Gujarat High Court
Kishor Bachuram Kapdi vs State Of Gujarat on 27 March, 2018
Author: Sonia Gokani
Bench: Sonia Gokani
R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1318 of 2016
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to
see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the
judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law
as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any
order made thereunder ?
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KISHOR BACHURAM KAPDI
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT
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Appearance:
MR ASHISH M DAGLI(2203) for the PETITIONER(s) No. 1
MR ANIP A GANDHI(2268) for the RESPONDENT(s) No. 2
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR(2) for the RESPONDENT(s) No. 1
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI
Date : 27/03/2018
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Gandhidham at Kachchh (for short, 'the trial Court', Dated: 30.07.2016, in Criminal Misc. Application No. 7589 of 2016, whereby, the trial Court dismissed the application of the appellant- original accused for filing a complaint under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Page 1 of 46R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT 2.0 The brief facts leading to the filing of
the present appeal are as follows:
2.1 The appellant-accused is a Director of Vashistha Industries Limited, who also has a firm in U.A.E in the name of Al Shadha Steel Trading LLC. Subsequently, the name of the said company was changed to Al Mufeed General Trading LLC. A Cash Credit (in brief, 'CC facility') facility was made available to the appellant-accused and the limit of which, initially, was of Rs.250/- lakh. However, later on the said limit was increased to Rs.400/- lakh. The Unit of the appellant-accused is one of the most prominent and profit making units, which got extended CC limit from time to time. It is the claim of the appellant-accused that he was regular in all his transactions, however, due to unprofessional approach of the Respondent-Bank, he, at some point of time, desired to change the Bank.
2.2 It is, further, his case that the appellant since had ventilated his grievance with regard to the charging of higher rate of interest and also charging of hidden interest and not providing necessary facilities,, he shifted the working capital accounts from Axis Bank to State Bank of India at Gandhidham. AS SBI offered all Page 2 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT the services along with competitive rate of interest and the limit of working capital was also made up to Rs.900/- lakh, the Bank eventually realizing such a shift, enhanced the limit of CC of Account No. 1465. The Respondent- Bank also issued a letter to the firm of the appellant-accused that the CC limit was enhanced to Rs.900/- lakh. It is, further, the case of the appellant-accused that the plots allotted on lease agreement by GIDC, upon which the construction needed to be carried out within a stipulated time frame and the appellant had to face a major loss. Therefore, a request was made to the expedite the process. He, therefore, moved an application to Kotak Mahindara Bank. An officer visited the premises of the appellant- accused to ensure that the additional funds would be spared and the reduction in the rate of interest of working capital was also assured. After submission of the papers, including the interbank finance status report and on finding the reports positive and normal, Kotak Mahindra Bank issued to the appellant finance facility, subject to, of course, creation of the valid mortgage papers.
2.3 In the interregnum, i.e. on 7/8.10.2013, a letter from Stamp Duty Collector, Bhuj, in connection with the mortgage deed by Axis Bank Page 3 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT was received, where, the Stamp Duty was required to be paid. It is the say of the appellant- accused that no such document was executed nor any mortgage deed was found with the Registrar Office, Gandhidham, and the document was not even executed with the help of the power-of-attorney. In fact, according to the appellant-accused, he never visited the Office of the Sub Registrar and the Notary Public.
2.4 When the appellant inquired with regard to the same with the higher officials, an E-mail was sent on 08.09.2014, which confirmed that the Bank had no information of impounding of any document bearing registration No. 4911, Dated:
04.08.2011. It is, in fact, the case of the Axis Bank, Gandhidham, that on 04.08.2011, the mortgage deed was registered vide registration No. 4911 and subsequently, it was impounded. It is, further, his case that there is no power-of-
attorney on record for doing any such mortgage deed. On the contrary, it was submitted that the CC limit of the appellant was extended and the appellant was called upon time and again to go on with the CC limit of the Bank. It is also the case of the appellant that he had shown is inclination to pay the amount, if, the document is released in his favour.
Page 4 of 46R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT 2.5 Under the circumstances, an FIR being I-
C.R. No. 238 of 2015 came to be registered with Gandhidham, 'A' Division Police Station.
2.6 The appellant-accused, therefore, preferred an application for anticipatory bail being Criminal Misc. Application No. 608 of 2015. This was objected to by the Respondent- Bank and various objections were raised as specified in Paragraphs- 11 to 15. It was averred that the CC facility obtained by the Company from the Respondent-Bank for Rs.400/- lakh was enhanced and this was used for personal purpose, and thereby, the fraud was committed with the Bank and the interest was not paid on the ground of CC facility. Hence, the account of the appellant-accused had become 'Non Performing Asset' ('NPA', for short).
2.7 According to the appellant-accused, all the documents submitted by him were re-examined and it was found that the Audit Finance Report submitted to the Registrar of Companies and to the Income Tax authority and those produced before the Bank in which the Chartered Accountant of the appellant had stated that the same had neither been signed nor had the seal. Therefore, it was pleaded by the Bank that those documents were false.
