Madras High Court
The Managing Director vs Kailash on 24 June, 2014
Author: S. Manikumar
Bench: S. Manikumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF MADRAS DATED: 24.06.2014 CORAM: THE HONBLE MR. JUSTICE S. MANIKUMAR C.M.A.No. 1762 of 2014 and M.P.No.1 of 2014 CMA Sr No.47085 of 2013 The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Limited, Railway Station Road, Kumbakonam. ... Appellant Vs. Kailash Respondent The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act against the award & Decree dated 20.09.2011 made in M.C.O.P.No.140 of 2009 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Additional Subordinate Judge), Mayiladuthurai. For Appellant : Mr. A.Babu JUDGMENT
At the outset, Mr.A.Babu, learned counsel for the State Transport Corporation submitted that quantum of compensation of Rs.3,66,960/- with interest, at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the date of claim till the date of deposit awarded to the respondent/claimant, by application of multiplier method, is erroneous and therefore, the compensation requires reduction. Submission of the counsel is placed on record and therefore, there is no need to advert to the aspect of negligence and liability fastened on the Corporation, to pay compensation.
2. Adverting to the above, it is the case of the respondent/claimant that the bus bearing Regn.No.TN49-N-0823, involved in the accident ran over his hip. He also sustained injuries, in urinary track and anus. Initially, he was treated in Myiladuthurai Government Hospital and thereafter referred for better treatment to Government Medical College Hospital, Chidambaram. He was hospitalised between 10.10.2006 and 01.12.2006. Three operations have been performed. As the intestine has come out, by surgical process, it has been rectified. Till such time, for defecation, a tube has been fixed. So also, urine has been collected in a bag, through a tube. Perusal of the award further discloses that the respondent, was once again hospitalised between 12.03.2007 and 25.04.2007.
3. It is also the case of the respondent/claimant that he continued his treatment even during the filing of the claim petition. At the time of accident, he was aged 27 years. According to him, due to the gravity of injuries and consequential disablement, he has lost happiness in life, suffered from agony, lost his marriage prospects also. To prove the nature of injuries, treatment, surgeries underwent and the expenses incurred towards hospital expenses and medicine, the respondent/claimant has marked Ex.P3, dated 10.10.2006, true copy of the accident register, Ex.P4 dated 01.12.2006, medical certificate from Raja Muthaiah Hospital, Chidambaram, Ex.P5, Registration certificate, Exs.P6 and P7, discharge summaries, Ex.P8, series of medical records, Ex.P9, series of medical records and receipts, Ex.P10, certificate issued by Raja Muthaiah Medical College, Chidambaram, Ex.P11, series of discharge summaries and Ex.P13, x-ray.
4. Added to that PW2, Doctor, who examined the respondent/claimant, has also supported the version of the respondent and further deposed that on clinical examination of the respondent with reference to the medical records, he had noticed that the respondent has sustained fracture of pubic rami bone. A portion of urinary track was crushed/mangled (rpije;j fhak;) . For collection of the waste and urine, a portion of a large intestine, has been kept outside the stomach and for that a surgery has been also performed. PW2, Doctor, has also deposed that during his clinical examination, when he pressed the abdomen of the respondent, urine was coming out, and having regard to the gravity of the injuries, impairment stated supra, he has assessed the extent of disablement as 50% and issued Ex.P12, disability certificate.
5. At the time of accident, the injured was stated to be aged 27 years. According to him, due to the injuries and disablement, he had even lost the marriage prospects. The nature of injuries and surgeries performed at Raja Muthaiah Medical College Hospital, period of hospitalisation from 10.10.2006 to 01.12.2006 and thereafter, between 12.03.2007 and 25.04.2007 in two spells, would itself speak about the impairment to the internal organs and the difficulty in passing urine. Considering the above, it could be reasonably presumed that the respondent, who was just aged about 27 years, at the time of accident, would have experienced severe pain and suffering, at the time of accident, during surgeries and convalescence.
6. From the treatment records, produced before the claims tribunal, coupled with the oral testimony of injured and PW2, Doctor, it could be seen that for nearly seven months, he had been taking treatment as inpatient and out patient, for the injuries and the impairment to the internal organs. During the trial, it is the case of the respondent that he had lost his marriage prospects. Though, as a milk vendor, the respondent claimed to have earned Rs.6,000/- per month, no document has been filed. However, the claims tribunal by fixing his monthly income of Rs.3,000/- proposed to apply multiplier method for the purpose of computing the future earning.
7. It is the case of the State Transport Corporation that Rs.3,66,960/- awarded as compensation is excessive. At this juncture, this Court deems it fit to extract the grounds based on which, the quantum of compensation has been challenged.
7. The lower court erroneously awarded sum of Rs.3,24,000/- towards 50% disability. Under multiplier method, which is higher side.
8. The lower court erroneously awarded sum of Rs.20,000/- towards Transportation & nutrition. Which is higher side.
9. The lower court erroneously awarded sum of Rs.20,000/- towards pain and sufferings. Which is higher side.
8. Considering the nature of injuries, more particularly, fracture of pubic rami bone, with damage to the system and the surgeries performed by the doctors, it cannot be said that the assessment made by PW2, is arbitrary. No oral or documentary evidence has been adduced by the Corporation and no contra medical evidence has been adduced. Having regard to the above, this Court is not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant corporation that PW2, has committed any error in assessing a higher extent of disablement. The disablement would certainly affect anybody, from discharging his day to day affairs, no matter, whatever be the avocation or employment, in which he was engaged, at the time of accident.
9. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar reported in 2011 ACJ 1 (SC), wherein, Paragraphs 4 to 17, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"General Principles relating to compensation in injury cases:
4. The provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (`Act' for short) makes it clear that the award must be just, which means that compensation should, to the extent possible, fully and adequately restore the claimant to the position prior to the accident. The object of awarding damages is to make good the loss suffered as a result of wrong done as far as money can do so, in a fair, reasonable and equitable manner. The court or tribunal shall have to assess the damages objectively and exclude from consideration any speculation or fancy, though some conjecture with reference to the nature of disability and its consequences, is inevitable. A person is not only to be compensated for the physical injury, but also for the loss which he suffered as a result of such injury. This means that he is to be compensated for his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned. (See C. K. Subramonia Iyer vs. T. Kunhikuttan Nair - AIR 1970 SC 376, R. D. Hattangadi vs. Pest Control (India) Ltd. - 1995 (1) SCC 551 and Baker vs. Willoughby - 1970 AC 467).
5. The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following:
Pecuniary damages (Special Damages)
(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure.
(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising:
(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;
(b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability.
(iii) Future medical expenses.
Non-pecuniary damages (General Damages)
(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries.
(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).
(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).
In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in serious cases of injury, where there is specific medical evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life. Assessment of pecuniary damages under item (i) and under item (ii)(a) do not pose much difficulty as they involve reimbursement of actuals and are easily ascertainable from the evidence. Award under the head of future medical expenses - item (iii) -- depends upon specific medical evidence regarding need for further treatment and cost thereof. Assessment of non-pecuniary damages - items (iv), (v) and (vi) -- involves determination of lump sum amounts with reference to circumstances such as age, nature of injury/deprivation/disability suffered by the claimant and the effect thereof on the future life of the claimant. Decision of this Court and High Courts contain necessary guidelines for award under these heads, if necessary. What usually poses some difficulty is the assessment of the loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability - item (ii)(a). We are concerned with that assessment in this case.
Assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanent disability
6. Disability refers to any restriction or lack of ability to perform an activity in the manner considered normal for a human-being. Permanent disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body, found existing at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation, after achieving the maximum bodily improvement or recovery which is likely to remain for the remainder life of the injured. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial or total. Partial permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform all the duties and bodily functions that he could perform before the accident, though he is able to perform some of them and is still able to engage in some gainful activity. Total permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform any avocation or employment related activities as a result of the accident. The permanent disabilities that may arise from motor accidents injuries, are of a much wider range when compared to the physical disabilities which are enumerated in the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (`Disabilities Act' for short). But if any of the disabilities enumerated in section 2(i) of the Disabilities Act are the result of injuries sustained in a motor accident, they can be permanent disabilities for the purpose of claiming compensation.
7. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the Doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often than not, with reference to a particular limb. When a disability certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent disability to an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is not the same as 45% permanent disability with reference to the whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions of that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of disability of the whole body. If there is 60% permanent disability of the right hand and 80% permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability with reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus 60%). If different parts of the body have suffered different percentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole body, cannot obviously exceed 100%.
8. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings, would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced show 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanently disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terns of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard multiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find that percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability, is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course, the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation (see for example, the decisions of this court in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co.Ltd. - 2010(10) SCALE 298 and Yadava Kumar v. D.M., National Insurance Co. Ltd. - 2010 (8) SCALE 567).
9. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and if so the extent of such permanent disability. This means that the tribunal should consider and decide with reference to the evidence: (i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary; (ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement, (iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with reference to any specific limb, then the effect of such disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire body, that is the permanent disability suffered by the person. If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent disability then there is no question of proceeding further and determining the loss of future earning capacity. But if the Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then it will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal ascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of the claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determine whether such permanent disability has affected or will affect his earning capacity.
10. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability on the actual earning capacity involves three steps. The Tribunal has to first ascertain what activities the claimant could carry on in spite of the permanent disability and what he could not do as a result of the permanent ability (this is also relevant for awarding compensation under the head of loss of amenities of life). The second step is to ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of work before the accident, as also his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood, or (ii) whether in spite of the permanent disability, the claimant could still effectively carry on the activities and functions, which he was earlier carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented or restricted from discharging his previous activities and functions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale of activities and functions so that he continues to earn or can continue to earn his livelihood. For example, if the left hand of a claimant is amputated, the permanent physical or functional disablement may be assessed around 60%. If the claimant was a driver or a carpenter, the actual loss of earning capacity may virtually be hundred percent, if he is neither able to drive or do carpentry. On the other hand, if the claimant was a clerk in government service, the loss of his left hand may not result in loss of employment and he may still be continued as a clerk as he could perform his clerical functions; and in that event the loss of earning capacity will not be 100% as in the case of a driver or carpenter, nor 60% which is the actual physical disability, but far less. In fact, there may not be any need to award any compensation under the head of `loss of future earnings', if the claimant continues in government service, though he may be awarded compensation under the head of loss of amenities as a consequence of losing his hand. Sometimes the injured claimant may be continued in service, but may not found suitable for discharging the duties attached to the post or job which he was earlier holding, on account of his disability, and may therefore be shifted to some other suitable but lesser post with lesser emoluments, in which case there should be a limited award under the head of loss of future earning capacity, taking note of the reduced earning capacity. It may be noted that when compensation is awarded by treating the loss of future earning capacity as 100% (or even anything more than 50%), the need to award compensation separately under the head of loss of amenities or loss of expectation of life may disappear and as a result, only a token or nominal amount may have to be awarded under the head of loss of amenities or loss of expectation of life, as otherwise there may be a duplication in the award of compensation. Be that as it may.
