Gujarat High Court
Jayantibhai Makanbhai Damor vs State Of Gujarat on 5 May, 2018
Author: G.R.Udhwani
Bench: G.R.Udhwani
R/CR.MA/8892/2018 JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION NO. 8892 of 2018
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.R.UDHWANI SD/-
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to YES
see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? YES
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the NO
judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law NO
as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any
order made thereunder ?
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JAYANTIBHAI MAKANBHAI DAMOR
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT
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Appearance:
MR.HEMANG H PARIKH(2628) for the PETITIONER(s) No. 1
MR L R PUJARI APP (2) for the RESPONDENT(s) No. 1
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.R.UDHWANI
Date : 05/05/2018
ORAL JUDGMENT
This successive bail application is filed seeking bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "Cr.PC") in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 65(e), 81 and 83 of the Gujarat Prohibition Act for which FIR came to be registered at Prohibition C.R. No.5244 of 2017 with Khambholaj Police Station, earlier bail application, having been withdrawn twice, one before the charge-sheet on 16/01/2018 (CR.MA No.30676 of 2017) and the other after the charge-sheet being (CR.MA No.5078 of 2018) on 09/03/2018.
Page 1 of 14R/CR.MA/8892/2018 JUDGMENT
2. There is no dispute that after full-fledged hearing, since this Court was not inclined to admit the petitioner to bail, CR.MA No.5078 of 2018 post charge-sheet was withdrawn. Principal ground urged as a change of circumstance is the information supplied to the petitioner with regard to the movement of two vehicles being Motor Bike bearing Registration No.GJ-23-G-247 and BOLERO Car bearing Registration No.GJ-18-GA-2625.
3. Relying upon such information, the contention is that the claim of the complainant that he had used the official duty vehicle for patrolling duty, during which offence in question was detected is falsified as none of the said vehicles were available at the scene of offence between 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. on the date of the incident. It is pointed out from the said information by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the said two vehicles had moved in the following manner.
Date Vehicle Kilometer Kilometer Time
used
27/11/2017 Two 18125- 82 10:00
wheeler 18043 12:30
28/11/2017 Two 18196- 71 16:30
wheeler 18125 20:00
29/11/2017 Two 18272- 76 11:00
wheeler 18196 15:00
27/11/2017 Bolero 38515- 57 00:05
car 38458 24:00
28/11/2017 Bolero 38515- 213 1:00
Car 38728 16:00
29/11/2017 Bolero 38839- 12 00:05
Car 3887 17:00
3.1 Learned Counsel submitted that as per log book,
BOLERO car had moved 213 kilometers between 1:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. On 28/11/2017 i.e. the date of incident and had Page 2 of 14 R/CR.MA/8892/2018 JUDGMENT gone to different places but after 4:00 p.m., it was never taken out from the police station and therefore, there was no question of the said vehicle being on patrolling duty between 6:00 and 8:00 p.m., when offence in question was allegedly detected.
3.2 It was also contended that according to the noting in the log-book, the police personnel concerned had gone to attend Prohibition Case No.5244 of 2017 at Khambholaj Police Station on the two-wheeler which had moved for 71 kilometers between 16:30 hours and 20:00 hours. It was therefore contended that even two-wheeler was not available at the scene of offence at the time of incident in question.
Learned APP, however, pointed out that above said Khambholaj prohibition case is the same as is concerned in the present FIR which has also been noted in the FIR itself.
3.3 Learned Counsel also contended that on the petitioner's separate application for trial/committal of the case, the order has been passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Anand holding that the case is not triable by the Magistrate; but will have to be committed to the Court of Sessions under Section 209 of the Code of Cr.PC. He would contend that the said finding is not in conformity with the legal provisions and the committal would consume further time and the trial would be delayed. Learned Counsel has relied upon the relevant legal provisions, reference to which would be made in detail elsewhere in this order.
