Gauhati High Court
West Bengal State Weaver'S Co-Op ... vs Dr. Bibhabasu Chowdhury And Ors. on 20 January, 2004
Equivalent citations: (2004)3GLR132, 2004 A I H C 972, (2004) 1 GAU LT 177, (2004) 3 GAU LR 132, (2004) 2 RENTLR 220
Author: I.A. Ansari
Bench: I.A. Ansari
JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J.
1. Will revision lie against the final order of the authority under the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, is the core question, which this revision petition has raised.
2. The material facts giving rise to the present revision may be stated as follows :
(i) The opposite party herein, as plaintiff, instituted Title Suit No. 37/ 93 aforementioned for ejactment of the defendant from the suit premises and also for arrear of rent on the ground that the defendant was defaulter and the suit premises were bona fide required for the use and occupation of the plaintiff, the case set up by the plaintiff being, briefly stated, thus: The plaintiff and his brother, namely, proforma defendant No. 5 were partners of M/s. Ellora, a registered partnership firm, situated at Club Road, Silchar, having exclusive possession of the suit room. The plaintiff and his brother let out the suit premises to the defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 4 on monthly rental of Rs. 850, the rent being payable before 7th day of each preceding month. The said registered firm, Ellora, was dissolved with effect from 1.4.1990 pursuant to the registered deed of dissolution of partnership, dated 25.11.1991. The suit premises fell in the exclusive share of the plaintiff and the plaintiff accordingly informed the defendant. The defendant attorned to the plaintiff as their landlord. The tenancy agreement, dated 10.4.1981, aforementioned expired on 9.4.1987 and a fresh agreement was executed enhancing the rent to Rs. 1000 per month. From the very inception of the tenancy, the defendants were irregular in making payment of rents, though neither the plaintiff nor his said brother had waived the right to receive the rent as per terms of the tenancy agreement. Since the month of April, 1992, the defendants, despite repeated demands made by the plaintiff, paid no rent to the plaintiff and became defaulters. The plaintiff is serving as a doctor of Silchar Medical College Hospital, his son, who is prosecuting studies in the Medical Science, intend to start a Poly Clinic at the suit premises. The suit premises were, thus, bona fide required by the plaintiff for his own use and occupation.
(ii) The defendants contested the suit by filing their written statement, their case being, that the suit was barred by limitation, the same was bad for waiver, estoppel and acquiescence and that the plaintiff had no locus standi to institute the suit. The further case of the defendants being, in brief, thus : The defendants have been served with notice, on 22.2.1993, by the Income Tax Officer, Ward No. 1, Silchar, asking the defendants not to pay rent to the plaintiff and complying with this direction, defendants refrained from paying rent to the plaintiff and as such, they are not defaulters, particularly, when there was no fixed mode of payment and rents were being paid as and when demanded. The plaintiff received an amount of Rs. 36,000 as rent for three years, i.e., with effect from 1.4.1987 to 31.3.1988, 1.4.1988 to 31.3.1989 and 1.4.1989 to 31.3.1990 and issued receipts accordingly. No arrear was required to be paid by the defendants to the plaintiff. The suit premises were not bona fide required by plaintiff.
(iii) Both the parties adduced evidence by examining one witness each and upon hearing, the trial Court, while holding that the defendants were defaulter, concluded that the suit premises were not bona fide required by the landlord. The suit was accordingly decreed on 8.1.1997. This decree led to the Title Appeal No. 6/97 preferred by the defendant challenging the judgment and decree. The plaintiff also preferred a Cross Objection against the finding of the learned trial Court on the point of bona fide requirement of the suit premises by the landlord. By the judgment and order, dated 11.3.1998, while the appeal was disallowed, the Cross Objection of the plaintiff succeeded. The suit was accordingly decreed for recovery of arrear rents and also for eviction of the tenant. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant has, now, approached this Court with the help of the present revision.
3. I have perused the materials on record. I have heard Mr. M.A. Laskar, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Mr. N.C. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party.
