Karnataka High Court
Shri. Shivarama Krishnan. A vs Sri. A Sundaramurthy on 6 January, 2026
Author: S.R.Krishna Kumar
Bench: S.R.Krishna Kumar
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NC: 2026:KHC:571
WP No. 35529 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
WRIT PETITION NO. 35529 OF 2025 (GM-CPC)
BETWEEN:
SHRI. SHIVARAMA KRISHNAN A.
S/O LATE ANANTHAKRISHNAN MUDALIYAR,
AGED ABOUT 69 YEARS,
R/AT MAIN, 1ST BLOCK,
RAJAJINAGAR, BENGALURU
PIN - 560 010
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. LAKSHMIKANTH K., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SRI. A SUNDARAMURTHY
S/O LATE B. ANANTHA KRISHNA MUDALIYAR
AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS,
RESIDING AT FLAT NO.C-901,
SETHANA POWER TOWER,
Digitally HORAMAVU AGARA MAIN ROAD,
signed by BABUSAPALYA,
MADHURI S BENGALURU - 560 043
Location:
High Court of 2. SMT. B. SHANKARI
Karnataka W/O LATE A. BALAKRISHNAN,
AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS,
R/AT NO.358, 18TH CROSS,
8TH MAIN, BEML LAYOUT,
BASAVESHWARA NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 079.
3. SRI B. SATISH
S/O LATE A. BALAKRISHNAN,
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
R/AT NO.358, 18TH CROSS,
8TH MAIN, BEML LAYOUT,
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HC-KAR
BASAVESHWARA NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 079
4. SMT.B. SHANTHA NARAIN @ SHANTHA KUMARI
D/O LATE A. BALAKRISHNAN,
W/O SAI NARAIN,
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,
R/AT NO.19/10A,
CORPORATION SCHOOL ROAD,
LAKE AREA, NUNGAMBAKKAM,
CHENNAI, TAMIL NADU STATE - 600 034.
REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER AND
GPA HOLDER SMT. B. SHANKARI,
W/O LATE A. BALAKRISHNAN
5. SMT. B. SRILAKSHMI
D/O LATE A. BALAKRISHNAN,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
R/AT NO.358, 18TH CROSS,
8TH MAIN, BEML LAYOUT,
BASAVESHWARA NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 079
6. SMT. M. INDUMATHI,
W/O LATE A. MOHANRAM,
AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS,
R/AT NO.11, VGNSS LAYOUT,
3RD CROSS, KAMALANAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 079
7. SRI. M. KUMARESH
S/O LATE A. MOHANRAM,
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
R/AT NO.11, VGNSS LAYOUT,
3RD CROSS, KAMALANAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 079
8. SRI. M. ANAND
S/O LATE A. MOHANRAM,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
R/AT NO.11, VGNSS LAYOUT,
3RD CROSS, KAMALANAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 079
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WP No. 35529 of 2025
HC-KAR
9. SMT. M. NALANI
D/O LATE A. MOHANRAM,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
W/O PARTHIBAN P.,
R/AT NO. 11, VGNSS LAYOUT,
3RD CROSS, KAMALANAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 079
REPRESENTED BY HER BROTHER
AND GPA HOLDER MR. M. ANAND
S/O LATE A. MOHANRAM
10. SMT. G. SHARAVATHI
W/O LATE A. GOPALAKRISHNAN,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
R/AT NO.17, 3RD CROSS,
NEAR ANDRAHALLI CIRCLE,
VIDYAMANYANAGAR, ANDHRAHALLI,
BENGALURU - 560 091.
