Gujarat High Court
The Surat Parsi Panchayat Trust (Surat) vs The Agriculture Produce Market ... on 6 May, 2022
Author: A. P. Thaker
Bench: A. P. Thaker
C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 64 of 2020
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2020
In R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 64 of 2020
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A. P. THAKER
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed No
to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? No
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy No
of the judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question No
of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
of India or any order made thereunder ?
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THE SURAT PARSI PANCHAYAT TRUST (SURAT)
Versus
THE AGRICULTURE PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE
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Appearance:
MR. ASIM PANDYA, SR. ADVOCATE WITH MR.MANAN BHATT(6535) for
the Appellant(s) No. 1,10,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9
for the Respondent(s) No. 4
MR. B.S. PATEL, SR. ADVOCATE WITH MR CHIRAG B PATEL(3679) for
the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3
MR UTPAL M PANCHAL(1075) for the Respondent(s) No. 5
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CORAM:HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A. P. THAKER
Date : 06/05/2022
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed below Exh-5 in Special Civil Suit No. 155/2008 by learned Page 1 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022 C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022 Principal Senior Civil Judge, Surat on 15.2.2020, whereby the application preferred by the original plaintiff for interim injunction pending the Suit for specific performance and permanent injunction, restraining the original defendants to deal with the suit property in any manner is allowed, the defendants have preferred this Appeal from Order under Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1(r) of CPC.
2. The appellants are the original defendants and respondent Nos.1 to 4 are the original plaintiffs in the said Suit. The plaintiffs have filed the Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 4.4.1992 and has also prayed for permanent injunction against dealing with the property in any manner.
3. As per the contention of the plaintiffs, the land was in occupation of one Baheramsha Minocher and possession was to be handed over to the plaintiffs by obtaining possession from him and for that purpose, signatures of the said person was obtained as consenting party in the agreement to sell. It is also averred that necessary permission from the Charity Commissioner was obtained at the relevant time. However, the same was challenged by some of the group of dis-satisfied Trustees and order of the said Charity Commissioner came to be set-aside by Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by order dated 21.9.2000 and the matter was remanded back. It is also contended that thereafter the plaintiffs filed Special Civil Application No. Page 2 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022 C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022 4621 of 2003 and also requested the government to acquire land as prayed by the plaintiffs, which was challenged by the defendants before the High Court by Special Civil Application No. 10305 of 2000 which came to be rejected on 27.9.2000. Thereafter, the State Government has issued Notification under Section 6 on 5.1.2022, against which defendant Nos. 7 and others have filed Special Civil Application No. 3495 of 2000 and Special Civil Application No. 3496 of 2000 and Special Civil Application No. 3494 of 2002. Meanwhile, the State Government withdrew the Notification on 26.6.2002 and, therefore, all the Civil Applications came to be withdrawn. That the plaintiffs have filed SCA No. 779 of 2003 against the withdrawal of the Notification by the State Government, which came to be dismissed. It is contended by the plaintiffs that plaintiffs are ready and willing to perform its part of the contract but the trustees of the Trust are not ready to executed sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs. It is also contended that the plaintiffs paid earnest money of Rs. 25 Lakh to defendant Trust and it is also ready and willing to perform its part of the contract. On all these grounds, the Plaintiffs have filed the aforesaid Suit and have also sought for permanent injunction against the defendants.
4. The defendants have resisted the Suit and submitted that as property is a Trust property, without the permission of the Charity Commissioner, it cannot be sold. It is also contended that since possession of the property was not Page 3 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022 C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022 with the plaintiffs and from the very beginning, the Trust was not ready to perform its part of contract, the time has already started in the year 1995 when the notice transaction was initiated, therefore, no injunction be issued against the defendant. It is also averred that even in the Notice dated 4.12.1995 wherein the plaintiffs have clearly demanded back the earnest money with interest of 1.5% and, therefore, it shows that the plaintiffs were not willing to perform its part of contract and accordingly the Suit is barred by law of limitation and interim injunction may not be granted in favour of the plaintiffs.
5. After hearing both the sides and considering the material placed on record, the trial Court has passed the impugned order restraining the defendants from dealing with the property in any manner during the pendency of the Suit.
6. Heard Mr. Asim Pandya, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Manan Bhatt, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. B.S. Patel, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Chirag Patel, learned advocate for original plaintiffs and Mr. Utpal Panchal, learned advocate for defendant No.5. Perused the material placed on record and the decisions cited at bar.