4. Presenting the case on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. Laskar has submitted that in the facts and circumstance of the present case and the law relevant thereto, it is clear that the defendants were not defaulters inasmuch as no rent was required to be paid and that conduct of the parties reveal that there was no fixed mode of payment of rent and that the plaintiff used to accept rent as and when the same was offered. This apart, there is no credible evidence on record, points out Mr. Laskar, that despite the demand made for payment of rent by the plaintiff, the defendants refused to make payment thereof. Mr. Laskar has also pointed out that the defendants did not make payment of the rent to the landlord on account of the letter, dated 22.12.1993, issued by the Income Tax Officer, Ward No. 1, Silchar, whereby the defendants were asked not to make payment of rents to the plaintiff. Acting upon this letter, the defendants did not, submits Mr. Laskar, pay the rents to the plaintiff and in the face of such a letter, defendants could not have been held to be defaulters.
5. Mr. Laskar has also submitted that the suit room measures about 35' x 12' on the ground floor of a RCC building and such a size of the room shows that the room itself was insufficient to start a polyclinic as contended by the plaintiff. It is, thus, clear, according to Mr. Laskar, that the plaintiff made out a vague case of bona fide requirement of the suit premises and since the size of the room was not conducive for starting a polyclinic, the learned trial Court correctly held that the landlord had failed to prove that the suit premises were required by him bona fide, but this finding was reversed by the appellate Court on mis-appreciation of the evidence on record and the law contained in that behalf.
6. Controverting the above submissions made on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite party, Mr. Choudhury has submitted that admittedly, the defendants have not paid rent since April, 1992 and since they have not made any payment of rent despite being under contractual and legal obligation to make payment of the rent, the defendants were correctly held to be defaulters. Since there is legal obligation, contends Mr. Choudhury, to pay due rent to the plaintiff, the defendants cannot escape the liability by merely referring to the letter, dated 22.12.2002, aforementioned for not paying rent to the plaintiff.
7. Mr. Choudhury has also submitted that the plaintiff himself is a doctor and his son has already become a graduate in Medicine and, hence, it is not unnatural for them to decide to start a clinic of their own in their own properties and since the suit room, in question, is suitable for such purpose, the plaintiff justifiably claimed that he was in bona fide need of the premises. The evidence on record clearly indicates, points out Mr. Choudhury, that besides the suit room, there is land available on the adjoining areas and on the back side of the suit room and, hence, the plaintiff can comfortably run a poly clinic by making use of the space so available with him and in this view of the matter, learned appellate Court was wholly justified in coming to the conclusion that the suit premises were bona fide required by the plaintiff.
8. What is, now, of immense importance to note is that during the course of hearing of this revision, it came to the notice of this Court that the Apex Court vide its order, dated 18.3.2002, passed in Civil Appeal No. 2060/2002, has held to the effect that against the final order of the authority under the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, writ petition is maintainable. This decision has given rise to the question as to whether a revision is at all maintainable against the final order of the authority concerned under the said Act and the learned counsel for the parties have accordingly been heard on this question.
9. Hence, before turning to the merit of this revision, it is essential to, first, decide as to whether a revision will be maintainable at all against the final order of the authority concerned under the said Act.
10. While considering the above aspect of the matter, it is pertinent to bear in mind the scheme of the said Act and its brief history leading to the form in which the Act presently stands.
11. The Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1972"), broadly speaking, regulates the incidents of tenancy and inter-se rights and obligations of the landlord and the tenant. When the quantum of rent to be paid by the tenant raises a dispute between the landlord and the tenant, Section 4 of the Act comes into application inasmuch as it lays down the procedure for determination of fair rent. Similarly, Section 5 enumerates the grounds on which a tenant is liable to be evicted from the tenanted premises. Section 6 contains duties of the landlord vis-a-vis the tenant and the tenanted premises. If the landlord fails to discharge any of his duties, Section 7(2) empowers the Court to pass appropriate order to remedy the grievances of the tenant regarding non-discharge of duties by the landlord. Section 8 makes it clear that an order or decision passed under Sections 4, 5 and 7(2) shall be treated as a decree. The scheme of the Act shows that for any of the purposes aforesaid, the proceeding under the Act can be initiated and such a proceeding is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. It is Section 8, which is material for this revision. Section 8 reads as follows :
"8. Appeals. A landlord or a tenant aggrieved by any decision or order of the Court under the provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 7(2) of this Act shall have a right of appeal against the same as if such decision or order were a decree in a suit for ejectment of the tenant from the house and such appellate Court's decision shall be final."