11. SRI. VIVEK G. KRISHNAN
D/O LATE A. GOPALAKRISHNAN,
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
R/AT NO.17, 3RD CROSS,
NEAR ANDRAHALLI CIRCLE,
VIDYAMANYANAGAR, ANDHRAHALLI,
BENGALURU - 560 091
12. SMT. VIDYA G.
D/O LATE A. GOPALAKRISHNAN,
W/O DHARMARAJ
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS,
RESIDING AT OLD NO.67/1,
NEW NO.70/1, 3RD MAIN ROAD,
NEAR SAI BABA TEMPLE,
VIJAYANAGAR, MUDALAPALYA,
NAGARABHAVI,
BENGALURU - 560 072
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K. R. ASHOK KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1 TO R12)
THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY
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WP No. 35529 of 2025
HC-KAR
OTHER APPROPRIATE WRIT BY SETTING ASIDE THE IMPUGNED
ORDER DATED 24.03.2025 PASSED BY THE HON'BLE COURT OF
XIV ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSION JUDGE AT BENGALURU (CCH-
28) IN EX.PET.NO.2356/2023 AT ANNEXURE - A.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING,
THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
This petition by the Judgment Debtor in EXE.No.2356/2023 is directed on the file of XIV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as 'the Executing Court"
for short) is directed against the impugned order dated 24.03.2025, whereby the objection raised by the petitioner/Judgment Debtor that the execution proceedings were not maintainable as being barred by limitation was rejected by the Executing Court.
2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents and perused the material on record.
3. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the petitioner - judgment debtor is none other than the brother of the respondents - decree holders. The petitioner instituted a suit in OS No.6971/2000 against the respondents-defendants, which -5- NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR culminated in a compromise decree dated 18.11.2009, the terms of which are set out as hereunder:
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT UNDER SECTION 89 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE READ WITH RULES FIND 25 OF THE KARNATAKA CIVIL PROCEDURE (MEDIATION) RULES, 2007.
The parties above named beg to submit as follows:
I. The plaintiff has filed this suit praying for a judgment and decree for partition and separate possession of 1/5th share of the plaintiff in Schedule-A and B properties and Schedule-C business and mesne profits from the date of suit till the date of delivery, among other reliefs. The aforesaid suit was referred to mediation for resolving the dispute between the parties. In the course of mediation, they have resolved their dispute and have agreed to the following terms and conditions:
(a) Both the parties have agreed to treat that the memorandum of partition entered into between them on 3.3.1997 and marked as Ex.P.1 in the above suit has been acted upon.
(b) The plaintiff confirms that the Schedule-B properties and Schedule-C business are the self- acquired properties of the concerned defendants. As such, plaintiff does not have any claim over the B- Schedule properties and C-Schedule business the same exclusively belongs to each one of the respective defendants.
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(c) By virtue of this settlement, both plaintiff and defendants have jointly agreed to sell and dispose of Schedule-A properties to the best market price and share the proceeds equally, i.e., 1/5th share each. The schedule properties along with the below mentioned V.V. Puram property shall be sold in the following order its entirety:
(i) Property bearing No.523, 1m Main Road, Anjinaya Temple Street, V.V. Puram, Bangalore, measuring 30ft. x 75 ft. together with existing building.
(ii) Property No.221, Sampangiramnagar, Bangalore-560 027 (Item No.3 of the Schedule-A);
(iii) Property bearing No.1041, 20m main, 1 Block, Rajajinagar, Bangalore-560 010 (Item No.1 of A-Schedule)
(iv) Property bearing No.C-72-(Old No. 104) P.V.R. Road, Ranasingpet, Bangalore-560 002) Item No.2 of 'A' Schedule)
(v) Land bearing No.425/2, measuring 1 acre and 20 Cents or as found in the Revenue record of Seri Village, Kaveripakkam, Tamil Nadu (Item-4 of 'A' Schedule);
(d) It is the joint responsibility of plaintiff and defendants to co-ordinate with each other in bringing the above properties for sale (Schedule-A properties described in the plaint). It is also mutually agreed to bear all the expenses in connection with updating the title deeds and obtaining encumbrance certificates and -7- NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR also payment of tax to the Corporation or to the Revenue authorities in respect of the above properties.
(e) It is mutually agreed between the parties that all of them will co-ordinate together for the sale of the schedule properties and the said V.V. Puram property and so also selecting the prospective purchaser for the mutual advantage of all the parties.
