Patna High Court
A.H. Wheeler And Company Pvt. Limited vs State Of Bihar on 25 September, 1987
Equivalent citations: 1988(36)BLJR325
JUDGMENT S.H.S Abidi, J.
1. This application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. has been filed by the petitioner A. H. Wheeler and Company Pvt. Limited, Muzaffarpur, through T. K. Bhattacharya (hereinafter referred to as the 'Company')-the 1st party in the proceeding under Section 144, Cr. P.C. for quashing an order dated 16-4-87 passed by Sri J. Jha, Sub-divisional Magistrate, Muzaffarpur East, directing the parties to keep peace and putting back opposite party, 2nd party Chandreshwar Singh in the possession of the book stall at Muzaffarpur Railway station.
2. It has been stated on behalf of the petitioner that the company is a licensee from the Government of India (Ministry of Railways) to carry on sales of books, magazines etc. on different Railway stations including Muzaffarpur Railway station and the Railways grant permission to the Company to instal their book stalls on the Railway platforms. At the Muzaffarpur railway station the company has three book stalls and two mobile trolleys. The Company appoints agent under written agreement to effect the sales at their book stalls on commission basis. These agreements are renewed from time to time and the Company supplies books, magazines etc to these book stalls for sale. The company pays royality to the Railways on the sales effected by them.
3. The company had appointed Chandreshwar Singh, 2nd party, opposite party as an agent of the company at their book stalls at Muzaffarpur under written agreement. His agency was renewed by the company from time to time and the last agreement was executed on 22-3-77/23-3-77 at the head office of the company at Allahabad between the company and the opposite party. This agreement is Annexure-1 to this petition. In pursuance of the agreement the company has been supplying book stalls, furnitures, fixturer, stock of books and the magazines etc. and the 2nd party had been selling the books and magazines on the basis of the commission and the opposite party, 2nd party had been sending material accounts to the Company's office at Allahabad and thereafter the company used to pay to opposite party, 2nd party his commission accordingly.
4. It has been stated that the term and conditions of the agreement were violated by Chandreshwar Singh and there was misappropriation of the amount of the company to the tune of Rs. 91,203.41 paise, which, according to the company, has been accepted by Chandreshwar Singh by his two letters enclosed as Annexures 2 and 2/1 to this petition. When the opposite party did not pay the money then the company terminated the agency of opposite party, 2nd party by agreeing to pay Rs. 500/- in lieu of one month's notice. According to the company the termination letter dated 25-2-87 was served upon Chandreshwar Singh personally by the officers of the Company and thereafter Company's officers informed the Officer-in-charge of G. R. P. Muzaffarpur, about the intention to serve the termination letter on opposite party and take charge of the book stalls by the said letter (Annexure-4) dated 27-2-87. It has also been said that the Company informed the Superintendent of Muzaffarpur Railway station about the same vide Annexure-5 to this petition. The company says that it took charge of the book stalls and the trolleys etc. from Chandreshwar Singh by means of inventory prepared in presence of opposite party, 2nd party, Notary Public and two Advocates of Muzaffarpur on 1-3-87 and thereafter put its locks on all the book stalls and trolleys. Thereafter the company says that it informed the Station Superintendent about the taking over of the charge of the book stalls for which it has got Annexure-6 and thereafter it informed the Officer-in-charge of O. R. P., Muzaffarpur, about the taking over the charge of the book stalls by its information dated 1-3-87 vide Annexure-7.
5. The Company further says that after taking over the charge of book stalls and trolleys etc. from Chandreshwar Singh it appointed its new agent namely Nehru Jha, on 1-3-87 vide Annexure-8 to this petition for which also information was sept to the Officer-in-charge of G. R. P., Muzaffarpur, and the Station Superintendent, Muzaffarpur, vide Annexures-9 and 10. The new agent, Nehru Jha, started functioning from 1-3-87. He opened the book stalls and sold some books and locked the book stalls with his own locks around 11 p. m. on 1-3-87. In the morning of 2-3-87 when Nehru Jha, new agent, came to open the book stalls, he found that another locks were placed on the said book stalls over his locks and accordingly Nehru Jha informed the Government Railway Police on 2-3-87 on which a proceeding under Section 144, Cr. P.C. was initiated by the learned Magistrate and notices were issued to the parties to show cause. Thereafter the parties appeared and filed their show cause and the learned Magistrate after hearing the parties passed the impugned order dated 16-4-87 (Annexure-13).
