Bangalore District Court
Shivananda H V vs M/S Solid Steels on 4 February, 2026
1
Crl.A.1798/2023
Judgment
KABC010335322023
IN THE COURT OF THE LIX ADDL.CITY CIVIL &
SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE CITY (CCH-60)
Dated this the 04th of February 2025.
PRESENT:
SRI SOMASHEKARA. A., B.A.L., LL.M.,
XV ADDL.CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS JUDGE,
BANGALORE CITY.
C/c LIX ADDL.CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS JUDGE,
BANGALORE CITY.
Crl.Appeal No.1798/2023
APPELLANT/S: Sri.SHIVANANDA H.V
Proprietor of Sri.Shivananda Steel
No.437, J.P.Nagar
Near Gobbalimara Circle
Mysore
(By Sri.P.K.S., Advocate)
-Vs-
RESPONDENT/S: M/s SOLID STEELS
Office at No.177/1, 3rd Flor,
7th B Main, Jayanagar
3rd Block, Bengaluru
Rep by its Authorised Person
Mr.Abdul Azhar, Partner.
(By Sri.V.K., Advocate)
Judge Sign
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Crl.A.1798/2023
Judgment
JUDGMENT
This appeal is filed by the appellant/accused under Section 374(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure calling in question the legality, correctness and propriety of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 17.10.2023 passed by the learned XXVIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, in C.C.No.3019/2019, whereby the accused was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and sentenced to pay a fine of ₹10,79,000/-, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one year.
2. Facts of the case;
The respondent herein is the complainant before the trial court. The complainant is a partnership firm dealing in the business of trading in iron and steel, cement, pipes, plumbing materials and other hardware. The case of complainant in brief is that during the course of business, the Judge Sign 3 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment accused proprietor placed orders for supply of steel materials and pursuant to the orders, the complainant supplied materials as per Invoice No.477 dated 30.12.2017 for ₹7,01,392/- and Invoice No.527 dated 13.01.2018 for ₹5,87,744/-, totally for ₹12,89,136/-. It is further alleged that the accused made part payment of ₹2,29,257/- on 17.01.2018 and the balance amount of ₹10,59,879/- remained due.
3. It is the further case of complainant that towards discharge of the said due amount, accused issued two cheques bearing No.736190 for ₹4,72,135/- and cheque No.736191 for ₹5,87,774/-, both dated 14.08.2018, drawn on Kaveri Grameena Bank, J.P. Nagar Branch, Mysore, in favour of complainant. The complainant presented the said cheques through its banker Karnataka Bank, Jayanagar 4th Block Branch, Bengaluru. The cheques came to be dishonoured with endorsements as "Funds Insufficient" and "Account Closed". Thereafter statutory notice dated Judge Sign 4 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment 27.08.2018 was issued calling upon the accused to pay the cheque amount within 15 days. Notice was served on 30.08.2018. Despite service, the accused neither replied nor paid the amount. Hence complaint came to be filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C. for offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act.
4. Before the trial court, accused appeared and was enlarged on bail. Substance of accusation was recorded. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The authorised person of complainant firm was examined as PW- 1 and documents Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-12 were marked. The accused examined himself as DW-1, but did not produce any documents. The learned Magistrate after appreciation of evidence, convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act and sentenced him to pay fine of ₹10,79,000/- and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one year.
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5. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the accused has preferred this appeal contending inter alia that there is no legally recoverable debt; the complainant firm was not in existence during transaction period; PW-1 had no valid authorisation to prosecute; statutory notice is invalid due to wrong reason of dishonour; invoices are unsupported by delivery proof; cheques were issued only as security; and the trial court wrongly convicted the accused only on presumption without proper appreciation of defence evidence.
6. After registration of the appeal, notice was issued to the respondent. The respondent appeared through counsel. Trial court records are secured.
7. Heard arguments. Perused appeal memorandum, written arguments and the entire records. The following points that would arise for my determination.
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1) Whether the trial court is correct in holding that the accused has committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act?
2) Whether there is any legal infirmity in the impugned judgment requiring interference by this Court?
3) What order?