(f) It is agreed by the defendants that the plaintiff's share in the sale proceeds of all the above properties is 1/5th after deducting the expenses incurred thereto and it is also agreed that the defendants shall pay a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- over and above his share as agreed under the memorandum of partition entered into between the parties as early as 3.3.1997. Apart from the said amount the defendants have agreed to pay another sum of Rs.8,00,000/- to the plaintiff towards delay in bringing the properties for sale. Thus the defendants have agreed to pay Rs. 18,00,000/-in addition to his 1/5th share in the sale proceeds of the schedule properties and the naid V.V. Puram property.
The said defendants at the first sale of the V.V. Puram property amount is required to be paid to the plaintiff by the referred to Supra.
(g) It is made clear by both the parties that all the above properties are free from encumbrance, charge claim and other security or security either collateral or main/principal security for loan or advances and it is not the subject matter of any agreement of sale/lease/mortgage or third party claim. If there is any such claim on any of the above properties, the person -8- NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR who has availed such loans or charge, such party shall be alone is answerable/liable and it is his sole responsibility to discharge and make the property free from encumbrance to enable the parties to sell the properties to a prospective purchaser free from encumbrance.
(h) It is also mutually agreed that wherever necessary to sign the documents such as sale agreements/sale deeds if the purchaser insist upon the signatures of the family member of the parties, the same will be acted upon, as desired by the purchaser.
(i) The plaintiff has agreed to pay a sum of Rs.44,400/ towards full and final settlement of the claim in respect of O.S.No.8194/2001 filed by the second defendant against the plaintiff which is pending on the file of this Hon'ble Court, when the plaintiff receives his amount of Rs. 18,00,000/- as stated supra.
(j) The plaintiff who is residing in Schedule Item No.1 Rajajinagar property, agrees to vacate the said property at the execution and registration of sale deed of the said property to the prospective purchaser to be identified by the parties jointly.
(k) Both the plaintiff and the defendants have mutually agreed to withdraw all the allegations/contentions made against each other.
(l) The fourth defendant Smt. Sharavathi who is the wife of late Gopalakrishnan has agreed to get her son G. Vivek and daughter G. Vidya who are majors to be impleaded in the suit and record the compromise.
-9-NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR The said G. Vivek and G. Vidya who have also agreed for the same have affixed their signature to this Compromise.
(m) The parties further agree to add the above said V.V. Puram property to A-Schedule of the suit as Item No.5 property for better clarity of the compromise.
II. In view of the aforesaid agreement entered into between the parties, the parties pray that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to dispose of the above suit, in terms of the aforesaid agreement.
III. In view of the aforesaid agreement, the Plaintiff prays for refund of the entire institution fee.
IV. Parties will appear on 18.11.09 before the Court for passing orders/decree in terms of the above said agreement
4. In pursuance of the said compromise decree, the property bearing No.221, Sampangiram Nagar, Bangalore -
560027 (Item No.3 of Schedule A) was jointly sold by all the parties on 28.10.2014. Subsequently, the respondents instituted the instant execution proceedings in Exe No.2356/2023 interalia alleging that the petitioner - judgment debtor had committed breach/default and was not co-operating with the respondents to give effect to and implement and execute the compromise decree
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR and as such, the compromise decree required to be executed by the Executing Court. After entering appearance before the Executing Court, the petitioner - judgment debtor contested the proceedings putting forth various contentions including raising a contention regarding limitation on the ground that the compromise decree having been passed on 18.11.2009, the instant execution proceedings which were instituted on 07.09.2023 beyond the period of 12 years as contemplated under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was barred by limitation. The respondents -
decree holders opposed the said contention and contended that there were mutual rights and obligations created under the compromise decree as well as subsequent events which occurred pursuant to the said compromise decree and since the petitioner -
judgment debtor had not complied with the terms and conditions of the compromise decree and had committed breach/default thereof, the respondents were entitled to file the instant execution proceedings, which were not barred by limitation and maintainable and sought for rejection of the said contention of the petitioner.