Page 5 of 46R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT 2.8 After bipartite hearing, the application under Section 438 of the Code was granted allowing anticipatory bail in favour of the appellant-accused. 2.9 The appellant had, through various
communications, requested the Bank to provide the details and documents in respect of which the Mortgage Deed had been executed. Since, they were not supplied, the appellant had to make an application under the Right to Information Act. On receipt of the letter from the Stamp Duty Office, at that stage, the appellant came to know of the execution of the Mortgage Deed. However, there was neither the signature of the appellant nor of his wife. It is, therefore, the say of the appellant-accused that from the objections filed on affidavit it is culled out that the objections raised by way of affidavit are not only false but they are fabricated and misleading. This when was brought to the knowledge of the Court concerned, by making an application under Section 340 of the Code, the Court had not deemed it fit to initiate actions against the respondent-Bank on the ground that the Court had become functus officio, after deciding the application for anticipatory bail.
Page 6 of 46R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT 3.0 This has aggrieved the appellant-
accused, and therefore, he is before this Court with the following prayers:
"25. ...
(A) That this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to admit this Criminal Appeal;
(B) The Hon'ble Court may be
pleased to allow this Criminal
Appeal by quashing and setting aside the judgment and order at Annexure-B passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 758 of 2016, Dated: 30.07.2016 and also be pleased to all the application as prayed for at Annexure-A in the facts and circumstances of the case.
(C) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this appeal, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to grant stay as to execution, implementation and operation of the order dated 30.07.2016 in Criminal Misc. Application No. 758 of 2016 in the interest of justice.
(D) ..." 4.0 Affidavit-in-reply for and on behalf of
the Axis Bank-Respondent No.2 herein refutes all the averments. According to the Bank, the appellant is a defaulter of the huge amount of Rs.9.55/- crore (rounded off) and the account of the appellant-accused had been classified as NPA, Page 7 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT as per the guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India. It is, further, say of the respondent-
Bank that Respondent No.2 had informed the Bank regarding classification of the account of the appellant as NPA.
5.0 Reply to the further affidavit and rejoinder affidavit also have been filed.
6.0 This Court has heard the learned Advocate, Mr. Dagli, who has fervently urged that on account of such a false statement of the Respondent-Bank, the proceedings have been initiated and that has put the appellant into jeopardy. He, further, has urged that the respondent-Bank does not get any license or authority to state falsely on oath and if, any leniency is shown by the Court, it would make travesty of the justice.
7.0 Learned Advocate, Mr. Satta, appearing for Respondent No.2 has strongly objected to this Court interfering with the order of the trial Court. It is his say that the appellant-accused being the defaulter of the Bank, initiated the proceedings to harass the Bank. This is also another way of shifting attention of the law makers and law protectors. It is also his say that by virtue of the power-of-attorney, Page 8 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT respondent No.2 had executed the Mortgage Deed on behalf of the appellant. According to the Respondent-Bank, Mortgage Deed bearing No. 4911 was registered by paying the requisite Stamp Duty and the same has not been impounded, and therefore, the mortgage deed is legal and valid.
8.0 Upon hearing both the sides and on perusal of the judgment and order, which is impugned in this appeal, it can be noticed that the trial Court has taken into consideration provisions of Section 340 of the Code, which empowers the Court to initiate an inquiry into any offence referred to in Clause(b) of sub- Section (1) of Section 195 of the Code, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding of the Court. It can be also in respect of the documents produced or given in the proceedings before a Court. What is required of the Court in such a case, is to make a preliminary inquiry, and then record a finding to that effect to make a complaint thereof in writing etc.. The Court also has regarded Section 344 of the Code, which is made for summary procedures for trial for giving false evidence to conclude that such proceedings had been concluded and the offence against the administration of justice cannot be initiated by the Court on conclusion of the proceedings. The trial Court in Page 9 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT the impugned order has recognized the powers of Section 193 of the Code. However, on the ground that the judicial proceedings has been concluded, the Court cannot be in any manner helpful to the applicant.
8.1 This Court notices that both the sides have made various averments, as stated in the Memo of the appeal and also by way of affidavit and affidavits-in-reply and rejoinder. Plenty of details therefrom indicate as to how the case is made out and that no proceedings could be initiated either under Section 340 of 344 of the Code.
8.2 Before adverting to the facts of the this case, various decision relied on by both the sides shall need to be regarded.
8.3 The Apex Court in 'ASHOK KUMAR AGGARWAL VS. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS', AIR 2014 SC 1020, was considering the appeal against the judgment and final order passed by the High Court of Delhi, on which an application was filed by the appellant to proceed against Respondent No.5 under Section 340 read with Section 195(1)(b) of the Code was dismissed.
8.4 The Apex Court, while referring to the
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decision in 'CHANDRA SHASHI VS. ANIL KUMAR
VERMA', (1995) 1 SCC 421, held that nobody should be permitted to indulge in immoral acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehoods in the judicial proceedings and if someone does so, it must be dealt with appropriately. In case recourse to a false plea is taken with an oblique motive, it would definitely hinder, hamper or impede the flow of justice and prevent the courts from performing their legal duties. What is required to be considered by the Court concerned, before lodging a complaint, is that the condition precedent for the court to be satisfied are that material so produced before the court makes out a prima facie case for a complaint and that it is expedient in the interest of justice to have prosecution under section 193 of the IPC.
8.5 Reference is also made to the decision in 'CHAJOO RAM VS. RADHEY SHYAM & ANOTHER', AIR 1971 SC 1367, where, the Court has held that the prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by courts only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. The relevant observations read as under:
"7. In this context, reference may be made of Section 340 under Chapter XXVI of the Cr.P.C., under the Page 11 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT heading of "Provisions as to Offences Affecting the Administration of Justice". This Chapter deals with offences committed in or in relation to a proceeding in the court, or in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in the court and enables the court to make a complaint in respect of such offences if that court is of the view that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into an offence.
