Tripura High Court
Sri Sukha Ranjan Das vs The State Of Tripura on 18 March, 2019
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2019 TRI 32, 2019 CRI LJ 2146 (2019) 2 DMC 770, (2019) 2 DMC 770
Author: Sanjay Karol
Bench: Sanjay Karol, S. Talapatra
Page 1 of 27
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Crl. A. No.21/2015
1. Sri Sukha Ranjan Das, S/o Late Hari Mohan Das, resident of
Village Jumerdhepa, P.S. Melaghar, District : Sepahijala, Tripura.
2. Smti. Sabita Das, W/o. Sri Sukha Ranjan Das, resident of
Village Jumerdhepa, P.S. Melaghar, District : Sepahijala, Tripura.
---- Convict-Appellant(s)
Versus
The State of Tripura, represented by the Secretary to the Govt. of
Tripura, Home Department, Agartala.
---- Respondent(s)
Connected with
Crl. A(J) No.45/2015
Sri Jhutan Das, S/o Sri Sukha Ranjan Das, resident of Village
Jumerdhepa, P.S. Melaghar, District:- Sepahijala, Tripura.
---- Convict-Appellant(s)
Versus
The State of Tripura, represented by the Secretary to the Govt. of
Tripura, Home Department, Agartala.
---- Respondent(s)
_B_E_F_O_R_E_
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJAY KAROL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. TALAPATRA
For the appellant(s) : Mr. Somik Deb, Advocate,
Mr. Raju Datta, Advocate,
Mr. A. Dey, Advocate.
For the respondent : Mr. Babul Choudhury, P.P.,
Mr. R.C. Debnath, Advocate.
Date of hearing : 17.12.2018.
Date of pronouncement : 18.03.2019.
Whether fit for reporting :
Yes No
√
Page 2 of 27
Judgment & Order
(Sanjay Karol, C.J.)
On 15.4.2012 Smt. Rupashree Debnath, aged 16 years
died as a result of multiple organ failure arising out of burn
injuries (80%). In relation to the said crime, her husband Jhutan
Das stands convicted for having committed an offence punishable
under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (for short, IPC).
Independently and additionally, Jhutan Das and his parents Sukha
Ranjan Das and Sabita Das stand convicted for having committed
an offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC.
2. Judgment of conviction and sentence dated 27.8.2015
is subject matter of challenge in these appeals on the following
grounds urged before us :
(a) There is unexplained and inordinate delay of 18
hours in lodging the FIR;
(b) no independent witness from the neighbourhood
was either associated or examined in Court;
(c) trial stands vitiated on account of non-
examination of one witness who allegedly witnessed the
incident;
(d) it being a case of circumstantial evidence,
testimonies of family members of the deceased, being
interested witnesses, required corroboration, in any
event there testimonies are full of improvements and
embellishments rendering them to be unbelievable and
the witnesses unreliable;
Page 3 of 27
e) prognosis of the burn injury caused by use of
Kerosene oil is not supported by the father of the
deceased or other evidence, scientific nature.
(f) additionally, on behalf of the accused parents, it is
argued that there is no iota of evidence of their
complicity in the crime.
3. Certain facts are not in dispute:
(a) Marriage between accused Jhutan Das and Smt.
Rupashree Debnath was solemnized sometime in the
year 2010;
(b) on 15.4.2012 the wife died as a result of burn
injuries; and
(c) the incident took place within 7 years of
marriage, in the matrimonial house, where the parties
i.e. the husband and the wife, had been residing
together till her last.
Also from the record, unrefutedly, it stands revealed
that at the time of marriage, age of the deceased was 16 years
and that of her husband (accused) 18 years.
4. Through the testimonies of 18 witnesses, prosecution
wants the Court to believe that after eloping the deceased,
accused solemnized his marriage with her. With initial reservation,
parents of the deceased accepted such relationship and then all
was well. From the wedlock, a female child was also born.
However, just six months prior to the incident, all the accused
persons started subjecting the deceased to ill-treatment by raising
a dowry demand of Rs.40,000/-, which was never met.
Page 4 of 27
Continuously she was subjected to cruelties and eventually on
15.4.2012, they set her on fire by pouring Kerosene oil. On
16.4.2012 at 14:25 hours, Uttam Kr. Debnath, father of the
deceased, lodged an FIR which was investigated by police officials
Sri Tapas Deb (PW-14) and Sri Arunodaya Das (PW-17).
