Madras High Court
V.Kotteeswaran vs The State on 4 June, 2020
Author: T.Ravindran
Bench: T.Ravindran
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
RESERVED ON : 13.03.2020
PRONOUNCED ON : 04.06.2020
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE T.RAVINDRAN
Crl.A.No.376 of 2014
V.Kotteeswaran ... Appellant/Accused
Vs.
The State
Represented by the Inspector of Police
Periyathachur Police Station,
Villupuram District.
(Crime No.178/2010) ... Respondent/Complainant
Prayer:- This Criminal Appeal has been filed under Section 374 of the
Criminal Procedure Code against the judgment dated 28.06.2014 passed in
S.C.No.144 of 2013 on the file of the I Additional District and Sessions Court,
Tindivanam.
For Appellant : Mr.K.Selvakumaraswami
For Respondent : Mr.R.Ravichandran (Crl.side)
Government Advocate
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JUDGMENT
The First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tindivanam, by
judgment dated 18.06.2014 in S.C.No.144 of 2013 convicted the
appellant/accused under Section 417 IPC and sentenced him to undergo
Rigorous imprisonment for one year and also to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- in
default to undergo Rigorous imprisonment for three months and acquitted him
of the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC. Impugning the same, the
criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant/Accused.
2.Briefly stated, according to the prosecution case, the victim girl aged
about 20 years and the appellant/accused are the residents of Rettanai Village
and one year prior to the giving of the complaint, the victim girl used to go to
the house of the accused for doing house hold works and while so, the accused
deceived the victim girl, dishonestly induced her by stating that he would
marry her and she is his wife and by saying so, it is put forth that he committed
sexual intercourse with the victim girl against her will and consent and thus,
the accused has committed the offences punishable under Sections 417 & 376
IPC.
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3.To sustain the prosecution case, PWs 1 to 12 were examined and
Exs.P1 to 9 were marked. No MO has been marked. On the conclusion of the
prosecution evidence, the accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.Cwith
reference to the incriminating evidence tendered against him by the
prosecution witnesses and the accused had denied the same and on the side of
the accused, no oral and documentary evidence has been adduced and No MO
has been marked.
4.The victim girl has been examined as PW1. The Criminal action in the
matter has been set in motion based on the complaint lodged by the victim girl
marked as Ex.P1. Even as per Ex.P1, it is found that the victim girl was
described as having 20 years of age. Further, the victim girl has not mentioned
in the complaint as to when the accused had committed the offence of rape
against her will and consent and she would only state that while she was doing
house hold works in the house of the accused about one year back, she and the
accused moved closely and the accused induced her by stating that she is his
wife and so saying, according to the victim girl, the accused had sexual
intercourse with her several times and likewise, it is stated by her that the
accused had forcibly sexual intercourse with her on several occasions and
thereafter, on seeing her vomiting, according to the victim girl, she being
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questioned by her mother Venniammal PW2, she disclosed the same to her
mother and it is further stated that when she and her mother approached the
accused and called upon him to marry the victim girl, in as much as the
accused had refused to the same, according to the victim girl, she has been
forced to lodge the complaint. As rightly put forth by the accused counsel, the
victim girl has not mentioned as to on what date, she had been subjected to
forcible sex on the part of the accused and the date of the occurrence itself is
not disclosed in the complaint Ex.P1. Very vaguely, it has been mentioned that
one year prior to the lodging of the complaintEx.P1 dated 25.05.2010,
according to the victim girl, the accused had sexual intercourse with her on
several occasions on the false promise of marrying her and that she is his wife.
However, as rightly contended by the accused counsel, considering the conduct
of the victim girl, when she had admitted that she had been having sexual
intercourse with the accused on several occasions, however, she would only
state that she had acquiesced to the same on the assurance given by the accused
that he would marry her and that, she is his wife, however, the free conduct of
the victim girl in submitting and subjecting her body to the accused on several
occasions without any serious hesitation and misgivings raises the needle of
suspicion in the case projected by the victim girl.