Clause (b) of Section 195 (1) Cr.P.C. authorises such court to examine prima facie as it thinks necessary and then make a complaint thereof in writing after having recorded a finding to that effect as contemplated under Section 340 (1) Cr.P.C. In such a case, the question remains as to whether a prima facie case is made out which, if unrebutted, may have a reasonable likelihood to establish the specified offences and whether it is also expedient in the interest of justice to take any action. Thus, before lodging a complaint, the condition precedent for the court to be satisfied are that material so produced before the court makes out a prima facie case for a complaint and that it is expedient in the interest of justice to have prosecution under Section 193 IPC. (Vide: Karunakaran v. T.V. Eachara Warrier & Anr., AIR 1979 SC 290; and K.T.M.S. Mohd. & Anr. v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1831).
8. In the case of Chajoo Ram v.Page 12 of 46
R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT
Radhey Shyam & Anr., AIR 1971 SC
1367, this Court held:
"7. The prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by courts only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. No doubt giving of false evidence and filing false affidavits is an evil which must be effectively curbed with a strong hand but to start prosecution for perjury too readily and too frequently without due care and caution and on inconclusive and doubtful material defeats its very purpose. Prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent and not merely because there is some inaccuracy in the statement which may be innocent or immaterial. There must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge."
(Emphasis added)
9. In Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 2119, this Court observed:
"In view of the language used in Section 340 CrPC the court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the section is conditioned by the words "court Page 13 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice". This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice....." (See also: R.S. Sujatha v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2011) 5 SCC 689) ".
8.6 What is required to have been considered by the Court concerned is not to initiate prosecution for perjury with the Court, but, it has to reach to a prima facie conclusion, after holding a preliminary inquiry, that there exists a deliberate and conscious effort to misguide the Court and to interfere with the administration of the justice. Moreover, it also has to consider, whether, such a prosecution is necessary in the interest of justice.
8.7 In 'SERGI TRANSFORMER EXPLOSION
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PREVENTION TECHNOLOGIES PVT. LTD. VS. CTR
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES LIMITED', (2016) 12 SCC 713, in a prosecution for perjury, the High Court took a hyper-technical view of the matter by directing launching of prosecution against the appellant. The Apex Court held that from the defence set-up by the defendant and the explanation thereto, there appears to be no intention on the part of the appellant to defy the order and it was held that it was not a fit case in which the High Court should have directed institution of the criminal proceedings against the appellant. The relevant observations read thus:
"9. The High court while considering the matter has in our opinion, failed to appreciate the defence that had been set up by the appellants. The explanation offered by the appellants was a plausible one which ought to have been kept in mind by the High Court while examining whether the the present was a fit case for prosecution of the appellants. At any rate, the High Court has not adverted to the question whether it was expedient "in the interest of justice" to launch prosecution against the appellants for the mistake which according to the respondents was deliberate but unintentional according to the appellants.
According to the appellants the mistake occurred out of a certain Page 15 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT communication gap between the higher officers of the company and the operation staff. That prosecution cannot cannot be launched just at the asking of a party is well established. A long line of decisions of this Court have examined the circumstances in which the court ought to invoke that power. The High Court has, while considering the question of launching prosecution for perjury, to examine whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to do so, having regard to the totality of the circumstances. Inasmuch the High Court has filed to advert to that aspect and record a finding that it is expedient in the interest of justice to direct prosecution, the order passed by the High Court falls short of the legal requirements.
10. Equally important is the fact that the High Court had by order dated 11.01.2001 examined the question whether the appellants could be allowed to file their drawing before DTL. The High Court had while examining that aspect of the matter clearly observed as under:
"As already stated herein-above, it is not as if that the production of the appellant is not patented. On the contrary, it is to be noted that the production of the appellant is patented as way bas as in 2002 whereas the product of the plaintiff-respondent is patented only in 2006. Though it is the contention of the plaintiff that the product of the appellant is not inn Page 16 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT conformity with the standards required by DTL, in my view, it will be for the DTL to decide whether the products are in conformity with the standards or not. AT this stage, it is only word against word. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the production of the appellant is not in conformity with the standards required by DTL, in my view, it will be for the DTL to decide whether the products are in conformity with the standards or not. AT this stage, it is only word against word. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the prosecution of the appellant is not in conformity with the requirements, whereas, it is the contention of the appellant that it is in conformity with the required standards. The application of the plaintiff under Rule 39 Order 1 and 2 is yet to be decided. The contention of the plaintiff that the defendant- appellant is dishonestly using the product of the plaintiff as its own product is not considered even at the stage of grant of injunction after hearing the parties. All orders passed are at ad interim ex- parte stage. In that view of the matter, I find that the learned District Judge has erred in rejecting the application. It is to be noted from paragraph 22 of the Purchase Order that in the event the appellant fails to submit the drawings within the stipulated period, the appellant would be required to submit the drawings within the stipulated period, the appellant would be required to face the penal liability. As against this, no prejudice would be caused Page 17 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT to the plaintiff inasmuch as the appellant has given clear undertaking reproduced herein above, wherein, it has categorically stated that it shall not claim any equities on account of submission of drawings. Appellant has further undertaken that the drawings to be submitted to DLT shall be in accordance with its patent i.e. Patent No. 189089. It is thus clear that if the appellant fails to submit the drawings, every day's delay would add to the penal charges that would be required to pay. As against this, no prejudice would be caused to the plaintiff merely by submission of the drawings. The question as to whether the appellant is dishonestly using the plaintiff's product is yet to be gone into event at a prima facie stage."