11. The Tribunal should not be a silent spectator when medical evidence is tendered in regard to the injuries and their effect, in particular the extent of permanent disability. Sections 168 and 169 of the Act make it evident that the Tribunal does not function as a neutral umpire as in a civil suit, but as an 12 active explorer and seeker of truth who is required to `hold an enquiry into the claim' for determining the `just compensation'. The Tribunal should therefore take an active role to ascertain the true and correct position so that it can assess the `just compensation'. While dealing with personal injury cases, the Tribunal should preferably equip itself with a Medical Dictionary and a Handbook for evaluation of permanent physical impairment (for example the Manual for Evaluation of Permanent Physical Impairment for Orthopedic Surgeons, prepared by American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons or its Indian equivalent or other authorized texts) for understanding the medical evidence and assessing the physical and functional disability. The Tribunal may also keep in view the first schedule to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 which gives some indication about the extent of permanent disability in different types of injuries, in the case of workmen. If a Doctor giving evidence uses technical medical terms, the Tribunal should instruct him to state in addition, in simple non-medical terms, the nature and the effect of the injury. If a doctor gives evidence about the percentage of permanent disability, the Tribunal has to seek clarification as to whether such percentage of disability is the functional disability with reference to the whole body or whether it is only with reference to a limb. If the percentage of permanent disability is stated with reference to a limb, the Tribunal will have to seek the doctor's opinion as to whether it is possible to deduce the corresponding functional permanent disability with reference to the whole body and if so the percentage.
12. The Tribunal should also act with caution, if it proposed to accept the expert evidence of doctors who did not treat the injured but who give `ready to use' disability certificates, without proper medical assessment. There are several instances of unscrupulous doctors who without treating the injured, readily giving liberal disability certificates to help the claimants. But where the disability certificates are given by duly constituted Medical Boards, they may be accepted subject to evidence regarding the genuineness of such certificates. The Tribunal may invariably make it a point to require the evidence of the Doctor who treated the injured or who assessed the permanent disability. Mere production of a disability certificate or Discharge Certificate will not be proof of the extent of disability stated therein unless the Doctor who treated the claimant or who medically examined and assessed the extent of disability of claimant, is tendered for cross- examination with reference to the certificate. If the Tribunal is not satisfied with the medical evidence produced by the claimant, it can constitute a Medical Board (from a panel maintained by it in consultation with reputed local Hospitals/Medical Colleges) and refer the claimant to such Medical Board for assessment of the disability. 13. We may now summarise the principles discussed above:
(i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity.
(ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes that percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as percentage of permanent disability).
(iii) The doctor who treated an injured-claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety.
(iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors.
14. The assessment of loss of future earnings is explained below with reference to the following illustrations:
Illustration `A': The injured, a workman, was aged 30 years and earning Rs.3000/- per month at the time of accident. As per Doctor's evidence, the permanent disability of the limb as a consequence of the injury was 60% and the consequential permanent disability to the person was quantified at 30%. The loss of earning capacity is however assessed by the Tribunal as 15% on the basis of evidence, because the claimant is continued in employment, but in a lower grade. Calculation of compensation will be as follows:
a) Annual income before the accident : Rs.36,000/-.
b) Loss of future earning per annum (15% of the prior annual income) : Rs. 5400/-.
c) Multiplier applicable with reference to age : 17
d) Loss of future earnings : (5400 x 17) : Rs. 91,800/-
Illustration `B': The injured was a driver aged 30 years, earning Rs.3000/- per month. His hand is amputated and his permanent disability is assessed at 60%. He was terminated from his job as he could no longer drive. His chances of getting any other employment was bleak and even if he got any job, the salary was likely to be a pittance. The Tribunal therefore assessed his loss of future earning capacity as 75%. Calculation of compensation will be as follows:
a) Annual income prior to the accident : Rs.36,000/-.
b) Loss of future earning per annum (75% of the prior annual income) : Rs.27000/-.
c) Multiplier applicable with reference to age : 17
d) Loss of future earnings : (27000 x 17) : Rs. 4,59,000/-
Illustration `C': The injured was 25 years and a final year Engineering student. As a result of the accident, he was in coma for two months, his right hand was amputated and vision was affected. The permanent disablement was assessed as 70%. As the injured was incapacitated to pursue his chosen career and as he required the assistance of a servant throughout his life, the loss of future earning capacity was also assessed as 70%. The calculation of compensation will be as follows:
a) Minimum annual income he would have got if had been employed as an Engineer : Rs.60,000/-
b) Loss of future earning per annum (70% : Rs.42000/- of the expected annual income)
c) Multiplier applicable (25 years) : 18
d) Loss of future earnings : (42000 x 18) : Rs. 7,56,000/-
[Note : The figures adopted in illustrations (A) and (B) are hypothetical. The figures in Illustration (C) however are based on actuals taken from the decision in Arvind Kumar Mishra (supra)].
15. After the insertion of section 163A in the Act (with effect from 14.11.1994), if a claim for compensation is made under that section by an injured alleging disability, and if the quantum of loss of future earning claimed, falls under the second schedule to the Act, the Tribunal may have to apply the following principles laid down in Note (5) of the Second Schedule to the Act to determine compensation :
"5. Disability in non-fatal accidents :
The following compensation shall be payable in case of disability to the victim arising out of non-fatal accidents : -
Loss of income, if any, for actual period of disablement not exceeding fifty two weeks.
