Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Pradip Kumar Banerjee vs The Airport Authority Of India & Ors on 29 June, 2011
Author: Tapen Sen
Bench: Tapen Sen
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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
( CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION )
APPELLATE SIDE
W.P. No. 9701 (W) of 2010
With
CAN 6102 of 2010
Pradip Kumar Banerjee
Vs.
The Airport Authority of India & Ors.
CORAM : The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tapen Sen
For the Petitioners : Mr. Arabinda Chatterjee
Mr. Nilay Sengupta
For the Respondents : Mr. Arijit Chaudhuri
Mr. D.K. Dhar Mr. Anirban Datta Heard on : 21.6.10, 1.10.10, 19.11.10, 21.12.10, 5.1.11, 23.2.11, 2.3.11,11.3.11, 16.3.11, 23.3.11, 24.3.11, 30.3.11, 6.4.11, 4.5.11 C.A.V. on : 4.5.2011 Judgment Delivered on : 29th June, 2011 Tapen Sen, J.: The case of the Petitioner (Pradip Kumar Banerjee), as pleaded in the Writ Petition is that he joined the Office of the Airport Director, Airport Authority of India (IAD), Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose International Airport (Respondent No. 5) on 2.11.1979 as a Junior Engineer. Five years thereafter on 29.6.1984 he was promoted to the post of an Assistant Engineer. In the year 1991, one Shibnath Pramanik, claiming himself to be the representative of one M/s. Tarashankar Construction Company was engaged by the said Respondent No. 5 for modification and enlargement of a children's park at the Airport residential colony. He failed to complete the work within the stipulated 2 period of two months and also failed to complete the same even after two years. The total value of the work was Rs. 92,852/- but he was able to complete the job only to the extent of Rs. 53,043.92/- and even then and without getting the completion certificate from the concerned Executive Engineer, he claimed the final bill. On account of slow progress of work, the Petitioner had, time to time, recommended imposition of various penalties on his running bills as a result of which, Pramanik used to threaten the Petitioner as well as one Gautam Das, a Junior Engineer, with dire consequences.
2. It is the further case of the Petitioner that on 30.4.1991, the Central Bureau of Investigation falsely implicated and trapped the Petitioner at the instance of the said Shibnath Pramanik. Subsequently a criminal case was instituted against the Petitioner under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
3. Thereafter on 6.5.1991, the Respondent No. 3 (Member [Planning]- cum-Disciplinary Authority) passed an Order placing the Petitioner and Gautam Das under suspension w.e.f. 30.4.1991.
4. No Departmental Proceedings were initiated and on the contrary, by a letter dated 31.3.1993, the Respondents caused an interview of the Petitioner to be taken for promotion subject to the outcome of the CBI charges. On 10.12.1999, the CBI case being Case No. 8 of 1993 was disposed of by the Learned 1st Special Court at Alipore convicting the Petitioner but acquitting Gautam Das although self-same charges were levelled against him also.
5. After acquittal of Gautam Das, the Authorities revoked his suspension Order. The Petitioner, on his part, filed a criminal Appeal before 3 this Court against his Order of conviction and the same was registered as CRA No. 393 of 1999. Thereafter, by an Order dated 13.7.2000, the Respondent No. 3 passed an Order holding that since the Petitioner was an accused in Special Case No. 8 of 1993 under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and since he was placed under suspension w.e.f. 30.4.1991 as he was caught red-handed and arrested by the CBI and since he was convicted by the Special Court at Alipore by Order dated 10.12.1999 and sentenced to undergo RI for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- and in default, to undergo further RI for three months-both sentences running concurrently, he was accordingly dismissed from service under Regulation 26 of the IAAI Employees' (Conduct, Discipline & Appeal) Regulations [ hereinafter referred to as the Regulations].
By reason of the said Order, it was pointed out that in view of the aforesaid factors leading to his conviction and sentence, it was a fit case where it was not necessary and/or reasonable to hold an enquiry.
6. According to the Petitioner, he was dismissed from service without any opportunity of hearing and without drawing up any Disciplinary Proceedings. He has submitted that the action of the Respondents was based entirely on the criminal case. The Petitioner filed a departmental Appeal but that was also rejected by Order dated 8/20.11.2000.