6. Against the impugned order when this application was filed in this Court, on 30-4-87 an order was passed by this Court which is as follows:
This application will be heard. Issue notice. The operation of the order dated 16-4-87 to the extent whereby and whereunder the learned Court below directed to give possession to the second party-opposite party shall remain stayed.
Opposite party-2nd party Chandreshwar Singh has filed a counter-affidavit to this application and has said that the company has no right to maintain this application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. inasmuch as the order impugned is a final order which may be challenged in application under Section 397/401, Cr. P.C. and that the proceeding which has been started on 2-3-87 has lost its force on 30-4-87 and so this application has become infructuous. The possession has been restored on 25-4-84 to opposite party and so he is in possession and conducting the business. It is said on behalf of opposite party-Chandreshwar Singh that G. R. P., Muzaffarpur, is in the grip of the Company and without caring for the specific orders of this Court, it has forcibly removed opposite party and put the shop under lock on 2-5-87.
7. It was argued on behalf of opposite party that he had been in possession of the disputed shop and stall for the last 40 years under an agreement and the same cannot be revoked or cancelled or terminated by the Company and that the Company has got influence over the authorities of the railways and the police and so they have got manufactured most of the documents annexed in this petition. Annexure-3 also called termination letter dated 25-2-87 which was pasted on the book stall has been fabricated in collusion with the local police and some local lawyers of Muzaffarpur, and it is said that it was never served upon opposite party. Further it is contended that the agency could be terminated only on one month's notice upon the other party and not by pasting the notice at the shop. It is said that the entire action was hasty, illegal, unwarranted with a view to deprive the opposite party from peaceful and lawful possession of the shop and stalls, and when the opposite party was in actual physical possession of the stall, specially when the question of termination of agency etc. being disputed, the order impugned was right. So far as the Annexures 2 and 2/1 are concerned, they have been prepared by the Company and it has obtained the signatures thereon under pressure. It was also said that a sum of Rs. 1,62,000/- was due to the petitioner from the Company in respect of which a case is pending before the Conciliation Officer where the Company is a party as it is apparent from Annexure-A to the counter-affidavit. It is also said that opposite party in order to settle the claim and counter claim once for all has filed a Title Suit No. 75 of 1987 in the court of the Subordinate Judge 1st, Muzaffarpur, and has also prayed for an injunction which is subjudice. The learned counsel for opposite party contended that the order of the learned Magistrate was completely within the jurisdiction and he was competent to pass the same. It is also contended that the question involved in this case is a question of civil dispute which can be adjudicated by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction.
8. On behalf of opposite party it was argued that in a proceeding under Section 145, Cr. P.C. the Magistrate has to look into the possession of the parties within a period of two months. As regards the agency given to Nehru Jha it has been contended that T. K. Bhattacharya in league with the new agent in order to oust his predecessor opposite party 2nd party from the lawful possession has manufactured the documents with an oblique motive. The agreement of agency was signed on 3-2-87 at Allahabad by Principal one day after the initiation of the proceeding under Section 144, Cr. P. C.
9. The company has filed a reply to the counter-affidavit denying and contradicting the allegations made by opposite party 2nd party-Chandreshwar Singh. It has been said that after the order of this court dated 30-4-87 was received by the Office of the Sub-divisional Officer, Muzaffarpur, (East), on 2-5-87 the Sub-divisional Officer, Muzaffarpur East, passed an order on 2-5-87 directing the G. R. P., Muzaffarpur, to comply with the order of the High Court and pursuant to the said order of the Sub-divisional Officer, Muzaffarpur, the book stalls in question were sealed by the G. R. P. on 2-5-87. It is said that opposite party was never in possession of the disputed book stalls and in fact he was only a selling agent of the Company under the agreement and he was entitled to a commission. Paragraphs 29 and 30 of the agreement have been referred to by the Company in respect of termination of the agency by way of one month's notice or agreeing to pay a sum of Rs. 500/- in lieu of notice and in the present case the Company has agreed to pay Rs. 500/- in lieu of notice, it is also urged that the possession of the book stalls was taken over by the Company from the 1st of March, 1987 in presence of the Notary Public, two respectable witnesses and opposite party 2nd party himself. It was also urged that the agent has no right to sell books, magazines etc. after the termination of his agency and the only remedy available to an agent in such a case is by way of compensation and damages but he cannot refuse or resist the giving possession of the book stalls to the Company. If the opposite party is allowed to sell the books magazines etc. on the basis of the order of the criminal court then it is not permitted under the agreement between the Railways and the Company.
