Allahabad High Court
M/S Pepsi Co India Holding Ltd. vs State Of U.P. And Others on 29 October, 2025
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:189868
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 12609 of 2005
M/S Pepsi Co India Holding Ltd.
.....Applicant(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and Others
.....Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s)
:
Dr. Archana Pandey, Rajendra Kumar Pandey
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)
:
Dharam Pal Singh, S. Niranjan
Court No. - 84
HON'BLE PADAM NARAIN MISHRA, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned AGA for the State and perused the material available on record. However, no one appears on behalf of opposite party no.2 to press this application.
2. The present application under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code has been filed by the applicant seeking quashing of the entire proceedings of Criminal Case No. 6944 of 2004 (State v. Manager, Pepsi Co.), arising out of Case Crime No. 122 of 2000, under Sections 272, 273 of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the IPC) and 7/16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'PFA Act'), registered at Police Station Kakadev, District Kanpur Nagar, as well as summoning order dated 23.8.2004 and Non-bailable warrant dated 9.8.2005, pending before the First Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar.
3. Fact in brief is that the opposite party no. 3 namely Jafar Hashmi lodged an FIR on 18.04.2000 alleging therein that incident took place on 7.4.2000. Thereafter, sample was collected and sent to Public Analyst for the analysis of sample and the report thereby was submitted on 14.9.2000. After investigation, Investigating Officer has submitted a final report dated 30.06.2002. Being aggrieved by the final report, the opposite party no. 3 filed a Protest Petition dated 11.08.2004 before 1st Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar and the learned Magistrate after due consideration rejected the final report and summoned the owner and Manager of Pepsi Co. to face trial for the offences punishable under Sections 272, 273 of IPC and section 7/16 of PFA Act.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant has raised three contentions. The first contention which has been raised by the learned counsel is that Chapter XIV of the IPC deals with offences affecting public health and safety. Sections 272 and 273 specifically penalize the adulteration of food and the sale of noxious food or drink. The punishment under these provisions is limited to six months' imprisonment, or a fine up to one thousand rupees, or both. These offences are non-cognizable and bailable as per the First Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the CrPC). It is further submitted that however, these provisions were enacted at a time when no special law existed to comprehensively regulate public health or food adulteration but, with the subsequent enactment of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (PFA Act), a special statute specifically designed to address offences relating to food adulteration, the field is now governed by this special legislation. Therefore, when an act of food adulteration falls within the scope of the PFA Act, Sections 272 and 273 IPC are not attracted, as the special law overrides the general provisions of the IPC in matters relating to food adulteration.
5. The second contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that Section 155(2) Cr.P.C puts an embargo on the powers of the prosecuting agency to investigate a non cognizable offence. It is not in dispute that both the offences under Sections 272/273 IPC are non-cognizable offences, and therefore, the said offences could not have been investigated by the police on account of the registration of the FIR. He also submitted that the prosecution against the Applicant Company is barred by limitation, as the trial court did not consider that fact while issuing the summoning order. The alleged offenses under sections 272 and 273 of the IPC are non-cognizable and punishable by up to 6 months of imprisonment, with a one-year limitation period. The offences under sections 7/16 of the PFA Act are punishable with the imprisonment for a term exceeding 6 months but less than 3 years have a three-year limitation period. The court passed the summoning order dated 23.08.2004 nearly four years after the relevant purchases and the Public Analyst's report which made the cognizance invalid.
6. The third contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (PFA Act) is a special law that provides a comprehensive framework for dealing with offences relating to food adulteration. It lays down specific statutory safeguards, procedures, and rights for persons accused of such offences. Therefore, prosecution under Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC, without following the mandatory provisions of the PFA Act, is illegal and unsustainable and invoking sections 272/273 IPC in cases covered by the PFA Act amounts to a circumvention of the special law, violating the principles of Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant (special law overrides general law) and the Doctrine of Circumvention. He next submitted that in the present case, mandatory procedures were not followed and the sample was collected and analyzed in violation of PFA norms. In essence, any offence concerning food adulteration must be prosecuted exclusively under the PFA Act by adhering to its mandatory procedural safeguards, and not under the general provisions of the IPC. Learned Counsel for the applicant placed reliance upon Ashok Kr. Sharma vs UOI 2020 SCC OnLine SC 683, Jatinder Kr. Jain vs State of Punjab 2008 (2) FAC 437, C.H.Satyanarayan vs State Crl. Rev. No. 114/2005, Ram Nath vs State of Uttar Pradesh (2024) 3 SCC 502, State of Uttaranchal vs Pradeep Aggarwal MANU/UC/0535/2012 AND M/S. Torque Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. vs State of Bihar MANU/BH/0298/2013.