7. The Petitioner then filed W.P. No. 22034 (W) of 2000. By an Order dated 5.2.2001 and referring to a Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the said Writ Petition was disposed of directing, inter alia, that in the 4 event the Petitioner was acquitted by the Appellate Court and his conviction set aside, then it would be open to him to make appropriate representations before the authority who would consider the case in accordance with law and in the light of the judgment.
8. It is stated that on 16.7.2004, CRA 393 of 1999 which was the criminal Appeal filed by the Petitioner against his Order of conviction before this Court, was allowed and the Order of conviction was set aside. The criminal appellate court found that the Petitioner was falsely implicated. Annexure P/5 is the said Judgment.
9. Soon after the said judgment, the Petitioner filed/sent letters dated 20.8.2004, 2.9.2004 and 14.10.2004 by which he requested that he should be reinstated in service. Nothing happened.
Consequently, the Petitioner filed another Writ Petition on or about 22.12.2004 being W.P. No. 21324 (W) of 2004 and by Order dated 22.12.2004 (Annexure-P/7), the same was disposed of at the stage of admissions itself by directing the disciplinary authority to give a reasoned decision on the Petitioner's representation dated 14.10.2004 within ten weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the Order and after giving a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing to the Petitioner. He was also directed to deal with each and every ground taken by the Petitioner. The said Order dated 22.12.2004 was communicated and reminders sent on 21.3.2005. According to the Petitioner, the Respondent authorities exchanged various inter-departmental memos and also with the CBI authorities discussing, inter alia, as to whether, they should file an 5 Appeal before the Supreme Court or not. The CBI authorities confirmed that they would not file any Appeal but advised the initiation of regular Departmental Proceedings. Thereafter, the Chairman accepted the advice of the CBI for a regular Departmental Proceeding under Regulations 23(3) and 23(4) of the said Regulations.
Thereafter, by a letter dated 22.2.2005, the Respondent No. 2 asked the Petitioner to be present for a personal hearing which the Petitioner did. After expiry of ten weeks, a letter dated 5.4.2005 was issued by the Respondent No. 6 communicating an Order dated 24.3.2005 being the decision of the Appellate Authority . By reason of the said Order dated 24.3.2005, the Appellate Authority held that since the Petitioner had been acquitted by the High Court upon benefit of doubt and since by a subsequent Order, the High Court had directed that the Appellate Authority shall give a reasonable opportunity of hearing and since it was found that he had not been exonerated on merits and that he was involved in demanding and accepting bribe from a contractor, which was a serious misconduct, therefore, major penalty proceedings be initiated after setting aside the earlier Order of dismissal dated 13.7.2000 but placing him again under suspension w.e.f. 13.7.2000.
10. According to the Petitioner, once the Order of dismissal was set aside, there was no question of the management holding a further enquiry since there was no earlier enquiry leading to his dismissal. He has pleaded that since the original Order of dismissal was set aside and in the 6 absence of a pending enquiry, the Respondents had no authority to place him again under suspension retrospectively w.e.f. 13.7.2000.
11. It appears that on 7.9.2005, a Memorandum was issued by the Respondent No. 3 being a charge sheet alleging that on 30.4.1991, the Petitioner had demanded and accepted a sum of Rs. 3000/- from Shibnath Pramanik. He was caught red-handed by the CBI while accepting the bribe and therefore, his act exhibited negligence in the performance of his duties, lack of integrity and amounted to an act unbecoming of an employee of the authority thereby violating Regulations 4(i) (a), 4 (i) (d) 5(i) (x) and 5 (ii) of the said Regulations.
The Petitioner then moved this Court vide W.P. No. 8256 (W) of 2005 challenging and praying for setting aside the order dated 24.3.2005 and also prayed for an Order of injunction restraining the authorities from initiating the Departmental Proceedings till disposal of the Writ Petition. It appears that the said Writ Petition was decided and it was held that on having an analytical view of the present facts of the case, the departmental proceeding should not be allowed to continue. The learned Single Judge had framed one more question and that was as to whether the decision passed by the Appellate Authority directing Departmental Proceedings on identical charges which has parity on all points with the criminal proceeding and which culminated in the acquittal of the Petitioner, was an exercise of power which hits the doctrine of reasonableness, fairness and the doctrine of nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa as the Appellate Authority had earlier acted as the disciplinary authority 7 and had imposed the punishment of dismissal from service and which was cancelled because the order of conviction passed by the learned trial Court had been set aside and quashed in a criminal Appeal by the High Court.