10. Further it was said that the company has already stopped the supply of books, magazines etc. to the opposite party long before the termination of agency i.e. with effect from 3-12-86. Any order for restoration of possession to the opposite party will result into the opposite party selling books, magazines etc. not supplied by the Company and thereby depriving the company as well as the Railways of their revenue. The new agent who has been appointed on 1-3-87 in place of opposite party is already receiving all the supplies from the company. In this view of the matter it was argued that the order of the learned Magistrate putting back opposite party into possession was wholly illegal for which he has got no jurisdiction to pass such order,
11. As regards the termination of the agency it has been said that it has been terminated by service of notice on opposite party which has been refused by him and so the Company has chosen other way of termination of agency and in lieu of one month's notice it agreed to pay Rs. 500/- as provided under Clause 80 of the Agreement, and so the termination of the agency of opposite party is valid. It was also argued that if at all opposite party has got any claim in respect of the amount he should go to Civil Court but it could not be decided by the Magistrate. As such for all these reasons the learned counsel for the petitioner said that the impugned order is bad in law.
12. The learned counsel for the other side-opposite party said that the impugned order itself has exhausted and this application has become infructuous. It is contended OP behalf of opposite party that the agency could not be terminated and has not been legally terminated as no service of notice has been effected and no amount of money in lieu of one month's notice has been paid. Further the disputed questions of fact about the claim of the parties could be decided by the civil court for which the Company should approach the civil court. Lastly, it was argued on behalf of opposite party that the impugned order is right and has been passed legally and this court can put back the opposite party in posession of the book stalls as he has been dispossessed by the police on the basis of the order of this Court.
13. For considerations of all these submissions firstly, it will have to be seen as to what are the powers of the Magistrate in a proceeding under Section 144, Cr. P. C.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon several decisions in this connection. In a division Bench case of Francis Duke Colridge Sumner, Offg. Deputy Secretary, Port Commissioners, Calcutta, and Ors. v. Jogendra Kumar Roy and Anr. A.I.R. 1933 Calcutta 348 at page 350 the Calcutta High Court observed :
Now there can be no doubt or dispute that the legislature by Section 144 of the Code has conferred very large powers upon Magistrate who have to deal with urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger. That section enables a Magistrate to make temporary orders, irrespective of the rights of the parties concerned, provided that, to quote the words of the section :
In his opinion...there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable.
The larger is the power, the greater is the necessity to be cautions about its exercise. The statute itself has provided a safeguard in the shape of a time limit. Judicial decisions have also laid down certain principles which have to be borne in mind, and of these only a two may be mentioned here : Courts, civil as well as criminal, exist for the protection of rights, and therefore the authority of a Magistrate should ordinarily be exercised in defence of rights rather than in their suppression ; when an order in suppression of lawful rights have to be made it ought not to be made unless the Magistrate considers that other action that he is competent to take is not likely to be effective ; and the order, if made, should never be disproportionate but should always be, as far as possible 'commensurate with the exigencies of any particular situation.
15. In a division Bench case of Abdul Majeed v. Emperor A.I.R. 1939 Allahabad 182 at page 184 it was observed by the Allahabad High Court :
The order of the Magistrate which is under revision has ceased to have effect and it is therefore unnecessary to set it aside, I merely express the opinion that the Magistrate should not enforce any use of this private property against the persons in possession thereof unless it is established either by a decree of a Civil Court or as the result of some enquiry under Section 147, Cr. P.C. ; that the persons claiming the right to use it have justification for their claim.