4. So far as the 1st contention raised by the learned Page 3 of 14 R/CR.MA/8892/2018 JUDGMENT Counsel for the petitioner is concerned, it is factually misconceived; inasmuch as, it is noticed that the two-wheeler was used for reaching the scene of offence and it is clearly noted in the log-book that the prohibition case No.5224 of 2017 i.e. the present case has been registered. The movement of the vehicle was admittedly upto 8:00 p.m. and the offence is detected between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m.
5. So far as the 2nd contention is concerned, this Court may refer to the relevant legal provisions, to examine the soundness of the findings of the Court below that as a consequence of deletion or repeal of Section 115 of the Gujarat Prohibition Act, 1949 (for short the Act), the Magistrate would have no jurisdiction and that the case will have to be committed to the Court of Sessions. Section 115 of the Act since repealed reads thus:
"[115. Magistrate's power to impose enhanced penalties.-459[(1)] Notwithstanding, anything contained in section 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898), it shall be lawful for 460[***] any Magistrate of the First Class to pass any sentence authorized by this Act 461 [except any sentence under section 54A] in excess of his powers under section 32 of the said Code, provided that the fine shall not exceed three thousand rupees.] 462[(2) The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) shall apply for trials of the offences under section 65A.]"
5.1 The provisions was brought on the statute by substitution through Section 76 of the Bombay Act No.22 of 1960. It overrides Section 32 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and expands and legalizes, except for Section 65A, the authority of the Magistrate of the First Class to pass any sentence authorized by the Act, in excess of his powers Page 4 of 14 R/CR.MA/8892/2018 JUDGMENT under Section 32 of the Code, with the rider that the fine should not exceed three thousand rupees.
5.2 From Section 115 of the Act two things can be inferred: (01) that the Magistrate of First Class has the powers under Section 32 of the Code to impose the sentence (02) by overriding Section 32 of the Code, for the purpose of Prohibition Act, such power was expanded, without any limit, except for Section 65A, as also with the rider above-noted. It would not be out of place to mention that Section 32 of the Code is pari-materia Section 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which reads as under:
"32. Mode of conferring powers.
(1) In conferring powers under this Code, the High Court or the State Government, as the case may be, may, by order, empower persons specially by name or in virtue of their offices or classes of officials generally by their official titles.
(2) Every such order shall take effect from the date on which it is communicated to the person so empowered."
5.3 As would be evident from following discussion, the jurisdiction to try the case is dealt with in Section 26 of Cr.P.C. and Magisterial power to sentence is contemplated in Section 29 of Cr.P.C. and Section 32 speaks of conferring powers by the High Court or the State Government upon the courts. Section 32 does not contemplate the jurisdiction of the court and since Section 115 had conferred expanded powers in the matter of sentence, upon the Magistrate of First Class than what it was before introduction of Section 115, it logically follows that repeal of Section 115 would revert the situation back to section 32 of Cr.P.C. and would not denude the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to try the case.
5.4 It can be noticed that clause (a) of Section 26 of Page 5 of 14 R/CR.MA/8892/2018 JUDGMENT
Cr.PC talks of the jurisdiction to try the offence in reference to Indian Penal Code and clause (b) thereof, contemplates the jurisdiction to try the offences under laws other than IPC. According to clause (b), if the Court is referred to any such other law, that Court would be trying the offence else, it would be tried by the High Court or any other Court mentioned in the first schedule. Class II of the first schedule classifies the offences against other laws and contemplates inter alia the Court by which such offences would be triable. For beneficial reference, 2nd classification in the 1st schedule is quoted hereunder:
II- CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCES AGAINST OTHE LAWS Offence Cognizable or Bailable By what non-cognizable or non- court triable bailable If punishable with Cognizable Non- Court of death, bailable Sessions.
imprisonment for
life, or
imprisonment for
more than 7 years,
If punishable with Cognizable Non- Magistrate of
imprisonment for 3 bailable the first
years, and upwards class.
but not more than
7 years.
