Delhi District Court
Roop Kishore Rastogi (Huf) vs Karan Chopra Others on 23 February, 2024
IN THE COURT OF CCJ CUM ARC, CENTRAL, TIS
HAZARI COURTS
RC ARC No. 77189/2016
Roop Kishore Rastogi Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors.
CNR No. DLCT03-000045-2012
In the matter of :
Sh. Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF),
Through its Karta,
Sh. Roop Kishore Rastogi,
C/o Barh Wali Kothi,
Nai Sarai, Delhi-110006. ...Petitioner
Versus
1. Sh. Karan Chopra,
S/o Sh. S.N. Chopra,
K-94, Haus Khas,
New Delhi.
Also at:
Pvt. Office No. 39,
Municipal No. 1719-20,
First Floor, Mangal building-II,
Jog Dhian Colony, Bhagirath Place,
Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006.
2. Sh. Sukh Dev Garg,
Pvt. Office No. 39,
Municipal No. 1719-20,
First Floor, Mangal building-II,
Jog Dhian Colony, Bhagirath Place,
Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006.
RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 1/19
3. Systochem Formulations Pvt. Ltd.,
Pvt. Office No. 39,
Municipal No. 1719-20,
First Floor, Mangal( building-II,
Jog Dhian Colony, Bhagirath Place,
Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006. ..Respondents
Eviction Petition under Section 14 (1)(a) & 14 (1) (b) of Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958
Date of Institution : 24.05.2012
Date on which judgment was reserved : 05.08.2023
Date of Decision : 23.02.2024
Decision : Petition Allowed
JUDGMENT
1. This is an eviction petition for recovery of one shop, measuring 13ft. x 8.3 ft, situated on the first floor, bearing private No. 39, in the property bearing municipal No 1719-20, Mangal Building-II, Jog Dhian Colony, Bhagirath Place, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-11006 as shown in red colour in the site plan (hereinafter referred to as tenanted shop) against the respondents u/s 14(1)(a) & (b) of Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 (hereinafter referred to as DRC Act).
2. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent No.1 is the tenant in respect of the tenanted shop for a monthly rent of Rs. 644/- per month excluding water and electricity, charges for house tax and sanitation charges. It is stated that respondent No.1 is in arrears of rent and house tax for a sum of Rs. 41,338/- being arrears of rent at the rate Rs.585/- per month RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 2/19 for the period 01.04.2007 to 31.01.2009 and rent at the reate Rs. 644/- w.e.f 01.04.2009 to 31.05.2012, and Rs. 2,826/- towards house- tax for the last three years which the respondent No.1 has neither tendered nor paid to the petitioner in spite of service of registered notice dated 02.02.2008.
3. That the respondent No.1 has illegally and unauthorisedly sublet, assigned and/or parted with possession of the tenanted shop sometime in the year 2005 to respondent No. 2 and 3, without the written consent of the petitioner. It is stated that at present respondent No. 2 and 3 are in occupation and possession of demised premises. Hence, the present petition.
4. Upon receipt of the petition, the respondents appeared and filed their written statements. The respondent No.1 has filed his written statement contending the following:
(a) That the petitioner has suppressed and concealed the material facts from this Court because it is very well in the knowledge of the petitioner that there is no subletting of the property in question and the petitioner has filed the present suit with the sole motive of getting the property vacated.
(b) That the tenanted shop is being used by M/s.
Systochem Formulations Pvt. Ltd. and respondents no.1 and 2 are the directors of the said firm, which is doing the business and trading of medical and surgical items only. That the respondent No.1 has at no point of time ever sublet the tenanted shop to anyone and this fact is very well within the knowledge of the petitioner that is why he has not bothered to take any action for such a long period.
RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 3/19
(c) That the respondent No.1 had been trying to pay the monthly rent to the petitioner but the petitioner always refused to accept the rent on one pretext or the other. That the electricity charges are being paid by the respondents regularly, however, he is not liable to pay any house tax as alleged by the petitioner. That no water meter connection has been provided in the tenanted shop by petitioner.