5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the trial Court proceeded to pass the impugned order rejecting the
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR objections raised by the petitioner - judgment debtor as regards the maintainability of the execution petition insofar as limitation was concerned. Aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the Executing Court, the petitioner is before this Court by way of the present petition.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would reiterate the various contentions urged in the petition and submit that since the compromise decree was passed on 18.11.2009, in the light of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the instant execution proceedings filed on 07.09.2023 after/beyond the prescribed period of 12 years was barred by limitation and the same was liable to be dismissed as not maintainable and the impugned order passed by the trial Court deserves to be set aside.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that since there were mutual and reciprocal rights and obligations created in favour and against both parties in the compromise decree, the decree would become enforceable only when the cause of action to execute the decree would arise after committal of breach by the petitioners and period of limitation would not commence/start from the date of the decree but subsequently,
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR when the breach occurred and when the decree became enforceable and as such, the impugned order passed by the trial Court does not warrant interference by this Court in the present petition.
8. I have given my careful consideration to the rival submissions and perused the material on record.
9. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would be necessary to extract Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which reads as under:
Where the decree or order becomes For the enforceable or where the decree or any execution of subsequent order directs any payment of any decree money or the delivery of any property to be (other than a made at a certain date or at recurring decree Twelve periods, when default in making the "136.
granting a years. payment or delivery in respect of which mandatory execution is sought, takes place, provided injunction) or that an application for the enforcement or order of any execution of a decree granting a perpetual civil court. injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation."
10. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision is sufficient to come to the conclusion that the limitation would commence only when the decree becomes enforceable or from the date of default and not from the date of the decree as provided in the said
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR provision. In the instant case, a perusal of the terms and conditions of the compromise decree would indicate that mutual and reciprocal rights and obligations were created in favour and against both parties in the compromise decree, as a result of which, the decree would become enforceable only upon breach/default being committed by either of the parties and the period of limitation would commence when the cause of action to execute the decree arose when it become enforceable and not from the date of decree.
11. In this context, the Trial Court has correctly and properly considered the material on record and taken into account that as per the compromise decree itself, the property at Sampangiram Nagar was jointly sold subsequently on 28.10.2014 by both the parties including the petitioner - judgment debtor, who himself participated in giving effect to and implementing and executing the compromise decree subsequent to the decree.
However, subsequent to the decree dated 18.11.2009 and sale deed dated 28.10.2014, the petitioner had allegedly committed default/breach of terms of conditions of the decree which consequently became enforceable only thereafter, as a result of which, the instant execution proceedings were not barred by
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR limitation. While arriving at the said conclusion, executing Court held as under:
ORDERS ON MAINTAINABILITY The present Decree Holders namely Sundaramurthy and 11 others have filed the present Execution Petition as against one Shivarama Krishnan based upon the Judgment and decree of compromise effected in O.S.No. 6971/2000 directing the Judgment Debtors to vacate and surrender the vacant possession of the Suit Schedule Property, secondly to sell the schedule Property by auction and apportionment of sale consideration as per the decree and for other appropriate reliefs.