PLUS either of the following :-
(a) In case of permanent total disablement the amount payable shall be arrived at by multiplying the annual loss of income by the Multiplier applicable to the age on the date of determining the compensation, or
(b) In case of permanent partial disablement such percentage of compensation which would have been payable in the case of permanent total disablement as specified under item (a) above.
Injuries deemed to result in Permanent Total Disablement/Permanent Partial Disablement and percentage of loss of earning capacity shall be as per Schedule I under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923."
16. We may in this context refer to the difficulties faced by claimants in securing the presence of busy Surgeons or treating Doctors who treated them, for giving evidence. Most of them are reluctant to appear before Tribunals for obvious reasons either because their entire day is likely to be wasted in attending the Tribunal to give evidence in a single case or because they are not shown any priority in recording evidence or because the claim petition is filed at a place far away from the place where the treatment was given. Many a time, the claimants are reluctant to take coercive steps for summoning the Doctors who treated them, out of respect and gratitude towards them or for fear that if forced to come against their wishes, they may give evidence which may not be very favorable. This forces the injured claimants to approach `professional' certificate givers whose evidence most of the time is found to be not satisfactory. Tribunals should realize that a busy Surgeon may be able to save ten lives or perform twenty surgeries in the time he spends to attend the Tribunal to give evidence in one accident case. Many busy Surgeons refuse to treat medico-legal cases out of apprehension that their practice and their current patients will suffer, if they have to spend their days in Tribunals giving evidence about past patients. The solution does not lie in coercing the Doctors to attend the Tribunal to give evidence. The solution lies in recognizing the valuable time of Doctors and accommodating them. Firstly, efforts should be made to record the evidence of the treating Doctors on commission, after ascertaining their convenient timings. Secondly, if the Doctors attend the Tribunal for giving evidence, their evidence may be recorded without delay, ensuring that they are not required to wait. Thirdly, the Doctors may be given specific time for attending the Tribunal for giving evidence instead of requiring them to come at 10.30 A.M. or 11.00 A.M. and wait in the Court Hall. Fourthly, in cases where the certificates are not contested by the respondents, they may be marked by consent, thereby dispensing with the oral evidence. These small measures as also any other suitable steps taken to ensure the availability of expert evidence, will ensure assessment of just compensation and will go a long way in demonstrating that Courts/Tribunals show concern for litigants and witnesses. Assessment of compensation.
17. In this case, the Tribunal acted on the disability certificate, but the High Court had reservations about its acceptability as it found that the injured had been treated in the Government Hospital in Delhi whereas the disability certificate was issued by a District Hospital in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The reason given by the High Court for rejection may not be sound for two reasons. Firstly though the accident occurred in Delhi and the injured claimant was treated in a Delhi Hospital after the accident, as he hailed from Chirori Mandi in the neighbouring District of Ghaziabad in Uttar Pradesh, situated on the outskirts of Delhi, he might have continued the treatment in the place where he resided. Secondly the certificate has been issued by the Chief Medical Officer, Ghaziabad, on the assessment made by the Medical Board which also consisted of an Orthopaedic Surgeon. We are therefore of the view that the High Court ought not to have rejected the said disability certificate."
10. In the light of the principles of law, set out in the above judgment and on the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that the Tribunal has not committed any grave irregularity in applying multiplier method. Perusal of the award shows that Rs.20,000/- alone has been awarded under the head pain and sufferings. Rs.10,000/- has been awarded under the head transportation. Rs.10,000/- for Nutrition. On the basis of Ex.P8, medical chit, the claims tribunal has awarded Rs.2,960/-. Altogether, the claims tribunal has awarded Rs.3,66,960/-. Considering the nature of injuries, extent of disablement, age of the claimant, the claims tribunal ought to have considered that the respondent/claimant has lost his amenities, marriage prospects, for which, adequate compensation should have been made. There is a long spell of hospitalisation. The respondent/claimant would have undergone severe pain and sufferings at the time of accident, when three surgeries were performed and for more than seven months form 10.10.2006 to 25.04.2007 and even thereafter. Sum of Rs.20,000/- awarded under the head pain and sufferings is grossly inadequate. When a 27 year old man sustained pubic rami fracture, with three surgeries performed, necessarily, he would have required an assistant. No compensation has been awarded under the head attendant charges. No compensation has been awarded under the head, loss of earning during period of treatment.
11. The quantum of compensation awarded to the respondents/claimants has to reflect the principles of just compensation which has been explained by the Apex Court in the following decisions.
(i) In R.D.Hattangadi v. M/s.Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd., reported in AIR 1995 SC 755, wherein, the Apex Court held as follows:
"In its very nature whenever a Tribunal or a Court is required to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guess work, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of disability caused. But all the aforesaid elements have to be viewed with objective standards."
(ii) In yet another decision in Divisonal Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty and another reported in (2003) 7 SCC 197, in Paragraph 12, the Supreme Court has held that, "Broadly speaking, in the case of death the basis of compensation is loss of pecuniary benefits to the dependents of the deceased which includes pecuniary benefits to the dependents of the deceased which includes pecuniary loss, expenses etc. and loss to the estate. The object is to mitigate hardship that has been caused to the legal representatives due to the sudden demise of the deceased in the accident. Compensation awarded should not be inadequate and should neither be unreasonable, excessive, nor deficient. There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of human life and the measure of damage cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation; but amount recoverable depends on broad facts and circumstances of each case. It should neither be punitive against whom claim is decreed nor should it be a source of profit for the person in whose favour it is awarded."