(d) That the respondents are liable to pay the legally recoverable rent as provided under the law and not as demanded by the petitioner.
5. In the written statement, respondents No.2 and 3 have contended the following:
(a) That the petitioner has suppressed and concealed the material facts from this Court because it is very well in the knowledge of the petitioner that there is no subletting of the property in question and the petitioner has filed the present suit with the sole motive of getting the property vacated.
(b) That the respondent No.3 is the firm M/s.
Systochem Formulations Pvt. Ltd. and respondents No.2 is one of the directors of the said firm, which is doing the business and trading of medical and surgical items. That after the induction of the respondent No.1 as one of the directors of the firm i.e. respondent no.3, the respondents are doing their business from the tenanted premises and this fact is very well within the knowledge of the petitioner meaning thereby that the respondents are using the tenanted premises legally and with the implied consent of the petitioner for the past about more than a decade.
RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 4/19
(c) That in view of the prevailing exorbitant rate of rent in the market, the intentions of the petitioner has malafide and dishonest and in order to get the premises vacated from the respondents, the petitioner has filed frivolous and vexatious respondents.
(d) That the respondents are regularly paying electricity charges. That the respondents had been trying to pay the monthly rent to the petitioner but the petitioner always refused to accept the rent on one pretext or the other. That the respondents are not liable to pay any house tax as alleged by the petitioner. That no water meter connection has been provided in the tenanted shop by the petitioner.
6. The petitioner filed her replications to the written statement of the respondent No.1 and respondent No.2 and 3, wherein petitioner re-affirmed and re-iterated the facts mentioned in the petition and denied the averments made by the respondents.
7. In support of their case, petitioner examined Sh. Roop Kishore Rastogi as PW1 who tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex. P-1 and relied upon following documents :
(i) Copy of rent note Ex. PW-1/1,
(ii) Copy of counter foil of rent receipt Ex. PW-1/2,
(iii) Site plan Ex. PW-1/3,
(iv) Copy of notice dated 29.02.2012 Ex. PW-1/4,
(v) Original postal receipt Ex. PW-1/5,
(vi) Original AD cards Ex. PW-1/6,
(vii) Order of Competent Authority (Slum) is Ex. PW-
RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 5/19 1/7.
8. PW1 was cross-examined by Ld. Counsel for the respondent No.1 and respondent No. 2 and 3. Vide order dated 27.03.2014, the petitioner's evidence was closed in affirmative.
9. The Respondents did not lead any evidence despite opportunities being given in this regard and thus, vide order dated 17.09.2014, the respondents evidence was closed.
10. It is pertinent to mention that during the pendency of the present petition, an application under order 22 Rule 10 CPC was moved by Smt. Rashmi Rastogi seeking permission to continue the present petition at her instance since the tenanted shop had vested in her by virtue of family settlement dated 15.11.2018. Vide order dated 23.03.2022, the said application was allowed and Smt. Rashmi Rastogi was permitted to continue the present petition.
11. I have heard arguments heard from both the sides. It was argued by Ld. Counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No.1 as an individual was the tenant of the petitioner in the tenanted premises and no evidence has been led by the respondents to establish that the petitioner had given it's written consent or approval to the respondent No.1 permitting him to use the tenanted premises by the respondent no.3 company. He further submitted that it is further the admitted position that the tenanted premises is being used by the respondent No.3 company to run it's business, therefore, the fact that the tenanted premises is not being used and occupied by the respondent No.1 stands established beyond doubt. It is argued by Ld. Counsel for the RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 6/19 petitioner that the respondents have alleged that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are the directors of the respondent No. 3 company and therefore, there is no subletting if the tenanted premises is being used by the company. He argued that the respondents have failed to produce any evidence on record to establish that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are the directors of the respondent No.3 company. He further argued that certified copies of the ROC records of the respondent No. 3 company including letter dated 15.09.2006 establish beyond doubt that the respondent No. 1 has resigned as director of the respondent No.3 company with effect from 15.09.2006 itself, and therefore, has no concern with the said company after 15.09.2006. He further submitted that without prejudice to the argument, it is well settled that a company is a distinct and separate legal entity and hence, by legal implication the possession of the respondent No. 3 company of the tenanted premises cannot be held to be that of it's directors.