Investigation revealed the accused to have murdered the
deceased for non-fulfillment of dowry demand. As such, challan
was presented in the Court for trial.
5. The accused were charged for having committed
offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304B read with Section
34 of IPC. Alternative charge under Section 302 read with Section
34 of IPC was also framed.
6. We notice that the trial Court has not returned any
findings with respect to the alternate charge. We also notice that
the trial Court has found only the husband to have committed an
offence punishable under Section 304B of IPC. It is a matter of
record that neither the complainant nor the State has preferred
any appeal assailing the findings or the judgment rendered by the
trial Court. It is only the convicts who have preferred these
appeals. Crl.A. No.21/2015 stands preferred by Sri Sukha Ranjan
Das and Smt. Sabita Das and Crl.A(J) No.45/2015 stands
preferred by Sri Jhutan Das.
7. It has come in the testimony of Sri Arunodaya Das
(PW-17) that on 15.4.2012 at about 11.10 p.m., the Duty Officer
of Melaghar Police Station received information on telephone that
Page 5 of 27
the deceased had committed suicide by setting herself on fire, in
relation to which an entry was made. He reached the spot for
verifying such information and found the deceased lying on the
floor of house of accused Jhutan Das. The injured had sustained
serious burn injuries and arranged her to be taken to the Melaghar
Sub-Divisional Hospital where the doctor declared her dead. The
following day, i.e. on 16.4.2012, pursuant to the request made to
the SDM, Sonamura, surathal report (Inquest Report)(Exhibit-2/3)
was prepared in the presence of the Executive Magistrate and
other witnesses. Postmortem was got conducted and viscera of
the deceased collected. On completion of formalities, body was
handed over to the father namely Sri Uttam Debnath who, on
16.4.2012 itself lodged a formal complaint of dowry death and as
such, request was made to the concerned Superintendent of Police
for making appropriate arrangements of investigation. Pursuant to
certain directions, he continued with the investigation and
recorded statements of the father and one Sri Subhash Debnath
(PW-2), uncle of the deceased. From the place of occurrence of
the incident, he seized one blue coloured plastic drum having
smell of Kerosene oil and burnt orange coloured cloth (parda) vide
memo (Exhibit-3/2), in the presence of independent witnesses.
Since accused Jhutan Das had also sustained burn injuries, he was
also got medically treated.
8. From the testimony of Sri Tapas Deb (PW-14) it is
clear that further investigation was carried out by him. He
Page 6 of 27
recorded statements of the witnesses; collected the postmortem
report and presented the challan in the Court for trial.
9. From the conjoint reading of the cross-examination
part of testimonies of these two witnesses, two things emerge; (a)
informant Uttam Kr. Debnath did not furnish any explanation for
the delay in lodging the FIR and (b)Balaram Paul who furnished
information about the incident to the father of the deceased was
not examined by him.
Since much emphasis is laid on such fact, we deem it
appropriate to deal with this issue here itself.
10. Prosecution case does not rest on the testimony of said
Balaram Paul. Before we deal with the testimonies, let us examine
the contents of the complaint lodged by the father (PW.1). In the
complaint, he alleges that on 09.02.2012 one Balaram Paul
telephonically informed him that the accused husband was beating
the deceased. Immediately, he rushed to the spot and noticed
injuries on the body of his daughter, inflicted by her husband.
Resultantly, when he sought intervention of the parents (other co-
accused), they reiterated dowry demand of Rs.40,000/-. As a part
of such conspiracy, on 15.4.2012, all the accused persons killed
the deceased by strangulating and setting her on fire after pouring
Kerosene oil.
11. The reference of Balaram Paul is only with regard to
the alleged incident which took place on 09.02.2012, and not
Page 7 of 27
15.4.2012. We are of the view that by mere non-association of
Balaram Paul during investigation or non-examination in Court,
the genesis of the prosecution story cannot be said to have been
falsified, the edifice to fall for if through the testimonies of other
witnesses, guilt stands proven and established beyond reasonable
doubt, it would be sufficient to uphold the conviction of the
accused. Balaram Paul is a witness only to a single act of assault
which in any event stands established by other credible evidence.
12. In any event, trial cannot be said to be vitiated only
on account of faulty, incorrect or incomplete investigation, if
otherwise this Court is convinced of the prosecution case.
