Punjab-Haryana High Court
M/S Delton Cables Limited Faridabad vs The State Of Haryana And Another on 15 October, 2010
Author: Mukul Mudgal
Bench: Mukul Mudgal
L.P.A No. 1 of 2008 (O&M) ::1::
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
L.P.A No. 1 of 2008 (O&M)
Date of decision : October 15, 2010
M/S Delton Cables Limited Faridabad,
...... Appellant.
v.
The State of Haryana and another,
...... Respondents
***
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUKUL MUDGAL, CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE AJAY TEWARI *** Present : Mr. P.K.Mutneja, Advocate for the applicant.
Mr. I.D.Singla, Advocate for respondent No.2.
***
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
2. To be referred to the Reporters or not ?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest ?
*** MUKUL MUDGAL, CHIEF JUSTICE C.M Nos.863 to 867 of 2008 For the reasons recorded, C.Ms are allowed and the applicants are impleaded as respondents in the present appeal so as to advance the course of justice.
L.P.A No.1 of 2008
This appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 28.11.2007 by which the writ petition filed by L.P.A No. 1 of 2008 (O&M) ::2::
respondent No.2 was allowed and it was held that the closure of the wire unit of the appellant was illegal.
The primary ground which weighed with the learned Single Judge was that the Labour Commissioner did not record any reasons for permitting the application for closure. The order dated 2.3.1985 permitting the closure reads as follows :-
" In reply to your letter No.7562, dated 2.12.1984 on the above subject, addressed to the Secretary to Govt. of Haryana, Labour Department, Chandigarh.
2. The Government agrees to the points raised in your application."
Ex-facie, it is apparent that the aforesaid order is a completely cryptic and non-speaking order.
Learned counsel for the appellant has, however, argued that the learned Single Judge has also held that no reasons were recorded in the application for permission to close down the wire unit and that this finding is palpably wrong since detailed reasons were given in the application.
Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that respondent No.2 had filed detailed objections to the said application. Had the Labour Commissioner acted as per the mandate of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the Act"), the details given by the appellant as well as respondent No.2 would have been discussed but, as mentioned above, the order of the Labour Commissioner was completely non-speaking.
Section 25-O(2) of the Act reads as follows :-
" 25-O. Procedure for closing down an undertaking :-
(1) xx xx xx (2) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section (1) the appropriate Government, after making such inquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen and the persons interested in such closure may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of L.P.A No. 1 of 2008 (O&M) ::3::
the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the general public and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen."
The aforesaid Section specifically requires not only hearing of all affected parties but also recording of reasons. The order of the Labour Court records no reason whatsoever and merely agrees with the points raised in the application. This clearly shows a total non-application of mind to a decision which affects the livelihood of about 80 workmen and their families. Consequently, the said order can not be sustained at all.
Counsel for the appellant has further argued that under Section 25-O(3) of the Act, if no order is passed on an application for a period of 60 days, it has to be deemed that permission for closure is granted. As per the learned counsel, the order permitting closure was passed after more than 60 days and, thus, under the deeming provision the closure would have to be permitted.
We, however, find that no such argument was raised before the learned Single Judge and no ground has been taken in the present appeal that any such argument was raised but was not considered.
Counsel for the appellant has further argued that during the pendency of the writ petition, 76 of 82 workmen of the Union had compromised the matter and the Union had been dissolved and in the circumstances, it would have to be held that the writ petition had abated. We regret our inability to concur with such a pedantic and harsh view in writ jurisdiction. The present is a case where an illegal order of closure which has resulted in the workmen losing their jobs is sought to be defended on highly technical grounds. Reference in this regard can be L.P.A No. 1 of 2008 (O&M) ::4::
made to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported as Shiv Shankar Dal Mills v. State of Haryana, (1980)2 SCC 437, wherein it was held as follows :-
" Article 226 grants an extraordinary remedy which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the court, exercising this flexible power, to pass such order as public interest dictates and equity projects :
Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go where only private interests are involved. Accordingly, the granting or withholding of relief may properly be dependent upon considerations as of public interest....."
Counsel for the appellant has further argued that the learned Single Judge has been unduly influenced by the fact that the appellant entered into a compromise with some of the workmen and that is why he allowed the writ petition filed by the respondents. We can not agree with such a plea as the impugned order of closure is even otherwise indefensible since the statutorily mandated requirement of recording reasons has been totally ignored by the Labour Commissioner. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation in upholding the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
( MUKUL MUDGAL )
CHIEF JUSTICE
( AJAY TEWARI )
October 15, 2010. JUDGE
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