If punishable with Non-cognizable Bailable Any
imprisonment for Magistrate.
less than 3 years,
or with fine only.
5.5 As is evident from the first column of the second
schedule, punishability of the offence is a deciding factor for trial of the offence. The first row in the schedule refers to the offences triable by the Court of Sessions. If the offence is punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for more than seven years, it would be tried by the Court of Sessions. Similarly, if the offence is punishable for imprisonment for three years and upwards and not more than Page 6 of 14 R/CR.MA/8892/2018 JUDGMENT seven years, it would be tried by Magistrate of the First Class and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for less than three years or with fine only, it would be tried by `any Magistrate'. The discussion in the later part of this judgment would point out that `any Magistrate' would include Magistrate of the First Class or Metropolitan Magistrate as the case may be and `Magistrate of First Class' would include Chief Judicial Magistrate and Chief Metropolitan Magistrate as the case may be. For the present, this Court may concentrate on the jurisdiction of the Courts in relation to the offences other than IPC.
5.6 It can be noticed from the classification of the offences above-referred that the jurisdiction of the court enhances with the hierarchy of the court. In other words, the court higher in hierarchy is conferred the higher jurisdiction in terms of the sentence. If the penal statute contemplates a sentence of less than three years or the fine only, the case would be tried by the court of lowest jurisdiction i.e. `any Magistrate', and if the sentence contemplated for the offence in the penal statute is three years and upwards but not more than seven years, the court higher in hierarchy i.e. Magistrate of the First Class is competent to try it. Similarly if the sentence contemplated for the offence is more than seven years or imprisonment for life or death, it would be tried by the court of higher hierarchy i.e. Court of Sessions. It is crucial to bear in mind the phrases like `for more than seven years', `for three years and upwards but not more than seven years', `for less than three years or with fine only' in the above classification. The said phrases must be given their plain and due meaning. `For more than seven years' would necessarily mean `not seven years' or `not below Page 7 of 14 R/CR.MA/8892/2018 JUDGMENT seven years' but some imprisonment in addition to seven years. Similarly `for three years and upwards but not more than seven years' would indicate that lower cap of the punishment in the provision must be at least three years and it can be extended to seven years and not more.
5.7 Furthermore, `for less than three years or fine only' would mean that there should be upper cap of three years in the class of offences concerned for any Magistrate to try it.
Thus so far as class of offences against other laws is concerned, the jurisdiction of the court is determinable by the minimum sentence to which the accused may be exposed in the event of commission of offence.
5.8 The question is whether the words like `may extend to ......' would determine the jurisdiction of the court or are the words contemplating the discretion vested in the jurisdictional court. More often than not, such words are found in penal provisions. In the opinion of this court, such words are determinative of the discretion of the jurisdictional court but would not determine the jurisdiction. As indicated above, jurisdiction is different than the power to impose sentence. Jurisdiction lies at the base of the sentence. In other words, jurisdiction of the court must be determined at the initial or starting point of the sentence and the jurisdiction cannot be mistaken for discretion. Jurisdiction is a point where the court would assume the statutory power for trying the case which may be conferred upon it under Section 26 in the present case. The question of exercising the discretion would follow only after the court finds sufficient evidence for conviction of the accused. It would then turn to the required Page 8 of 14 R/CR.MA/8892/2018 JUDGMENT penal provision to find out appropriate sentence for the accused. If the sentence is in the range i.e. if it may `extend to .... ' the court would be exercising the discretion based upon the facts and circumstances emerging in the evidence and other factors. Although, the jurisdiction of the court may expire within the maximum of the sentence contemplated by the penal provisions. It is not difficult to deal with such issue as the answer to the same lies in the provision like Section 325 of Cr.P.C. which reads as under:
"325. Procedure when Magistrate cannot pass sentence sufficiently severe.