8. My findings on the above points are as under;
Point No.1: In the Affirmative Point No.2: In the Negative Point No.3: As per the final order for the following;
REASONS
9. Point Nos.1 and 2: Both these points are taken together for common discussion.
The appellant has argued that the partnership deed and registration certificate are subsequent and hence complaint is not maintainable.
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10. The appellant has strongly contended that the complainant produced partnership deed dated 24.12.2018 (Ex.P-10) and registration certificate dated 27.12.2018 (Ex.P-11), whereas transaction pertains to 2017-18 and hence the firm was not in existence during transaction period. On careful perusal, it is noticed that complainant has asserted it was carrying on business and supplied materials and the accused has not convincingly disproved such business dealings. The subsequent production of partnership deed and registration certificate by itself does not falsify the transaction, especially when accused has admitted cheques and signatures. Moreover, even if there is some discrepancy regarding internal constitution/registration, the accused cannot escape liability under Section 138 once the cheque issued by him is dishonoured and statutory compliance is proved. Therefore, this contention does not go to the root to warrant acquittal.
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11. The appellant contends that PW-1 had no authority at the time of filing complaint and issuing notice and authorisation letter was produced later as Ex.P-12. It is true that PW-1 admitted in cross-examination that authorisation was not produced initially. However, the complainant later produced Ex.P-12 authorisation letter and it was marked in evidence. The defect, if any, is curable and it is not shown that such belated production caused any prejudice to the defence. Further, the accused had full opportunity to cross-examine PW-1 and contest the case on merits. Therefore, the proceedings are not vitiated on this ground.
12. It is seen that PW-1 subsequently produced partnership deed and registration certificate as Ex.P-10 and Ex.P-11 and authorisation letter Ex.P-12. Even assuming that documents were later produced, such technical objections cannot by itself nullify the complaint when the complainant firm is shown to be in existence and capable of Judge Sign 9 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment suing, and when accused has admitted issuance of cheques and has not rebutted liability.
13. PW-1 produced authorisation letter Ex.P-12. It is true that PW-1 admitted that authorisation was not produced initially. However, production of authorisation subsequently cures the defect and the proceedings are not vitiated. Moreover, accused has not demonstrated any prejudice caused to his defence due to such later production. Appellant contends notice is invalid as reason for dishonour was stated as "Funds Insufficient" though one cheque was "Account Closed". This Court finds that the statutory requirement is demand for payment of cheque amount and not the exact reproduction of endorsement wording. The accused was made aware of dishonour and liability and demand was raised. Hence notice cannot be held invalid on such hyper-technical ground.
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14. At the outset, it is to be noted that the accused has not disputed the cheques Ex.P-3 and Ex.P-4 as belonging to him and has also admitted his signature thereon. Once issuance and signature are admitted, the statutory presumption under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act squarely comes into operation that the cheque was issued for discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability. It is equally settled law that such presumption is rebuttable, however, the burden shifts on the accused to raise a probable defence either by leading positive evidence or eliciting material admissions in the cross-examination of PW-1. A mere denial or explanation without supporting circumstances does not constitute rebuttal. In the present case, except taking inconsistent stands such as "no transaction" and "security cheque", the accused has not produced any cogent materials to probabilise his defence. Hence, the presumption remains unrebutted.
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15. The complainant has produced two invoices Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2 showing supply of steel materials under Invoice No.477 dated 30.12.2017 and Invoice No.527 dated 13.01.2018. The complainant's case is that accused had made part payment of ₹2,29,257/- and balance amount remained due. Even though PW-1 has admitted in cross- examination that invoices do not bear the signature of accused and there is no separate delivery challan produced, such admission by itself cannot demolish the complainant's case, because in proceedings under Section 138 of N.I. Act, the complainant is not required to prove the transaction in the manner of a civil suit, once presumption under Section 139 is attracted and accused fails to rebut it. Further, the accused has not produced any document such as purchase return, settlement statement, complaint of non-delivery, or proof of having cleared the outstanding dues. Therefore, the complainant has established the existence of liability with the Judge Sign 12 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment support of documentary evidence and oral testimony, and the defence has failed to dislodge the same.