12. In answer to the said second question, the learned Single Judge observed that the Appellate Authority, by Order dated 24.3.2005, took the decision of initiating the departmental proceeding on the ground that the Petitioner was caught red-handed in a CBI trap while taking illegal gratification. The said Order was passed by the Appellate Authority who was the chairman namely Sri K. Rama lingam and who was also the Disciplinary Authority who had taken the decision on 13.7.2000 by which the Petitioner had been dismissed from service. The learned Single Judge further held that no one should be a Judge of his own cause and therefore, referring to various Supreme Court judgments, he came to the conclusion that in the instant case, as the Disciplinary Authority, namely K. Ramalingam sat as an Appellate Authority to take a decision on the representation of the Petitioner, hence , applying the doctrine of fairness and reasonableness as well as the maxim referred to above, his decision (of the Appellate Authority dated 24.3.2005) and the subsequent Departmental Proceedings initiated vide Memorandum dated 7.9.2005, were bad and as such, were set aside and the impugned Order of suspension passed by the Appellate Authority was also set aside. It was further held that the Writ Petitioner was entitled to be reinstated in service with all allowances and service benefits. This judgment was delivered on 23.2.2007.
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13. It appears that thereafter the Respondents filed an intra Court Appeal vide MAT No. 1840 of 2007 and by judgment dated 6.8.2007, a Division Bench headed by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.S. Nijjar, C.J. sitting with the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Asim Kumar Banerjee, held that on a very close scrutiny of the entire matter, the disciplinary authority had concluded that the Petitioner's acquittal was not an honourable acquittal. Their Lordships accepted the reasons given by the disciplinary authority after observing that the said acquittal can hardly be equated with a declaration of innocence and therefore it was held that the Respondents were justified in issuing the charge-sheet. It appears that thereafter the Petitioner moved the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India vide CC 496 of 2008 and by an Order dated 29.2.2008 (Annexure-P/14), the SLP was dismissed with an observation that however, the Disciplinary Proceedings may be expedited.
14. Thereafter the Petitioner decided to participate in the Disciplinary Proceedings. He has stated that he started participating from 4.3.2008 onwards and therefore he could not file his Written Statement formally nor was the same sought for after his appearance but nevertheless, he was allowed to refute the charges by cross-examining the witnesses. The Petitioner has discussed the evidences of various witnesses and has also discussed the Report of the enquiry officer attempting to point out the same suffers from numerous defects.
15. Finally on 1.5.2009, a letter was issued by the Manager (Personal) communicating an order dated 23.4.2009 (page 322 of the Writ 9 Petition) by which the Respondent No. 3 passed an Order imposing the penalty of Dismissal from service with immediate effect and further informing him that he could file an Appeal within one month before the Appellate Authority. It appears that thereafter the Petitioner filed a departmental Appeal and by a communication dated 13.8.2009 the Petitioner was served the order of the Chairman (Appellate Authority) holding that there were no new facts and therefore the Appeal stood rejected without any modification.
It appears that the Order of the disciplinary authority dismissing the Petitioner from service dated 23.4.2009 was passed by one V.P. Agarwal, Member (Planning)-cum-Disciplinary authority. The Appellate Order was also passed by him in the capacity of an Appellate Authority .
The Petitioner filed W.P. No. 17503(W) of 2009 and by an Order dated 26.10.2009 another Hon'ble Single Judge set aside the Order of the Appellate Authority on the ground that the Chairperson (Appellate Authority ) could not also have acted as the Disciplinary Authority. After setting aside the Order, it was directed that the Appeal be heard by a sub-Committee of the Board of the Airport Authority of India and in case any party seeks Review, the reviewing Authority shall be the full Board of the Airport authority of India.
It was further directed that the application of the Petitioner for grant of subsistence allowance on the basis of revised scales of pay be considered and a reasoned Order be passed within three weeks from the date of communication of the order after giving adequate opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner.