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5.The entire case of the prosecution merely rests upon the evidence of
the victim girl examined as PW1. During the course of cross examination, the
victim girl has admitted that she does not know the contents of the complaint
and only the author of the same would know the contents of the complaint and
further, admitted that the accused sister Sarasu is her friend and that she used
to go to the accused house often and further, she would also admit that she and
the accused got associated and closely moved and further would state that the
accused had three brothers and all had married, the accused mother is also
residing with the accused and his three brothers, are also residing in the same
house and further would state that Kuppammal and Kannan are residing nearby
and also would state thatVeerappan, Balasubramanian and Ezhumalai are also
residing closer and would also state that Veerappan, Balasubramanian and
Ezhumalai all knew about the relationship between her and the accused and
further, she would only state that on becoming pregnant, she met the accused
brother and complained about her pregnancy, however, the accused brother
challenged her case and further, she would claim that the female baby, which
she had conceived,died about 1 ½ years ago and she had disclosed the birth of
the baby to the police during the course of investigation. Therefore, when as
per the evidence of the victim girl, she had been closely moving with the
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accused often over a considerable period of time and also would admit that she
had sexual intercourse with him on several occasions, in such view of the
matter, her case that she had subjected herself to the desire of the accused
freely on his mere promise of marrying her and that she is his wife, as such,
cannot be readily accepted.
6.Furthermore, the Investigation Officer examined as PW11, who had
examined the victim girl, has admitted that the victim girl has not mentioned
the date and time of the occurrence in the complaint Ex.P1 and further also
admitted that the victim girl has not disclosed as to how others had known
about her acquaintance and relationship with the accused and further admitted
that various persons are residing nearby to the house of the accused and that,
he had not examined them and further, admitted that during his investigation,
the victim girl had not stated to him that she used to go to the accused house,
on being called by the accused mother and at that point of time, the occurrence
had happened. Further also admitted that the victim girl had not stated to him
that she and the accused sister Sarasu had acquaintance and on that score, she
had been going to the accused house often and further admitted that the victim
girl has not stated to him that the accused had committed rape on her morning
and evening, on several times about three years ago and further admitted that
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the victim girl has not stated to him that the accused had sexual intercourse
with her for more than 10 times and further admitted that the victim girl had
not stated to him that on becoming pregnant, she had gone to the hospital and
further admitted that the victim girl had not stated to him that she had
approached the accused brother and requested him to arrange her marriage with
the accused and further admitted that PW2 Venniammal knew about the
occurrence only on being informed by the victim girl and also would admit that
she does not know as to what had happened to the pregnancy of the victim girl.
Therefore, when it is found that the victim girl had not disclosed the
investigation officer during the course of investigation that she used to go to
the accused house on several occasions, on being called by the accused mother
and her acquaintance with the accused sister and thereby, she had moved
closely with the accused and further, when she had not disclosed to the
investigation officer that the accused had sexual intercourse on several
occasions as now put forth during the course of evidence and further, did not
disclose that her acquaintance to the accused is known to the others, her
evidence, as above pointed out,does not inspire confidence and acceptance in
any manner and therefore, it is found that the victim girl had not disclosed
anything about the others having knowledge about her relationship with the
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accused to the investigation officer during the course of investigation as above
pointed out and also admitted by PW2 herself, she had come to know about the
occurrence only on being apprised about the same by the victim girl. The Sub-
Inspector of Police, who had registered the FIR and also examined as PW9, has
also admitted that the victim girl had not disclosed the date and time of the
occurrence and only stated that the same had taken place one year prior to the
lodging of the complaint. The Medical Officer, who had examined the victim
girl and examined as PW7 during the course of her evidence, has stated that on
examining the victim girl, she found her to be pregnant and also would state
that her hymen was absent and no external injury and her vagina admitted two
figures and concluded her examination by holding that the victim girl had
already sexual intercourse on several times. Therefore, from the medical
evidence adduced in the matter, it is found that there is no symptom of the
victim girl subjected to any forcible sex, but it is only on her own and with her
free consent. No doubt, as pointed out, only belatedly the victim girl had been
examined by the medical officer, particularly, after she had become pregnant.