In Paragraph 15 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has held that, "Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of "just" compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression "which appears to it to be just", a wide discretion is vested in the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness, and non-arbitrariness. If it is not so, it cannot be just."
(iii) In Nizam Institute of Medical Sciences v. Prasanth S.Dhananka reported in (2009) 6 SCC 1 = 2010 ACJ 38 (SC), the three-Judge Bench was dealing with a case arising out of the complaint filed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. While enhancing the compensation awarded by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission from Rs.15 lakhs to Rs.1 crore, the Bench made the following observations which can appropriately be applied for deciding the petitions filed under Section 166 of the Act:
We must emphasise that the court has to strike a balance between the inflated and unreasonable demands of a victim and the equally untenable claim of the opposite party saying that nothing is payable. Sympathy for the victim does not, and should not, come in the way of making a correct assessment, but if a case is made out, the court must not be chary of awarding adequate compensation. The adequate compensation that we speak of, must to some extent, be a rule of thumb measure, and as a balance has to be struck, it would be difficult to satisfy all the parties concerned. ...At the same time we often find that a person injured in an accident leaves his family in greater distress vis-`-vis a family in a case of death. In the latter case, the initial shock gives way to a feeling of resignation and acceptance, and in time, compels the family to move on. The case of an injured and disabled person is, however, more pitiable and the feeling of hurt, helplessness, despair and often destitution enures every day. The support that is needed by a severely handicapped person comes at an enormous price, physical, financial and emotional, not only on the victim but even more so on his family and attendants and the stress saps their energy and destroys their equanimity. (emphasis supplied)
(iv) In Reshma Kumari and others v. Madan Mohan reported in (2009) 13 SCC 422, the Apex Court reiterated that the compensation awarded under the Act should be just and also identified the factors which should be kept in mind while determining the amount of compensation. The relevant portions of the judgment are extracted below:
The compensation which is required to be determined must be just. While the claimants are required to be compensated for the loss of their dependency, the same should not be considered to be a windfall. Unjust enrichment should be discouraged. This Court cannot also lose sight of the fact that in given cases, as for example death of the only son to a mother, she can never be compensated in monetary terms.
The question as to the methodology required to be applied for determination of compensation as regards prospective loss of future earnings, however, as far as possible should be based on certain principles. A person may have a bright future prospect; he might have become eligible to promotion immediately; there might have been chances of an immediate pay revision, whereas in another (sic situation) the nature of employment was such that he might not have continued in service; his chance of promotion, having regard to the nature of employment may be distant or remote. It is, therefore, difficult for any court to lay down rigid tests which should be applied in all situations. There are divergent views. In some cases it has been suggested that some sort of hypotheses or guess work may be inevitable. That may be so.
In the Indian context several other factors should be taken into consideration including education of the dependants and the nature of job. In the wake of changed societal conditions and global scenario, future prospects may have to be taken into consideration not only having regard to the status of the employee, his educational qualification; his past performance but also other relevant factors, namely, the higher salaries and perks which are being offered by the private companies these days. In fact while determining the multiplicand this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jashuben, 2008 ACJ 1097 (SC), held that even dearness allowance and perks with regard thereto from which the family would have derived monthly benefit, must be taken into consideration.
One of the incidental issues which has also to be taken into consideration is inflation. Is the practice of taking inflation into consideration wholly incorrect? Unfortunately, unlike other developed countries in India there has been no scientific study. It is expected that with the rising inflation the rate of interest would go up. In India it does not happen. It, therefore, may be a relevant factor which may be taken into consideration for determining the actual ground reality. No hard-and-fast rule, however, can be laid down therefor. (emphasis supplied).
12. Considering the failure on the part of the claims tribunal, in not awarding just compensation under various head, as explained in the foregoing paragraphs, this Court in exercise of the powers, under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC, is inclined to suo motu enhance the quantum of compensation and while doing so, take the support of the following judgments:
(i) In National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. M.Jayagandhi reported in 2008 (1) TNMAC 177, on the question as whether in the absence of any Cross Objection, the High Court could suo moto enhance the compensation, by exercising power under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC., this Court, at Paragraphs 37 and 38, held as follows:
37. The question arising for consideration is whether in the absence of any Cross Objection, the Appellate Court could suo motu enhance the compensation. The Appellate Court exercising power under Order 41, Rule 33, CPC could enhance the quantum of compensation even without Cross-Objection. The Courts and Tribunals have a duty to weigh various factors and quantify the amount of compensation which should be just. Reference could be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sheikhupura Trans. Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporter's Ins. Co. Ltd. , 1971 ACJ 206 (SC), wherein it is held that pecuniary loss to the aggrieved party would depend upon data which cannot be ascertained accurately, but must necessarily be an estimate or even partly a conjecture. The general principle is that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing, on the one hand, the loss to the Claimants of future pecuniary benefits and on the other any pecuniary advantage which from what-ever sources come to them by reason of the death, i.e. the balance of loss and gain to a dependent by the death must be ascertained. The determination of the question of compensation depends on several imponderables. In the assessment of those imponderables, there is likely to be a margin of error. Broadly speaking, in the case of death, the basis of compensation is loss of pecuniary bene-fits to the dependents of the deceased which includes pecuniary loss, expenses, etc. and loss to estate. Object is to mitigate hardship that has been caused to the legal representatives due to sudden demise of the deceased in the accident. Compensation awarded should not be inadequate and should neither be un-reasonable, excessive nor deficient.