16. The main defence of the accused is that the disputed cheques were issued only as security cheques before commencement of business and that the complainant has misused the same. This defence does not inspire confidence for more than one reason. Firstly, the accused has admitted business dealings with complainant and has not denied that he used to purchase materials. Secondly, even assuming for argument sake that cheques were obtained initially as security, it is settled that security cheque also comes under Section 138 when it is presented towards discharge of an existing liability. Thirdly, the accused has not produced any written request, notice or complaint to show that he demanded return of security cheques or objected to their misuse at the earliest point of time. Fourthly, the accused has also not produced any account extracts, bank statements, or proof to show that there was no outstanding Judge Sign 13 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment due. Hence, the bald plea of "security cheque" without supporting evidence cannot be treated as a probable defence and does not rebut the statutory presumption.
17. The complainant has produced bank endorsements showing dishonour of cheques, one with remark "Funds Insufficient" and another with remark "Account Closed". Dishonour on the ground of "Account Closed" is also recognized as dishonour attracting Section 138 of N.I. Act. Therefore, dishonour is proved through bank endorsements and the first ingredient of Section 138 stands satisfied. The argument of the appellant that endorsement discrepancy exists does not assist the defence, because the fact remains that the cheques were dishonoured and payment was not made thereafter.
18. The accused has contended that in the notice the complainant has mentioned "Funds Insufficient" to both cheques and therefore the notice is invalid. This contention Judge Sign 14 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment cannot be accepted. The object of statutory notice under Section 138(b) is to inform dishonour and demand payment of cheque amount within the statutory period. The notice in the present case clearly demands payment of the cheque amount and calls upon the accused to pay within 15 days. The accused has not shown that he was misled or prejudiced by alleged incorrect description. Further, the accused did not even issue a reply notice disputing the transaction or alleging misuse of cheques. Hence, the notice cannot be held invalid on such technical ground.
19. The appellant contends that complainant failed to prove actual supply of goods as there is no delivery proof, no signature on invoices and no supporting documents. This Court notes that PW-1 admitted the absence of delivery proof. However, in cases under Section 138, once cheque issuance and signature is admitted, the presumption operates and the complainant is not required to prove supply like a civil recovery suit unless accused rebuts presumption Judge Sign 15 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment by probable defence. Here, the accused has not produced any material to show that no goods were supplied or that invoices are fabricated. Further, accused has not initiated any proceedings alleging false billing or cheating. Hence, mere absence of delivery challan is not sufficient to disprove legally enforceable liability.
20. The appellant contends that the notice mentions wrong reason and therefore notice is invalid. This Court is of the view that the purpose of statutory notice under Section 138(b) is to demand payment and inform dishonour. The notice Ex.P-5 clearly calls upon the accused to pay cheque amount within statutory time. The accused has not shown that he was prejudiced or misled. Moreover, accused did not issue any reply notice disputing liability or alleging misuse of cheques. Hence, the notice cannot be held invalid on such technical contention.
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21. The appellant contends that notice is defective because it does not correctly mention the reason for dishonour of both cheques. This Court finds that notice substantially complies with Section 138(b) as it conveys dishonour and demands payment within statutory time. The Supreme Court in C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed, (2007) 6 SCC 555 held that once notice is sent to correct address and served, drawer cannot take hyper-technical objections to avoid liability and also emphasised that drawer can pay within 15 days after receipt and avoid prosecution. Further, the Supreme Court has consistently held that procedural technicalities should not defeat substantive compliance in NI Act prosecutions, when demand and opportunity are provided.
22. The conduct of accused is also relevant. Though statutory notice was served, the accused neither issued reply raising these objections nor paid the amount. Further, Judge Sign 17 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment though accused entered witness box as DW-1, he did not produce any documentary proof such as ledger, bank statement, correspondence, or settlement record. The defence version remains unsubstantiated. In cheque dishonour cases, once presumption is activated, the accused has to show a probable defence. Failure to produce any acceptable material evidence makes the defence improbable. Hence, adverse inference arises against the accused.