In the case of Md. Gulam Abbas and Anr. v. Md. Ibrahim and Ors. the Supreme Court observed :
This provision confers a jurisdiction to "direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management" with the object, inter alia, of preventing "a disturbance of the public tranquility or a riot, or an affray". Section 144(3) specifically lays down that the order under this section "may be directed to a particular individual, or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place." The kind of orders mentioned here are obviously intended only to prevent dangers to life, health, safety or peace and tranquility of members of the public. They are only temporary orders which cannot last beyond two months from the making thereof as is clear from Section 144 (6) of the Code. Questions of title cannot be decided here at all. But previous judgments on them may have a bearing on the question whether, and, if so, what order should be passed under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code.
It may sometimes happen that a person may be prevented from doing something even upon his own property provided the doing of a perfectly legal act constitutes a danger to human life, health, or safety of others or to public peace and tranquility....
16. In other case of Gulam Abbas and others v. the State of U. P. and Ors. the Supreme Court at page 1862 observed :
The entire basis of action under Section 144 is provided by the urgency of the situation and the power thereunder is intended to be availed of for preventing disorders, obstructions and annoyances with a view to secure the public weal by maintaining public peace and tranquility Preservation of the public peace and tranquility is the primary function of the Government and the aforesaid power is conferred on the executive magistracy enabling it to perform that function effectively during emergent situations and as such it may become necessary for the Executive Magistrate to override temporarily private rights and in a given situation the power must extend to restraining individuals from doing acts perfectly lawful in themselves, for, it is obvious that when there is a conflict between the public interest and private rights the former must prevail. It is further well settled that the section does not confer any power on the Executive Magistrate to adjudicate or decide disputes of civil nature or questions of title to properties or entitlements to rights but at the same time in cases where such disputes or titles or entitlements to rights have already been adjudicated and have become the subject matter of judicial pronouncements and decrees of Civil Courts of competent jurisdiction then in the exercise of his power under Section 144, he must have due regard to such established rights and subject of course to the paramount consideration of maintenance of public peace and tranquility, the exercise of power must be in aid of those rights and against those who interfere with the lawful exercise thereof and even in cases where there are no declared or established rights the power should not be exercised in a manner that would give material advantage to one party to the dispute over the other but in a fair manner originally in defence of legal rights, if there be such and the lawful exercise thereof rather than in suppressing them. In other words, the Magistrate's action should be directed against the wrongdoer rather than the wronged.
17. Thus from all this it is clear that the executive power of the learned Magistrate is for preventing disorder, obstruction and annoyance with a view to secure and maintain public peace and tranquility in the emergent situation, the Magistrate cannot adjudicate or decide the dispute of civil nature or the question of title of the property or the entitlements of the parties, but he can only take into consideration the decisions and adjudications of the competent court regarding the disputed property and on the basis of that make order for maintenance of the public tranquility and peace. He can also not order a property to be dispossessed and another party to be in possession in a proceeding under Section 144, Cr. P.C. It is the duty of the court to protect the rights of the parties and not to create rights and possession against a person who is already in possession in accordance with law. In other words a person in legal possession cannot be allowed to be dispossessed and another person who is not entitled to possession be ordered to be in possession. The Magistrate has to pass only the orders preventing the parties from committing breach of peace and public tranquility seeing the apparent title of parties made out and decided already by evidence in the record.
18. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that by the impugned order the learned Magistrate has dispossessed the petitioner and put the opposite party in possession of the book stalls which is not provided under the law. Learned counsel for the other side says that the petitioner was not in possession of the book stalls and so the learned Magistrate was right in ordering the opposite party to be put in possession of the same. In the case of Hafizal Eqbal and Ors. v. Gopal Sardar a division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held:
n these cases Magistrate must ascertain upon evidence who is in possession and if it is necessary they then can issue orders restraining other persons from interferring with such possession. These orders however, seem to be issued without any consideration whatsoever. Only the other day cases came before a Bench of which I was a member where a Magistrate had issued orders restraining the person in occupation from remaining in occupation. In other words, the learned Magistrate had evicted the person in possession and had placed the usurpur in possession by means of an injunction under this section. Quite clearly Section 144, Cr. P.C. was never intended for such purposes. The section is intended to give Magistrate powers to take immediate action to prevent breaches of the peace and such like ; but even so learned Magistrate should be careful to ascertain who is in possession and who is the disturber of that possession. Issue of an injunction of this sort, though the order is only effective for a comparatively short space of time, is a serious matter and these orders should not be made without an investigation as to the true facts of the case.