12. Abare reading of Section 8 show's that this Section provides that a landlord or tenant, whoever is aggrieved by the decision or order of the Court rendered under the provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 7(2) of the Act shall have a right of appeal against the same as if such decision or order were a decree in a suit for ejectment of tenant from a house and such appellate Court's decision shall be final.
13. Before the addition of the words, "such appellate Court's decision shall be final" to Section 8 (which was earlier numbered as Section 9), this Court considered in Civil Revision No. 127/94, if a revision or second appeal would lie against the order of the appellate Court under Section 9. Baharul Islam, J, (as he then was) answered this question, relying upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Mulchand Agarwala v. Santolal Agarwalla, AIR 1954 Assam 177, to the effect that revision was incompetent as second appeal was available from the appellate Court's decision under Section 9.
14. After addition of the words "such appellate Court's decision shall be final", Section 8 came up for consideration before this Court if, in the face of such amendment, a second appeal would lie against the appellate Court's decision. In Ramesh Chandra Basak v. Deo Narayan Prasad and Ors., reported in 1984 GHC 34, a Full Bench of this Court took the view that in view of the amendment so introduced into Section 8, no second appeal would lie against the appellate Court's decision inasmuch as the same is final. For the purpose of coming to such a conclusion, the Court had placed reliance on South Asian Industries (P.) Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh, reported in AIR 1965 SC 1442 (decided by a Bench of four Judges), wherein Subba Rao, Actg. CJ, speaking for the Supreme Court had observed. "The expression "final" prima facie connotes that an order passed on appeal under the Act is conclusive and no further appeal lies against it".
15. Thus, the decision in Mulchand Agarwalla (supra) shows that in view of absence of any bar to prefer further appeals against a decision of the appellate court constituted under Section 9 of the Act of 1946, their Lordships held that the effect of Section 9 of the then Act should be carried to its logical conclusion, namely, that the order rendered by an appellate court should be subject to second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. In course of time, in Ramesh Chandra Basak (supra), the Full Bench of this Court took the view that in the face of the bar imposed by Section 8 by making appellate Court's decision final, no further right of appeal exists.
16. In other words, in view of the fact that Section 8 of the Act of 1972 makes decision of the appellate Court final, it follows, as held in Ramesh Chandra Basak (supra), that the Act not only provides for a right of one appeal, but that it also prohibits entertainment of any further appeal. Hence, in the light of the provisions of Section 8, as has been laid down in Ramesh Chandra Basak (supra), no right of second appeal is provided.
17. The question, which, now, arises for consideration is as to whether in the face of Section 8 of the Act of 1972, shall it be concluded that the proceedings initiated under the said Act comes to a complete end with the decision of the appellate Court rendered under Section 8 or whether a revision can be entertained against an appellate order if a case is made out that the Court had no jurisdiction and/or that the Court refused to exercise jurisdiction and/or that the Court, while exercising jurisdiction, acted with material irregularity.
18. My quest for an answer to the above question brings me to the decision in Chagan Lal v. Municipal Corporation, Indore, AIR 1977 SC 1555. This is a decision, which has been rendered by a Bench of three Judges of the Apex Court. In this case, there was an assessment authority of the Municipal Corporation. Against the assessment made by such an authority of the Corporation, a right of appeal was provided to the Municipal Appellate Committee. Under Section 149 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Act, 1956, a right of appeal was also provided to the District Court from the decision of the Municipal Commissioner and Sub-section (1) of Section 149 provided that the decision of the District Court shall be final. In this Case, the High Court had interfered with the decision of the District Court and it was contended before the Apex Court that since Sub-section (1) of Section 149 provides that the decision of the District Court shall be final, the decision of the District Court could not have been interfered with in revision by the High Court, The Apex Court, while dealing with this aspect of the matter, held thus : "This plea cannot be accepted, for, under Section 115 of the CPC, the High Court has got a power to revise an order passed by the Court subordinate to it. It cannot be disputed that the district Court is a subordinate Court and is liable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court".