7. Mr. Asim Pandya, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has vehemently submitted that there is no dispute that the said property belongs to the Trust which is a registered Trust under the provisions of Gujarat Public Trust Act, 1950. He has submitted that the trial Court has passed the Page 4 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022 C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022 impugned order after gross delay of 12 years from the institution of the suit proceedings and after 28 years from the date of agreement to sell. He has submitted that the trial Court has failed to consider that there is complete change in circumstances and situation since the agreement to sell was signed and the suit proceedings were filed. He has submitted that the trial Court failed to consider the fact that the plaintiffs through the letter dated 4.12.1995 declared that they were no more interested to purchase the suit property while asking to refund the amount of Rs. 24 Lakh paid to the Trust. Mr. Pandya has also contended that the agreement to sell is of the year 1992 and the suit is filed in the year 2008 i.e. after 16 years and, therefore, it is barred by law of limitation.
8. Mr. Pandya, learned Senior Counsel has also submitted that the agreement to sell clearly stipulates payment of 25% of the total sale consideration once necessary permission was obtained and as per the say of the plaintiffs, the permission to sell under Section 36 of the Trust Act had been granted on 11.7.1994 and, therefore, the plaintiff ought to have paid 25% of the total sale consideration to the appellants. Mr. Pandya, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the plaintiffs have failed to perform his part of the obligation under the agreement and, therefore, the plaintiffs have no right to ask for specific performance. He has submitted that the trial Court failed to consider the fact that various proceedings under Tenancy Act and Acquisition Act were either pending or decided between 1992 and 2020. He has Page 5 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022 C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022 submitted that since the order of granting permission under Section 36 of the Trust Act has been set aside and the matter has been remanded by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, there is no question of any permission of the Charity Commissioner to sell that property and in that view of the matter, even specific performance is not permissible. He has also vehemently submitted that the trial Court has failed to consider the important ingredients of granting interim injunction i.e. prima-facie case, irreparable injury and balance of convenience and has granted the impugned order of restraining defendants, is factually and legally not sustainable.
9. Mr. Pandya, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that considering the Notice transaction entered into between the parties, it was well within the knowledge of the plaintiffs that defendants Trust is not ready to execute the sale deed way back in the year 1995 and, therefore, the Suit ought to have been filed within 3 years from the year 1995. Therefore, the suit filed in 2018 is completely barred under Limitation Act. By referring to the various conditions of the agreement to sell, he has submitted that now it is not enforceable and the Suit filed by the plaintiffs is also barred by limitation considering this condition. He has submitted that when the Suit itself is time barred, there cannot be any prima-facie case in favour of the plaintiffs. He has submitted that the impugned order of the trial Court deserves to be interfered with by this Court and needs to be set aside. He has also submitted that there is Page 6 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022 C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022 no imminent threat or danger to the property being vested or transferred as shown by the plaintiffs and while granting interim injunction the provisions of Order 37 Rule 2 of the CPC are not kept in mind by the trial Court. The trial Court has also not adverted to the aspect of limitation period. Mr. Pandya, learned Senior Counsel has prayed to allow the present Appeal from Order by setting aside the impugned order as the same is perverse.
10. Mr. Asim Pandya, learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the order of the Coordinate Bench dated 5.12.2019 in Appeal from Order No. 259 of 2019, especially para-5 of the said order, which reads as under:
"5. Delay, laches, acquiescence and indolence are some of the factors for declining the discretionary remedy; being antithesis to necessity and imminence. In other words delay, laches, acquiescence or indolence are the conducts in defiance to the urgent and imminent necessity of an injunction. The object and the purpose of injunction is implicit in Order 39 of the Code itself. Insofar as Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Order 39 Rule 1 of the CPC are concerned, the purpose of injunction would be to preserve or protect the corpus of the suit so that in the event of decree in favour of the plaintiff his rights are not prejudiced and decree is not rendered a paper decree. As a necessary corollary in cases where it appears that the corpus of the suit can be preserved or retained even without injunction and compensation in terms of money would be adequate relief, injunction would be refused. It must be borne in mind that mere dealing of a property by defendant during the pendency of the suit would not be the cause for injunction; the intention behind such dealing or the necessity to prevent the danger of property being wasted, Page 7 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022 C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022 damaged or alienated would be material for grant of injunction.