In Ram Pratap Narain Singh v. State of Bihar and Ors. 1987 P.L.J.R. 685 at page 689 it was said:
It is true that in a proceeding under Section 144 of the Code, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the rights or to decide the question of title or posession by usurping the functions of a civil court It is also not permissible for the Magistrate under the cover of an order under Section 144 of the Code to dispossess one party from the disputed property and to deliver the possession of the same to the other party.
19. In a proceeding under Section 165 the Magistrate has no power to pass an interim order to give back possession to one who claims to have been dispossessed, unless and until the rights of the parties have been conferred on the materials already showing the rights of the parties. If a person is evicted and a person without a right is put back in possession of a usurpur is made to get back possession under the cover of court's order or an injunction to put back in possession, however, the short space of the order be then it is an exercise of jurisdiction not warranted by law. Here in this case the learned Magistrate at the preliminary stage and without enquiry and investigation of the facts ordered the opposite party to be put back in possession which is unwarranted by law. Further it appears that at the time of passing of the order the opposite party was not in possession of the disputed property and that the petitioner first party was in possession. The second party had not been in possession so the restoration of possession should have not been ordered by the learned Magistrate, It further gives strength to the claim of the petitioner that it had obtained possession of the property from the opposite party, otherwise there would not have been an order for restoration of possession to the opposite party.
20. Now the question arises as to what is the position of the petitioner and the opposite party in regard to the disputed book stalls. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the petitioner was a licensee from the Railways for holding book stalls and the opposite party is an agent subject to the conditions enumerated in the terms of contract of agreement which has been filed as Annexure-1 to this petition. The opposite party on the other hand has not denied the contract and has admitted that he is an agent and has got no independent right of his own. His contention is that his agency has not been terminated and so he has got right to be in possession over the disputed stalls.
In the case of Balak Das and Anr. v. Bhagwan Das alias Bhagwan Bhagat and Anr. this Court has observed :
I am satisfied from the materials that although Bhagwan Das was in possession of the disputed lands his possession in Jaw amounts to permissive possession as agent. In Bajirao v. Mt. Dadibai A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1674, it has been observed that the possession of an agent or a servant which is permissive cannot give him a locus standi as against his principal or master in a proceeding under Section 145. The possession that can be pleaded in a proceeding under Section 145 must be possession based on a claim of right to possession.
In the case of Puran Singh v. State of Punjab,(&) it was observed :
Similarly an occupation of the property by a person as an agent or servant at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession.
In the later decision of this Court in Ram Pratap Narain Singh v. State of Bihar and Ors.,(supra) in which the present petitioner-company was opposite party No. 3 in an application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. for quashing an order of the learned Magistrate at Begusarai in a proceeding under Section 144, Cr. P. C., a learned single judge of this court following the above mentioned two decisions on this point took the same view that possession of the principal can be through the agent.
22. Thus in this instant case the opposite party who is an agent of the principal (the company) and that the opposite party has not claimed any independent right of his own, except that of as agent and principal and that his possession as permissive possession on behalf of the company, cannot have any independent right of his own except the permissive possession of the company and so no locus standi to the opposite party against the petitioner who is the principal of the opposite party.
23. Learned counsel for the opposite party has also submitted that this was a case under Section 145, Cr. P.C. and the present one is a case under Section 144, Cr. P.C. and so the position in law that an agent who has got permissive possession has got no locus standi against his principal is not applicable in the instant case. This contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party is not tenable, as an agent is always an agent and the question of permissive possession and locus standi arises whether it is a case under Section 144, Cr. P.C. or a case under Section 145, Cr. P.C. An agent cannot be in independent possession against the principal. A principal always has possession over a property through his agent or servant and so for that reason the possession of the principal through his agent or servant continues to be so.
