Allahabad High Court
Sanjay Gupta@ Sanju Mohan vs State Of Up Another on 28 June, 2024
Author: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
Bench: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:105492 AFR Reserved on 26.06.2024 Delivered on 28.06.2024 Court No. - 66 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 19550 of 2024 Applicant :- Sanjay Gupta @ Sanju Mohan Opposite Party :- State Of Up Another Counsel for Applicant :- Kamal Singh Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Kartikeya Shukla Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.
1. Applicant is aggrieved by summoning order dated 28.08.2023 passed under Section 204 Cr.P.C. by Additional Sessions Judge/ Special Judge (Dacoity Affected Area), Jalaun at Orai in Complaint Case No. 58 of 2022 (M/s Balaji Traders Proprietor Manoj Kumar Agarwal vs. Sanjay Gupta @ Sanju Mohan), whereby applicant has been summoned to face trial for offence under Section 387 IPC.
2. It has been pointed out that both parties are in litigation on the issue of trade mark and copyright with regard to packaging of Supari which is pending before appropriate Court. It is the case of applicant that Complainant has initiated present proceedings only to put pressure on him to compromise in the case.
3. It is the case of Complainant that alleged occurrence took place on 22.05.2022 when accused side have threatened him and tried to kidnap him by pointing a gun in order to procure Rs. 5 lacs to permit him to run the business of Gutkha (Sudh Supari Dana) and when Police Authorities failed to lodge FIR, an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed. It is further case of Complainant that under the orders of Court it was treated as complaint case and statements under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. were recorded and applicant was summoned by impugned order to face trial under Section 387 IPC.
4. Sri Kamal Singh, learned counsel for applicant, submitted that even considering above referred contents of complaint and statements, no offence is made out against applicant as it is not the case of Complainant that he has given any money to applicant. It has also been urged that absolutely a false case was lodged only in order to put pressure on applicant. Learned counsel referred the judgments passed by Supreme Court in R.S. Nayak vs. A.R. Antulay, 1986 Vol. LXXXVIII Page 260; Mrs. Dhanalakshmi vs. R. Prasanna Kumar and others, Manu/SC/0159/1989; Medchi Chemicals & Pharma P. Ltd. vs. Biological E. Ltd. and others, (2000)3 SCC 269; and State of Haryana and others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 to contend that it is a fit case to exercise inherent power envisaged under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
5. Per contra, Sri Kartikeya Shukla, learned counsel appearing for Opposite Party No. 2, i.e., Complainant, urged that impugned order assigned reasons as required under Section 204 Cr.P.C. that there are sufficient ground to proceed against applicant. He also referred the statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. as well as impugned summoning order.
6. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the material available on record.
7. Before adverting to rival submissions it would be relevant to refer few paragraph of a recent judgement passed by Supreme Court in A.M. Mohan Vs. State Represented by SHO and another, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 339:-
"9. The law with regard to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. to quash complaints and criminal proceedings has been succinctly summarized by this Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited1 after considering the earlier precedents. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations of this Court in the said case, which read thus:
"12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few--Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234], State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045], State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 615], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786], M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out : (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not."
8. In aforesaid factual and legal background the Court has to consider, whether on basis of material available ingredients of Section 387 IPC are made out as well as what is the effect of rival litigation on the issue of Trademark and Copyright. For reference definition of 'extortion' as given in Section 383 IPC and Section 387 IPC are reproduced hereinafter:
"383. Extortion-Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits "extortion"."
