
• The income of the petitioner, • The check period, • The assets and liabilities declared by the petitioner prior to joining service, and • The assets and liabilities during the petitioner's service tenure.-5-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:2967 WP No. 100261 of 2025 A mechanical and vague reference to the application of mind does not fulfill the legal requirement of a reasoned decision.
18. Furthermore, the police ought to have first registered the FIR, then forwarded the source report along with the FIR, and only thereafter sought authorization under Section 17 of the PC Act from the Superintendent of Police.
The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has rightly pointed out that a plain reading of the proviso (ii) to Section 17 of the PC Act empowers the Superintendent of Police to grant authorization for investigation. However, in accordance with the settled legal procedure, an investigation always commences under Section 157 of the Cr.P.C. only after the registration of an FIR under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C.
Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has correctly argued that the FIR must first be registered, and only thereafter can the Superintendent of Police grant authorization for investigation. This legal principle has been affirmed in several decisions of this Hon'ble Court, including:
• Udaya Ravi v. State of Karnataka, S.P. ACB (now S.P. Lokayukta) and Another, W.P. No.104906/2023 (GM- RES), dated 20.12.2023, wherein a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, relying on previous judgments, quashed the FIR.
• Balakrishna H.N. v. State of Karnataka by ACB Mysuru, W.P. No.15886/2022, dated 03.01.2023, in which a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court adopted a similar view and quashed the FIR.
• T.N. Sudhakar Reddy v. State of Karnataka, Lokayukta, Crl.P. No.13460/2023, dated 04.03.2024, where this Court followed the earlier precedent and quashed the FIR."
6. The contentions raised by the respondent/Lokayukta were considered and rejected by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the aforementioned case. The decision in Crl.P.No.1019/2024 was challenged by the respondent/Lokayukta -6- NC: 2025:KHC-D:2967 WP No. 100261 of 2025 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (Crl.) No.16113/2024, which was dismissed on 22.01.2025, while keeping open the question of law.
7. Additionally, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nirankar Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. & Ors. - Crl.A No.5009/2024, at paragraphs 10 and 11, has held as follows:
10. We have considered that the check period in this case extends from the year 1996 to 2020, which spans nearly twenty-five years. It is imperative to recognize that over such a long duration, inflation, economic fluctuations, and natural economic progressions significantly affect the valuation of assets such as property and gold. Such economic changes can lead to discrepancies in asset valuations over the years.
Therefore, a rigid and static assessment of an individual's income and assets over such a prolonged period is flawed. A more dynamic approach must be adopted, factoring in changes in the economy and asset valuation over time when determining whether assets are disproportionate to known sources of income.
11. Furthermore, disproportionate asset cases cannot be scrutinized in the same manner as bank statements or daily ledgers of income and expenditure. The evaluation of declared assets and income over such a long period cannot be conducted in a mechanical manner. A certain margin of variation must be allowed when making such assessments, as economic fluctuations inevitably impact asset values over two decades or more. A nuanced appreciation of economic trends, inflation, and property valuation must be incorporated into such an analysis.
8. In the instant case, the Superintendent of Police, upon receiving the source report, failed to conduct a preliminary enquiry before granting authorization for investigation. Without conducting such an enquiry, the Superintendent of Police prematurely granted authorization to the Police Inspector to conduct an investigation even before the FIR was registered.
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9. Moreover, the order passed under the second proviso to Section 17(c) of the PC Act is not a speaking order, as it does not assign any reasons for granting authorization to investigate the offence. Such an order, devoid of reasoning, does not meet the legal standards required for a valid administrative decision.
10. Furthermore, the investigation is sought to be conducted for an excessively prolonged check period from 1997 to 12.06.2020, spanning over 23 years, which is prima facie bad in law in light of the judicial precedents set by this Apex Court in the case of Nirankar Nath Pandey (supra).
11. In light of the above, the continuation of the criminal investigation would not serve the ends of justice; rather, it would defeat the very purpose of securing justice. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The FIR dated 15.06.2020 in Cr.No.2/2020, registered by respondent No.2, pending before the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Koppal, is hereby quashed.
12. However, liberty is reserved to the respondents to initiate appropriate proceedings against the petitioner in accordance with law.
Sd/-
(HEMANT CHANDANGOUDAR) JUDGE Bkm CT:vh List No.: 3 Sl No.: 0