19. The decision in Chagan Lal (supra) shows that even if an Act makes an order of an appellate authority final and no further right of appeal lies, the High Court may still entertain revision if conditions precedent for exercise of powers under Section 115 of the Code exist.'
20. I may also, at this stage, refer to the decision in Aundal Animal v. Sadashivan Pillai, AIR 1987 SC 183. In this case, the Kerala Building Lease and Control Act provides a right of appeal under Section 18 and Sub-section (5) of Section 18 provides that a decision of the appellate authority, as mentioned in Section 18, shall not be liable to be questioned except in the manner as provided under Section 20 thereof. Section 20 embodies that in certain circumstances specified in the Section 20 itself, a revision will lie to the District Court if the decision is from subordinate Court and, in any other case, to the High Court: In this case, the Apex Court observed and laid down as follows :
"The learned Single Judge referred to the decision of Judicial Committee in the case of Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin, AIR 1934 PC 81. The learned Judge also referred to a decision of this Court in South Asian Industries (P.) Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh, AIR 1965 SC 1442 (supra). The learned Judge concluded that so long as there was no specific provision in the statue making the determination by the District Court final and excluding the supervisory power of the High Court under Section 115 of the CPC, it had to be held that the decision rendered by the district Court under Section 20 (1) of the Act being a decision of a court subordinate to the High Court to which an appeal lay to the High Court was liable to be revised by the High Court under Section 115 of the CPC, In that view of the -matter, the Full Bench rejected the view of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Kurien v. Chacko, 1960 Ker LT 1248. With respect, we are unable to sustain the view of the Full Bench of the High Court on this aspect of the matter. In our opinion, the Full bench misconstrued the provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 18 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of Section 18 clearly states that such decision of the appellate authority as mentioned in Section 18 of the Act shall not be liable to be questioned except in the manner under Section 20 of the Act. There was thereby an implied prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under Section 115 of the CPC to the High Court when a revision has been provided under Section 20 of the Act in question. When Section 18(5) of the Act specifically states that "shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law" except in the manner provided under Section 20, it cannot be said that the High Court which is a court of law and which is a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, under Section 115 of the CPC could revise again an order after revision under Section 20 of the Act. That would mean there would be trial by Four Courts, which would be repugnant to the scheme manifest in the different sections of the Act in question, Public policy or public interest demand curtailment of law's delay and justice demands finality within quick disposal of the case. The language of the provisions of Section 18(5) read with Section 20 inhibits further revision. The Courts must so construe. (Emphasis is supplied)
21. A careful reading of the decision in Aundal Amamal (supra) shows that since a revision was already provided in the Act itself against the order of the appellate authority and there was an implied prohibition for the exercise of powers under Section 115 of the Code, the Apex Court concluded that no second revision can be entertained by the High Court by taking recourse to Section 115, This decision cannot, however, be stretched to mean that the Apex Court has held that when an appellate Court's order under an Act is made final, no revisional jurisdiction can be exercised by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code.
22. What the decision in Aundal Amamal (supra) lays down is that the question as to whether a proceeding commenced under an Act governing relationship of landlord and tenant becomes final for all intents and purposes shall be determined on the basis of the intention of the legislature, which has to be gathered from the language employed in the Act and the whole scheme of the Act including hierarchy of the Courts, which the Act perceives. This apart, for achieving the object with which such an Act has been made, public policy and public interest are to be borne in mind by the Court.