13. Mere error, illegality or defect in investigation cannot
be a ground to doubt the prosecution story. In fact, Court is duty
bound to examine as to whether such fact would result into
miscarriage of justice or not. Equally, the accused would be under
an obligation to prima facie show as to what prejudice, serious in
nature, stands caused to him. [See : Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer
Singh & Ors.,(2017) 11 SCC 195 (2 Judge Bench); C Muniappan
and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567 (2 Judge
Bench) & Abu Thakir and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR (2010)
SCC 2119 (2 Judge Bench)].
It is also not the requirement of law that in every case
witnesses from the neighborhood must be examined by the police
or by the prosecution in the Court, more so in dowry related
cases.
Page 8 of 27
14. We do notice that the factum of dowry demand and
dowry death was first brought to the notice of the police only on
16.4.2012. There has been a delay of more than 18 hours.
However, we find the explanation, plausible and acceptable in
nature, emerging in the unrebutted testimony of PW-1 who does
state that "I was not in a position even to talk with any person. I
lost my mental balance to report anything to the police over the
entire episode." We notice that initially the father was silent in
explaining the delay, but then can it be said that such fact would
be fatal to the prosecution case or that it is a case of an
afterthought after due deliberation, with the purported object of
false implication of the accused. To our mind, not so. For we find
that the incident took place in a remote corner of the State.
Parties are residing not in an urban but rural area. Also it took
time for the police to reach the spot for carrying out spot
investigation. The inquest also was prepared the following day,
when itself, the complaint was lodged. Noticeably, accused do not
question the role of the police, to be partisan or allege false
implication. Hence, the question of delay pales into insignificance,
more so when we notice that the accused husband had also
sustained burn injuries, which remain unexplained on record and
that the unfortunate incident took place in the matrimonial house.
15. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment
- creature of an afterthought. It loses its spontaneity. Danger of
often exaggerated story creeps in but then this alone is not the
settled principle of law. In every case the trial court is duty bound
Page 9 of 27
to examine, as to whether the delay is colourded by an
afterthought or not. Prompt lodging of the FIR only helps ruling
out the possibility of introduction of a new or a distorted fact. Also
it lends assurance regarding the truth of the informants‟ versions.
However, delay per se cannot be said to be fatal in all cases. In
fact, Courts are duty bound to exhibit sensitivity in the cases of
dowry death where victim‟s closest relation are in a state of woe
and shock, but then appreciating such fact would also depend
upon the attending circumstances and the explanation furnished
during trial. Also, mental condition of the close relative needs to
be kept in mind. [See: Jitender Kumar v. State of Tripura, (2012) 6
SCC 204 (2 Judge Bench); Manoj Kumar Sharma and ors. v. State of
Chhattisgarh and Anr., (2016) 9 SCC 1 (2 Judge Bench); Satish Shetty v.
State of Karnataka, (2016) 12 SCC 759 (2 Judge Bench); State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Raghuvir and Anr.,(2018) 13 SCC 732 (2 Judge Bench)].
16. The Apex Court in Kulwant Singh and Ors. v. State
of Punjab, (2013) 4 SCC 177(2 Judge Bench) has observed as
under:
"25. We may also mention that the issue about
the delay in lodging an FIR has been dealt by this
Court ad nauseum and we should not make a
fetish out of any perceived delay in lodging the
FIR. Some time back, one of us (Madan B.Lokur,
J.) had occasion to deal with this issue in Gurmail
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 11 SCALE 224
and it is not necessary to repeat the conclusions
arrived at nor is it necessary to reaffirm the
principle that delay in lodging the FIR cannot be
a ground for throwing away the entire
Page 10 of 27
prosecution case as held in Jitender Kumar v.
State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 204."
(emphasis supplied)
17. With the issue of delay over, we now proceed to discuss
other issues. At this juncture, we take note of what Dr. Abhijit
Dasgupta (PW-15), who conducted the postmortem, has opined.
Postmortem report (Exhibit-5) stands proven on record. Almost
whole of the body stood burnt. The cause of death is burn injuries
resulting into multiple organ failure.
18. From the testimonies of the witnesses, we have
discussed thus far, two undisputed facts emerge: (a) death took
place as a result of burn injuries and (b) it was as a result of an
incident which took place in the matrimonial home, i.e. the house
of the accused husband.