"387. Putting person in fear of death or of grievous hurt, in order to commit extortion.-Whoever in order to the committing of extortion, puts or attempts to put any person in fear of death or of grievous hurt to that person or to any other, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
9. In order to further appreciate the rival submissions it would be apt to reproduce the relevant part of complaint, statement of Complainant recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C., statements of witnesses recorded under Sections 202 Cr.P.C. and impugned order, as under:
Relevant part of Complaint:
"4. यह कि घटना दिनांक 22.05.2022 समय करीब 3 बजे दिन की है, प्रार्थी बाजार से अपने घर स्कूटी से आ रहा था, कि जैसे ही राठ रोड उरई से सत्कार मैरिज हाउस वाले रास्ते पर अपने घर के लिये चला तभी एक स्कार्पियों कार आकर रूकी, और प्रार्थी की स्कूटी के आगे लगा दी, उसमें से उक्त संजय गुप्ता एवं 3 अज्ञात व्यक्ति जो अपने-अपने हाथों में राइफल लिये थे, जिन्हे सामने आने पर प्रार्थी पहिचान सकता है, गाड़ी से उतरे और उक्त संजय गुप्ता प्रार्थी से बोला कि अपना सुपारीदाना गुटखा बन्द कर दो, और हमने जो तुम्हारे सुपारीदाना के नाम से निकाला है, उसे बाजार में चलने दो और उसमें से मुनाफे का कुछ हिस्सा तुमको दे देगें, तो प्रार्थी ने मना कर दिया तो उपरोक्त लोग आग बबूला होकर के सीने पर राइफले लगाकर कहा कि यदि अपना गुटखा चलाओगे तो प्रतिमाह5 लाख रूपया देना पड़ेगा, प्रार्थी द्वारा इन्कार करने पर उपरोक्त लोग प्रार्थी को मारपीट कर जबरन अपहरण करने के उद्देश्य से गाड़ी में डालने लगे प्रार्थी द्वारा चिल्लाने पर रास्ते से निकल रहे राजा सिंह पुत्र रणवीर सिंह निवासी नया रामनगर उरई एवं राममनोहन पुत्र रामदयाल निवासी गांधी नगर उरई, जिला जालौन तथा मुहल्ले के कई लोग आ गये तो उपरोक्त सभी लोग प्रार्थी को गुटखा (शुद्ध सुपारी दाना) बाजार में बेचने पर व 5 लाख रूपया प्रतिमाह ना देने पर जान से मारने की धमकी देते हुये स्कार्पियों में बैठकर भाग गये।"
Relevant part of statement of Complainant:
"दिनांक 22.05.2022 को समय करीब 3.00 बजे दिन में मेै बाजार से स्कूटी से घर आ रहा था राठ रोड सत्कार मैरिज हाउस के एक स्कार्पियो कार आकर उसकी स्कूटी के सामने रूकी और उस गाडी से सजय गुप्ता एवं तीन अज्ञात व्यक्ति अपने-अपने हाथों में राइफल लिये उतरे और संजय गुप्ता मुझे बोला कि अपना सुपारीदाना गुटखा बंद कर दो और जो हमने तुम्हारे सुपारी दाना के नाम से निकाला है उसे बाजार में चलने दो, हम लोग कुछ मुनाफा तुम्हें दे देगे। मेरे मना करने पर वह नाराज होकर मेरे सीने में राइफल लगा दिया और कहा कि यदि अपना गुटखा चलाओगे तो हमें 05 लाख रूपया देना पड़ेगा, मेरे मना करने पर मुझे मारपीट करके जबरन गाडी में डालने लगे। मेरे चिल्लाने पर राहगीर राजा सिंह पुत्र राणादीर सिंह एवं राममनोहर पुत्र रामदयाल तथा मुहल्ले के कई लोग आ गये। वह लोग मुझे गुटखा बाजार में बेचने पर व 5 लाख रूपया प्रतिमाह न देने पर जान से मारने को धमकी देते हुये गाडी में बैठकर भाग गये। मै कोतवाली उरई रिपार्ट करने गया व पुलिस अधीक्षक जालौन स्थान उरई को प्रार्थनापत्र पंजीकृत डाक से प्रेषित किया।"
Relevant part of statement of PW-1:
"घटना दिनांक 22 मई सन् 2022 की समय करीब 3.00 बजे दिन की है मैसर्स बालाजी ट्रेडर्स के मालिक मनोज अग्रवाल अपनी स्कूटी से बाजार से चलकर कटिका वाले रास्ते से अपने घऱ जा रहे थे तभी स्कूटी के आगे एक स्कार्पियों कार रूकी कार के अंदर से संजय गुप्ता व तीन अज्ञात कत्रिम जो अपने हाथ में बंदूक लिए थे उतरे। संजय गुप्ता ने मनोज अग्रवाल से कहा कि मैंने तुम्हारे नाम से जो सुपारी दाना निकाला है उसे चलने दो और अपना जो चला रहे हैं उसे बंद कर दो मैं जो चल रहा हूँ मुनाफे में से कुछ हिस्सा देता रहूंगा मनोज अग्रवाल ने ऐसा करने से मना कर दिया तो वह गुस्से में आकर बंदूक तान दी और बोले कि अगर अपना गुटखा चलाना हो तो मुझे रू० 500,000 रूपये हर महीने दो और मारपीट करने लगे और खींचकर गाड़ी में डालने लगे वहाँ चिल्लाने की आवाज सुनकर 10-20 आदमियों की भीड़ इकट्ठा हो गई फिर मुल्जिमान यह धमकी देते हुए कि अगर रू० 500,000 रूपए हर महीना नहीं दिया तो जान से मार देंगे और उसी गाड़ी में बैठकर चले गए।"
Relevant part of statement of PW-2:
"घटना दिनांक 22/05/2022 की है समय करीब 3.00 बजे दिन की घटना है मैसर्स बालाजी ट्रेडर्स के मालिक मनोज अग्रवाल अपनी स्कूटी से अपने घर जा रहे थे वह सरकर कटिका वाले रास्ते से जा रहे थे तभी स्कूटी के आगे स्कार्पियों कार रूकी कार के अंदर से संजय गुप्ता व तीन अज्ञात कत्रिम उतरे जो अपने हाथ में बंदूक लिए थे संजय गुप्ता ने मनोज अग्रवाल से कहा कि मैंने तुम्हारे नाम से जो सुपारी दाना गुटका निकाला है उसे चलने दो और जो अपना गुटखा चला रहे हो उसे बंद कर दो मैं अपने गुटके की आमदनी में से कुछ हिस्सा देता रहूंगा मनोज गुप्ता ने ऐसा करने से मना किया तो उन्होने गुस्से में आकर बंदूक के तान दी और बोले अगर अपना गुटखा चलाना हो तो मुझे 5 लाख रूपया हर महीने का दो और मारपीट करने लगे खींचकर गाड़ी में डालने लगे चिल्लाने की आवाज सुनकर वहां पर 10-20 लोग इकट्ठे हो गए और फिर मुल्जिमान धमकी देते हुए कि अगर रू० 500,000 हर महीना नहीं दिया तो जानसे मार देंगे और गाड़ी में बैठकर चले गए।"