23. For the sake of brevity, let me, once again, turn to South Asian Industries (P.) Ltd. (supra), wherein the Apex Court, I find, observed as held as follows :
"The expression "final" prima facie connotes that an order passed on appeal under the Act is conclusive and no further appeal lies against it. The last sentence in Section 43 of the Act, does not restrict the scope of the said expression; indeed, the said sentence impose a further bar. The expression "final" in the first part of Section 43 of the Act puts an end to a further appeal and the words "shall not be called in question in any original suit application or execution proceeding" bar collateral proceedings. The Section imposes a total bar. The correctness of the judgment in appeal cannot be questioned by way of appeal or by way of collateral proceedings. It is true that the expression "final" may have a restrictive meaning in other context, but in Section 43 of the Act such a restrictive meaning can not be given for Ch. VI of the Act provides for a hierarchy of tribunals for deciding disputes arising thereunder. The Act is a self-contained one and the intention of the Legislature was to provide an exhaustive code for disposing of the appeal under the Act. The opening words of Section 43 of the Act "save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act" emphasize the fact that the finality of the order cannot be questioned by resorting to something outside the Act. An appeal disposed of by a single Judge of the High Court and the appeal from the judgment of the single Judge to a Division Bench thereof are different appeals. An appeal under Section 39(1) of the Act and an appeal under Clause 10 of the letters patent does not form part of a single appeal. The expression "appeal" in Section 39 of the Act does not take in a Letters latent appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Therefore, an appeal does not lie under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent for the High Court of Lahore, to a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court against a judgment passed by a single Judge of the said High Court in a second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Case law discussed." (Emphasis is supplied)
24. From a combined reading of the decision of the. Apex Court in South Asian Industries (P.) Ltd. (supra), Chagan Lal (supra) and Aundal Ammal (supra), what follows is that if the Act bars any right of further appeal and declares the order of the appellate authority as final, no further right of appeal will be available with the parties and, similarly, if the Act, expressly or by implication, prohibits exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, no power of revision can be exercised under Section 115; but on the exercise of the revisional power, if the Act puts no restriction, then, the Court cannot refuse to entertain a revision under Section 115 merely on the ground that the appellate Court's order is final and for the purpose of proper construction and correct interpretation of such an Act, the provisions of the Act, the language of the Act, the intention of the legislature, public policy, public interest and the whole scheme of the Act including the hierarchy of Courts specified in the Act must be kept in mind.
25. I may, however, also hasten to add that there is a subtle, but marked difference between the contents of the Act, in question, in Chagan Lal (supra) and Aundal Ammal (supra). In Chagan Lal (supra), assessment of house tax was by an executive body and the right of appeal was provided to an appellate committee. This Committee too was an executive authority. Hence, the process of assessment of house rent as well as appeal arising therefrom were not governed by the provisions of the CPC. It was in the face of such provisions that a right of appeal to the District Court was provided and there was no hierarchy of Courts specified by the Act. In this context, when the word 'final' is used in respect of the decision of the appellate Court, it cannot be said that the revisional powers contained under Section 115 of the CPC cannot be invoked. As against this, the scheme of Kerala Buildings and the Lease and Rent Control Act shows that suit for ejectment was governed by the CPC and so were the appeals. This apart, the revision was also provided under the said Act.
26. Turning to the case at hand, it is of utmost importance to note that the Act of 1972 indicates that action is instituted in a Civil Court and the appeal is also preferred before a Civil Court and to such a suit and appeal, provisions of the CPC are applicable. Thus, the scheme of the Act of 1972 shows that an action is instituted in a Court of civil jurisdiction and it becomes final by the verdict of the appellate Court's decision, which also exercises civil jurisdiction. In such a situation, when the Act of 1972 states that the decision of the appellate Court shall be final, the logical conclusion will be that all causes of action between the landlord and the tenant come to an end in respect of all such matters to which provisions of the Act apply with the pronouncement of the decision by the appellate Court in terms of Section 8. Viewed from this angle, it is not possible to hold that the right of revision will still remain open to the parities concerned against the final decision of the Court under Section 8. It is, in this context, that the decision of the Apex Court in Subodh Chandra Deb (supra) needs to be considered and when so considered, it becomes transparent that no revision lies against the decision of the appellate Court and, hence, the provisions of Section 115 of the Code cannot be resorted to for entertaining a revision arising out of a proceeding under the Act of 1972.