19. We notice that through the testimony of Sri Uttam Kr.
Debnath (PW-1) it has come on record that all the accused were
not residing together. The parents(co-accused) were residing
separately, though in close vicinity. It is in this backdrop, we are
of the considered view that at least the husband was obliged to
furnish plausible explanation about the manner in which his wife
sustained such burn injuries. Also how he sustained burn injuries
on his hands. It is not his suggested case to the Investigating
Officer/Court that the deceased set herself on fire by pouring
Kerosene oil. It is nobody‟s case that otherwise deceased was
temperamental in nature and/or suffering from some depression
Page 11 of 27
or ailment prompting her to take away her life. In view of the law
laid down by the Apex Court the accused was under an obligation
to have furnished a plausible explanation.
19. It is a settled principle of law that the accused is duty
bound to explain the incriminating circumstance proved against
him while making a statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The Apex
Court in Aftab Ahmad Ansari v. State of Uttaranchal, (2010)
2 SCC 583 (2 Judge Bench) and in Neel Kumar v. State of
Haryana, (2012) 5 SCC 766 (2 Judge Bench) has held that
either maintaining silence or not furnishing sufficient explanation
for such a circumstance is an additional link in the chain of
circumstances to sustain the charges against the accused.
20. In fact, in view of the dictum laid down in the said
decisions, we find the provisions of 106 of the Evidence Act, 1972
to be squarely applicable in the instant case for the accused had
to explain as to how his wife died and as to how he sustained
injuries on his hand.
21. The principles stand reiterated in Munna Kumar
Upadhya v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 6 SCC 174 (2
Judge Bench) in the following terms:
"None of the accused, particularly accused No.2,
offered any explanation during the recording of their
statements under Section 313 CrPC. It is not even
disputed before us that the material incriminating
evidence was put to accused No. 2 while his
statement under Section 313 CrPC was recorded.
Page 12 of 27
Except for a vague denial, he stated nothing more. In
fact, even in response to a question relating to the
injuries that he had suffered, he opted to make a
denial, which fact had duly been established by the
statements of the investigating officers, doctors and
even the witnesses who had seen him immediately
after the crime.
The statement of Section 313 CrPC is to
serve a dual purpose, firstly, to afford to the accused
an opportunity to explain his conduct and secondly to
use denials of established facts as incriminating
evidence against him.
It was expected of the accused to render
proper explanation for his injuries and his conduct.
However, he opted to deny the same and in fact even
gave false replies to the questions posed to him.
If the accused gave incorrect or false
answers during the course of his statement
under Section 313CrPC, the Court can draw an
adverse inference against him. The accused in the
present case has not only failed to explain his
conduct, in the manner in which every person of
normal prudence would be expected to explain but
had even given incorrect and false answers. In the
present case, the Court not only draws an adverse
inference, but such conduct of the accused would
also tilt the case in favour of the prosecution."[Also :
Jitender Kumar(supra); Neel Kumar alias Anil Kumar
(supra); Phula Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh,
(2014) 4 SCC 9 (2 Judge Bench); The State of Tripura
v. Sanvlo Naik and Ors.,(2017) 16 SCC 54 (2 Judge
Bench)].
22. Further the Apex Court in Phula Singh(supra), has
observed that
Page 13 of 27
"11. .................. if the accused has been given the
freedom to remain silent during the investigation as
well as before the court, then the accused may
choose to maintain silence or even remain in
complete denial when his statement under Section
313 Cr.P.C. is being recorded. However, in such an
event, the court would be entitled to draw an
inference, including such adverse inference against
the accused as may be permissible in accordance
with law."
23. Under identical circumstances where death has taken
place in the house of the accused, the Apex Court in Chandra
Bhawan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2018) 6 SCC 670
(2 Judge Bench) while holding the accused not to have sufficiently
explained the circumstance in which the incident occurred
observed as under:
"32. We also find that both the accused (appellants
herein) in their statements recorded under Section
313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 failed to
give any explanation when asked about the
circumstances in which the incident occurred in their
house. When the incident admittedly occurred in their
house, the appellants were required to explain the
circumstances in which Satyawati died. They,
however, failed to give any explanation."
24. It is also settled principle of law that with the
prosecution having discharged its initial burden of establishing the
ingredients, raising statutory presumption of complicity of the
accused in the crime, burden of proving innocence or rebutting
such presumption is on the accused. [Pathan Hussain Basha v.
State of A.P., (2012) 8 SCC 594 (2 Judge Bench)].