(1) Whenever a Magistrate is of opinion, after hearing the evidence for the prosecution and the accused, that the accused is guilty, and that he ought to receive a punishment different in kind from, or more severe than, that which such Magistrate is empowered to inflict, or, being a Magistrate of the second class, is of opinion that the accused ought to be required to execute a bond under section 106, he may record the opinion and submit his proceedings, and forward the accused, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom he is subordinate.
(2) When more accused than one are being tried together, and the Magistrate considers it necessary to proceed under sub- section (1), in regard to any of such accused, he shall forward all the accused, who are in his opinion guilty, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate.
(3) he Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom the proceedings are submitted may, if he thinks fit, examine the parties and recall and examine any witness who has already given evidence in the case and may call for and take any further evidence and shall pass such judgment, sentence or order in the case as he thinks fit, and as is according to law."
(emphasis supplied) 5.9 Thus it is made clear by Section 325 of Cr.P.C. that for imposition of the sentence severe than the authority of the court trying the case, it can make reference to the court of higher jurisdiction. It is crucial to note that here that section 325 implies that the jurisdiction of the court to try the case Page 9 of 14 R/CR.MA/8892/2018 JUDGMENT may be shorter than the sentence contemplated in the penal statute for which the accused is being tried. This is the clear indication that jurisdiction to try the case is not same as the jurisdiction to impose the sentence.
6. Second class of the offence in first schedule quoted herein above refers to three jurisdictions; namely `court of sessions', `magistrate of the first class', and `any magistrate'. When it comes to sentencing power contemplated under Section 29 of Cr.P.C., the court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate are treated equally by Section 29(4). Likewise the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate and the Court of Magistrate of the First Class are treated equally. Thus the Court of Magistrate of First Class would include the court of Metropolitan Magistrate. Furthermore, as is evident from the explanatory note (2) of the First Schedule of Cr.P.C., the Magistrate of the First Class and `any Magistrate' would include Metropolitan Magistrate but not Executive Magistrate. It is also required to be noted that the Magisterial Courts consist of Metropolitan Magistrate and Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for the Metropolitan areas and Judicial Magistrate First Class and Chief Judicial Magistrate for other areas. Therefore the expression `any Magistrate' used in the last column of the above classification of the offences would include Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Metropolitan Magistrate or Chief Judicial Magistrate and Judicial Magistrate First Class. As a necessary corollary, the class of offences in the last two column would be triable by any of the above-referred classes of Magistrates.
7. Coming to Section 65 of the Prohibition Act, it may Page 10 of 14 R/CR.MA/8892/2018 JUDGMENT be recalled that the Judicial Magistrate, First Class has decided to commit the case registered under Section 65 of the Act to the Court of Sessions on the premise that the repeal of Section 115 denudes his jurisdiction to try the case.
7.1 From the above reasonings, it is apparent that such a premise is not based upon sound judicial reasonings. That apart, so far as Section 65 of the Act is concerned, the expression "shall on conviction be punished..... with imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and fine....." is suggestive of the discretion of the Court rather than jurisdiction. The range of sentence can be anything upto ten years. Thus, after conviction, the trial Court would be required to consider various factors emerging in the evidence to find out the appropriate sentence for the convict within the range of ten years. "Extend to ten years" would necessarily imply that it can be any sentence upto or below ten years.
7.2 As noticed above, jurisdiction to try the case where a penal provision contemplates a sentence upto seven years is vested with all Magistrates and jurisdiction to try an offence where the sentence contemplated under the penal provision is more than seven years or life or with death is vested in the Court of Sessions. Section 65 does not provide a lower cap. The lower end is open and as pointed out herein above, the jurisdiction of the Court must be determined with the sentence at lower end and therefore the Magistrate who has the jurisdiction to try the class of an offences where the punishment contemplated is upto seven years, would be competent to try the offence under Section 65 of the Act. After conviction, if the Magistrate is of the opinion that the Page 11 of 14 R/CR.MA/8892/2018 JUDGMENT sentence severe than what is permitted in his authority is required to be imposed, he can make a reference to the Court of Sessions under Section 325 of Cr.PC. Although, Section 325 of Cr.PC, contemplates a reference to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate but that is because the sentencing powers of the Magistrate other than Chief Judicial Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate are restricted to three years, under Section 29 of Cr.P.C., and in the instant case, it is noticed from the discussion hereinabove that Section 26 read with 2nd class of the 1st schedule indicates that the Magistrate is empowered to try the class of offences punishable upto seven years and therefore taking a clue from Section 325, it would be competent for the Magistrate to refer the case to the Court of Sessions for the sentence beyond his authority and that court would be following similar procedure as contemplated in Section 325 of Cr.PC.