Relevant part of impugned order:
"उपरोक्त सुस्थापित विधि के आलोक में हस्तगत प्रकरण के तथ्यों व परिस्थितियों की समीक्षा से स्पष्ट है कि परिवादी को गुटका (शुद्ध सुपारी दाना) बाजार में बेंचने पर एवं 5,00,000/- रूपये प्रतिमाह न देने पर जान से मारने की धमकी देने तथा कथन किया है। परिवादी की ओर से परीक्षित साक्षी पी०डब्लू०1 राममनोहर व पी०डब्लू० 2 राजा सिंह ने परिवादी के कथनों का समर्थन किया है।
इस स्तर पर परिवाद कथानक व समर्थन में व इस स्तर पर उपलब्ध साक्ष्य के आधार पर न्यायालय के मत में विपक्षी संजय गुप्ता उर्फ संजू गोहन के विरूद्ध प्रथम दृष्टया धारा 387 भा०दं०सं० का अपराध गठित होना पाया जाता है। उपरोक्तानुसार विपक्षी संजय गुप्ता उर्फ संजू गोहन को धारा 387 भा०दं०सं के अपराध में विचारण हेतु आहूत किये जाने का पर्याप्त आधार है। "
(Emphasis supplied)
10. In order to appreciate, whether contents of Section 387 IPC are made out or not, it would be appropriate to reproduce relevant part of judgments passed by Supreme Court in Dhananjay @ Dhandnjay Kumar Singh Vs. State of Bihar and others, (2007)14 SCC 768 and Salib @ Shalu @ Salim vs. State of U.P. and others, 2023 INSC 687:
Dhananjay @ Dhandnjay Kumar Singh (Supra) "5.Section 384 provides for punishment for extortion. What would be an extortion is provided under Section 383 of the Penal Code in the following terms:
"383.Extortion.--Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits ''extortion'."
6.A bare perusal of the aforementioned provision would demonstrate that the following ingredients would constitute the offence:
1. The accused must put any person in fear of injury to that person or any other person.
2. The putting of a person in such fear must be intentional.
3. The accused must thereby induce the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security.
4. Such inducement must be done dishonestly.
7. A First Information Report as is well known, must be read in its entirety. It is not in dispute that the parties entered into transactions relating to supply of bags. The fact that some amount was due to the appellant from the First Informant, is not in dispute. The First Information Report itself disclosed that accounts were settled a year prior to the date of incident and the appellant owed a sum of about Rs.400-500 from (sic) Gautam Dubey (sic).
8. According to the said Gautam Dubey, however, a sum of Rs.1500/- only was due to him.
9. It is in the aforementioned premise the allegations that Gautam Dubey and the appellant slapped the first informant and took out Rs.1580/- from his upper pocket must be viewed.
10. No allegation was made that the money was paid by the informant having been put in fear of injury or putting him in such fear by the appellant was intentional.
11. The first informant, admittedly, has also not delivered any property or valuable security to the appellant.
12. A distinction between theft and extortion is well known. Whereas offence of extortion is carried out by overpowering the will of the owner; in commission of an offence of theft the offender's intention is always to take without that person's consent.
13. We, therefore, are of the opinion that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, no case under Section 384 of the Penal Code was made out in the first information report."
Salib @ Shalu @ Salim (supra) "21. "Extortion" has been defined in Section 383 of the IPC as follows:--
"Section 383. Extortion.--Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits 'extortion.
Illustrations
(a) A threatens to publish a defamatory libel concerning Z unless Z gives him money. He thus induces Z to give him money. A has committed extortion.
(b) A threatens Z that he will keep Z's child in wrongful confinement, unless Z will sign and deliver to A a promissory note binding Z to pay certain monies to A. Z sings and delivers the note. A has committed extortion.