24. It has been said on behalf of the petitioner that the decisions of the licence have been violated by the opposite party and so his agency has been cancelled and books and articles etc. have not been supplied to the opposite party since 26-12-86. Further a notice of termination was sought to be served upon the opposite party which he refused to accept and wanted time for making good the money. Meanwhile inventory was prepared and the new agent from the day till the 11 p. m. on 1st of March, 1987 at the stall and still the agent of the petitioner. The petitioner further alleged that agency of opposite party has been terminated and for that the petitioner wanted to serve a notice and when it could not be served, then the petitioner offered Rs. 500/- to opposite party in lieu of termination as provided in the agreement and it was said that it was to be adjusted to the amount due from the opposite party to the company. In this way the petitioner has terminated the agency of opposite party for the petitioner has further stated that two lawyers and public were also there during the course of termination of agency of opposite party regarding which informations were also given to G. R. P., Muzaffarpur, and the Superintendent of Muzaffarpur railway station. Thus it appears that the termination of agency of opposite party has been established.
25. In case of illegal termination of agency an agent has got a right to claim damages and other dues against his principal, but he cannot resist the possession of his principal.
26. Learned Magistrate, as said above, has got no right to keep the opposite party in possession of the book stalls. He has exceeded his jurisdiction. He ought to have passed an order under Section 144, Cr. P.C. directing the parties to maintain peace. In the case of Gulam Abbas v. Md. Ibrahim and Ors. (supra) the Supreme Court observed :
It may, however, be noted that the Magistrate is not concerned with individual right in performing his duty under Section 144 but he has to determine what may be reasonably necessary or expedient in a situation of which he is the best judge.
27. Learned counsel for the opposite party has said that the order impugned has spent its force and so there is no question for quashing the the same. As to this contention even if an order has spent its force but if it is not in accordance with law, then it is liable to be quashed. In a division Bench case of this court in Muzaffarpur Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors. 1973 Cr. L.J. 143 at page 145 it has been observed :
Counsel for the Muzaffarpur Municipality (opposite party No. 3) strongly urged that as the order has already spent its force, it could not be set aside. It is not possible for me to accept this submission of learned counsel. In spite of the fact that the order had spent its force, a rule was issued in the case of Saligram Singh v. Baijnath Singh A.I.R. 1934 Patna 104 :1833 Cr. L.J. 1057, with a view to examine the legality or otherwise of the order. In that case the order passed although spent by lapse of time before the hearing of the rule, was set aside, on the ground that no wrongful act of the petitioner (of that case) has been alleged or found. On the same lines is the decision in Hansraj Prasad Singh v. Abdul Jabbar A.I.R. 1935 Pat. 461:36 Cr. L.J. 1268. In the case of Panchkesar Kuer v. Madho Singh, (1938) 19 Pat. L.T. 796, the order was set aside with the following observations (Per Verroa, J.) :
I am aware of the fact that the order has by now spent itself, but it may affect the future rights of the parties in any subsequent litigations." In Bindeshwari Singh v. Raghunandan Mahto A.I.R. 1940 Pat. 559 : 41 Cr. L.J. 578, it was held that if the order was not properly passed, it must be set aside even though it had spent its force. Similarly, in Dewan Singh v. Deo Narain Singh , Ramaswami, J. (as he then was) interfered with an illegal order even though the order had spent its force, on the ground that it would affect the future rights of the parties.
Thus the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party fails, as an order even if it has spent its force cannot set aside if it is found to be illegal and without jurisdiction.
28. It has been contended on behalf of the learned counsel for the opposite party that application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. is not maintainable and the court cannot pass an order for restoration of the possession of the petitioner who has been dispossessed by the order of the learned Magistrate. This contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party cannot stand as this Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C. has got power to restore the status quo ante. In the Full Bench decision of this Court in Rajiv Bharti v. State of Bihar and Ors. 1985 Cr. L.J. 143 at page 146 it was observed :
To conclude: The answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that in the exercise of its inherent power under the Code the High Court can order restitution of possession to the petitioner while setting aside a wholly arbitrary order of the Magistrate dispossessing him under the garb of an order under Section 144 of the Code.
Thus following the above full Bench decision of this Court the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party does not stand as this Court has got power to restore the status quo ante.
29. In the result this application is allowed and the impugned order of the learned Magistrate dated 16-4-87 is set aside and the possession of the petitioner is restored and there will be no disturbance in possession of the same. The police is directed to unlock the stall and put back the same in the possession of the petitioner within a period of two months from today.