12. It was further argued by Ld. Counsel for the petitioner that one of the arguments raised by the respondents is with regard to the rent receipts Ex. PW1/R1 (colly) that some of these rent receipts are counter-signed by the respondent No. 2 and therefore, the petitioner was always aware of the respondent No. 2 occupying the tenanted premises. He argued that bare perusal of the said rent receipts Ex.PW1/R1 (colly), would reveal that the name of the tenant mentioned therein is Sh. Karan Chopra i.e. the respondent No. 1 herein and the rent receipts counter-signed by the respondent No. 2 is merely on behalf of the tenant and not in his personal capacity. It was submitted by Ld. Counsel for the petitioner that it has been established by RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 7/19 admission of the respondents that the respondent No. 1 is in arrears of rent of Rs. 41,338/- for the period from 01.04.2007 up to 31.05.2012. It is neither pleaded nor proved by the respondent No. 1 that he had even tendered the rent to the petitioner either by hand or by money order or deposited the rent in Court under the provisions of Section 27 of the Act.
13. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the respondent No.1 and Ld. Counsel for respondent No. 2 and 3 submitted that the petitioner has miserably failed to prove that there is any sub- letting by the respondent No.1 and the petitioner has admitted in his cross-examination that he came to know in the year 2008 that the respondent No.1 has illegally sub-let the tenanted premises and he sent a notice to the respondent No.1 in the same year, whereas the perusal of the record shows that no such notice has been placed on the court file. It was submitted by them that the respondent No.1 has filed 20 rent receipts exhibited as PW-1/R1 (colly), to which the petitioner has admitted that some of the rent receipts bears the signature of the respondent No.2 encircled as mark A and the petitioner further stated that his employee Harish Chand Sharma and another employee Kedarnath Sharma had been collecting the rent, whereas he has not able to produce any employment record to this effect. It was submitted that the petition of the petitioner is liable to be dismissed because of the fact that he has not been able to prove that there was any sub- letting or that the respondent had parted with possession of the the tenanted premises without the knowledge of the petitioner. It was submitted that as far as the question of case u/s 14 (1) (a) of DRC Act is concerned, the petitioner has failed to prove that RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 8/19 there is any willful default on the part of the respondent in paying the monthly rent.
14. I have also perused the record.
15. In order to bring a case within the purview of section 14(1)(a) of DRC Act, the followings are the essential ingredients :
i. That there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties;
ii. That there are arrears of legally recoverable rent; iii. That a valid legal demand notice was duly served upon the respondent;
iv. That the respondent has neither paid nor tendered the entire arrears of legally recoverable rent within two months of date of receipt of legal demand notice.
16. The respondent No. 1 has neither denied the landlord tenant relationship with the petitioner nor has he disputed the rent deed Ex. PW-1/1. In fact, none of the respondents have disputed the existence of landlord tenant relationship between the petitioner and respondent No. 1. Therefore, the landlord tenant relationship between the petitioner and respondent No.1 for the purpose of Section 14 (1) (a) of DRC Act is established.
17. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent No.1 is in arrears of rent since 01.04.2007 and a total amount of Rs. 41,338/- is pending towards the arrears of rent against the respondent No. 1. It is pleaded by the petitioner that he has served notice dated 02.02.2008 to the respondent No. 1 calling him to pay the aforesaid arrears but respondent No. 1 had failed RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 9/19 to comply with the said notice. However, in his evidence affidavit, the petitioner has mentioned that apart from the notice dated 02.02.2008, notice was also issued to the respondent No. 1 on 29.02.2012. There are no pleadings qua the notice dated 29.02.2012 in the petition. It is relevant to note that the petitioner has not filed the notice dated 02.02.2008 on record. The petitioner has relied upon the notice dated 29.02.2012 Ex. PW- 1/4. A bare perusal of Ex. PW-1/4 reveals that the amount of arrears demanded by the petitioner were in the sum of Rs. 36,580/-, whereas, in the petition, the petitioner has mentioned the arrears to be in the sum of Rs. 41,338/-. It can be seen that not only the evidence of the petitioner qua the notice Ex. PW-1/4 is beyond the pleadings but also there is inconsistency in the amount of the arrears mentioned in the petition and the notice Ex. PW-1/4. No doubt, the respondents have not furnished any proof that they had paid the rent to the petitioner since 2007 or deposited the same in the Court under section 27 of DRC Act in case of the petitioner's refusal, but it was for the petitioner to prove that a valid notice was sent to the respondents in terms of 14 (1) (a) of DRC Act. Therefore, the petitioner has not been able to make out a case for section 14 (1)(a) of DRC Act.
18. The petitioner, in order to bring a case within the purview of section 14(1)(b) of DRC Act, is required to prove the following essential ingredients:
i. That there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties;
ii. That the tenant has, on or after 9th day of June,1952 RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 10/19 sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with possession of whole or any part of the tenanted premises;
iii. That he did so without obtaining consent of the landlord in writing;
19. As already observed, the landlord tenant relationship between petitioner and respondent No. 1 is not in dispute.
20. The petitioner has alleged that respondent No. 1 has sub-let the premises to the respondents No. 2 and 3 without its written consent in the year 2005. It is not disputed by the respondents that the tenanted shop is being used by respondent No. 3 which is doing the trading of medical and surgical items. However, they have denied that there was any sub-letting of the premises and they contended that this fact was within the knowledge of the petitioner. It is not disputed by the respondents that the tenanted shop was let out to respondent No. 1 in his personal capacity. The respondent No. 3 is a private limited company which as per the certified copies of the memorandum of association, came into existence on 08.04.1999. As per the certified copies of the articles of association, respondent No. 1 and 2 were shown as directors of the respondent No. 3. As per the certified record of the respondent No. 3, the respondent No. 3 is having its principal office at the tenanted shop. It is a settled principle of law that a company is a separate legal entity apart from its share holders and directors. Therefore, it is proved that respondent No. 1 has parted with the possession of the tenanted shop and the possession of the tenanted shop is with respondent No. 3. It is also relevant to mention here that as per the certified RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 11/19 record of respondent No. 3 company, respondent No. 1 had ceased to be a director of respondent No. 3 w.e.f. 15.09.2006, meaning thereby that respondent No. 1 lost control over respondent No. 3 on 15.09.2006. Apparently, the respondents have made a false averment in their written statements that respondent No.1 is a director of respondent No. 3. The conduct of respondents prima facie attracts criminal prosecution for making a false statement before the Court.
21. Now it is to be adjudicated whether there was any lawful sub-tenancy created in favour of the respondent No. 3 by respondent No. 1. As per Section 16 of DRC Act, a tenant cannot sub-let whole or any part of the tenanted premises without the previous consent of the landlord in writing and if he does so, same would not be deemed to be a lawful sub-tenancy. In the present case, contention of respondents is that the sub-letting was within the knowledge of the petitioner as he himself admitted in his cross-examination that he became aware about the sub-letting in the year 2008. It is also contended by the respondents that some of the rent receipts Ex. PW-1/R1 (colly.) bear the signature of respondent No. 2. The contention of the respondents is misconceived as there cannot be any general consent for sub- letting and even acquiescence of the landlord will not be sufficient. The consent of the landlord must be specific and in writing. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. Vs. H.C. Sharma & Ors., 1988 1 SCR 1023, where it was held :
"It is true that Justice R.S. Bachawat had expressed the view that A the consent could be general or special but in the case before the Court there was no conduct which showed that RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 12/19 there was consent by the general words of the clause in the deed. We are of the opinion on reading of the different provisions that the consent enjoined by bargain between the parties in this case must be in writing and must be to the specific sub-letting.