11. In the totality of the above facts, we are of the view that the High Court has taken a hyper technical view of the matter in directing launch of prosecution against the appellants. From the defence set up by the appellants and the explanation offered by them it appears to us that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to defy the orders by which they have been restrained from taking further steps towards compliance of the purchase order, dated 02.12.2010 issued by DTL, for otherwise, there was no need for the appellants to approach the District Court and the High Court for permission to do so."
Page 18 of 46R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT In 'PREM SAGAR MANOCHA VS. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)', (2016) 4 SCC 571, the Apex Court hold and observed as under:
"Section 340 of CrPC falls under Chapter XXVI of the Code- "Provisions as to Offences Affecting the Administration of Justice". Either on an application or otherwise, if any court forms an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made in respect of an offence referred to under Section 195 of CrPC which appears to have been committed in relation to a proceeding in that court, the court after such preliminary inquiry, enter a finding and make a complaint before the Magistrate of competent jurisdiction. It is this jurisdiction which has been invoked suo motu by the High Court in the Criminal Appeal, leading to the impugned order.
Section 340 of CrPC, prior to amendment in 1973, was Section 479-A in the 1898 Code and it was mandatory under the pre-amended provision to record a finding after the preliminary inquiry regarding the commission of offence; whereas in the 1973 Code, the expression 'shall' has been substituted by 'may' meaning thereby that under 1973 Code, it is not mandatory that the court should record a finding.
What is now required is only
recording the finding of the
preliminary inquiry which is meant Page 19 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT only to form an opinion of the court, and that too, opinion on an offence 'which appears to have been committed', as to whether the same should be duly inquired into. We are unable to appreciate the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel that the impugned order is liable to be quashed on the only ground that there is no finding recorded by the court on the commission of the offence. Reliance placed on Har Gobind v. State of Haryana[1] is of no assistance to the appellant since it was a case falling on the interpretation of the pre-amended provision of the CrPC. A three- Judge Bench of this Court in Pritish v. State of Maharashtra[2] has even gone to the extent of holding that the proceedings under Section 340 of CrPC can be successfully invoked even without a preliminary inquiry since the whole purpose of the inquiry is only to decide whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence which appears to have been committed. To quote:
"9. Reading of the sub-section makes it clear that the hub of this provision is formation of an opinion by the court (before which proceedings were to be held) that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into an offence which appears to have been committed. In order to form such opinion the court is empowered to hold a preliminary inquiry. It is not peremptory that such preliminary inquiry should be Page 20 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT held. Even without such preliminary inquiry the court can form such an opinion when it appears to the court that an offence has been committed in relation to a proceeding in that court. It is important to notice that even when the court forms such an opinion it is not mandatory that the court should make a complaint. This sub-section has conferred a power on the court to do so. It does not mean that the court should, as a matter of course, make a complaint. But once the court decides to do so, then the court should make a finding to the effect that on the fact situation it is expedient in the interest of justice that the offence should further be probed into. If the court finds it necessary to conduct a preliminary inquiry to reach such a finding it is always open to the court to do so, though absence of any such preliminary inquiry would not vitiate a finding reached by the court regarding its opinion. It should again be remembered that the preliminary inquiry contemplated in the sub- section is not for finding whether any particular person is guilty or not. Far from that, the purpose of preliminary inquiry, even if the court opts to conduct it, is only to decide whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence which appears to have been committed." In the impugned order, the High Court did form an opinion after the inquiry. To quote:
"90. It was argued on behalf of the Page 21 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT state by the learned standing counsel that the ballistic expert's deposition, Ex. PW-95 was calculated to let the accused Manu Sharma off the hooks. It was submitted that the witness had stated that no definite opinion could be given whether the two empty cartridges were fired from the same weapon. However, on the basis of the same material, he took a somersault and gave a completely contrary opinion in the Court saying that they appear to have been fired from different weapons. It was submitted that by the time this witness stepped on to the box, the defence had formed its definite plan about a "two weapon theory". The deposition of this witness was sought to support the "two weapon theory". That this court and Supreme Court rejected the theory did not in any way undermine the fact that PW- 95 gave false evidence." Therefore, what is to be seen is whether the High Court is justified in forming the opinion on commission of the offence under Section 193 of IPC. The stand of the appellant in his report (Ex PW-95/2) dated 04.02.2000, and while deposing before the court at the trial, it is to be noted, was consistent. Query No.3 was whether both the empty cartridges were fired from the same firearm or otherwise. Since there was no recovery of the firearm, the same was not sent along with the cartridges for the examination by the expert. Therefore, the opinion tendered was that he was unable to give any definite opinion in answer to Query No.3, "unless the suspected firearm is available for Page 22 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT examination." It was at that juncture, there was a court question. According to the court, "for reply to query no. 3, the presence of the firearm was not necessary. The question was whether the two empty cartridges have been fired from one instrument or from different instruments". To that question, the appellant responded that "after comparison, I am of the opinion that these two cartridge cases C/1 and C/2 appeared to have been fired from two different firearms". It is not a clear, conclusive, specific and definite opinion. In further examination, the appellant has clearly stated that "I have already stated these two cartridge cases appear to have been fired from two different fire arms. Definite opinion would have been given once the weapon is given to me for examination".