7.Considering the abovesaid factors intoto, when it is found that the
victim girl was aged about 20 years at the time of the alleged occurrence and
when she has clearly admitted that she has yielded to the sexual intercourse on
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several occasions and when her case that she had submitted to the sexual
intercourse only on the assurance of the accused that he would marry her is
found to be unreliable and totally unacceptable and accordingly, it is found that
her consent so obtained cannot at all be described as consent obtained by
misconception on fact and in such view of the matter, when the conduct of the
victim girl shows that she had not resisted the accused in any manner and also
found to be having sexual intercourse with him on several occasions as
admitted by her and the victim girl is found to be having knowledge about the
significance and consequences of the sexual intercourse she had with the
accused and accordingly, when she is found to have not shown any resistance
to the accused at the time of committing the alleged offence, the same would
only disclose that she voluntarily had given consent in having sexual
intercourse with the accused and there is no misconception with reference to
the same as put forth by her, therefore, the trial Court had rightly come to the
conclusion that the victim girl had freely and voluntarily consented to the
sexual intercourse with the accused. Therefore, according to the trial Court, the
act of the victim girl is only an act of promiscuity and not an act induced by
misconception of fact and after holding that the consent has been given by the
victim girl freely, voluntarily and consciously in undergoing sexual intercourse
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with the accused, the trial Court had rightly held that the prosecution has failed
to establish the commission of the offence on the part of the accused
punishable under Section 376 IPC and resultantly, acquitted him of the
aforesaid offence.
8.The trial Court, after holding that the act of the victim girl in having
sexual intercourse with the accused on several occasions can only be an act of
promiscuity and not an act induced by misconception of fact and the consent
given to the same by the victim girl is only made freely, voluntarily and
consciously, however, proceeded to hold that the victim girl had been deceived
with the false promise of the accused in marrying her and thereby, the accused
had forcible sexual intercourse with her and thus, the accused is liable to be
punished under Section 417 IPC. However, as rightly put forth by the accused
counsel, when the main offence of rape alleged to have been committed by the
accused based on the alleged false promise of marrying the victim girl itself is
not made out by the prosecution and consequentially, the accused having been
acquitted of the offence under Section 376 IPC, it does not stand to reason as
to how the trial Court had proceeded to hold that the accused had given a false
promise of marrying the victim girl and that, she would be his wife and
accordingly, had forcible sexual intercourse with her. When according to the
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trial Court, the act of the victim girl does not come under the misconception of
fact with reference to the alleged promise of the accused promising to marry
her therefore, when the essential ingredients that the accused had deceived the
victim girl frequently or dishonestly and thereby intentionally induced her to
subject her body to his sexual desire, the above facts having not been made out
by the prosecution, in my considered opinion, the accused cannot be held to
have committed the offence of cheating as contemplated under Section 415
IPC.
9.In this connection, the trial Court seems to have mainly relied upon the
FIR and by holding that normally in sexual offence, there would be a delay in
the lodging of the FIR due to myriad reasons, particularly, the reluctance of the
victim girl and her family members to go to the police complaining about the
incident as they same would affect their reputation and honour and on that
basis, based on the averments contained in the complaint that the accused had
deceived the victim girl on the false promise of marrying her, proceeded to
hold that the accused had committed the offence punishable under Section 417
IPC.
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10.As rightly put forth by the accused counsel, as to whether the
abovesaid facts would constitute the offence of cheating punishable under
Section 417 IPC, the apex Court in the decision rendered in Criminal appeal
dated 21.08.2019 passed in Crl.A.No.1165 of 2019 (@ SLP (Crl) No.2712 of
2019) (Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.)
had the occasion to go into the question as to what would constitute sexual
relations made with the victim girl on the false promise of marrying her and
whether her consent given to the acts would only be based on the
misconception of facts, the apex Court had analyzed the issues in detail and the
same is adverted below for better appreciation of the facts involved in the
matter.