Page 14 of 27
What is the meaning of the expression "beyond
reasonable doubt" stands explained in Yogesh Singh(supra).
25. It is true that there is no eyewitness to the occurrence
of the incident and the prosecution case is primarily based on
circumstantial evidence. It is equally true that none from the
neighbourhood stands associated or examined in Court, but then it
is not the requirement of law that in every case, witness from the
neighbourhood needs to be associated or examined provided in
that matter, testimonies of the relatives stand corroborated.
26. It is equally true that relatives who deposed against the
accused are always interested in ensuring successful completion of
trial culminating into conviction. But then, as per law laid down by
the Apex Court in their testimonies, if otherwise found to be fully
inspiring confidence, being consistent with the prosecution case,
are not required to be discarded merely for the reason that they
are interested parties.
27. We repeat that no doubt, relatives are interested in the
success of trial but then this itself cannot be a ground to discard
their testimony, more so when their depositions are found to be
fully inspiring the confidence and no
embellishments/contradictions or exaggerations are highlighted
indicating the witnesses to be unreliable or their depositions
untrustworthy.
Page 15 of 27
28. What are the factors to be kept in mind while
appreciating the testimony of an interested witness are now well
settled. The term interested postulates with the person concerned
must have some direct interest in seeing the accused person,
under all circumstances and in any event that is to say, somehow
or the other convicted, either on account of animus or for some
other reason which the witness may be harbouring against the
accused. Mere relationship is not sufficient to discredit the
witness, more so in the absence of any material, even prima facie
indicating the intent of false implication. Relatives do have interest
in ensuring successful culmination of trial for after all they are the
aggrieved persons but then this in itself cannot be said to be a
factor of not accounting for their testimonies which, in any event,
has to be appreciated and scrutinized in accordance with the
provisions of the Evidence Act. [See: Masalti v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 202 (4 Judge Bench); State of Rajasthan v. Kalki
and Anr., (1981) 2 SCC 752(3 Judge Bench); Jitender Kumar(supra);
Yogesh Singh (supra); Arjun and Anr. v. State of Chattisgarh,(2017) 3
SCC 247 (2 Judge Bench); Kuna alias Snajaya Behera v. State of
Odisha,(2018) 1 SCC 296 (2 Judge Bench)].
The Apex Court has used the words „intrinsically
reliable or inherently probable‟ being the essential ingredients for
relying upon the testimonies of such witness. [State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Ballabh Das and Ors., (1985) 3 SCC 703 (2 Judge
Bench)].
Page 16 of 27
29. We repeat that there is no eye witness to the incident
and the prosecution case is primarily that of circumstantial
evidence. But then, this is not in relation to dowry demands.
30. A Constitution Bench (5 Judge) of the Apex Court in
Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. The State of Uttar Pradesh,
AIR 1963 Supreme Court 74 has fully explained the concept of
circumstantial evidence for determining innocence or guilt of the
accused which has to be deduced from the material on record.
And, what is required to be kept in mind by the Court, while
appreciating such evidence, stands reiterated by the Apex Court in
Bhim Singh and Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand, (2015) 4 SCC
281(2 Judge Bench) that when conviction is solely based on
circumstantial evidence, then there should not be any snap in the
chain of circumstances, for benefit thereof, would come to the
accused as a princple benefit of doubt. On the question of any
reasonable hypothesis, the Court held that if some of the
circumstances in the chain can be explained by any other
reasonable hypothesis, then the accused is not entitled such
benefit of doubt. However, in assessing such evidence, imaginary
possibilities have no place for Court only considers ordinary
human probabilities.
31. Earlier Apex Court in Padala Veera Reddy v. State of
Andhra Pradesh and others, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706 (3
Judge Bench) culled out the following tests guiding the Courts in
deterring the grant of two accused in a case of circumstantial
Page 17 of 27
evidence; (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is
sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2)
those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly
pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances,
taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is
no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability
the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4)
the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be
complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis
than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not
only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be
inconsistent with his innocence.
32. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal, (1994) 1
SCC 73 (2 Judge Bench), the Apex Court clarified that in a
criminal trial, the degree of proof is stricter than what is required
in civil proceedings. Further, in a criminal trial however intriguing
the facts and circumstances of the case may be, the charges made
against the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts
and the requirement of proof cannot lie in the realm of surmises
and conjectures. Thus requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not stand altered even after introduction of S. 498A,
I.P.C and S. 113A of Indian Evidence Act. Although, the court's
conscience must be satisfied that the accused is not held guilty
when there are reasonable doubts about his complicity in the
crime. Further it must be borne in mind that there is no absolute
standard for proof in a criminal trial and the question whether
Page 18 of 27
charges made against the accused stand proved beyond all
reasonable doubts must depend upon the facts and circumstances
of the case and the quality of the evidences adduced in the case
and the materials placed on record. It observed that the doubt
must be of a reasonable man and the standard adopted must be a
standard adopted by a reasonable and just man for coming to a
conclusion considering the particular subject matter. The
conscience of the court can never be bound by any rule but that is
coming itself dictates the consciousness and prudent exercise of
the judgment. Reasonable doubt is simply that degree of doubt
which would permit a reasonable and just man to come to a
conclusion. Reasonableness of the doubt must be commensurate
with the nature of the offence to be investigated. Exaggerated
devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful
doubts or lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence.
Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let
hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty
escape is not doing justice, according to law."
(emphasis supplied).
33. In Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam and Anr. v. State
of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 2 SCC 684 (2 Judge Bench) while
dealing with cases relating to women the Apex Court held that:
"The role of courts, under the circumstances assumes
greater importance and it is expected that the courts
would deal with such cases in a more realistic manner
and not allow the criminals to escape on account of
Page 19 of 27
procedural technicalities or insignificant lacune in the
evidence as otherwise the criminals would receive
encouragement and the victims of crime would be
totally discouraged by the crime going unpunished.
The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases
involving crime against women."
34. Applying the aforesaid principles let us discuss the
evidence of the relevant witnesses. Prosecution case primarily
rests upon the testimonies of relatives of the deceased namely, Sri
Uttam Kumar Debnath(PW-1), Sri Subhash Debnath (PW-2), Smt.
Shipra Debnath (PW-4), Smt. Jayanti Deb (Das) (PW-5), Sri
Prasenjit Debnath (PW-7), Sri Narayan Debnath (PW-9) and Smt.
Binasri Debnath (PW-16).
35. PW-1 states that two years prior to the incident,
accused „enticed away‟ the deceased and solemnized his marriage,
whereafter parties started residing together and gave birth to a
female child. Further, six months prior to the incident (which
means sometime in January, 2012 for the incident took place on
the 15th July, 2012) accused Jhutan Das started pressurizing the
deceased and all the accused subjected her to ill-treatment by
raising a demand of Rs.40,000/-. Acts of ill-treatment were
brought to his notice by the deceased but due to financial
constraints, he could not fulfill such demands. On many occasions,
she was brutally assaulted. „One day‟ at about 9.30 p.m., one
Balaram Paul informed that the deceased was being physically
assaulted by her husband and in-laws. Ensuring that her cries are
Page 20 of 27
not heard by anyone, accused had loudly played a musical
instrument. Upon receipt of such information, he immediately
reached the spot and saw his daughter lying on the floor in a
"precarious condition". There were injuries on her body. At that
time, only accused Jhutan Das was in the house. Immediately he
brought the matter to the notice of co-accused Sukha Ranjan Das
and Sabita Das who were residing separately at a distance of 200
metres. However, Sukha Ranjan Das not only reiterated the dowry
demand but threatened of aggravating the mental torture. Also he
proposed transfer of ownership of 3 kanis of land having rubber
plantation. On 15.7.2012, this witness spoke with the deceased on
phone. Later at about 10.30-10.35 p.m. hearing cries from the
matrimonial house of his daughter, he ran and on reaching found
the deceased lying dead inside the room. Accused Jhutan Das who
had sustained burn injuries on his right hand was sitting outside
the bedroom and the other co-accused were there in the
courtyard. When queried, Jhutan Das maintained silence,
pretending as though he was in a state of shock over his wife‟s
death. Noticing the mosquito net covering the bed and finding
other articles, including the bicycle to be intact and only one
curtain of the door to be slightly burnt, he gathered an impression
that after murdering the deceased, accused had set her on fire. In
the meantime, friends and relatives assembled and someone
informed the police. The deceased was taken to the hospital where
she was declared dead. It was in the hospital that he lodged a
Page 21 of 27
written report (Exhibit-1). The incident occurred within two years
of marriage.