We fail to understand how the stand taken by the appellant, as above, attracts the offence of perjury. As we have already observed above, the appellant has all through been consistent that as an expert, a definite opinion in the case could be given only if the suspected firearm is available for examination. It is nobody's case that scientifically an expert can give a definite opinion by only examining the cartridges as to whether they have been fired from the same firearm. It was the trial court which insisted for an opinion without the presence of the firearm, and in that context only, the appellant gave the non-specific and Page 23 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT indefinite opinion. An expert, in such a situation, could not probably have given a different opinion."
8.8 In case of 'AMARSINGH NATHAJI VS. HARDIK HARSHADBHAI PATEL', (2017) 1 SCC 113, the Apex Court was examining the validity and the legality of the proceedings, under Section 340 of the Code, initiated by the High Court as a part of its judgment in Appeal from Order, wherein, the order passed by the learned Sr. Civil Judge, declining to grant interim injunction in a Civil Suit. This Court after elaborate consideration of the arguments, by a detailed judgment, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order passed by the trial Court.
The plaintiff had also approached the Apex Court by way of Special Leave Petition, which had been dismissed as not pressed and the parties amicably settled their disputes. On account of the contrary stand taken by the appellant, the High Court took a view that the conduct of the appellant had affected the flow of justice, and therefore, it was expedient in the interest of justice to file a complaint against the appellant under Section 340 of the Code. It directed Registrar Judicial to make a complaint against Respondent No.1, for the offence punishable under Section 199 and Section 200 of Page 24 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT the IPC, before the Competent Court having jurisdiction.
8.9 What was argued before the Apex Court was that the High Court had not followed the procedure contemplated under Section 340 of the Code. Since, two pre-conditions for initiating the proceedings under Section 340 would that (1) the material produced before the Court must made out a prima facie case for a complaint for the purpose of making a preliminary inquiry into an offence and yet, in clause (B) of sub-Section (1) of Section 195 (2), it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made in the alleged offence. Mere fact that a person made a contrary statement in a judicial proceeding is not sufficient to lodge a complaint under Section 199 and 200 of the IPC. It must be shown that there was deliberate intention of giving false statement in a judicial proceedings by producing false, fabricated documents for the purpose of using the same at any stage of such judicial proceedings and thereafter also, the Court concerned has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice to initiate an inquiry in the offence against public justice. More particularly, referring to Section 340(1) of the Code in regard to the overall factual matrix and overall probable consequences of such a Page 25 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT prosecution. The relevant observations read as under:
"4. It is necessary to refer to the relevant paragraphs in the judgment where the High Court has dealt with the issue:
"19. Before concluding, the Court deems it necessary to take serious view on the conduct of the respondent No.1 - defendant No.1, who either for an extraneous consideration, or to save his skin, has taken contradictory stands in the judicial proceedings by filing one written statement at Exh. 20 supporting the case of the present appellant - plaintiff and subsequently by filing the application at Exh. 43, and other documents in the nature of affidavits supporting the case of the respondents No.3 to 5. It appears that the respondent No.1 has tried to change his version after the impugned order was passed by the trial Court, just to suit his purpose, misusing and abusing the process of law. The Court is constrained to observe that due to sky-rocketing escalation in the prices of the lands in and around the urban areas, the execution of such illegal agreements at the instance of the owners/power-of- attorney holders/banakhat holders has become rampant, and that more often than not, the proceedings of Courts are being misused and abused to a large extent by such Page 26 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT unscrupulous elements. In many cases, innocent persons are being cheated and defrauded by such elements, in the quest of earning easy money, dragging such innocent persons to litigations which go on for years together.
20. In the instant case also, the respondent No.1 - defendant No.1 after requesting the trial Court to reopen his right to file written statement, and after filing written statement at Exh.20 along with the affidavit and declaration supporting the case of the appellant - plaintiff, had filed an application at Exh. 43, requesting the trial Court to de-exhibit the earlier written statement at Exh. 20 by stating, inter alia, that the said written statement was filed by the Advocate Ms. Trupti Patel on his behalf without his knowledge. The said Application at Exh. 43 was rejected by the trial Court, which order has remained unchallenged. All these documents namely the written statement at Exh. 20 with affidavit and declaration and the other written statement and the affidavit filed before the trial Court have also been produced by the learned Counsels for the parties in the present proceedings and have been relied upon by them, to support their respective contentions. From the said documents on record, it clearly transpires that the respondent No.1 - defendant No.1 had sought to produce two sets of documents contradictory to each other, in relation to the Page 27 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT proceedings in this Court, and had made the declarations and statements which he knew were false, for being used as evidence in the judicial proceedings. The respondent No.1 has neither denied his signatures on the written statement Exh. 20 and the affidavit filed along therewith, nor has taken any action against the advocate Ms. Trupti Patel, who had allegedly filed the said written statement on his behalf. The second written statement was sought to be filed along with the application Exh. 43 after the impugned order was passed by the trial Court, and when the present Appeal from Order was pending before this Court. The Court, therefore, has reason to believe that the respondent No.1 has deliberately and consciously tried to take Courts for a ride and filed the documents and declarations making false statements which could be read as evidence in the judicial proceedings, and thereby has prima facie acted in the manner which would affect the administration of justice, tantamounting to the offences as contemplated in Section 199 and Section 200 of IPC, and as referred in Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Cr.P.C. As stated herein above, nowadays such illegal transactions and agreements are rampant, and the process of law is being misused and abused by the unscrupulous elements, which ultimately hampers the administration of justice. The Court, therefore, is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice to file complaint against the respondent No.1 in exercise of the powers conferred under Section Page 28 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT 340 of Cr.P.C.