8. The proviso to amended Section 65 of the Act noticed above also requires a close consideration. As noticed above, the sentence under Section 65 may extend to ten years and proviso contemplates minimum sentence to be imposed, in absence of the special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be mentioned in the judgment of the Court. The words of significance are "in the judgment of the Court". Thus, if the Magistrate finds good reasons, justifying to impose a sentence lesser than the minimum provided in clause (i), (ii) and (iii) of the proviso, he can impose the lesser sentence but this exercise has to be done at the time of judgment and not at the time of commencement of the trial. Otherwise, the expression "in the judgment of the Court" would be rendered redundant or carry no meaning.
Page 12 of 14R/CR.MA/8892/2018 JUDGMENT 8.1 On conviction of the accused, the Court would be obliged to find out whether it is a first offence, second
offence or third offence or subsequent offence for appropriate punishment under Section 65 of the Act. The first, second and third or subsequent offence must be inferable from the evidence adduced. In other words, if there is an evidence justifying the inference that first, second or third or subsequent offence is committed, the Court would proceed to decide the quantum of sentence. While doing the said exercise, if the court finds special and adequate reasons for imposing the sentence lesser than the minimum, it can proceed to impose such lesser sentence. However, the difficulty would arise only when the Magistrate desires to proceed to impose the sentence of more than seven years imprisonment, but is incompetent to do so. In such a case, as indicated herein above, it would be competent for him to make a reference to the Court of Sessions.
9. If the case triable under Section 65 of the Act is permitted to be committed to the Court of Sessions, the result would be absurd; inasmuch as, as noticed from the classification of the offences above referred, the Court of Sessions is competent to try the class of offences punishable with more than seven years or life or death. On conviction, the Court of Sessions, in such a case would proceed to impose a sentence of more than seven years and upto ten years. Thus, though Section 65 does not contemplate a sentence of more than seven years, such a result would be achieved by committing the case. It would amount to rewriting the Section by substituting the words 'more than seven years' for the Page 13 of 14 R/CR.MA/8892/2018 JUDGMENT words 'may extend to ten years'. Not only that, the accused may lose his valuable right to appeal to the Court of Sessions.
10. The result of the above discussion is that: (01) by repeal of Section 115, the Magistrate is not denuded of his jurisdiction to try the case; (02) all the Magistrate under Section 26 of Cr.PC read with 2nd class of 1st schedule of Cr.P.C. are empowered to try the offence if it is punishable upto seven years; (03) the jurisdiction of the Court to try the case is different than the jurisdiction to impose the sentence. The jurisdiction of the court lies at the initial point of the sentence and not within discretionary range of sentence; (04) if the Court is of the opinion that the case on conviction qualifies for a punishment higher than its punishing authority, it may refer it to the Court of higher hierarchy i.e. Court of Sessions in the instant case.
11. For the foregoing reasons, the order dated 28/03/2018 passed by the learned 3rd Additional Civil Judge & JMFC, Anand in Criminal Case No.448 of 2018 at Annexure-C to the application made by the petitioner cannot be sustained and the same is quashed and set aside. The Court below is directed to adhere to necessary procedure at the earliest for the trial of the case without committing it.
12. With the above observations and findings, this bail application is disposed of. Endeavor should be made to conclude the trial within four months henceforth.
(G.R.UDHWANI, J) SOMPURA Page 14 of 14