2. Based upon a compromise decree dated 18/11/2009, a decree was passed by this Court as on 12/4/2010. The Judgment Debtors have raised an objection, accordingly the Decree Holders have filed the present application by way of written arguments have addressed their written arguments with regard to maintainability of Execution petition on the ground that youngest son V. Ananthakrishna Modaliar is said to have filed a suit for Partition & Separate Possession as against his brothers in O.S.No. 6971/2000 and after the contest of the matter, the matter was referred to Mediation and the compromise was effected by virtue of a decree dated 18/11/2009. And that, in terms of the decree, execution final decree was also drawn, whereby since the properties were situated at various parts of the Bengaluru, that were
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR listed and were ordered to be sold in priority and apportion the sale consideration so received amongst the brothers in 1/5th share each and in case of the death of one of the brothers, it shall be shared amongst their respective family members. And the details of properties were furnished. One such Property is situated at V.V.Puram, the other Property at S.R. Nagar and upon the Property that was situated at Rajajinagar and another Property at PVR Road. And that the order of preference of sale of Property was also settled in terms of the said decree. Accordingly, V.V.Puram Property was sold on 17/11/2011, SR Nagar Property was sold on 28/10/2014. Rajajinagar Property is not yet sold. And PVR Road Property was sold on 22/6/2012. Therefore, it was clear from the terms of the decree that Rajajinagar Property was required to be sold but the same could not be sold since Judgment Debtor was residing with his family and as a good gesture not to cause inconvenience until he shifts his residence and the Property was not taken for sale and the order of preference No.3 was kept as a last Property. And that it was also contended that, as per the decree, Plaintiff was residing in Rajajinagar Property agreed to vacate the said Property. But inspite of a compromise decree Judgment Debtor has not yet come forwarded to vacate and surrender the vacant possession of the Rajajinagar Property immediately after the sale of PVR Property on 22/6/2012, which was the last to be sold. The Judgment Debtors family members requested the Decree Holder to vacate and surrender the
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR possession of the said Property. On 28/10/2014 the SR Nagar Property was also sold. And thereafter preference to sell Rajajinagar Property was taken up and then the Judgment Debtor was required to vacate and surrender the vacant possession and to arrange the sale of the said Property from the date of the said compromise decree. And therefore, the Decree Holder has contended that, as per Article 136 since there was an obligation upon the parties, whereby the right to seek for the sale of Rajajinagar Property arose after the sale of SR Nagar Property on 28/10/2014. And therefore, the starting point of limitation would apply after the sale of SR Nagar Property, which is governed under Article 136.
3. And also contended that it is not a normal decree but it was a conditional decree and delivery of possession is in terms of Order 21 Rule 35 r/w. Section (2) (3) of C.P.C. "And that the possession of the building or the enclosures is to be delivered and a person governed by a decree does not offer free access to the Court through which its office may order for delivery of possession". And therefore, noting the objections raised by Judgment Debtor, wherein a contention is raised by the Judgment Debtor that it is barred by limitation and it has crossed 12 years period of limitation from 18/11/2009 and therefore, a contention is raised by the Judgment Debtor that it would not attract execution since it is barred by time.
4. Noting these aspects, the Execution Petitioners have approached this Court by way of the
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR present written arguments and have relied upon few citations.
5. Having heard both sides, perused the materials available on record.
6. Following points arise for my consideration:-
Points for consideration
1. Whether the objections of Judgment Debtor relating to limitation is sustainable?
2. What order?
7. My findings to the above points are as under:
Point No.1 : In the Negative Point No.2 : As per final order for the following;
REASONS
8. Point No.1:- The Judgment Debtors have raised an objection that Decree Holders have filed a false petition seeking execution of decree passed in O.S.No. 6971/2000 dated 18/11/2009. And that as per Article 136 of Limitation Act 1963, the period of limitation for execution of any decree or other of any civil Court other than a decree granting Mandatory Injunction is 12 years. And the maximum period of limitation for execution of a decree or order is 12 years from the date when the decree or order became enforceable, which is usually the date of decree or order, as held in the case of I.Ahmad Vs. K.Bibi, reported in
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR AIR 1985 ORISSA 8102. Hence, on these and other grounds the Judgment Debtor has sought for dismissal of the execution petition.
9. And further the Advocate for DHR has also relied upon another citation reported in Shaifuddin Vs. Kanhaiya Lal reported in the case of AIR 2023 SC (Civil) 1616, wherein their Lordships referring to Article 136 have held, "Limitation - Compromise Decree - cause of action to execute compromise decree arose when premises were removed from possession of Decree Holders."
10. Further another citation reported in (2000) 6 SCC 259, in the case of Deep Chand and others Vs. Mohan Lal, referring to Article 136, their Lordships have held that, "Execution of decree - Decree itself directing its execution only after execution of Sale Deed in favour of Decree Holder - Held, limitation period of 12 years will start running from the date of execution of the Sale Deed in favour of Decree Holder - Application for execution of the decree filed within 12 years from that date would be maintainable."
11. Further another citation reported in (2004) 12 SCC 469, wherein it is held, "Starting point of limitation under Article 136, held, is the date on which the decree becomes capable of execution - Where decree passed in 1973 remained unenforceable during the operation of T.N.
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Ordinance, 1975."