11. Mr. B.S.Patel, learned Senior Counsel for the original plaintiff has vehemently submitted that the impugned order of the trial Court is proper and it is not perverse. He has also submitted that the Civil Court can grant decree even in absence of permission under Section 36 of Public Trust Act. He has submitted that there is no denial as to the execution of agreement to sell and payment of Rs. 25 Lakh as earnest money by the plaintiffs to the Trust. He has submitted that question of limitation is a mixed question of facts and law and in this case, considering the various litigation initiated and pending between 1992 and 2020 and the conditions enumerated in the agreement to sell, it cannot be said that cause of action has started in the year 1995. According to him, limitation would start only from the date on which there is denial to execute the sale deed as per agreement to sell. He has submitted that notice of 1995 needs to be read in proper perspective as Trust was directed to keep Rs. 1 Lakh as token till the necessary permission is sought and there was no any intention on the part of the plaintiff to put an end to the agreement to sell. He has submitted that even there is no abandonment of claim of specific performance of agreement. He has submitted that earlier there was permission granted under Section 36 of the Public Trust Act by the Charity Commissioner to sell the property and the same has been challenged by the person who subsequently became Trustees of the Trust. By referring to the said proceedings, Page 8 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022 C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022 he has submitted that the Trust has taken different stand in different proceedings. He has submitted that when there is no denial to agreement to sell and acceptance of earnest money of Rs. 25 lakh and earlier order of Charity Commissioner of granting permission to sell the property to the plaintiffs and non-fulfillment thereof by the defendants are the factors which goes to show that there is prima-facie case in favour of the plaintiffs. He has also submitted that the question pertains to the alienation of the immovable properties and, therefore, in view of the various decisions, upon which he relies, such properties need to be reserved as it is and, therefore, the order of the trial Court cannot be said to be perverse one. He has supported the impugned order and has prayed to dismiss the present appeal. He has further submitted that the application for interim injunction was filed at the time of filing of the Suit. However, if no order is being passed by the trial Court for 12 years, it is not the fault of the plaintiffs. He has submitted that reliance placed on the order of the coordinate bench passed in AO No. 259 of 2019 is an interim order and, therefore, it cannot be binding to this Court and cannot be considered as precedent. He has relied upon the following decisions:
1. Urvashiben and Another v. Krishnakant Manuprasad Trivedi, reported in 2019 (3) SCC 372, wherein Para-19 reads as under:
"19.In the judgment in the case of Rathnavathi (supra) in Page 9 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022 C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022 paragraphs 42 and 43 it was clearly held that when the time is not fixed in the agreement, the limitation of three years to file a suit for specific performance would begin when the plaintiff has noticed that defendant has refused the performance of the agreement. In the judgment in the case of Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla(2)(Dead) by Proposed LRs. v. C.A.@ SLP(C)Nos.23062- 63/18 Bibijan & Ors.14 while interpreting Article 54 of the Limitation Act, it is held that words "date fixed for the performance" is a crystallised notion. The second part "time from which period begins to run" refers to a case where no such date is fixed. In the case of Balsaria Construction (P) Ltd. v. Hanuman Seva Trust & Ors.15 and Chhotanben (supra) this Court clearly held that issue of limitation, being a mixed question of fact and law, is to be decided only after evidence is adduced.
2. Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd) Fardikot v. Baldev Dass, reported in AIR 2005 SC 104. In para-10, it is observed as under:
"10. Be that as it may, Mr. Sachhar is right in contending that unless and untill a case of irreparable loss or damage is made out by a party to the suit, the court should not permit the nature of the property being changed which also includes alienation or transfer of the property which may lead to loss or damage being caused to the party who may ultimately succeed and may further lead to multiplicity of proceedings. In the instant case no such case of irreparable loss is made out except contending that the legal proceedings are likely to take a long time, therefore, the respondent should be permitted to put the scheduled property to better use. We do not think in the facts and circumstances of this case, the lower appellate court and the High Court were justified in permitting the Page 10 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022 C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022 respondent to change the nature of property by putting up construction as also by permitting the alienation of the property, whatever may be the condition on which the same is done. In the event of the appellant's claim being found baseless ultimately, it is always open to the respondent to claim damages or, in an appropriate case, the court may itself award damages for the loss suffered, if any, in this regard. Since the facts of this case do not make out any extraordinary ground for permitting the respondent to put up construction and alienate the same, we think both the courts below, namely, the lower appellate court and the High Court erred in making the impugned orders. The said orders are set aside and the order of the trial court is restored".
