Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
C.B.S. Venkata Ramana, Commissioner Of ... vs Rangineni Mohan Rao And Two Ors. on 27 July, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2004(2)ALD(CRI)347
Author: L. Narasimha Reddy
Bench: L. Narasimha Reddy
JUDGMENT L. Narasimha Reddy, J.
1. The Criminal Revision Case has been filed against the order in Criminal Appeal No. 18 of 1999, dated 30.07.2001 on the file of the Sessions Court, Karimnagar. The Criminal Appeal in turn was filed against the order, dated 2.05.1994, passed by the District Collector, Karimnagar-second respondent herein, in exercise of powers under Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act).
2. The rice mill of the petitioner was inspected by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Jagtial, on 26.07.1988. Huge stocks of paddy, rice and broken rice were seized and proceedings were initiated under the Act; on the ground that there was variation in stocks. After issuing show-cause notice to the petitioner and hearing him, the second respondent directed confiscation of 50% of the seized stock. In the appeal before the Sessions Court, the confiscation was restricted to 10%. This Court allowed the Criminal Revision Case, through an order dated 3.03.2003. It was observed therein that except for the last sentence in the order relating to the confiscation, the order dated 2.05.1994 was prepared by an official subordinate to the second respondent, and such a course of action is impermissible in law. A direction was issued to the Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh to cause necessary entries in the records of the second respondent as to the manner in which he discharged his functions, and to keep the same in view before he is assigned any functions, involving adjudication of matters.
3. The second respondent filed Criminal M.P. No. 4385 of 2004 for expunction of the remarks made against him, mainly on the ground that he was not given an opportunity to explain. The said Criminal M.P. was ordered on 24.06.2004 and the remarks made against the petitioner were expunged. Through a separate order, the petitioner was directed to show-cause as to why necessary observations be not made, in relation to the order passed by him on 2.05.1994. In response to this, the petitioner filed an affidavit narrating the manner in which he conducted the proceedings.
4. Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the second respondent was under heavy pressure of work and was required to deal with as many as 82 departments in his capacity as administrative head of the District. He contends that no particular procedure is prescribed for disposal of the cases under Section 6-A of the Act, and that no exception can be taken to the manner in which the second respondent passed the order. He relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Dr. DILIP KUMAR DEKA v. STATE OF ASSAM, , in STATE OF KARNATAKA v. REGISTRAR GENERAL, KARNATAKA HIGH COURT, and in PRAKASH ROAD LINES LTD. v. COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, .
5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner in the Criminal Revision Case.
6. The Criminal Revision Case has been disposed of on merits through a separate order. The short question that falls for consideration now is virtually in realm of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
7. The second respondent passed an order in exercise of power conferred upon him under Section 6-A of the Act. The mere fact that different view is possible on the same set of facts, does not call for any observation or discussion as to nature of disposal. In fact, the very existence of hierarchy of Courts presupposes the possibility of difference of opinions at various levels. However, if it touches on the very conducting of proceedings, not confined to the facts of a particular case alone, the High Court, is not only conferred with the power, but also endowed with the duty to ensure that any deviations from the procedure are corrected, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. If a totally impermissible procedure is being adopted by a subordinate Court or adjudicating agency, the High Court cannot remain satisfied by reversing or modifying such orders as and when they are brought before it. Necessary indication or direction in this regard would help remedy in the situation. Such a course, in a given case, may go a very long way in avoiding recurrence of the mistakes, or the consequences flowing from them.
8. Reverting to the facts of the case, it needs to be observed that the case of the petitioner related to seizure of 5233 quintals of paddy, 2152 quintals of rice, 430 quintals of broken rice and 70 quintals of rice bran. The case was heard by the second respondent on 12.07.1993 and orders were pronounced on 2.05.1994. The order runs into three typed pages. The direction as to confiscation of 50% of the value of the seized stock was written with pen as under:
"As the violations of the provisions of Control Order are proved, I order confiscation of 50% of the value of the seized stocks."
9. Rest of the order was typed. This Court expressed the view that the typed portion of the order was authored by different persons and the second respondent has only written the portion extracted above.
10. In the affidavit filed by the petitioner, he states that having regard to the pressure of work, he had evolved a procedure for disposal of the matters arising under the Act. According to him, after completion of the hearing, the conclusions arrived at, used to be dictated to the stenographer, leaving the operative portion of the order to be dictated later. He also states that the concluding portion of the order used to be written with hand, to avoid leakage of the same by the subordinate staff. He, however, did not dispute the fact that the stenographer used to type the order to the extent of narration of facts, including the contents of show-cause notice and explanation. The relevant portion of the affidavit reads as under:
"It is also relevant to state that the stenographer used to type the order to the extent of contents of show-cause notice and the explanation of the respondent in the case. I used to dictate the reasoning which is typed and brought to me and I used to dictate/write the last portion on the day of passing the order."
11. From a reading of the same, it is evident that the orders passed by him used to contain three portions viz;
a) Facts, contents of show-cause notice and explanation submitted by the respondent in the proceedings -- By the stenographer.
b) Reasoning and findings -- Dictated by the second respondent at the conclusion of the hearing;
c) Last portion -- Written or dictated by the second respondent on the date of pronouncement of the order.