38. Of course, the Claimants who are widow, minor daughter and mother have not filed any Cross-Objection. Even without a Cross-Objection, questioning the quantum, the Court could suo motu enhance compensation under Or. 41, R. 33, CPC. In this context, reference could be made to 1999 ACJ 977 [Karnataka] wherein it has been held as follows:
(6) I am in general agreement with the basic proposition of law that has been canvassed by the appellant's learned advocate when he points out that it is a well settled principle that a party who suffers an order or a decree and does not Appeal against it or assail it would normally not be permitted at the hearing of the Appeal to try and take advantage of the situation by asking for enhancement. The issue is not that but really as to whether this situation prescribes an absolute and total bar to the Court granting a relief if in the interest of justice such a relief is an absolute must. One has to view the situation from a rather practical point of view the first of them being with regard to the very poor quality of legal assistance that is usually available in and around the M.A.C.T. and thereafter, the second aspect of the matter being that the status of the parties and their general condition themselves may be such that they are unable to agitate the matter further and the third aspect of the matter which is relevant having regard to the present case, is the possibility of certain further tragic occurrences such as deaths that may have intervened, all of which may contribute to a situation wherein the Court finds that no Appeal or Cross-Objections have been filed. The essence of doing justice requires that compensation when awarded has got to be reasonable and fair and it has also got to be adequate having regard to the totality of the circumstances. The hearing of the Appeal involves a total review of the case and the Appeal is virtually an extension of the proceedings before the lower Court. The law is well settled with regard to one interesting aspect of the matter, namely, that the Courts do come across a few instances where instead of over-pitching the case before the Trial Court, a very modest amount is claimed and the Tribunals in these circumstances have been wrongly limiting the relief to the amount that has been claimed on the ground that even though the party is entitled to something higher, what was asked for is a lower figure. This Court had occasion to correct these orders and to lay down that the Tribunal is required to pass an order quantifying the compensation correctly irrespective of what has been claimed on the basis of the principle that it is not the amount that is claimed in that matter, insofar as if the Court has to the power to award a lesser amount, that it is equally equipped with the power to award a higher amount. It is that principle which applies with equal force to the Appeal Court and though I do not dispute that a Court would normally not permit a party to ask for enhancement unless an Appeal or Cross-Objections have been filed but there could be a very small category of cases in which the Court would make an exception, the reason being that the essence of doing justice requires that a Court will not refuse a relief only because of a technical or a procedural bar. I need to amplify here that if the technicalities are upheld, the result would be doing injustice insofar as the party will be left with a compensation lesser than what a fair evaluation entitles the party to. Again, I do not on the basis of the law as enunciated by the Courts in the decisions set out by me above, subscribe to the view that there exists any bar in the way of this Court exercising such powers. The powers do exist under Order 41, Rule 33, Civil Procedure Code and more importantly, such powers can certainly be exercised under section 151, Civil Procedure Code in the interest of justice. Applying the above decision, in Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation v. Vasantha and Ors. , 2006 (3) ACJ 1917: 2006 (1) TN MAC 336 Justice Arumuga perumal Adithyan has enhanced compensation, exercising power under Or. 41, R. 33, CPC and Section 151, CPC.
(ii) In Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation v. Saroja and Ors., reported in 2008 (1) TNMAC 352, this Court has considered the question as to whether compensation can be enhanced suo-moto in exercise of power under Order 41 Rule 33 and the point is answered as follows:
6. On point:
The learned counsel for the respondents/claimants placing reliance on Order XLI, Rule 33 of C.P.C. and the various decisions emerged thereunder would pray that the compensation might be enhanced even though no cross-objection has been filed by the claimants, whereas the learned counsel for the appellant - Transport Corporation would cite the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. R. Swaminathan & Ors. , 2006 (2) ACC 701 (SC), and develop his arguments to the effect that unless there is a cross objection, the question of enhancing the compensation would not arise. Hence, it is just and necessary to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. R. Swaminathan & Ors. , 2006 (2)ACC 701 (SC). An excerpt from it would run thus:
Apparently the first respondent claimant was satisfied with the Tribunal's Award as he did not file any Appeal there against to the High Court. Nonetheless, being aggrieved by the Single Judge's judgment, the claimant filed a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. This Appeal was allowed and by the impugned judgment the High Court has awarded total compensation amounting to Rs.7,44,000/- under different heads with a direction for payment of inte-rest at 18% from the date of Petition. The appellant-Insurance Company is aggrieved thereby and is in Appeal before us.
The issue that arises in this case is, whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in in-creasing the compensation amount beyond the amount awarded by the Tribunal despite the fact that the Award of the Tribunal was not at all challenged by the claimant. The only reason given by the Division Bench of the High Court for doing so is:
In this connection, we may observe that we are aware of the fact that we are enhancing the compensation even though the injured has not claimed it. But, the question is covered by catena of decisions justifying enhancement of compensation even if cases where the injured has not preferred an Appeal, provided the circumstances of the case wa-rrants the same. To say the least, this was a very facial way of interfering with the award when no interference was called for. We called upon the learned Counsel on both sides to show us at least one case (out of the catena of judgments referred to in the impugned judgment) in support of this proposition. Learned counsel frankly confessed that there was none. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the appellant drew our attention the judgment of this Court in Banarsi v. Ram Phal , 2003 (2) SLT 258: 2003 (9) SCC 606, which supports the proposition that in an Appeal filed by the defendant laying challenge to the grant a smaller relief, the plaintiff as a respondent cannot seek a higher relief if he had not filed an Appeal on his own or had not taken any cross-objection. In the present Appeal it would appear that the claimant neither Appealed against the award of compensation passed by the Tribunal, nor filed any cross-objection in the First Appeal filed by the Insurance Company. Thus, we are satisfied that the Division Bench of the High Court wholly erred in increasing the compensation amount beyond the amount awarded by the Tribunal in the Appeal filed by the Insurance Company.