That was the view of the Delhi High Court in Raja Ram Goyal v. Ashok Kumar and others, [ 1975] All India Rent Control Journal 534. In Kartar Singh v. Shri Vijay Kumar and Another, [ 1978] All India Rent Conrol Journal 264 the High Court of Punjab & Haryana has also expressed similar view. In the case of Mis Delhi Vanaspati Syndicate, c Delhi v. Mis Bhagwan Dass Faqir Chand, (A.LR. 1972 Delhi 17) Khanna, C.J. as he then was of the Delhi High Court observed at page 19 of the report:
"Section 16 of the Act of 1958 holds the key to the interpretation of provisions of Clause (b) of sub- section (1) D of Section 14 of this Act as well as of Clause (b) of sub· section (1) of S. 13 of the Act of 1952. It deals with restrictions on sub-letting. Sub- section (1) of section 16 makes sub-letting lawful though it was without the consent of the landlord provided that the sub-letting has taken place before 9th day of June, 1952 and the sub-tenant is in occupation of the premises at the time when the Act of 1958 came into force. Sub-section (2) of section 16 reiterates the provisions of Clause (b) of sub-section ( 1) of Section 13 of the Act of 1952 and lays down that the sub-letting after 9th day of June, 1952 without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord shall not be deemed to the lawful. It does not say that the requisite consent should be obtained before sub-letting the premises and the consent obtained after sub-letting will not enure for the benefit of the tenant. However, sub- section (3) of Section 16 prohibits subletting of the premises after commencement of Act of 1958 without the 'previous' consent in writing of the landlord. . The use of word 'Previous' in this sub- section shows that where it was the intention of the legislature that the consent in writing should be obtained before sub-letting, it said so specifically. The absence of the word 'Previous' in sub· section (2) shows that it was not the intention of the legislature that the consent in writing could be obtained before sub-letting. Before the Act of 1952 a tenant could successfully show acquiescence of the landlord in sub-letting to escape forfeiture of tenancy. Since the absence of consent in writing by a landlord for sub-letting gave rise to unnecessary litigation between a landlord and a tenant, the Act of 1952 required the consent of the landlord in writing after its commencement. The purpose seemed to be that the RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 13/19 consent of the landlord evidence by a writing would cut out litigation on this ground. After all a landlord could always agree to sub-letting either before or after sub-letting of the premises. For that reason no condition was laid down that such consent should be obtained before sub-letting the premises.'' We are in agreement with this approach to the interpretation and it is in consonance with the view expressed by this Court earlier as mentioned herein before. In the aforesaid view of the matter we are of the opinion that it was necessary for the tenant to obtain the consent in writing to sub-letting the premises. The mere permission or acquiescence will not do. The consent must be to the specific sub-letting and must be in writing. Indeed there was no implied permission also here. Our attention was drawn to the fact that the landlord had written letter to the tenant and the landlord objected to the sub-letting, the moment he realised the situation."
22. Similarly, it was held in Bajaj Auto Limited V. Behari Lal Kohli, 1989 3 SCR 730:
"9. There is still another reason to hold that the aforesaid clause can not come to the aid of the appellant. A perusal of its language would show that it contains the respondent's consent in general terms without reference to M/s. United Automobiles. As a matter of fact M/s. United Automobiles came to be inducted as a sub-tenant much later. Can such a general permission be treated to be the consent as required by S. 14 (1) Proviso (b) of the Act? It was held by this Court In M/s. Shalimar Tar Products v. S.C. Sharma, [1988) 1 SCC 70; that S. 14(1) Proviso (b) and 16(2) and (3) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 enjoin the tenant to obtain consent of the landlord in writing to the specific sub-letting and any other interpretation of the provisions will defeat the object of the statute and is, therefore, impermissible, Since it is not suggested that the consent of the respondent was obtained specifically with reference to the sub-letting in favour of M/s. United Automobiles, the clause in the lease deed, which has been relied on can not save the appellant, even if it be assumed in its favour that the clause is admissible and the sub-lessee is appellant's associate concern. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs."