23. It is an undisputed fact that the cheques in question i.e., Ex.P-3 and Ex.P-4 belong to the accused and the signatures thereon are admitted. When the accused admits issuance of cheques and his signatures, the statutory presumption under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act gets attracted that the cheques were issued towards discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability.
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24. It is settled that the presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act is a rebuttable presumption. However, once the presumption arises, the burden shifts on the accused to rebut the same by raising a probable defence, either by leading positive evidence or by bringing on record such circumstances in the cross-examination of PW-1, which would make the complainant's case improbable. The accused cannot rebut the presumption by mere denial. In the present case, except taking inconsistent defences, the accused has not produced any acceptable evidence to rebut the presumption.
25. The complainant has produced invoice documents Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2 to show supply of steel materials. The complainant's case is that the accused made part payment and balance remained due, for which the cheques were issued. The oral evidence of PW-1 supports the documentary evidence. Though PW-1 in cross- examination has admitted that invoices do not contain Judge Sign 19 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment accused signature and there is no separate proof of delivery, such admissions by themselves do not demolish the complainant case in proceedings under Section 138 of N.I. Act, in view of statutory presumption, especially when accused failed to produce any documentary materials to show that there was no transaction or no liability.
26. The accused contends that the disputed cheques were issued only as security. Even assuming that cheques were taken as security in the course of business transactions, the same by itself does not take away the applicability of Section 138, if on the date of presentation there existed legally enforceable debt or liability. The accused has not produced any written correspondence, notice, complaint or document showing that he demanded return of the cheques, or that cheques were not meant to be presented. The defence version is not supported by any contemporaneous material. Therefore, the plea of "security Judge Sign 20 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment cheque" remains a bald plea and does not amount to rebuttal of statutory presumption.
27. The accused mainly contends that the cheques were issued as security. Such defence, by itself, does not take the case outside Section 138 when liability is shown and cheque is dishonoured. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in ICDS Ltd. v. Beena Shabeer, (2002) 6 SCC 426 held that even if a cheque is issued as security, once it is towards discharge of liability, Section 138 can be attracted. The Supreme Court in Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Ltd., (2016) 10 SCC 458 specifically observed that when cheques are issued for repayment of instalments/dues, dishonour will attract Section 138 and the "security" label is not decisive.
28. The accused contends that cheques were issued as security. Even assuming that cheques were issued as security, the same would not automatically absolve the Judge Sign 21 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment accused if the cheque is presented against an existing liability. The Supreme Court in ICDS Ltd. v. Beena Shabeer, (2002) 6 SCC 426 and Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. IREDA, (2016) 10 SCC 458 held that the nature of cheque as security is not conclusive and if liability exists, Section 138 can be attracted.
29. Further, in Sripati Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2021) 9 SCC 114, the Apex Court reiterated that security cheque can result in prosecution under Section 138 depending on the enforceable liability.
30. The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court has also consistently held that even a security cheque can attract Section 138 when the accused fails to rebut presumption and liability is shown on date of presentation (principle consistently applied by the High Court while following the above Apex Court law).
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31. The complainant has produced bank endorsements showing dishonour. Dishonour of a cheque with endorsement "Account Closed" is also covered under Section 138 of N.I. Act. Hence, dishonour is duly proved. The contention that one cheque returned with "Funds Insufficient" and later changed to "Account Closed" does not aid the accused because the fact of dishonour remains and no payment was made thereafter.
32. It is not in dispute that the cheques Ex.P-3 and Ex.P-4 belong to the accused and the signatures on the said cheques are admitted. Once the execution/signature is admitted, the initial burden of complainant stands discharged and statutory presumption arises in favour of complainant. This position of law is well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee, (2001) 6 SCC 16, wherein it is held that presumption under the Act is mandatory and the Court has to draw it once foundational facts are proved. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further Judge Sign 23 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment clarified in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 that presumption under Section 139 includes presumption regarding legally enforceable debt and liability.