7. Learned AGA for the state could not refute any of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicant or give any plausible answer. The learned AGA has not been able to show as to how the complaint against the Applicant under Section 272/273 IPC is sustainable when the investigating agency failed to comply with the PFA Act norms.
8. After hearing the learned counsel for the applicant and learned AGA for the state and perusal of the records, i am agreement with ground put forward on behalf of the applicant for quashing of criminal proceedings. According to Counsel for the Applicant, on coming into force of the PFA Act, it repealed Section 272 and 273 of IPC by necessary implication as it occupied complete field with regard to 'adulteration of foodstuff' and also emphasised on the principle of a special law prevailing over a general law to the extent Section 272/273 IPC got covered by the PFA Act. The PFA Act is a special and comprehensive enactment deal with certain subject matter 'adulteration of foodstuff'. Thus, it has an overriding effect over the general law dealing with the same subject matter. In the case of the Jeewan Kumar Raut and another vs Central Bureau of Investigation (2009) 7 SCC 526, which relates to the Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994 (TOHO), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made the following observation regarding the relationship of the special enactment with the general law. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced here under:-
It is a well-settled principle of law that if a special statute lays down procedures, the ones laid down under the general statutes shall not be followed. In a situation of this nature, the respondent could carry out investigations in exercise of its authorization under Section 13 (3) (iv) of TOHO. While doing so, it could exercise such powers which are otherwise vested in it. But, as it could not file a police report but a complaint petition only; Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code may not be applicable. The provisions of the Code, thus, for all intent and purport, would apply only to an extent till conflict arises between the provisions of the Code and TOHO and as soon as the area of conflict reaches, TOHO shall prevail over the Code. Ordinarily, thus, although in terms of the Code, the respondent upon completion of investigation and upon obtaining remand of the accused from time to time, was required to file a police report, it was precluded from doing so by reason of the provisions contained in Section 22 of TOHO. To put it differently, upon completion of the investigation, an authorized officer could only file a complaint and not a police report, as a specific bar has been created by the Parliament. In that view of the matter, the police report being not a complaint and vice-versa, it was obligatory on the part of the respondent to choose the said method invoking the jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned for taking cognizance of the offence only in the manner laid down therein and not by any other mode. The procedure laid down in TOHO, thus, would permit the respondent to file a complaint and not a report which course of action could have been taken recourse to but for the special provisions contained in Section 22 of TOHO."
9. I finds merit on ground put forward on behalf of the applicant for quashing, that is, for the offence of food adulteration, procedure is prescribed under sections 10 and 11 of the PFA Act, for taking a sample and for getting the same tested. Separate procedure for trial has also been prescribed. Section 20 the PFA Act specifically provides that cognizance can only be taken on written complaint or with the consent of competent authority, not upon the a police report. In the case in hand, on the perusal of the records, it appears that no such procedure has been followed in the present case. In these circumstances, registering of FIR without following the procedure laid down in the Section 10 and 11 of the PFA Act and taking cognizance without following the procedure laid down in the section 20 of the PFA Act is not permissible in the eyes of law. 10. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered opinion that the criminal proceedings against the applicant under Sections 272/273 IPC and 7/16 of PFA Act, is unsustainable in the eyes of law and the entire proceedings of Criminal Case No. 6944 of 2004 (State v. Manager, Pepsi Co.), arising out of Case Crime No. 122 of 2000, under Sections 272, 273 of IPC and 7/16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, registered at Police Station Kakadev, District Kanpur Nagar, as well as summoning order dated 23.8.2004 and Non-bailable warrant dated 9.8.2005, pending before the First Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar is hereby quashed.
11. Accordingly, the petition is allowed.
(Padam Narain Mishra,J.) October 29, 2025 Akram