36. From the cross-examination part of his testimony, we
do not find the veracity of his statement or his credit to be
impeached in any manner. Fully inspiring in confidence, it is free
from embellishments, impeachments and contradictions. Non-
examination of neighbours would not render his testimony, in any
manner, to be doubtful. It does not require corroboration at all. It
is true that he does not remember the date and time when his
daughter was beaten up, but then he clarifies by stating that "I
am not in a position at this stage to say" so. One cannot be
oblivious of the fact that such statement was recorded after a
period of two years in Court. Be that as it may, assuming
hypothetically that the incident in relation to which Balaram Paul
apprised the accused remains unproven, however from the other
part of his testimony, to our mind, the factum of dowry demand
remains fully established about which there is no doubt. There is a
demand; of a specific amount and/or property; the persons to
whom and by whom it was so made. On his sole testimony the
charge of dowry demand and cruelty stands proven against all the
accused persons.
37. Sri Subhash Debnath (PW-2) is the uncle of the
deceased. His testimony though in the nature of hearsay only
corroborates what is so stated by PW-1.
Page 22 of 27
38. Smt. Shipra Debnath (PW-4) who is the mother of the
accused substantially corroborates what is so stated by her
husband Sri Uttam Kr. Debnath (PW-1). However, we do notice
there are two contradictions in her statement; (i) the time of
marriage, which she unlike her husband refers to be 4 years prior
to the incident and (ii) her husband agreeing to meet the demand.
But then, to our mind, this would, in no manner, render
the testimony of her husband to be unbelievable, impeaching his
credit, for she is categorical about (a) the dowry demand; (b)
made by the accused; (c) of a sum of Rs.40,000/-; (d) deceased
being subjected to cruelty (constant pressure), both mental and
physical; and (e) in the night of 15.4.2012, cries coming from the
house of the deceased when her husband went to see as to what
had really happened.
39. Discrepancies, contradictions, embellishment, and
improvements are bound to be there with the long passage of
time. How best to appreciate their testimonies stand explained by
the Apex Court in Yogesh Singh (supra) in the following terms:
"29. It is well settled in law that the minor
discrepancies are not to be given undue emphasis and
the evidence is to be considered from the point of view
of trustworthiness. The test is whether the same
inspires confidence in the mind of the Court. If the
evidence is incredible and cannot be accepted by the
test of prudence, then it may create a dent in the
prosecution version. If an omission or discrepancy
goes to the root of the matter and ushers in
incongruities, the defence can take advantage of such
inconsistencies. It needs no special emphasis to state
Page 23 of 27
that every omission cannot take place of a material
omission and, therefore, minor contradictions,
inconsistencies or insignificant embellishments do not
affect the core of the prosecution case and should not
be taken to be a ground to reject the prosecution
evidence. The omission should create a serious doubt
about the truthfulness or creditworthiness of a
witness. It is only the serious contradictions and
omissions which materially affect the case of the
prosecution but not every contradiction or omission.
[See Rammi alias Rameshwar v. State of M.P., (1999) 8
SCC 649; Leela Ram (dead) through Duli Chand v. State of
Haryana and Another, (1999) 9 SCC 525; Bihari Nath
Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh & Ors., (2004) 9 SCC 186;
Vijay alias Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 8
SCC 191; Sampath Kumar v. Inspector of Police,
Krishnagiri, (2012) 4 SCC 124; Shyamal Ghosh v. State of
West Bengal, (2012) 7 SCC 646 and Mrittunjoy Biswas v.
Pranab alias Kuti Biswas and Anr., (2013) 12 SCC 796)].
..........................................
44. In the present case, we do not find any major contradiction either in the evidence of the witnesses or any conflict in medical or ocular evidence which would tilt the balance in favour of the respondents. The minor improvements, embellishments etc., apart from being far yield of human faculties are insignificant and ought to be ignored since the evidence of the witnesses otherwise overwhelmingly corroborate each other in material particulars."
40. At this juncture, we may also observe that the alleged acts of cruelty were never reported to the police, but then this, according to us, would again not render the prosecution case to be vulnerable, for we notice the parties to hail from a rural areas, apart from the fact that it was a love marriage and perhaps, Page 24 of 27 prudently, the parents would have wanted the parties to live happily, without much altercation and adjust with the passage of time.
41. It is not that in every case, non-disclosure of factum of cruelty to the members of the society, neighbours or relatives who are not close can be fatal. Each case has to be seen in the attending facts and circumstances. [See : Monju Roy and others,(2015) 13 SCC 693 (2 Judge Bench); Union of India v. Sanjeev v. Despande, (2014) 13 SCC 525 (2 Judge Bench)].