33. Once presumption arises, the accused has to rebut the same by raising a probable defence on the touchstone of "preponderance of probabilities" and not beyond reasonable doubt. This principle is clearly laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 and reiterated in Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418, holding that accused may rebut the presumption either by direct evidence or by relying on the material brought out from the complainant's evidence. Further, in Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513, the Apex Court held that bare denial is not sufficient and the defence must be probable.
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34. The complainant produced invoices Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2 and the oral evidence of PW-1 supports supply of goods and outstanding balance. Even if invoices do not bear signature/acknowledgment, when cheques and signatures are admitted, the presumption under Section 139 still operates and the burden shifts to accused. In K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan, (2001) 8 SCC 458, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that once cheque is issued, the presumption of legally enforceable debt arises and it is for accused to prove the contrary. The Apex Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 further held that presumption is not rebutted by mere explanation and the accused must establish a probable defence.
35. Further, in Sripati Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2021) 9 SCC 114, the Supreme Court reiterated that a security cheque can also attract Section 138 depending upon the facts and enforceable liability on the date of presentation.
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36. The dishonour endorsements produced by complainant clearly establish dishonour. The endorsement "Account Closed" is treated on par with dishonour and falls under Section 138. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in NEPC Micon Ltd. v. Magma Leasing Ltd., (1999) 4 SCC 253 held that dishonour for reasons such as "account closed" will attract Section 138. The Supreme Court in Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 13 SCC 375 further clarified that dishonour for reasons like "account closed", "payment stopped", "refer to drawer" etc. may attract Section 138, depending on facts.
37. The appellant contends that complainant firm was not existing during alleged transaction period and partnership documents were later produced. This Court finds that such objection cannot by itself nullify prosecution when complainant has established issuance of cheques and accused has admitted signature. Further, the Supreme Court in A.C. Narayanan v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 11 SCC Judge Sign 26 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment 790 has recognised that complaint through authorised representative is maintainable provided authorisation is shown.
38. Moreover, in cheque dishonour matters, Courts have repeatedly held that disputes about internal constitution/registration are not sufficient to displace presumption unless accused establishes non-existence of liability.
39. Now let us re-appreciate the evidence of the parties led before the Trail Court. PW-1 is the authorized person/partner of complainant firm. He has deposed that the complainant firm supplied steel materials to accused under two invoices and accused made part payment, leaving a balance due. He further deposed that towards discharge of the balance, accused issued two cheques Ex.P-3 and Ex.P- 4 and upon presentation, the same were dishonoured. PW-1 Judge Sign 27 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment further deposed regarding issuance of statutory notice Ex.P- 5 and service thereof and non-payment by accused.
40. In the cross-examination, PW-1 admitted that: (i) invoices do not bear signature/acknowledgement of accused, (ii) separate delivery challan/document is not produced, (iii) there was controversy regarding partnership deed and registration documents, and (iv) authorisation letter was produced subsequently.
41. However, PW-1 consistently denied the defence suggestion that there was no transaction or that cheques were misused. The evidence of PW-1 remained intact on the crucial aspects of issuance and dishonour of cheques, service of notice and non-payment.
42. DW-1/accused has admitted that the cheques belong to him and the signatures are his. His defence is that the cheques were issued as security during earlier business Judge Sign 28 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment dealings and the complainant has misused them. DW-1 has stated that he requested return of the security cheques.
43. However, DW-1 has not produced any documentary evidence such as: (I) written request/ notice seeking return of cheques, (ii) account settlement or ledger extracts, (iii) bank statement showing absence of liability, (iv) complaint lodged against complainant alleging misuse, or (v) proof disproving invoices/transaction. Thus, the defence remains a bare statement without corroboration.
44. It is not in dispute that the cheques Ex.P-3 and Ex.P-4 belong to the accused and the signature is admitted. Once execution/signature is admitted, statutory presumption arises under Sections 118(a) and 139 of N.I. Act. This is the settled principle in Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee, (2001) 6 SCC 16 and Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441, wherein it is held that presumption under Section 139 includes presumption of legally enforceable debt/liability.
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45. The presumption under Section 139 is rebuttable, however the accused must raise a probable defence by preponderance of probabilities and mere denial is insufficient. This is reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 and Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418. The accused may rebut the presumption by leading evidence or by eliciting admissions from complainant, but he must bring on record such circumstances which make complainant's case improbable.