12. It is true that the provisions of C.P.C. or Cr.P.C. do not apply to the proceedings before the authority discharging functions under Section 6-A of the Act, as to manner of hearing and disposal of cases. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that an adjudication by such an authority affects the rights of citizens. With the expanding sphere of administrative activity, the distinction between the quasi-judicial adjudication on the one hand and judicial functions, pure and simple on the other, is almost getting blurred. In quasi-judicial proceedings, which take place mostly before the administrative authorities, almost all the trappings of adjudication by the Courts are prevalent except for few minor details. It is apt to quote a couple of passages from the Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth. At page 48 of the said book, the learned authors described the nature of quasi-judicial functions as under:
"A quasi-judicial function is an administrative function which the law requires to be exercised in some respects as if it were judicial. A standard example is a minister deciding whether or not to confirm a compulsory purchase order or to allow a planning appeal after a public inquiry. The decision itself is administrative, dictated by policy and expediency. But the procedure is subject to the principles of natural justice, which require the minister to act fairly towards the objectors and not (for example) to take fresh evidence without disclosing it to them."
13. Administrative Tribunals also discharge quasi-judicial functions. The characteristic feature of the outcome of such adjudication is described as under:
"Secondly, the decisions of most tribunals are in truth judicial rather than administrative, in the sense that the tribunal has to find facts and then apply legal rules to them impartially, without regard to executive policy. Such tribunals have in substance the same functions as courts of law." (page 909)
14. From the above, it is evident that except for being relieved from the rules of procedure, a quasi-judicial authority is also under obligation to decide the matters before them, judicially.
15. Adjudication, whether quasi-judicial or other wise, is a compendious process comprising of getting hold on the facts of the case, noting the contentions of the parties, appreciation of evidence adduced on their behalf, application of relevant provisions of law, formation of opinion, and ultimate declaration of the decision. None of these facets can be separated from the other. In fact, each depends upon, or influences, the other. The narration of facts in a judgment or order, in fact, constitutes the foundation of the case. Any slip or deviation in taking note of the facts is prone to have its effect on the subsequent steps. It is the facts of the case that linger in the mind of the adjudicator, till the disposal of the case. Howsoever perfect or intelligent an adjudicator may be, he cannot undertake a perfect adjudication, unless, he masters the facts of the case by himself. If that function is permitted to be undertaken by another, the whole of adjudicatory process becomes vitiated.
16. Even where a semblance of latitude in this regard is to be given in the context of pressure of work, the outcome of adjudication cannot be said to have seriously suffered, if the facts are borne in mind at the time of hearing, and the findings as well as the decision is dictated then and there, leaving the facts to be supplemented at a later stage. In cases where the judgments are reserved for months together, recording of facts by a person, other than the adjudicator would virtually render the whole adjudicatory process a meaningless or at least routine exercise, without any seriousness.
17. Reverting to the facts of the case, it needs to be seen that in the order of three pages, the recording of the facts runs upto 21/2 pages. The portion relating to findings which is said to have dictated by the second respondent runs as under:
"The case has come up for final hearing on 12.07.1993, on which date the learned counsel for the respondent argued the same grounds as put forth in the written reply to the show cause notice. The material records produced have been examined and seen that;
i) the variation in paddy and broken rice is within the permissible limits,
ii) the variation in rice is more than the permissible limits, thus it amply proves that the respondent is not maintaining true and correct accounts and violation of conditions 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7 under clause 4 and clause 14 of the A.P. Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1984, read with Section 7 of E.C. Act, 1955."
18. If the narration of facts was already undertaken by the stenographer, and conclusions were dictated on conclusion of hearing, it is not known why it took ten months for the 2nd respondent, to write the last sentence. Even according to these findings, the variation in paddy and broken rice was said to be in permissible limits. A vital plea as regards the rice, which clearly finds a mention in the facts, is not at all reflected in the findings, and still, 50% of the entire stock was confiscated. This is not being referred to, to touch the merits of the matter. The effort is only to demonstrate the perils of permitting part of the adjudicatory functions to be discharged by another. The fact that no procedure is prescribed or that there is pressure of work is not an excuse to carry out the adjudicatory process with basic infirmities. It is a matter, which needs to be seriously addressed to by the authorities and for taking remedial steps.
19. Another contention advanced on behalf of the 2nd respondent is that the petitioner did not make any grievance about the procedure. A Court, conferred with supervisory jurisdiction does not have to wait for raising a plea or submission of a complaint, in such matters. Once an irregularity as to procedure is noticed in relation to functioning of an inferior Tribunal, the High Court can act, to correct the anomaly.
20. In the decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, several remarks were made against some of the parties, which were in fact unrelated to the subject matter of the case. While in one case an officer was directed to be put under suspension straight away, in the other, the High Court took the State Government for a ride for the poor percentage of convictions in criminal cases. The Supreme Court took serious exception to that. In the case on hand, the effort of the Court is to express its disapproval of the procedure in general, evolved and adopted by the second respondent. If the same procedure is continued by him and is being adopted by other officers undertaking similar functions, it should, in fact, be a matter of concern for the Court and the State.
21. Therefore, it is held that the procedure adopted by the second respondent in disposing of the cases arising under Section 6-A of the Act, when he functioned as District Collector, was erroneous and cannot be approved. If such procedure is still prevalent any where, the same needs to be immediately corrected.
22. Office is directed to mark a copy of this order to the Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh, for taking appropriate steps in the matter.