3. Maheshbhai Chhaganbhai Patel v. Jarin Naushir Dalal D/o. Jalambhai Rustamji, reported in 2011 Lawsuit (Guj) 1312, wherein Para-5.03 reads as under:
"5.03. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.), Faridkot (supra) in a suit relating to immovable property when there are triable issues and so as to avoid creation of third party rights and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, it is always desirable that during the pendency of the litigation status-quo on the date of the suit is directed to be maintained. Considering the aforesaid, it appears that the learned trial court has materially erred in rejecting the application Ex.5 and in not directing the parties to maintain status-quo".
4. B. Santoshamma v. D. Sarala, reported in 2020 (sc) 579, the paras- 67 to 75 read as under:
Page 11 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022 "67. The relief of specific performance of an agreement, was at all material times, equitable, discretionary relief, governed by the provisions of the Specific Relief Act 1963, hereinafter referred to as S.R.A. Even though the power of the Court to direct specific performance of an agreement may have been discretionary, such power could not be arbitrary. The discretion had necessarily to be exercised in accordance with sound and reasonable judicial principles.
68. Section 10 of the S.R.A. as it stood prior to its amendment with effect from 1.10.2018 provided:-
"10. Cases in which specific performance of contract enforceable.- Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the specific performance of any contract may, in the discretion of the court, be enforced-
(a) when there exists no standard for ascertaining actual damage caused by the non-performance of the act agreed to be done; or
(b) when the act agreed to be done is such that compensation in money for its non-performance would not afford adequate relief.
Explanation.- Unless and until the contrary is proved, the court shall presume-
(i) that the breach of a contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money; and
(ii) that the breach of a contract to transfer movable property can be so relieved except in the following cases:-
(a) where the property is not an ordinary article of commerce, or is of special value or interest to the plaintiff, or consists of goods which are not easily obtainable in the market;Page 12 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022
C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022
(b) where the property is held by the defendant as the agent or trustee of the plaintiff."
69. After amendment with affect from 1.10.2018, Section 10 of the S.R.A. provides:
10. Specific performance in respect of contracts.- The Specific performance of a contract shall be enforced by the court subject to the provisions contained in sub-
section (2) of section 11, section 14 and section 16.
70. After the amendment of Section 10 of the S.R.A., the words "specific performance of any contract may, in the discretion of the Court, be enforced" have been substituted with the words "specific performance of a contract shall be enforced subject to ...". The Court is, now obliged to enforce the specific performance of a contract, subject to the provisions of sub- section (2) of Section 11, Section 14 and Section 16 of the S.R.A. Relief of specific performance of a contract is no longer discretionary, after the amendment.
71. An agreement to sell immovable property, generally creates a right in personam in favour of the Vendee. The Vendee acquires a legitimate right to enforce specific performance of the agreement".
5. Tribhovandas Purshottamdas Thakkar v. Ratilal Motilal Patel & Ors, reported in AIR 1968 SC 372, wherein in Para-3, it is held as under:
"3. The learned Judge also held that s. 56B of the Bombay Public Trusts Act which provides that "in any suit or legal proceedings in which it appears to the Court that any question affecting a public religious or charitable purpose is involved, the Court shall not proceed to determine such question until after Page 13 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022 C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022 notice "has been given to the Charity Commissioner", made it obligatory upon the Court to issue notice to the Charity Commissioner, and if that officer desires to be joined as a party, to implied him in a proceeding to enforce a mortgage by sale of the mortgaged property. In our judgment, that view also cannot be sustained. A suit to enforce a mortgage or a proceeding to enforce a mortgage decree against property belonging to a public trust is not a suit or proceeding in which a question affecting a public religious or charitable purpose is involved.
12 Mr. Utpal Panchal, learned advocate for the respondent No.5 has adopted the arguments of Mr. Asim Pandya, learned Senior Counsel and has prayed to allow the present Appeal from Order and set aside the impugned order of the trial Court.