42. Smt. Bakul Debnath (PW-6) and Sri Prasenjit Debnath (PW-7) also corroborate what is so stated by PW-1.
Sri Narayan Debnath (PW-9) is the uncle of the deceased. On the issue of dowry demand, with regard to the time and amount as also the acts of ill-treatment he corroborates the testimony of PW-1. Also hearing cries, he reached the spot where he noticed the body of the deceased lying on the floor with burn injuries. He noticed smell of Kerosene oil. This witness, as is so stated by PW-1, wants the Court to believe that the deceased was first murdered whereafter her body was burnt.
43. Smt. Binasri Debnath (PW-16) is the eldest sister of the deceased. Significantly, she does state that at the night of the incident, she had spoken with her sister on telephone and was told that the accused had tortured her for not meeting the demand. But then which one of the accused, she does not state. After some time, hearing cries coming from the house of the accused, she Page 25 of 27 tried to reach but could not, as she had to take care of her mother, who as has come on record had fainted. Later on, she learnt from her father that the accused had killed the deceased by setting her on fire. Significantly, this witness in the cross- examination part of her testimony does mention of having informed the police of the telephonic conversation which she had had with her sister.
44. The theory of "last seen together" is squarely applicable in the instant case as has been so held by the Apex Court in Ganpat Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2017) 16 SCC 353 (2 Judge Bench).
45. Hence, testimonies of all the witnesses cumulatively establish the factum of dowry demand, the acts of cruelty meted out to the deceased by all the accused persons; accused Jhutan Das and Sukha Ranjan Das and Smt. Sabita Das to be residing separately; at the time of the occurrence only accused Jhutan Das was present in the house with burn injuries on his hand, but accused Sukha Ranjan Das and Smt. Sabita Das who also reached the spot were outside in the courtyard. The body of the deceased in a burnt condition was taken to the hospital where she was declared dead.
46. We do find the prosecution to have established through the testimonies of relations of the deceased that a sum of Rs.40,000/- was demanded, not only by husband but also by his Page 26 of 27 parents. In fact, father suggested transfer of land in lieu thereof. This was in relation to an incident which had taken place six months prior to the death. As such, their complicity in relation to the offence under Section 498-A stands conclusively established beyond reasonable doubt. The deceased was subjected to cruelty i.e. harassed with a view to coerce her to meet an unlawful dowry demand which was never meet. In the instant case, presumption, statutory in nature under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, is thus clearly invokeable.
47. Persistently her husband pressed such demand and subjected her to cruelty, also physical in nature. On the date of the incident, the deceased had spoken with her sister, informing the demand being pressed by her husband. Father of the deceased does state that when he reached the spot i.e. the matrimonial house, he found his daughter lying on the floor with the body burnt. Also accused husband had sustained burn injury on his hand. Well, the accused has not furnished any explanation as to how he or his wife sustained the burn injury. It is not his case that he tried to douse the fire which resulted into such injuries. It is a matter of record that the death is unnatural. It took place within 7 years of marriage. It was caused by a burn injury. Consistently, dowry demand, specific in nature was made by the husband of the deceased. As such statutory presumption under the provisions of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is clearly unshakeable.
Page 27 of 27
48. In this backdrop, we do not find the findings returned by the Court below holding accused Jhutan Das to have committed an offence punishable under Section 304B of the IPC as also under Section 498A of IPC and the remaining two accused Sukha Ranjan Das and Sabita Das to have committed an offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC not to be borne out from the record or based on incorrect and improper appreciation of the material on record or misinterpretation/misapplication of the provisions of law.
49. Hence, for all the aforesaid reasons both the appeals, assailing the judgment passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sonamura, West Tripura in Case No. Sessions Trial 45(WT/S) of 2013 titled as The State of Tripura v. Jhutan Das and Ors., stand dismissed. Interim order(s), if any, stands vacated. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.
50. In view of the dismissal of the appeal the bail bonds of the appellants (Sri Sukha Ranjan Das and Smt. Sabita Das) stands cancelled and they are directed to surrender before the trial Court within 1(one) month from today to serve out the remaining sentence failing which the trial Court shall take action in accordance with law.
Record be sent back immediately.
(S. TALAPATRA), J (SANJAY KAROL), CJ. Sukhendu/Pulak