“14. In the present case, the “misconception of fact”
alleged by the complainant is the appellant’s promise to marry
her. Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court
has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise
given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken,
and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but
subsequently not fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v State of
Chhattisgarh, this Court held:
“37. The sum and substance of the aforesaid
decisions would be that if it is established and
proved that from the inception the accused
who gave the promise to the prosecutrix to
marry, did not have any intention to marry
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and the prosecutrix gave the consent for
sexual intercourse on such an assurance by
the accused that he would marry her, such a
consent can be said to be a consent obtained
on a misconception of fact as per Section 90
of the IPC and, in such a case, such a consent
would not excuse the offender and such an
offender can be said to have committed the
rape as defined under Sections 375 of the IPC
and can be convicted for the offence under
Section 376 of the IPC.”
Similar observations were made by this Court in Deepak
Gulati v State of Haryana (“Deepak Gulati”):
“21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a
promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court
must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a
false promise of marriage by the accused…”
15. In Yedla Srinivasa Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh11 the
accused forcibly established sexual relations with the
complainant. When she asked the accused why he had spoiled
her life, he promised to marry her. On this premise, the accused
repeatedly had sexual intercourse with the complainant. When
the complainant became pregnant, the accused refused to marry
her. When the matter was brought to the panchayat, the accused
admitted to having had sexual intercourse with the complainant
but subsequently absconded. Given this factual background, the
court observed:
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“10. It appears that the intention of the accused as per the
testimony of PW 1 was, right from the beginning, not
honest and he kept on promising that he will marry her, till
she became pregnant. This kind of consent obtained by the
accused cannot be said to be any consent because she was
under a misconception of fact that the accused intends to
marry her, therefore, she had submitted to sexual
intercourse with him. This fact is also admitted by the
accused that he had committed sexual intercourse which is
apparent from the testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3 and before
the panchayat of elders of the village. It is more than clear
that the accused made a false promise that he would marry
her. Therefore, the intention of the accused right from the
beginning was not bona fide and the poor girl submitted to
the lust of the accused, completely being misled by the
accused who held out the promise for marriage. This kind
of consent taken by the accused with clear intention not to
fulfil the promise and persuading the girl to believe that he
is going to marry her and obtained her consent for the
sexual intercourse under total misconception, cannot be
treated to be a consent….”
16.Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the
maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide
by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in
sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates
the woman’s “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a
promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a
false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no
intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The
“consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the
ground of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception
was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In
Deepak Gulati this Court observed:
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“21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a
promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court
must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a
false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the
consent involved was given after wholly understanding the
nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may
be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation
made to her by the accused, or where an accused on
account of circumstances which he could not have
foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to
marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such
cases must be treated differently.
…
24.Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate
evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial
stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of
keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of
course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of
intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various
unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise
made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to
reasons that are not very clear from the evidence
available, does not always amount to misconception of
fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term
“misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate
relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in
such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and
fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is
assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the
accused had never really intended to marry her.”
17. In Uday v State of Karnataka12 the complainant was a
college going student when the accused promised to marry her.
In the complainant’s statement, she admitted that she was aware
that there would be significant opposition from both the
complainant’s and accused’s families to the proposed marriage.
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She engaged in sexual intercourse with the accused but
nonetheless kept the relationship secret from her family. The
court observed that in these circumstances the accused’s
promise to marry the complainant was not of immediate
relevance to the complainant’s decision to engage in sexual
intercourse with the accused, which was motivated by other
factors:
“25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the
prosecution in this case. In a case of this nature two
conditions must be fulfilled for the application of Section
90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was
given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must be
proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or
had reason to believe that the consent was given in
consequence of such misconception. We have serious
doubts that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix
to consent to having sexual intercourse with the appellant.