13. In rejoinder of the argument of Mr. B.S. Patel, learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Pandya, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the reliance placed on various decisions by Mr. Patel, learned Senior Counsel for the original plaintiffs are based upon different facts and therefore they are not applicable to the facts of the present case. According to him, all the decisions are based upon its own facts and, therefore, it cannot be applicable to the facts of the present case. According to him, the impugned order is completely jeopardize to the right of the Trust to even lease out property for shorter period of 4 months or shorter period. He has submitted that due to impugned order the Trust cannot be permitted to use or occupy the said property as it affects the right of the Trust in using the Page 14 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022 C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022 property. He has submitted that considering the period of limitation involved in the matter, the impugned order be set aside by allowing the present Appeal from order.
14. Having considered the submission made on behalf of both the sides coupled with the material placed on record and the various decisions referred to hereinabove, it clearly transpires that there is no dispute regarding the fact that there is an agreement to sell executed between the plaintiff and the defendant Trust way back in the year 1992. It is admitted fact that at the time of such execution, plaintiff has paid Rs. 25 Lakh as earned money to the Trust. It also reveals from the agreement that there are several conditions made in it. Condition No.3 reflects that necessary permission was to be obtained by the Trust and on such permission being granted, 25% of the sale price was to be paid. It also reveals that there is also condition of getting even permission regarding the Tenancy Act. Thus, the agreement to sell was to be executed after obtaining necessary permission. Now, admittedly in this case, necessary permission under Section 36 of the Trust Act was granted by the Charity Commissioner for the sale of the property to the plaintiff. However, some of the beneficiaries who afterwards became Trustees have challenged the said action by preferring Appeal before Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and the Tribunal has ultimately set aside the order of the Charity Commissioner and has remanded back the matter for re-consideration. It also reveals that even during the interregnum period there was Page 15 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022 C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022 litigation which includes issuance of Notification by the State Government itself. Thus, the necessary condition for fulfillment of the agreement to sell i.e. regarding obtaining necessary permission from the concerned authorities by the Trust, is yet not completed by the Trust. Therefore, unless and until it is obtained and denied the right of the plaintiff to get the execution of the sale deed on the basis of the agreement to sell, it cannot be said that the cause of action has arose after 3 years of the date of Notice. Therefore, the important ground raised by the defendants regarding Suit being barred by law of limitation is prima- facie not applicable.
15. It also reveals from the material placed on record and the pleadings of the parties, that the conduct of the defendant shows that it does want to fulfill its obligation under the agreement to sell. Since right over the immovable property is involved, it is desirable that it should not change the hands pending the Suit proceedings. There is no denial as to existence of the agreement to sell and acceptance of the earnest money of Rs. 25 Lakh and also the fact that shows that some of the Trustees who are the beneficiaries, have challenged the action of the granting of permission by the Charity Commissioner and upon remanding back of the mater to the Charity Commissioner by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal as well as various objections raised by some to the Trustees and beneficiaries of the Trust against the agreement to sell, it shows that defendant is not willing to perform its part of agreement to sell and, therefore, trial Page 16 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022 C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022 Court has rightly held that there is prima-facie case in favour of the plaintiff. Moreover, considering the conduct of the defendant Trust, if no interim injunction is passed against it, it may create third party right in the property which may adversely affect the right of the plaintiff and plaintiffs would need to file Suit against those third party or between them and there could be multiplicity of proceedings, which may not be compensated in terms of money. Against which, if ultimately the Suit fails, then the necessary damages in terms of money could be awarded to the Trust.
16. Considering the material placed on record, the order of the trial Court cannot be termed as arbitrary and / or perverse one. The trial Court has properly appreciated the material placed on record. Hence, under limited power available to this Appellate Court upon the discretionary order passed by the trial Court in granting injunction in favour of the plaintiffs, this Court does not find it proper to interfere with the said order as it is plausible one. Under the circumstances, the impugned order of the trial Court is sustainable. However, considering the fact that the Suit is of the year 2008 and the Plaintiff and defendant are Institution, it is better that Suit is expedited by the trial court and decided as early as possible.
17. In view of the above discussion, the present Appeal from Order deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly it is dismissed. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the Page 17 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022 C/AO/64/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 06/05/2022 case, the trial Court is hereby directed to expedite the hearing and disposal of the Special Civil Suit No. 155 of 2008 pending before the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Surat, preferably within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of order of this Court. Parties are directed to cooperate the trial Court for disposal of the Suit in time bound manner as above. No order as to costs.
Direct service permitted.
Civil Application also stands disposed of accordingly.
(DR. A. P. THAKER, J) SAJ GEORGE Page 18 of 18 Downloaded on : Fri May 06 20:58:24 IST 2022