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16. Thereafter an Order was passed on 8.2.2010 by the sub- Committee of the Board holding that there were no new facts which called for taking a decision other than the one that was already taken by the Disciplinary Authority, and therefore, the Appeal dated 28.5.2009, supplementary Appeal dated 16.12.2009 and the Representation of the Petitioner dated 8.1.2010 stood rejected without any modification in the Order of penalty dated 23.4.2009.
17. The Petitioner has also filed CAN 6102 of 2010 in which he has prayed that the Respondents be directed to pay the admissible salary to him w.e.f. 1.5.1991 to 24.3.2005 after considering all pay revisions and adjusting the subsistence allowance already paid to him.
18. The Respondents have filed an affidavit-in-opposition to the said CAN 6102 of 2010. They have disputed the allegations made by the Petitioner to the effect that he was proceeded against falsely or that he had become a victim of conspiracy. They have stated that the Petitioner was found guilty and convicted by the Criminal Court, but because of the benefit of doubt, he was acquitted by the High Court. They have further denied the allegations that the Disciplinary Proceedings were initiated in a motivated manner. They have also stated that the Petitioner had not claimed for revision of subsistence allowance earlier, but pursuant to the Order dated 26.10.2009 passed in the earlier Writ Petition, the concerned authority considered the matter and paid him a sum of Rs.8,48,949/- being the differential amount of subsistence allowance due to revision in the scale of pay. They have, however, denied that the Petitioner was entitled to full salary for the period from 1.5.1991 to 24.3.2005 11 because he was placed under suspension from 30.4.1991 due to his arrest and subsequent detention by Police. As per Regulation 26, he was dismissed from service since he was convicted and found guilty by a Criminal Court and on being acquitted by the High Court on benefit of doubt, he was placed under suspension with effect from 13.07.2000. They have also stated that the claim for full back wages was made by the Petitioner in the earlier Writ Petition being W.P. No. 17503 (W) of 2009, but it was not argued and, therefore, it cannot be argued again in a subsequent Writ Petition. In any way, he is not entitled to back wages on the principles of "no work no pay".
19. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has referred to Regulation 23(4) and has submitted that under the said Regulation, the Respondents have the authority to hold "a further enquiry" on the allegations on which the penalty of Dismissal etc. was imposed, but in the instant case, the order dated 24.3.2005, which was passed by the Appellate Authority , establishes that after setting aside the Order of Dismissal dated 13.07.2000 and directing that the Petitioner be placed under suspension with effect from 13.07.2000, the Respondents decided to initiate an absolutely fresh major penalty proceedings which is contrary to the provisions of Regulation 23(4).
20. Learned Counsel submits that a similar provision is in existence under Rule 10(4) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965. He submits that the said Rule being Rule 10 fell for consideration by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and a photocopy of the judgment passed in Civil Appeal No. 1821 of 1991 has been brought on record by 12 the Petitioner between Pages 313 to 316 of the Writ Petition. In the said judgment, it has, inter alia, been observed that there are three requirements for the application of the Rule 10(4). They are :-
(i) that the Government servant must be dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired as a measure of penalty ;
(ii) that the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement is set aside or declared or rendered void by a decision of a court of law ;
And
(iii) that the disciplinary decides to hold "a further enquiry" against the said Government servant on whom the allegations were alleged and on the basis whereof the order of penalty imposed.
21. It has further been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as would appear from the Page 315 of the Writ Petition that if these three requirements are satisfied, then the Government servant shall be deemed to be placed under suspension by the Appointing Authority from the date of the original Order of dismissal. While concluding and allowing the Appeal, their Lordships have held that since there was no enquiry leading to the removal of the appellant in the first instance, the decision to hold a further enquiry does not attract Rule 10(4). The Hon'ble Supreme Court therefore finally held that the retrospective suspension of the appellant was unjustified and without the authority of law. Rule 10(4) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 is placed in juxtaposition to Regulation 23(4) of the 13 Airports Authority of India Employees (Conduct, Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 2003.
CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 AAIE (CDA) Regulations, 2003 10(4):- 23(4):- Where a penalty of dismissal, Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement removal from service or compulsory from service imposed upon a retirement imposed upon an Government servant is set aside or employee is set aside or declared or declared or rendered void in rendered void in consequence of or consequence of or by a decision of a by a decision of a court of law and Court of Law and the disciplinary the disciplinary authority, on authority, on a consideration of the consideration of the circumstances of circumstances of the case, decides to the case, decides to hold a further hold a further inquiry against him on inquiry against him on the the allegations on which the penalty allegations on which the penalty of of dismissal, removal or compulsory dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, retirement was originally imposed, the Government servant shall be the employee shall be deemed to deemed to have been placed under have been placed under suspension suspension by the Appointing by the Competent Authority from the Authority from the date of the date of the original order of original order of dismissal, removal dismissal, removal or compulsory or compulsory retirement and shall retirement and shall continue to continue to remain under remain under suspension until suspension until further orders: further orders. Provided that no such further inquiry shall be ordered unless it is intended to meet a situation where the Court has passed an order purely on technical grounds without going into the merits of the case.
22. The aforementioned judgement, which has been placed between Pages 313 to 316 of the writ petition, is a judgement passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahender Singh Vs Union of India and Another reported in 1991 Supp (2) SCC 127.
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23. In the instant case, the Hon'ble High Court passed its judgement in a Criminal Appeal on 16.07.2004 being C.R.A. No. 393 of 1999 by which it allowed the Appeal and set aside the judgement and order of conviction and sentence of the Trial Court. Thereafter, the Petitioner had filed a number of representations for reinstatement and when no action was taken, he filed a Writ Petition being W. P. No. 21324 (W) of 2004, which was disposed of by an order dated 22.12.2004 at the stage of Admission itself by directing the Appellate Authority to decide the Appeal in the manner already referred to earlier. Thereafter, the Appellate Authority passed an order on 24.3.2005 setting aside the Order of Dismissal, but ordering initiation of penalty proceedings against the Petitioner. The operative portion of the said order reads as follows :
"4. WHEREAS Shri Banerjee has been acquitted by the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta upon benefit of doubt vide order dtd. 16.7.2004 and Court desired that before giving the final decision the Appellate Authority shall offer a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing to Shri Banerjee. As per the directives of the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta Shri Banerjee has been given personal hearing by the Appellate Authority on 25.2.2005. The Appellate Authority observed that the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta vide its order dtd. 16.7.2004 while setting aside the conviction order, of the Trial Judge has acquitted Shri Banerjee upon benefit of doubt and he has not been exonerated on merits. However, the incident in which Shri Banerjee was involved i.e. demanding and accepting bribe from the contractor (in which he was caught red handed in a CBI trap case on 30.4.91) is a serious misconduct.
5. Hence, the Appellate Authority after taking into consideration all the records hereby order that the major penalty proceedings may be initiated against Shri P.K. Banerjee under AAI Employees (CDA) Regulations, 2003. The order dtd. 13.7.2000 imposing the penalty of 'dismissal' may be set aside and he may be placed under suspension w.e.f. 13.7.2000.
6. The order of Appellate Authority is hereby conveyed."
(Quoted)
24. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 24.3.2005, the Petitioner filed a Writ Petition being W.P. No. 8256 (W) of 2005 and by a judgement dated 23.2.2007, another Hon'ble Single Judge of this court held that 15 the Departmental Proceedings should not be allowed to continue. His Lordship also held that the Writ Petitioner was entitled to be reinstated in service and he accordingly directed the Respondents to allow his joining and release of arrears salary and service benefits etc.
25. This judgement became a subject matter of Appeal in MAT No. 1840 of 2007 and a Division Bench of this Court, by its judgement dated 6.8.2007, observed, while dealing with the matter, that the substantial question of law, which arose in the said Appeal, was whether an employee acquitted by the Criminal Court of criminal charges would be automatically entitled to be reinstated in service and, was the employer debarred from holding a departmental enquiry on the same allegations, which formed the subject matter of criminal prosecution.
26. Like in this case, the learned Counsel for the Respondents, who was also appearing for the appellants before the Division Bench had argued, in the background of Regulation 23 that after due scrutiny it was found by the Appellate Authority that although the Respondent no. 1 had been acquitted of criminal charges he was nevertheless involved in a serious misconduct. He was caught "red-handed" while accepting bribe from a contractor and he was acquitted on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence against him and, therefore, his acquittal was only on "benefit of doubt". He had argued that therefore such an acquittal cannot be equated to a finding of 16 innocence as it was not a case of complete exoneration. Learned Counsel has made similar arguments in this case also.