23. In the present case, the respondents have failed to prove that the petitioner has given its written consent for sub- letting the tenanted shop in favour of respondent No. 3. In view of the above preposition of law, the contention of the respondents RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 14/19 that the petitioner was aware about the sub-letting and thus a valid sub-tenancy had come into existence, has to be rejected.
24. In view of the foregoing, the petitioner has succeeded in establishing its case under Section 14 (1) (b) of the DRC Act. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and eviction order is passed in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents in respect of the tenanted shop i.e., One Shop, measuring 13ft. x 8.3 ft, situated on the First Floor, bearing private No. 39, in the property bearing municipal No 1719-20, Mangal Building-II, Jog Dhian Colony, Bhagirath Place, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-11006 as shown in red colour in the site plan Ex. PW-1/3.
25. Before parting with, it is necessary to deal with an important aspect of the case. It is already observed that the respondents have made false averment in their written statements that respondent No.1 is a director of respondent No. 3, whereas he has already resigned the respondent No. 3 company on 15.09.2006 as reflected in the certified record of the ROC. It cannot be impressed enough that it is the legal duty of every party to state true facts in the pleadings and if they do not, they must suffer the consequences, and the Court should not hesitate from taking a strict action. In this regard, it is noteworthy to refer to the the observation of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Sanjeev Kumar Mittal Vs The State, Test.Cas. No. 19/2004, dated 18.11.2010, which are as under:
"6.6. If there is falsehood in the pleadings (plaint, written statement or replication), the task of the Court is also multiplied and a lis that could be decided in a short time, then takes several years. It is the legal duty of every party to state in the RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 15/19 pleadings the true facts and if they do not, they must suffer the consequences and the Court should not hold back from taking action.
xxx xxx xxx
8. False averments in pleadings are sufficient to attract Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code 8.1. In the present case, the petitioner has filed a petition containing false averments but he has not entered into the witness box. The question arises whether a person who has made false averments in pleadings but does not appear in the witness box, has committed any offence.
8.2. Pleadings which are the foundation of the case, on the basis of which the issues arise and the trial is held and are required to be signed and verified. Order 6 Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:
"Rule 15. Verification of pleadings. - (1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case.
(2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true.
(3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed. (4) The person verifying the pleading shall also furnish an affidavit in support of his pleadings."
8.3. Section 282 of the Indian Succession Act [39 of 1925] also provides for punishment for false averment in petition or declaration. It reads as under:
"Section 282 - If any petition or declaration which is hereby required to be verified contains any averment which the person making the verification knows or believes to be false, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860)."
8.4. The Code of Civil Procedure commentary by V.R. Manohar and W.W. Chitaley, (Tenth Edition) Volume 3 at pp117 notes that the object of verifying a pleading is to fix, on the party verifying, responsibility for the statements that it contains. Further at pp 121, it notes that pleadings, far from being mere RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 16/19 formalities, are required by law to be true. Verifications being made under the sanction of a solemn declaration, a false verification will render the party verifying liable to a prosecution for an offence under Sections 191 and 193, Indian Penal Code.
xxx xxx xxx 8.7. Making false averment in the pleading pollutes the stream of justice. It is an attempt at inviting the Court into passing a wrong judgment and that is why it must be treated as an offence. 8.8. Where a verification is specific and deliberately false, there is nothing in law to prevent a person from being proceeded for contempt. But it must be remembered that the very essence of crimes of this kind is not how such statements may injure this or that party to litigation but how they may deceive and mislead the courts and thus produce mischievous consequences to the administration of justice. A person is under a legal obligation to verify the allegations of fact made in the pleadings and if he verifies falsely, he comes under the clutches of law. 8.9. Consequently, there cannot be any doubt that if a statement or averment in a pleading is false, it falls within the definition of offence under Section 191 of the Code (and other provisions). It is not necessary that a person should have appeared in the witness box. The offence stands committed and completed by the filing of such pleading. There is need for the justice system to protect itself from such wrongdoing so that it can do its task of justice dispensation."