She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her marriage
with the appellant was difficult on account of caste
considerations. The proposal was bound to meet with stiff
opposition from members of both families. There was
therefore a distinct possibility, of which she was clearly
conscious, that the marriage may not take place at all
despite the promise of the appellant. The question still
remains whether even if it were so, the appellant knew, or
had reason to believe, that the prosecutrix had consented
to having sexual intercourse with him only as a
consequence of her belief, based on his promise, that they
will get married in due course. There is hardly any
evidence to prove this fact. On the contrary, the
circumstances of the case tend to support the conclusion
that the appellant had reason to believe that the consent
given by the prosecutrix was the result of their deep love
for each other. It is not disputed that they were deeply in
love. They met often, and it does appear that the
prosecutrix permitted him liberties which, if at all, are
permitted only to a person with whom one is in deep love.
It is also not without significance that the prosecutrix
stealthily went out with the appellant to a lonely place at
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12 o'clock in the night. It usually happens in such cases,
when two young persons are madly in love, that they
promise to each other several times that come what may,
they will get married…”
18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the
above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section
375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards
the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was
vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to
marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of
marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and
with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given.
The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear
a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual
act.
19. The allegations in the FIR indicate that in November 2009
the complainant initially refused to engage in sexual relations
with the accused, but on the promise of marriage, he established
sexual relations. However, the FIR includes a reference to
several other allegations that are relevant for the present
purpose. They are as follows:
(i) The complainant and the appellant knew each
other since 1998 and were intimate since 2004;
(ii) The complainant and the appellant met regularly,
travelled great distances to meet each other, resided
in each other’s houses on multiple occasions,
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engaged in sexual intercourse regularly over a
course of five years and on multiple occasions visited
the hospital jointly to check whether the complainant
was pregnant; and
(iii) The appellant expressed his reservations about
marrying the complainant on 31 January 2014. This
led to arguments between them. Despite this, the
appellant and the complainant continued to engage
in sexual intercourse until March 2015.
The appellant is a Deputy Commandant in the CRPF while the
complainant is an Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax.
20. The allegations in the FIR do not on their face indicate that
the promise by the appellant was false, or that the complainant
engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this promise. There
is no allegation in the FIR that when the appellant promised to
marry the complainant, it was done in bad faith or with the
intention to deceive her. The appellant’s failure in 2016 to fulfil
his promise made in 2008 cannot be construed to mean the
promise itself was false. The allegations in the FIR indicate that
the complainant was aware that there existed obstacles to
marrying the appellant since 2008, and that she and the
appellant continued to engage in sexual relations long after
their getting married had become a disputed matter. Even
thereafter, the complainant travelled to visit and reside with the
appellant at his postings and allowed him to spend his weekends
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at her residence. The allegations in the FIR belie the case that
she was deceived by the appellant’s promise of marriage.
Therefore, even if the facts set out in the complainant’s
statements are accepted in totality, no offence under Section 375
of the IPC has occurred.”
11.Applying the abovesaid principles of law to the case at hand, when
according to the victim girl, as adduced by her during the course of chief
examination that her status and the status of the accused are not equal and that
the victim girl being aged about 20 years on the date of the alleged occurrence
and knew about the consequences of sexual intercourse and also was aware of
the position that the accused family would not consent to the accused marrying
her on any account, in such view of the matter, when there is no clear case
made out by the victim girl that the alleged promise of marriage put forth by
the accused was given in bad faith and with the intention of cheating her at the
time it was given and considering the conduct of the victim girl in having
sexual intercourse with the accused on several occasions and not disclosing the
same to any one till she became pregnant and furthermore, though she would
claim that her relationship is known to other persons, however the same has not
even been disclosed to the investigation officer as above pointed out, in such
view of the matter, when the allegation put forth in the complaint, on the face
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of it, does not indicate that the alleged promise made by the accused was false
and that, the victim girl had sexual relationship with the accused on the basis of
the alleged promise and as above pointed out, when the victim girl is aware of
the various obstacles in marrying the accused and despite the abovesaid
factors, the conduct of the victim girl in continuing the sexual relationship with
the accused over a period of time and on several occasions as admitted by her,
in such view of the matter, the bare allegations in the complaint made by the
victim girl that she was deceived by the accused on the promise of marriage, in
such view of the matter, when the trial Court has proceeded to hold that the
consent of the victim girl in having sexual intercourse with the accused has
been given freely, voluntarily and consciously and accordingly, there is a huge
delay in the lodging of the complaint, in all, it is found that the offence of
cheating alleged against the accused in promising to marry the victim girl and
thereby, having forcible sex with or without consent and against her will as
such cannot be believed in any manner and therefore, the trial Court is found to
have erroneously determined that the accused is liable to be punished for the
offence punishable under Section 417 IPC.