27. The Division Bench, while dealing with the matter, observed in Paragraph 10 of the judgement (See Page 192 of the Writ Petition) that "It is now a trite law that judgement of acquittal itself would not have exonerated him of the charges levelled against him. He could have been proceeded against in a departmental proceeding (See Manager, Reserve Bank of India Vs S. Mani & Commissioner of Police V. Narender Singh)."
28. The Division Bench also observed in Paragraph 11 infra that "In Narender Singh's case (supra) (the two Judges' Bench of Supreme Court) it has been held that:-
"13. It is now well settled by reason of a catena of decisions of this Court that if an employee has been acquitted of a criminal charge, the same by itself would not be a ground not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him or to drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is passed."
29. While dealing with the said matter, the Division Bench also held (See Page 201 of the Writ Petition) that in their view / opinion, a perusal of various pronouncements by the Hon'ble Supreme Court would indicate 17 that the law is well-settled that acquittal in a criminal case would not be a bar for drawing up of a Disciplinary Proceeding against the delinquent employee. The Division Bench also observed that it is well settled that the two proceedings, namely, criminal and departmental, are entirely different and they operate in different fields and have different objectives. The objective of a criminal trial is to punish the offender if he is found guilty on the basis of evidences produced, which established the case of the prosecution beyond all doubt, but in case where the prosecution fails to reach the required standard beyond reasonable doubt, the accused becomes entitled to acquittal, but such an acquittal cannot be equated with a declaration of innocence. In other words, even if an accused is found not guilty of the criminal charges, it does not amount to a declaration that he is not guilty. In a departmental enquiry, a charge can be held to be proved on the preponderance of probabilities and an Enquiry Officer can rely on evidence without following the strict rules of evidence. In such proceedings, confessional statements and hearsay evidences can also be relied upon. The Departmental Proceedings, therefore, do not stand on the same pedestal as that of criminal proceedings.
30. Considering the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the Division Bench observed (See Page 220 of the Writ Petition) that in their opinion, that case was not a case of "no evidence". It was a case of "not sufficient evidence" and, therefore, They came to the conclusion that they were inclined to accept the reasons of the Disciplinary Authority and were also 18 inclined to agree that the acquittal of the Petitioner "can hardly be equated" with a "declaration of innocence" of the petitioner of that case and in that background, the Division Bench said that the Respondents were justified in issuing the charge sheet to the Petitioner (See Page 221 of the Writ Petition).
31. This judgement was taken up before the Supreme Court of India and the SLP was summarily dismissed on 29.2.2008 with a direction, however, that the Departmental Proceedings may be expedited (Annexure "P-14"). In the background of the aforementioned facts and circumstances and in the background of the fact that the Division Bench had given its seal of approval to the Respondents observing that they were justified in issuing the charge sheet and the said observations / judgement of the Division Bench having been upheld by the Supreme Court, there is now no scope for the Petitioner to argue that the Respondents did not have any authority to initiate a fresh proceeding as it was barred under Regulation 23(4). Let it be recorded that this Regulation was also duly noticed by the Division Bench and thereafter, the judgement was passed (See Page 181 to 182 of the Writ Petition). Under the said circumstances and for the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is no merit in this Writ Petition and there is no reason at all as to why this Court should now set aside the Order of the Appellate Authority dated 8.2.2010 (Annexure "P-27") as such an Order has been passed on the basis of a validly constituted Departmental Proceeding in which, although he appeared before the 19 reconstituted Sub Committee on 8.1.2010 but despite six communications from the Enquiry Officer, the Petitioner failed to appear before him. The reasons given in the order dated 8.2.2010 are reasons, which are not at all irregular nor illegal considering the observations of the Division Bench referred to above.
The Writ Petition is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
As a consequence of this Order, CAN 6102 of 2010 is also dismissed.
Upon appropriate Application(s) being made, urgent Xeroxed Certified copy of this Judgment, may be given/issued expeditiously subject to usual terms and conditions.
(Tapen Sen, J.)
...............June, 2011
S.B. A.F.R / N.A.F.R.