21. In view of the above, the Appeal from Order is dismissed. The Registrar (Judicial), Gujarat High Court, Ahmedabad is directed to make complaint against the respondent No.1 in view of the above findings recorded by the Court for the offence under Section 199 and Section 200 of IPC before the competent Court of Magistrate, having jurisdiction, who shall, after following the procedure as contemplated in Section 343 of Cr.P.C., deal with the case in accordance with law."
5. It is the main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that while passing the order, as extracted above, the High Court has not followed the procedure contemplated under Section 340(1) of the CrPC. Section 340(1) of the CrPC reads as follows:
"340. Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195.-
(1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in Page 29 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,-
(a) record a finding to that effect;
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction;
(d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and
(e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate."
6. There are two pre conditions for initiating proceedings under Section 340 CrPC - (i) materials produced before the court must make out a prima facie case for a complaint for the purpose of inquiry into an offence referred to in clause (b)(i) of sub-Section (1) of Section 195 of the CrPC and (ii) it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into the alleged offence.
7. The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of Page 30 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT 1860) (hereinafter referred to as "the IPC"); but it must be shown that the defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and offences against public justice and more specifically referred in Section 340(1) of the CrPC, having regard to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a prosecution. (See K.T.M.S. Mohd. and Another v. Union of India[1]). The court must be satisfied that such an inquiry is required in the interests of justice and appropriate in the facts of the case.
8. In the process of formation of opinion by the court that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into, the requirement should only be to have a prima facie satisfaction of the offence which appears to have been committed. It is open to the court to hold a preliminary inquiry though it is not mandatory. In case, the court is otherwise in a position to form such an opinion, that it appears to the court that an offence as referred to under Section 340 of the CrPC has been committed, the court may dispense with the preliminary Page 31 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT inquiry. Even after forming an opinion as to the offence which appears to have been committed also, it is not mandatory that a complaint should be filed as a matter of course. (See Pritish v. State of Maharashtra and Others[2]).
9. In Iqbal Singh Marwah and Another v. Meenakshi Marwah and another, a Constitution Bench of this Court has gone into the scope of Section 340 of the CrPC.
Paragraph-23 deals with the relevant consideration:
"23. In view of the language used in Section 340 CrPC the court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the section is conditioned by the words "court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice". This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon Page 32 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint. ..."
10. Having heard the learned counsel appearing on both sides and having gone through the impugned order and also having regard to the subsequent development whereby the parties have decided to amicably settle some of the disputes, we are of the view that the matter needs fresh consideration. We are also constrained to form such an opinion since it is fairly clear on a reading of the order that the court has not followed all the requirements under Section 340 of the CrPC as settled by this Court in the decisions referred to above regarding the formation of the opinion on the expediency to initiate an inquiry into any offence punishable under Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228 of the IPC, when such an offence is alleged to have been committed in relation to any proceedings before the court.
Page 33 of 46R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT On forming such an opinion in respect of such an offence which appears to have been committed, the court has to take a further decision as to whether any complaint should be made or not."
8.10 The Apex Court in the case of 'PRITISH VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & OTHERS', (2001) 8 SCC 336, was considering the plea in the appeal that the High Court had repealed the request of ordering a prosecution in a land acquisition case. This was requested on the ground that fabricated copies of the sale deeds were presented before the Courts to an extent that the lands sold had been shown before the Reference Court. The Reference Court conducted an inquiry on being told by the applicants that the documents were forged, the relevant record had been called for from the Sub Registrar for the purpose of examining the correctness of three documents and it was found that they were fabricated copies of the original sale deeds. The Court, therefore, had directed that it was expedient in the interest of justice to file a complaint in writing against them before the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, having jurisdiction to initiate appropriate actions for having misguided the Court by preparing and producing false documentary evidence as well as by giving false Page 34 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT oral evidence with a view to have wrongful gain. An appeal came to be filed and the District Judge ordered the complaint to be filed against five more persons besides the appellant. It was when challenged before the High Court, it was argued that Reference Court had overlooked the basic principles of natural justice and proceeded to make an inquiry without giving an opportunity of hearing. The Apex Court negated that contention by saying that while initiating a preliminary inquiry, the Court need not give a notice to the person, against whom it may make a complaint on completion of any such preliminary inquiry and after the Court choses to take action against such persons, it does not mean that he will not have an opportunity to file objection in the proceedings under Section 340 of the Code. The Apex Court held thus:
"8. Chapter XXVI of the Code contains provisions "as to offences affecting the administration of justice". Among the 12 sections subsumed therein we need consider only three. Section 340 consists of four sub-sections of which only the first sub-section is relevant for the purpose of this case. Hence the said sub-section is extracted below:
"When upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice Page 35 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause
(b) of sub-section (1) of section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,-
(a) record a finding to that effect;
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction;
(d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and
(e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate."