27. Before proceeding any further, it is also of utmost importance to note that there is a glaringly noticeable difference in the language of Section 100 and Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. While Section 100 makes right of second appeal subject to the other provisions of the Code and also any other law, which will, obviously, include Rent Control Act, Section 115 does not impose any such limitation on the revisional jurisdiction, yet, in the face of the law laid down in Aundal Ammal (supra), there can be no escape from the conclusion that an Act may expressly or impliedly bar jurisdiction of the High Court in exercising the powers under Section 115. This apart, Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes it clear that the Court of Civil jurisdiction shall not take cognizance of suits, which are expressly or impliedly barred. This, in turn, shows that an Act may restrict the application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to the Act. In such a situation, in the light of the law laid down in Aundal Ammal (supra), High Court cannot assume jurisdiction under Section 115 ignoring the scheme of the Act, in question. In other words, if an Act expressly or impliedly prohibits exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, the Court cannot invoke its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115.
28. Keeping in view the above, let me, now, turn to Subodh Ch. Deb v. State of Assam and Ors., decided by this Court, on 31.5.2000, in WP(C) No. 6230/99. In this case, the suit was instituted by the landlord under the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, for ejectment of the tenant and the suit was decreed by the trial Court. There was an appeal and the appeal was also dismissed. Challenging the legality and validity of this appellate judgment, a writ application was filed by the defendant on the ground that the rate of monthly rent of the rented premises, in dispute, was Rs. 45 and not Rs. 150 and that the finding of the Court below that the petitioner was a defaulter was perverse and that the same should be set aside and quashed. As regards the second prayer that the rent was not Rs. 150 per month, the learned Single Judge held that this was a disputed question of fact and cannot be enquired into and determined by a writ Court. As regards the prayer that the finding of defaulter was perverse, the learned Single Judge held thus : "Article 226 does not give a right to the petitioner to challenge the legality and validity of the decree passed by the Civil Court inasmuch as appropriate remedy for it is provided. A remedy is provided, in this particular case, too, to file a revision against the judgment, but instead of filing a revision under Section 115 of the CPC, the petitioner approached the High Court for exercise of writ jurisdiction." The writ petition was accordingly dismissed.
29. A Division Bench of this High Court dismissed in limini the Writ Appeal No. 254/2000, which arose out of the decision, dated 31.5.2000, aforementioned passed in WP(C) No. 6230/99. While dealing with this case, in Civil Appeal No. 2260/2002, i.e., Subodh Chandra Deb v. State of Assam and Ors., the Apex Court held and directed as follows :
"By order dated 4th September, 2001, this Court issued notice limited to the question why the case should not be remanded back to the High Court for deciding the case treating the petition as revision. It is however, to be noted that proceedings were between landlord and tenant under the provisions of Assam Urban Area Rent Control Act hence a writ petition will be maintainable against the final order of the authority under the Act.
The writ appeal was disposed of by the Division Bench of the High Court in limini agreeing with the learned Single Judge holding that no writ petition was maintainable against respondent Nos. 3 and 4 who are landlords of the petitioner." (Emphasis is added)
30. A careful reading of the above decision of the Apex Court in Subodh Ch. Deb (supra) shows that against the final order of the authority under the Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, a writ petition will be maintainable. Does this, now, mean that no revisional jurisdiction can be exercised under Section 115 of the Code by the High Court against the order of the final authority under the Act.
31. While considering the above aspect of the matter, it needs to be carefully noted that in Subodh Chandra Deb (supra), the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on two grounds. One of the grounds was that the rate of monthly rent was Rs. 45 or 150 is actually a question of fact, which cannot be decided in a writ petition. Thus, so far as this ground was concerned, the learned Single Judge did not hold that no writ petition would lie, for, there could have been a revision. However, while dealing with next ground, i.e., the ground of defaulter, the learned Single Judge held that the writ petition is not maintainable, for a remedy under Section 115 was available to the petitioner. It is in the context of this ground, namely, rejection of the writ petition on the ground that remedy for revision is available that Apex Court has, now, laid down that writ petition is maintainable against the final order of the authority concerned under the Act.