(c) A threatens to send club-men to plough up Z's field unless Z will sign and deliver to B a bond binding Z under a penalty to deliver certain produce to B, and thereby induces Z to sign and deliver the bond. A has committed extortion.
(d) A, by putting Z in fear of grievous hurt, dishonestly induces Z to sign or affix his seal to a blank paper and deliver it to A. Z sings and delivers the paper to A. Here, as the paper so signed may be converted into a valuable security. A has committed extortion."
22. So from the aforesaid, it is clear that one of the necessary ingredients of the offence of extortion is that the victim must be induced to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, etc. That is to say, the delivery of the property must be with consent which has been obtained by putting the person in fear of any injury. In contrast to theft, in extortion there is an element of consent, of course, obtained by putting the victim in fear of injury. In extortion, the will of the victim has to be overpowered by putting him or her in fear of injury. Forcibly taking any property will not come under this definition. It has to be shown that the person was induced to part with the property by putting him in fear of injury. The illustrations to the Section given in the IPC make this perfectly clear.
23. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to the following observations made by a Division Bench of the High Court of Patna in Ramyad Singh v. Emperor Criminal Revision No. 125 of 1931 (Pat):-
"If the facts had been that the complainant's thumb had been forcibly seized by one of the petitioners and had been applied to the piece of paper notwithstanding his struggles and protests, then I would agree that there is good ground for saying that the offence committed whatever it may be, was not the offence of extortion because the complainant would not have been induced by the fear of injury but would have simply been the subject of actual physical compulsion."
It was held:-
"It is clear that this definition makes it necessary for the prosecution to prove that the victims Narain and Sheonandan were put in fear of injury to themselves or to others, and further, were thereby dishonestly induced to deliver papers containing their thumb impressions. The prosecution story in the present case goes no further than that thumb impressions were 'forcibly taken' from them. The details of the forcible taking were apparently not put in evidence. The trial Court speaks of the wrists of the victims being caught and of their thumb impressions being then 'taken' ....... The lower Courts only speak of the forcible taking of the victim's thumb impression; and as this does not necessarily involve inducing the victim to deliver papers with his thumb impressions (papers which could no doubt be converted into valuable securities), I must hold that the offence of extortion is not established."
24. Thus, it is relevant to note that nowhere the first informant has stated that out of fear, she paid Rs. 10 Lakh to the accused persons. To put it in other words, there is nothing to indicate that there was actual delivery of possession of property (money) by the person put in fear. In the absence of anything to even remotely suggest that the first informant parted with a particular amount after being put to fear of any injury, no offence under Section 386 of the IPC can be said to have been made out." (Emphasis supplied)
11. I have carefully perused the contents of complaint, statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. as well as impugned order. As referred in Dhananjay @ Dhandnjay Kumar Singh (supra) and Salib @ Shalu @ Salim (supra), in order to make out a case of extortion, one of the essential ingredient is to deliver any property or valuable security being under threat by Complainant to accused, whereas in the present case such ingredient is absolutely missing as it was not a case of Complainant that he actually handed over Rs. 5 lacs to accused.
12. The nature of allegation is that Complainant was put under threat of fear of death that he has to pay Rs. 5 lacs to run the business of Gutkha but admittedly no amount was paid. A reference be taken of statement of Complainant and other witnesses being part of present order that, "बंदूक तान दी और बोले कि अगर अपना गुटखा चलाना हो तो मुझे 5,00,000 रूपये हर महीने दो".
13. The words used in Section 387 IPC, i.e., "in order to the committing of extortion" is used for an act committed during act of extortion and for that act of extortion has to be concluded in terms of Section 383 IPC.
14. In aforesaid circumstances, since in the present case act of 'extortion' was not concluded as Rs. 5 lacs was not paid, therefore, offence under Section 383 IPC was not made out and consequently offence under Section 387 IPC was also not made out. [See, Dhananjay @ Dhandnjay Kumar Singh (supra) and Salib @ Shalu @ Salim (supra)]
15. The outcome of above discussion is that, ingredients of Section 387 IPC are not made out, therefore, in view of A.M. Mohan (supra), it is a fit case where in exercise of inherent power present criminal proceedings can be quashed.
16. In the result, application is allowed. Impugned summoning order dated 28.08.2023 as well as entire proceedings of Complaint Case No. 58 of 2022 (M/s Balaji Traders Proprietor Manoj Kumar Agarwal vs. Sanjay Gupta @ Sanju Mohan), under Section 387 IPC, Police Station Kotwali Orai, District Jalaun, pending in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge/ Special Judge (Dacoity Affected Area), Jalaun at Orai, are hereby quashed.
17. Registrar (Compliance) to take steps.
Order Date :-28.06.2024 AK