9. Reading of the sub-section makes it clear that the hub of this provision is formation of an opinion by the court (before which proceedings were to be held) that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into an offence which appears to have been committed. In order to form such opinion the court is empowered to hold a preliminary inquiry. It is not peremptory that such preliminary inquiry should be held. Even without such preliminary inquiry the court can form such an Page 36 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT opinion when it appears to the court that an offence has been committed in relation to a proceeding in that court. It is important to notice that even when the court forms such an opinion it is not mandatory that the court should make a complaint. This sub-section has conferred a power on the court to do so. It does not mean that the court should, as a matter of course, make a complaint. But once the court decides to do so, then the court should make a finding to the effect that on the fact situation it is expedient in the interest of justice that the offence should further be probed into. If the court finds it necessary to conduct a preliminary inquiry to reach such a finding it is always open to the court to do so, though absence of any such preliminary inquiry would not vitiate a finding reached by the court regarding its opinion. It should again be remembered that the preliminary inquiry contemplated in the sub- section is not for finding whether any particular person is guilty or not. Far from that, the purpose of preliminary inquiry, even if the court opts to conduct it, is only to decide whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence which appears to have been committed.
10. "Inquiry" is defined in Section 2(g) of the Code as "every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a magistrate or court." It refers to the pre-trial inquiry, and in the present context it means the inquiry to be conducted by the Page 37 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT magistrate. Once the court which forms an opinion, whether it is after conducting the preliminary inquiry or not, that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence the said court has to make a complaint in writing to the magistrate of first class concerned. As the offences involved are all falling within the purview of "warrant case" [as defined in Sec. 2
(x)] of the Code the magistrate concerned has to follow the procedure prescribed in Chapter XIX of the Code. In this context we may point out that Section 343 of the Code specifies that the magistrate to whom the complaint is made under Section 340 shall proceed to deal with the case as if it were instituted on a police report, That being the position, the magistrate on receiving the complaint shall proceed under Section 238 to Section 243 of the Code.
11. Section 238 of the Code says that the magistrate shall at the outset satisfy that copies of all the relevant documents have been supplied to the accused. Section 239 enjoins on the magistrate to consider the complaint and the documents sent with it. He may also make such examination of the accused, as he thinks necessary. Then the magistrate has to hear both the prosecution and the accused to consider whether the allegations against the accused are groundless. If he finds the allegations to be groundless he has to discharge the accused at that stage by recording Page 38 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT his reasons thereof. Section 240 of the Code says that if the magistrate is of opinion, in the aforesaid inquiry, that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence he has to frame a charge in writing against the accused. Such charge shall then be read and explained to the accused and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or not. If he pleads not guilty then the magistrate has to proceed to conduct the trial. Until then the inquiry continues before the magistrate.
12. Thus, the person against whom the complaint is made has a legal right to be heard whether he should be tried for the offence or not, but such a legal right is envisaged only when the magistrate calls the accused to appear before him. The person concerned has then the right to participate in the pre-trial inquiry envisaged in Section 239 of the Code. It is open to him to satisfy the magistrate that the allegations against him are groundless and that he is entitled to be discharged.
13. The scheme delineated above would clearly show that there is no statutory requirement to afford an opportunity of hearing to the persons against whom that court might file a complaint before the magistrate for initiating prosecution proceedings. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that even if there is no specific statutory provision for affording Page 39 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT such an opportunity during the preliminary inquiry stage, the fact that an appeal is provided in Section 341 of the Code, to any person aggrieved by the order, is indicative of his right to participate in such preliminary inquiry.
14. Section 341 of the Code confers a power on the party on whose application the court has decided or not decided to make a complaint, as well as the party against whom it is decided to make such complaint, to file an appeal to the court to which the former court is subordinate. But the mere fact that such an appeal is provided, it is not a premise for concluding that the court is under a legal obligation to afford an opportunity (to the persons against whom the complaint would be made) to be heard prior to making the complaint. There are other provisions in the Code for reaching conclusions whether a person should be arrayed as accused in criminal proceedings or not, but in most of those proceedings there is no legal obligation cast on the court or the authorities concerned, to afford an opportunity of hearing to the would be accused. In any event appellant has already availed of the opportunity of the provisions of section 341 of the Code by filing the appeal before the High Court as stated earlier.
15. Once the prosecution proceedings commence the person against whom the accusation is made has a legal right to be heard. Such a legal protection Page 40 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT is incorporated in the scheme of the Code. Principles of natural justice would not be hampered by not hearing the person concerned at the stage of deciding whether such person should be proceeded against or not.
16. Be it noted that the court at the stage envisaged in Section 340 of the Code is not deciding the guilt or innocence of the party against whom proceedings are to be taken before the magistrate. At that stage the court only considers whether it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence affecting administration of justice. In M.S. Sheriff and anr. v. State of Madras and ors. (AIR 1954 SC 397) a Constitution Bench of this Court cautioned that no expression on the guilt or innocence of the persons should be made by the court while passing an order under Section 340 of the Code. An exercise of the court at that stage is not for finding whether any offence was committed or who committed the same. The scope is confined to see whether the court could then decide on the materials available that the matter requires inquiry by a criminal court and that it is expedient in the interest of justice to have it inquired into."