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12.On the same lines with reference to the same proposition of law as
outlined by the apex Court above referred to, according to the accused counsel,
this Court had also the occasion to consider the same in the judgment rendered
in Criminal Appeal No.171 of 2007 (Theerthagiri and two others Vs. State
rep.by the Inspector of Police, All Women Police Station, Harur,
Lr.No.12/2004) dated 13.10.2015 and the order dated 04.04.2018 passed in
Crl.R.C.(MD).No.914 of 2007 (Amali Arockia Selvi Vs. Maria Michael @
Michael and another). The principles of law outlined in the abovesaid
decisions are taken into consideration and followed as applicable to the case at
hand.
13.Furthermore, as above pointed out, the victim girl is alleged to have
become pregnant due to the act of rape committed by the accused and even on
the date of alleging of the complaint, she is stated to be pregnant and the same
has been confirmed by the medical officer, accordingly, it is also admitted by
the victim girl that she had given birth to a female baby and the same had died,
further according to the victim girl, she had disclosed the same to the police
during the course of investigation, however, as above pointed out, the
Investigation Officer PW11 has testified that his investigation does not
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disclose as to what had happened to the pregnancy caused to the victim girl. If
the alleged case of the victim girl has any semblance of truth, as rightly put
forth, if the victim girl has given delivery of a female child and if the abovesaid
birth of the child is only due to the acts of the accused, she would have
disclosed the same to the investigation officer and the investigation officer
would also have taken steps to take DNA test with reference to the child to
ascertain her parentage, however, no such steps has been initiated and directed
in the matter. When according to the investigation officer, the birth of the
female child to the victim girl has not been disclosed during the course of
investigation, it is found that the material facts had been suppressed by the
victim girl one way or the other and the abovesaid factor also undermines the
truth of the case projected by the victim girl.
14.In the light of the abovesaid discussions, when the prosecution case is
circumscribed with serious doubts failings, lacunae, suspicions and
shortcomings and when with reference to the same, no plausible explanation is
forthcoming on the part of the prosecution, resultantly, in my considered
opinion, the benefit of doubt emerging from the same should be extended in
favour of the accused, thus, it is found that the presumption of innocence of the
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accused has not been dislodged by the prosecution by adducing acceptable and
reliable evidence, in such view of the matter, I hold that the accused is not
guilty of the offence punishable under Section 417 IPC and acquit him thereof.
15. In conclusion, the impugned judgment dated 18.06.2014 passed in
S.C.No.144 of 2013 on the file of the The First Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Tindivanam, convicting and sentencing the appellant/accused
under Section 417 IPC are set aside and the accused is held not guilty of the
offence under Section 417 IPC and is acquitted of the same and resultantly, the
criminal appeal is allowed. Bail bond, if any, executed by the appellant/A2
shall stand cancelled. Fine amount, if any, paid by the appellant/A2 is ordered
to be refunded to him.
Index : Yes / No
Internet : Yes / No 04.06.2020
sms
To
1.The State
Represented by the Inspector of Police
Periyathachur Police Station,
Villupuram District.
(Crime No.178/2010).
2. Additional District and Sessions Court, Tindivanam.
http://www.judis.nic.in
23/25
T.RAVINDRAN, J.
sms Pre-delivery Judgment made in Crl.A.No.376 of 2014 04.06.2020 http://www.judis.nic.in 24/25