7. A mere perusal of the excerpt from the said decision would clearly indicate that the Hon'ble Apex Court in that decision has not laid down as a universal rule of interpretation of Order 41, Rule 33 of C.P.C. Taking into consideration, the method and manner in which the Division Bench of this Court in the Letters Patent Appeal, without citing adequate reasons and precedents, enhanced the compensation amount to an extent of Rs. 7,44,000/- with 18% interest from that of Rs. 3,00,000/- awarded by the Single Bench of the same Court, the Hon'ble Apex Court found fault with it.
8. Furthermore, the above excerpt also would reveal that without even relying upon any precedent, the Division Bench of this Court, simply enhanced the compensation and that too to the extent of double that of what the Single Judge of this Court ordered. It is also clear that when the Hon'ble Apex Court wanted a precedent in that regard, the learned counsel for the appellant therein cited only the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Banarsi v. Ram Phal , 2003 (2) SLT 258: 2003 (9) SCC 606. As such, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, the Hon'ble Apex Court felt that the power under order 41, Rule 33 of C.P.C. invoked by the High Court and that too in a case where such an enhancement was not at all warranted, looked askance at it. It is therefore explicite that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cited decision has not laid down the law that even in a fit case, the High Court should not invoke Order 41, Rule 33 of C.P.C. in the absence of filing cross Appeal. Furthermore under Order 41, Rule 33, there are earlier decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, which could be cited as under:
(i) Municipal Board, Mount Abu v. Hari Lal , 1988 ACJ 281.
(ii) Dangir v. Madan Mohna , AIR 1988 SC. 54.
(iii) M.D. Pallavan Transport Corporation Ltd., v. Kalavathi , 1998 (1) ACJ 151.
(iv) State of Punjab v. Bakshish Singh , 1998 (8) S.C.C. 222.
9. The perusal of the aforesaid Judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court would clearly highlight that without filing cross Appeal, the respondents in the Appeal could pray for reliefs and that the High Court under Order 41, Rule 33 could grant such reliefs also. This Court in several cases adhering to the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court held that under Order 41, Rule 33 of C.P.C., this Court could enhance the compensation in appropriate cases. An excerpt from the decision of this Court in Managing Director, Thanthai Periyar Transport Corp., Villupuram v. Sundari Ammal and four Others reported in 1999 (2) CTC 560 would run thus:
Unfortunately, in the instant case, there is no cross-objection. Therefore, it would be essential, in this context, to consider whether this Court has got powers to enhance the amount of compensation, in the event of coming to the conclusion that the award was on the lower side, even though there is no cross-objection by the claimants.
In Dangir v. Madan Mohan , AIR 1988 S.C. 54 and M.D., Pallavan Transport Corporation Ltd., v. Kalavathi , 1998 (1) A.C.J 151, it is held that this Court has got power to enhance the compensation, even though the claimants had not filed any cross-objection against the award seeking for higher compensation, if this Court finds that the amount awarded by the Tribunal is not just and adequate.
As pointed out by the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Bakshish Singh , 1998 (8) S.C.C. 222, the reading of the provision would make it clear that the Appellate Court has got wide power to do complete justice between the parties and which enables this Court to pass such decree or order as ought to have been passed or as the nature of the case may require notwithstanding that the party in whose favour the power is sought to be exercised has not filed any Appeal or cross-objection.
The Apex Court in Dhangir v. Madan Mohan, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 54, be referring Order 41, Rule 33, would make the following observation:
The Appellate Court could exercise the power under Rule 33 even if the Appeal is only against a part of the decree of the lower Court. The Appellate Court could exercise that power in favour of all or any of the respondents although such respondent may not have filed any Appeal or objection. The sweep of the power under Rule 33 is wide enough to determine any question not only between the appellant and respondent, but also between respondent and co-respondents. The Appellate Court could pass any decree or order which ought to have been passed in the circumstances of the case. The words ?as the case may be require? used in Rule 33, Order 41 have been put in wide terms to enable the Appellate Court to pass any order or decree to meet the ends of Justice. What then should be the constraint? We do not find many, we are giving any liberal interpretation. The rule itself is liberal enough. the only constraints that we could see may be these: That the parties before the lower Court should be there before the Appellate Court. The question raised must properly arise out of judgment of the lower Court. If these two requirements are there, the Appellate Court could consider any objection against any part of the judgment or decree of the lower Court. It is true that the power of the Appellate Court under S. 33 is discretionary. But, it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between the parties. The Court should not refuse to exercise th at discretion on mere technicalities.
10. And then the Division Bench of this Court in the decision in The Managing Director, Annai Sathya Transport Corporation Ltd., Dharmapuri v. Janardhanam and 7 others , 2000 (2) CTC 272 placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court held a similar view that without cross Appeal Order 41, Rule 33 of C.P.C. could be invoked in appropriate cases. An excerpt from it would run thus:
At this stage, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/claimants would submit that the Tribunal has awarded interest only from the date of the Judgment and not from the date of the petition. The learned counsel for the respondents/claimants would submit that even though no Appeal has been filed by the respondents/claimants or no cross-objections have been filed by them, this Court has discretionary power by virtue of Order 41, Rule 33 of Code of Civil Procedure and also in view of the rulings of the Supreme Court in Dhangir v. Madan Mohan , AIR 1988 SC 54 to grant the proper relief. Of course, the Apex Court has pointed out in clear and categorical terms and the power conferred under Order 41, Rule 33 on the Appellate Court is discre-tionary, and then it must be used in proper case using the judicial discretion to render justice. The Apex Court in United India Insurance Co., Ltd., v. Narendra Pandu-rang Kadam and others , 1995 (1) SCC 320 has clearly laid down that the rate of interest must be awarded from the date of the petition and not from the date of the Judgment.