Thus, there is no doubt that the averments made by respondents in their written statements in regard to the directorship of respondent No.1 falls within the purview of section 191 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. Now, coming to question as to what course of action should be taken in such a situation, the Court, apart from an initiating inquiry under section 340 Cr.P.C, can also proceed to impose realistic and exemplary costs upon the litigant to discourage frivolous litigation and to instill faith of the public into the judicial institution. In Padmawati and Ors v. Harijan Sewak Sangh, 154 (2008) DLT 411, Hon'ble Delhi High Court observed as under:
"6. The case at hand shows that frivolous defences and frivolous litigation is a calculated venture involving no risks situation. You have only to engage professionals to prolong the RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 17/19 litigation so as to deprive the rights of a person and enjoy the fruits of illegalities. I consider that in such cases where Court finds that using the Courts as a tool, a litigant has perpetuated illegalities or has perpetuated an illegal possession, the Court must impose costs on such litigants which should be equal to the benefits derived by the litigant and harm and deprivation suffered by the rightful person so as to check the frivolous litigation and prevent the people from reaping a rich harvest of illegal acts through the Courts. One of the aim of every judicial system has to be to discourage unjust enrichment using Courts as a tool. The costs imposed by the Courts must in all cases should be the real costs equal to deprivation suffered by the rightful person."
xxxxxx "9. Before parting with this case, I consider it necessary to pen down that one of the reasons for over-flowing of court dockets is the frivolous litigation in which the Courts are engaged by the litigants and which is dragged as long as possible. Even if these litigants ultimately loose the lis, they become the real victors and have the last laugh. This class of people who perpetuate illegal acts by obtaining stays and injunctions from the Courts must be made to pay the sufferer not only the entire illegal gains made by them as costs to the person deprived of his right and also must be burdened with exemplary costs. Faith of people in judiciary can only be sustained if the persons on the right side of the law do not feel that even if they keep fighting for justice in the Court and ultimately win, they would turn out to be a fool since winning a case after 20 or 30 years would make wrong doer as real gainer, who had reaped the benefits for all those years. Thus, it becomes the duty of the Courts to see that such wrong doers are discouraged at every step and even if they succeed in prolonging the litigation due to their money power, ultimately they must suffer the costs of all these years long litigation. Despite settled legal positions, the obvious wrong doers, use one after another tier of judicial review mechanism as a gamble, knowing fully well that dice is always loaded in their favour, since even if they lose, the time gained is the real gain. This situation must be redeemed by the Courts."
In Padmawati (supra), the Court imposed costs of Rs. 15.1 lacs. Against the said order, Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) petition bearing No. 29197/2008 was preferred, which was dismissed by Hon'ble Supreme Court on 19.03.2010.
26. Therefore, in totality of circumstances and keeping in view of the fact that the respondents have paid nothing to the RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 18/19 petitioner and succeeded in dragging the petitioner into the litigation, this Court deems fit to award costs of Rs. 15 lacs to the petitioner which shall be payable by the respondents, jointly and severally.
Digitally
signed by
PRANAV
PRANAV JOSHI
Announced in open Court JOSHI Date:
2024.02.23
on 23rd Day of February, 2024 15:30:12
+0530
(Pranav Joshi)
ASCJ-cum-JSCC-cum-GJ/Central,
THC/Delhi/23.02.2024
RC ARC No. 77189/2016 Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF) Vs. Karan Chopra & Ors. 19/19