8.11 Thus, the law has been made clear that at the time of preliminary inquiry, the presence of the accused is not necessary. It is also a pre-requirement or a pre-condition of Section 340 Page 41 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT of the Code that from the material produced before the Court concerned, a prima facie case is to be made out for the purpose of inquiring into the offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code and again, it is to be decided by the Court whether, it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry be made in the alleged offence. It is also a trite law that even when there are contrary statements made during the judicial proceedings, that itself may not be sufficient to initiate prosecution and it must be shown that intentionally false statement was made or fabricated documents were produced for the purpose of using the same at any stage of judicial proceedings. And yet, the necessity would be for the Court to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice to initiate an inquiry into the offence against public justice, more particularly, as referred to under Section 340 of the Code.
While reverting to the facts of the instant case in the aforesaid legal background, the factual matrix and overall circumstances so also the impugned order shall have to be considered by this Court. The Court concerned has chosen not to enter into the realm of even the preliminary inquiry on the ground that the anticipatory bail application had already been concluded and thus, any false declaration or presentation of the false Page 42 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT documents would be within the purview of the Court concerned. It is given to understand to this Court that I-C.R. No. 238 of 2015 came to be registered with Gandhidham, 'A' Division Police Station, which had been lodged by the respondent No.2, herein, namely Aakash Shelendraprasad Bhargava, who is an authorized signatory of the Axis Bank, and therefore, the appellant had moved the trial Court concerned for anticipatory bail. In an affidavit filed before the Court concerned, as stated herein above, a reference has been made of non-payment of interest on oath and the account of the appellant having been classified as NPA on 20.09.2012. In fact, the CC Account of the appellant's company had become NPA on 29.10.2014 and the Bank, itself, appears to have renewed the CC facility to the tune of Rs.900/- lakh vide communications dated 01.02.2013 and 02.04.2014. On a preliminary examination, the Court concerned could have made out that those details, furnished before it, are not correct. It is also fairly submitted by the learned Advocate that while filing the affidavit before the Court concerned, at the time of proceeding with anticipatory bail, an attempt was made to justify the stand of the bank and this was a mistake committed by the Bank. The possibility cannot be ruled out that in a zeal to ensure that the anticipatory bail is not granted to the appellant-accused, exaggerated version, which preliminary appears to be a incorrect version, has Page 43 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT come on record. An attempt was also made to justify this by saying that the affidavit is always prepared by the Advocate representing the Bank and possibly, the mistake has crept in on account of the same.
8.12 Thus, having found that this is a wrong presentation of the facts on the part of the authorized signatory of the Axis Bank, two more options are available with this Court, firstly, to direct the Court concerned, which had decided the anticipatory bail application to examine the matter on merit and also to direct the lodgment of the complaint under Section 340 of the Code, if, the Court deems it appropriate in the interest of justice, (2) to initiate an inquiry into offence of false evidence. Unless this Court forms an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice to initiate such an inquiry into the offence against the public justice, having regard to the overall factual matrix and the circumstances as well as regarding the probable consequences of such a transaction no direction can be issued. The trial Court on the ground of its having no jurisdiction rejected the application of the present appellant, this Court needs to hold that such an approach is unsustainable. The Court before whom the documents were presented and which are alleged to be misleading and the material produced if is alleged to be unintentional for the purpose of which is Page 44 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT used at the initial stage of proceedings, the Court ought to have rgarded the same instead of rejecting the same on the ground of it is having no jurisdiction.
Instead of relegating the parties to the Court concerned, this Court had undertaken the exercise of finding from materials, as mentioned herein above, produced before the Court concerned and it has been made out prima facie that the statement made to be incorrect and for that, the explanation has been tendered by the Bank officials. Therefore, the question to be addressed is whether further inquiry into the matter would be necessitated and whether, there would be any justification of initiating prosecution and whether there is any need for initiating an inquiry in the interest of justice or to initiate prosecution for producing incorrect version amounting to false evidence being against the interest of justice and the answer of this Court will be in negation from overall gamut of facts and in absence of any ill intention or mala fide design and it is also not found expedient in the interest of justice to so do it. However, while so holding, it is also found necessary to direct that the Officer Concerned shall tender an unconditional apology before this Court for furnishing those incorrect details. The consequential outcome of such apology on pending proceedings against the accused-appellant would be Page 45 of 46 R/CR.A/1318/2016 JUDGMENT determined by the Court concerned. The appellant will be at liberty to bring to the notice of the Court concerned these aspects and the Court concerned shall also take into account the correct details as would emerge from the record and shall decide in accordance with law. Any prosecution based on incorrect statement if has sustained so far, the same shall need to be ended undoubtedly. However, both the sides have since made diverse claims with regard to the factual details, which have emerged, this Court will not enter into that arena and would rather leave it to the Court concerned before whom the matters are pending for adjudication on merit.
9. This appeal is DISPOSED OF, accordingly. Let the apology of the respondent in writing be tendered before this Court, as directed above, within a period of THREE WEEKS from today, which shall form the part of the record of this Court. A copy of the same shall also be supplied to the other side. The costs of this petition shall also be paid to the appellant-accused by the Respondent- Bank, as may be quantified by the Registry of this Court. Direct service is permitted.
(SONIA GOKANI, J) UMESH /-
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