32. Therefore, the word "final", occurring in Section 8 of the Act of 1972, has to be interpreted keeping in view the whole scheme of the Act, the language in which Section 8 has been couched, the intention of legislature, public policy and public interest. When considered so, it is not difficult to construe that the word "final" connotes not only that no further appeal is provided under the Act, but that the Act imposes a complete bar to further proceedings arising out of the dispute, which resulted into institution of the proceeding under the Act. The Act provides a complete system for adjudication of dispute and prescribes therefor an hierarchy of Courts for deciding disputes arising under the Act. The Act, if one may borrow, with utmost respect, the words of Subba Rao, Actg. CJ, in South Asian Industries (P.) Ltd. (supra), "a self-contained one and the intention of legislature was to provide an exhaustive Code" for disposal of disputes under the Act. Public policy or public interest, as indicated in Aundal Ammal (supra), demands curtailment of laws and justice demands finality with quick disposal of the case.
33. Though the Act of 1972 does not specifically bar revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, the fact remains that when the word 'final' is interpreted, in the manner as indicated hereinabove, keeping in view the whole scheme of the Act, it clearly follows that with the pronouncement of the appellate decision, the proceeding, which commences under the Act, shall come to a complete end. Thus, the word "final", occurring in Section 8, does not leave open to adjudication the dispute, which had led to the institution of the proceeding under the Act and sets at rest the controversy between the parties, which had given rise to the cause of action for instituting the proceeding. The Act, while, on the other hand, aims at protecting the interest of the tenant, it, at the same time and on the other hand, provides for expeditious procedure for ejectment of tenants, who deserve to be ousted from tenanted premises. It is trite that rules of interpretation of statute are to guide Courts in arriving at an interpretation, which furthers the ends of justice rather than inhibits them.
34. The Act is, undoubtedly, a beneficial and social legislation. If a doubt arises as to whether the span of life of litigation under the Act has been curtailed or shortened, construction of the Act should be in favour of the trimming of the proceeding and not in protracting the length of the litigation, for, such a course will uphold the ends of justice. Since the dispute between landlord and tenant, ordinarily, calls for determination of simple questions of facts, it stands to reason that the Act makes appellate Court's decision rendered under the Act as final for the purpose of bringing a complete end to all further proceedings involving the dispute. It is from this angle that the decision of Apex Court in Subodh Chandra Deb (supra) needs to be read. In this case, the writ petition was rejected on the ground that tenant had the remedy of revision available for determination of the question as to whether he was a defaulter or not. When the Division Bench dismissed the writ Appeal in limini, the Apex Court issued notice with limited question as to why the case should not be remanded to the High Court for deciding the case treating the petition as revision; but finally, instead of remanding the case for being heard as revision, the Apex Court took note of the fact that since the proceedings were between landlord and tenant under the Act of 1972, a writ petition will be maintainable against the final order of the authority under the Act meaning thereby that no remedy for revision is available under the Act and that a proceeding, which commences under the Act of 1972, conies to an end finally with the decision of the appellate Court rendered under Section 8.
35. In the case at hand, though the Act does not, in so many words, provide for revision or restrict the High Court's power of revision under Section 115, the fact remains that the word "final" has to be interpreted by considering the whole scheme of the Act, the intention of the legislature and the public policy. The public policy demands shortening of the period of litigation and the intention of the legislature is to make the decision of the appellate Court final: The scheme of the Act shows that there is hierarchy of Courts for determination of disputes raised by the parties. It needs to be borne in mind that though Section 115 does not make this Section subject to any other provisions of the Code or to any other law made by the legislature, the fact remains that the provisions of the Code are applied with the help of Section 9 of the CPC, Section 9 makes it clear that "Courts", which obviously include a High Court, have jurisdiction unless the same is expressly or impliedly barred. Though there is no express bar under the Act of 1972 on the powers of the High Court to revise any order passed under the Act including an appellate order passed under Section 8 of the Act, the fact remains that the word "final", if interpreted keeping in view the whole scheme of the Act, it will mean that the Act puts an implied bar on the revisional powers of the High Court and such an implied bar can be inferred from the scheme of the Act and also the recent decision of the Apex Court in Subodh Chandra Deb (supra).
36. Considering, therefore, the matter in its entirety, I am firmly of the view that no revision lies against the final decision of an authority under the Act of 1972 and the remedy available, if any, to the aggrieved party is to approach the Court by way of writ petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India.
37. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, I find that this revision is not maintainable and the same is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.
38. Let the LCR be sent back.