46. In the present case, though accused entered witness box, he has not produced any supporting documents and his defence is not probabilised.
47. The complainant has relied upon invoices Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2 and oral evidence of PW-1. In cheque dishonour cases, once presumption arises, the complainant is not required to prove the debt like a civil suit unless the accused Judge Sign 30 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment successfully rebuts the presumption. The Supreme Court in K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan, (2001) 8 SCC 458 has held that once cheque is issued, presumption arises and burden lies on accused to prove that no debt existed.
48. Though PW-1 admitted absence of delivery challans and signature in invoices, the accused has not produced any credible evidence to show that there was no transaction or no liability. Therefore, the contention of "no legally enforceable debt" is not acceptable.
49. In this case, the accused failed to show by any probable evidence that there was no enforceable liability at the time of presentation. Hence this defence does not rebut presumption.
50. The endorsements show dishonour for "Funds Insufficient" and "Account Closed". Dishonour for "Account Closed" is covered under Section 138. The Supreme Court Judge Sign 31 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment in NEPC Micon Ltd. v. Magma Leasing Ltd., (1999) 4 SCC 253 held that "Account Closed" attracts Section 138. The Supreme Court in Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 13 SCC 375 has reiterated that dishonour for reasons like "account closed" is within the sweep of Section 138. Therefore, the dishonour requirement is satisfied.
51. The appellant contends notice is defective as wrong reason is stated for dishonour. This Court finds that Ex.P-5 notice substantially complies with Section 138(b), as it intimates dishonour and demands payment within the stipulated period. The Supreme Court in C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed, (2007) 6 SCC 555 held that once notice is served and drawer does not pay, he cannot escape liability by taking hyper-technical objections. The object is to give opportunity to drawer to pay and avoid prosecution. Hence, the notice contention is rejected.
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52. Though statutory notice is served, the accused did not issue any reply raising the grounds now urged. The Supreme Court in K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan, (2001) 8 SCC 458 and C.C. Alavi Haji, (2007) 6 SCC 555 has held that failure to respond/pay after notice strengthens presumption and prosecution case. Further, accused has not produced any documentary evidence to probabilise his defence. Hence, this Court draws adverse inference against the defence.
53. The sentence imposed is fine slightly above cheque amount, which is within permissible limits. The appellate court normally does not interfere unless it is excessive, illegal or arbitrary. Considering the nature of offence and quantum involved, the sentence is proportionate and needs no interference.
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54. The cheque amount is substantial. The trial court has imposed fine of ₹10,79,000/- which is proportionate and within the limits. No special grounds are made out for interference with sentence. Therefore, this Court finds no illegality or arbitrariness requiring interference.
55. On overall re-appreciation, the trial court has properly applied presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of N.I. Act and rightly held that accused failed to rebut the presumption. There is no perversity or legal infirmity. Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered in the Affirmative and Point No.2 in the Negative.
56. Point No.3: In view of the above detailed discussion, this Court holds that the accused has failed to rebut the statutory presumptions and the complainant has complied with mandatory requirements under Section 138 of N.I. Act. The findings of the trial court are based on proper appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from illegality or Judge Sign 34 Crl.A.1798/2023 Judgment perversity. Hence, the conviction and sentence warrant no interference. For the foregoing reasons, I proceed to pass the following;
ORDER The Criminal Appeal filed by the appellant/ accused under Section 374(3) of Cr.P.C., is hereby dismissed.
The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated.17.10.2023 passed by the learned XXVIII Addl. C.M.M., Bengaluru in C.C.No.3019/2019 for the offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act is hereby confirmed.
Trial Court records be sent back forthwith along with copy of this judgment.
(Dictated to the Typist on Computer, then corrected, signed and pronounced by me in open court on this 4th day of February, 2026.) (SOMASHEKARA A.) XV Addl. C.C. & Sessions Judge, BANGALORE CITY.
C/c LIX Addl. C.C. & Sessions Judge, BANGALORE CITY.
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