11. Over and above that the decision of the Hon'ble Three Judges? Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh and others , 2003 ACJ 12: 2004 (2) TN MAC 398 (SC), could be cited here. An excerpt from it would run thus:
Firstly, under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ?the M.V. Act?), there is no restriction that compensation could be awarded only up to the amount claimed by the claimant. In an appropriate case where from the evidence brought on record if Tribunal/Court considers that claimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award. Only embargo is - it should be 'just' compensation, that is to say, it should be neither arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the evidence. This would be clear by reference to the relevant provisions of the M.V. Act. Section 166 provides that an application for compensation arising out of an accident involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both, could be made (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be. Under the proviso to subsection (1), all the legal representatives of the deceased who have not joined as the claimants are to be impleaded as respondents to the application for compensation. Other important part of the said Section is subsection (4) which provides that ?the Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under subsection (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act?. Hence, Claims Tribunal in appropriate case can treat the report forwarded to it as an application for compensation even though no such claim is made or no specified amount is claimed.
(iii) In Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation v. Pothumponnu [CMA(MD)No.714 of 2009, dated 05.08.2009], this Court, held as follows:
17. Notice can be issued to the opposite parties/respondents only in case where their rights are going to be affected be way of variation/reduction. In this case, the claimants are going to be benefited. Hence, no notice is necessary in the appeal. When the Tribunal commits a mistake that too a material mistake, this Court cannot close its eyes and decide the matter mechanically. When the mistake is noticed by this Court, this Court has got power to do away with it, even while dismissing the appeal at the admission stage itself. The presence of the respondent is not a must. When there is a case for admission, the matter can be admitted and notice can be ordered. When there is no case made out for admission, the appeal deserved to be dismissed. While dismissing, the material irregularity committed by the Tribunal can be set right by awarding suitable amounts to the respondents without notice to them. The presence of the claimants or absence does not make any difference. Even if they are present and they do not bring it to the notice of this Court about the irregularity, this Court can always remedy the same suo motu under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act and invoking Articles 227 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, Sections 163 and 166 are beneficial provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act aimed at consoling and compensating the victims of the accident. This Court's approach should be humane in nature not whittled down by technicalities. The powers of the Court are wide enough to do complete justice. Therefore, for pain and suffering undergone by the respondent, this Court is inclined to award Rs.1,00,000/-. For loss of marriage prospects and amenities, this Court is inclined to award a further compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-. For attendant charges Rs.20,000/- is awarded. For loss of earning during the period of treatment and convalescence, this Court is inclined to award Rs.30,000/- (Rs.3,000/- per month). This Hon'ble Court in Nesamony Transport Corporation Ltd., v. Chenthilathiappan & another [2000 (I) ACC 332], has held that if there is sufficient evidence to prove that the injured was taking treatment in the hospital, medical evidence need not be rejected. Considering the nature of injuries, there is possibility of the respondent/claimant incurring future medical expenses. Hence, Rs.5,000/- is awarded under the head future medical expenses also. Rs.500/- is awarded under the head damages to clothes. Altogether, the award is enhanced to Rs.6,02,460/-, with interest, at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of claim till the date of deposit, excluding interest on Rs.5,000/- awarded under the head future medical expenses.
13. Though, the claims tribunal has awarded inadequate compensation ignoring the factors to be taken into consideration, while determining just and reasonable compensation, it is unfortunate that the Managing Director of the Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation limited, Kumbakonam has chosen to question the quantum of compensation as grossly excessive and sought for reduction. A 27 year old man, who has suffered a pubic rami fracture with complications arising therefrom to the urinary track, and other parts of the body, may have to live and suffer with the extent of disablement assessed by the doctor. Time is the only healing remedy. Therefore, for the reasons stated supra, while enhancing the compensation, suo motu in exercise of the powers conferred under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC, having regard to the act of the Managing Director, Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation, Kumbakonam, this Court deems it fit to award cost of Rs.10,000/- to be paid to the claimant, along with the quantum of compensation of Rs.6,02,460/-, now determined by this Court with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of claim, till the date of realisation. Award towards future medical expenses, shall not carry any interest.
14. In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed with costs. The award of Rs.3,66,690/- is enhanced to Rs.6,02,460/-. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. The appellant State Transport Corporation, is directed to deposit the enhanced award amount, with proportionate accrued interest and costs now ordered, excluding interest on the award towards future medical expenses, less the statutory deposit, to the credit of M.C.O.P.No.140 of 2009 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Additional Subordinate Judge), Mayiladuthurai, within a period of six weeks from S.MANIKUMAR, J., ars the date of receipt of a copy of this order. On such deposit, the respondent/claimant is permitted to withdraw the entire amount with proportionate accrued interest and costs, by making necessary application.
24.06.2014 Index: Yes Internet: Yes ars To
1. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, (Additional Subordinate Judge), Mayiladuthurai.
2. The Section Officer, VR Section, High Court, Madras.C.M.A.No. 1762 of 2014 and M.P.No.1 of 2014 CMA SR No.47085 of 2013