12. Having noted the said citation, the contention of the present execution Petitioners ie., Decree Holder is that, as per the compromise entered into between the Plaintiff ie., the present Judgment Debtor Shivaramakrishnan in O.S.No. 6971/2000 and the present Decree Holders / Defendants, as per the compromise effected on 12/11/2009 is that, both parties have agreed for the sale of properties in the order disclosed at Clause-1, Page-2. Whereby the Property at V.V.Puram was to be sold at the first instance and followed by Sampangiramanagara Property and then the Property at Rajajinagar and subsequently in the category-4, the Property of PVR Road and lastly the land bearing 425/2002 which is not available for sale. In the first 4 categories, the Property in the Serial No.3 ie., Rajajinagar Property is not yet sold since the Judgment Debtor Shivaramkrishnan is in possession of the same. As such, the said Property was not sold since on one or the other pretext the Judgment Debtor has not vacated himself from the Property at Rajajinagar. Therefore the Decree Holders have approached this Court. As per the said terms of the compromise, as discussed and safely relying upon the citation relied by the counsel for Decree Holder, the period of limitation as stated under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation would commence from the date on which the last Property which was sold ie., the S.R. Nagar Property which is sold on 28/10/2014. Therefore,
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR from the said date, the present Decree Holders have filed the present execution petition as on 7/9/2023, which is within 12 years from the date of limitation. Hence sought for rejecting the objections raised by the Judgment Debtors. Having noted the citations relied by the Judgment Debtors and Decree Holders which are as under :
In case of Bimal Kumar and another Vs. Shakunthala Debi & others, wherein it is held, "Whether preliminary or final - Decree passed in terms of compromise - Terms of compromise clearly showing that parties had obtained separate and exclusive possession of properties allotted to their respective shares - Compromise thus leaves nothing to be done for future - Decree passed by embodying such compromise is final decree".
Further at para-23, their Lordships have held that, ""It is clearly admitted that they were in separate and exclusive possession of the properties and the same had already been allotted to them. It was also admitted that they were in possession of their respective shares and, therefore, no final decree or execution was required to be filed. It is demonstrable that the compromise application does not contain any clause regarding the future course of action. The parties were absolutely conscious and rightly so, that their rights had been fructified and their possession had been exclusively determined. They were well aware that the decree was final in nature as their shares were allotted and nothing remained to be done by metes and bounds. Their rights had attained finality and no further
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR enquiry from any spectrum was required to be carried out. The whole thing had been embodied in the decree passed on the foundation of compromise."
13. And further the Learned Counsel for the Decree Holder also relied upon the case of Ram Bachan Rai and others vs. Udar Rai and 11 others, "
A contention was advanced to the effect that as the cost for enforcement of decree was not quantified, the period of limitation could not have commenced from the date of Judgment and decree".
And further at para-35 it is held that, "The irresistible conclusion is that the initiation of an execution proceedings was indubitably barred by limitation. Thus analyzed, the reasons ascribed by the learned single Judge are absolutely unsustainable. The period of limitation stipulated under Article 136 of the Act could not have been condoned as has been so presumed by learned single Judge."
14. The reasons that is based upon the said compromise between the Decree Holder and the Judgment Debtors, the time that would commence to run in favour of the parties would be from the sale of S.R.Nagar Property which is sold on 28/10/2014 and not on the date of the drawing of a compromise decree. For the simple reason that, parties to both the compromise had mutually agreed that certain properties would be sold as per the serial numbers as enclosed in their compromise petition at page-
2. In these circumstances, the arguments addressed by
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR the Judgment Debtor that the execution petition is barred by limitation since from the date of the decree the claim of the execution Petitioners / Decree Holders is barred by time cannot be accepted. Safely relying upon the citations relied by the counsel for the Decree Holder reported in (2000) 6 SCC 259, this execution petition is well within the time. Therefore, I answer point No.1 in the Negative.
14. Point No.2 : In furtherance of my findings to points No.1, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER Objections raised by the Judgment Debtors with regard to maintainability of the Execution Petition so far as the limitation is concerned, it hereby dismissed and does not sustain. Hence, Decree Holders to proceed with the case in hand by taking necessary steps."
12. As correctly held by the executing Court, having regard to the undisputed fact that the compromise decree contain several mutual/reciprocal rights and obligations cast upon by the parties coupled with the undisputed fact that the petitioner along with respondents jointly sold Sampangiram Nagar property on 28.10.2014, which is subsequent to the compromise decree dated 18.10.2009, the instant execution proceedings filed in 2023 within the prescribed of 12 years from the date of sale of Sampangiram
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR Nagar property on 28.10.2014 cannot be said to be barred by limitation since the compromise decree did not become enforceable on 18.10.2009 which was the date of decree but only after committal of alleged breach/default by the petitioner. Under these circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the Trial Court is fully justified in adjudicating the maintainability raised by the petitioner by passing the impugned order which cannot be said to suffer from any illegality or infirmity nor can the same said to have occasioned failure of justice warranting interference of this Court in the present petition. It is also significant to note that the petitioner who had undisputedly participated in the sale of Sampangiram Nagar property in terms of the compromise decree subsequently on 28.10.2014 was estopped from contending that the instant execution proceedings within 12 years from that date were barred by limitation.
13. In the case of Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf Vs. M/s.
Badam Balakrishna Hotel Pvt. Ltd,. And Ors. - 2023 INSC 949 the Apex Court held as under:
"1. Leave granted.
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR
2. A legal journey adopted by the appellant with periodical stoppages orchestrated in the process at behest of respondent no(s). 1 and 2 brought the lis back to the place where it started, forcing it to undertake a fresh guard by the impugned order.
3. This case is a classic example of the unfortunate situation taken note of and lamented by Right Honorable Sir James Colvilbe in General Manager of the Raj Durbhunga Vs. Maharajah Coomar Ramaput Singh, 1872 SCC OnLine PC 16, "These proceedings certainly illustrate what was said by Mr.Doyne, and what has been often stated before, that the difficulties of a litigant in India begin when he has obtained a Decree..."
The situation not only continues but has become more prevalent.
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15. The conduct of a party assumes significance. If a party is likely to have an undue advantage, despite the availability of an opportunity to raise a plea of lack of jurisdiction at an earlier point of time, it should not be permitted to do so during the execution proceedings. In other words, a plaintiff shall not be made to suffer by the passive act of the defendant in submitting to the jurisdiction. One has to see the consequence while taking note of the huge pendency of the cases before various Courts in the country. There is no gainsaying that but for
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR the adverse decree suffered, a judgment-debtor would not have ventured to raise such a plea. It is clearly a case of an afterthought to suit his convenience. He cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate. Though we are conscious about the earlier precedents dealing with the stage at which such a plea can be raised, much water has flown under the bridge in terms of the ground reality. Union of India and Others v. N. Murugesan and Others, (2022) 2 SCC 25, "Approbate and reprobate
26. These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again, it is a principle of equity coming under the contours of common law. Therefore, he who knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will not get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the rest. A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either has to affirm or disaffirm the transaction. This principle has to be applied with more vigour as a common law principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully and on near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a species of estoppel dealing with the conduct of a
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NC: 2026:KHC:571 WP No. 35529 of 2025 HC-KAR party. We have already dealt with the provisions of the Contract Act concerning the conduct of a party, and his presumption of knowledge while confirming an offer through his acceptance unconditionally."
14. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order does not warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Constitution of India as held in the cases of Radhey Shyam and Ors Vs. Chhabi Nath and Ors - (2015) 5 SCC 423, K.P. Natarajan and Ors. Vs. Muthalammal and Ors -
AIR 2021 SC 3443 and Mohd. Ali Vs. V. Jaya - (2022) 10 SCC
477.
15. In the result, I pass the following:
ORDER
i) The petition is hereby dismissed.
ii) Having regard to the fact that the compromise decree is of the year 2009, the executing Court is directed to dispose of the execution proceedings as expeditiously as possible.
Sd/-
(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE MDS; List No.: 1 Sl No.: 37