Bombay High Court
Sub-Divisional Engineer, Irrigation ... vs Sarang Marotrao Gurnule on 19 March, 2008
Equivalent citations: 2008(110)BOM.L.R.1293
Author: K.J. Rohee
Bench: K.J. Rohee, R.C. Chavan
JUDGMENT K.J. Rohee, J.
Page 1296
1. The appellant/employer has challenged the order of the learned Single Judge dated 23.11.1998 dismissing Writ Petition No.3407 of 1998 challenging the Award passed by the Labour Court, Yavatmal on 6.1.1998 in Reference (IDA) No.11/1995 directing the appellant to reinstate the respondent/workman with continuity of service but without back wages.
2. According to the respondent/workman he was serving with the appellant in Quality Control Laboratory at Yavatmal as Helper on daily wages of Rs.20.10 ps. from 1.5.1985. The respondent worked for more than 240 days in every year. He worked with the appellant till 2.2.1991. There was no complaint in respect of the services rendered by the respondent. However, in spite of availability of work, the appellant used to give technical break to the respondent in order to deprive the respondent of the benefit of coming on regular establishment. No reasons used to be given for the technical breaks. The services of the respondent were terminated by the appellant from 3.2.1991 by oral order. While terminating the services of the respondent, no notice or reasons were given. No seniority list was maintained. After terminating the respondent, new workers were appointed by the appellant and they are still working with the appellant. The termination of the services of the respondent is illegal Page 1297 and by terminating the services of the respondent the appellant has engaged in unfair labour practice. The respondent made repeated applications to the appellant in 1995 for giving him work. However, there was no response by the appellant. The matter was taken to the Conciliation Officer but the attempt of conciliation failed. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Nagpur referred the dispute to the Labour Court by an order dated 11.9.1995.
3. The appellant contended that the respondent was never appointed by the appellant but his services were temporarily engaged on daily wages from 1.5.1985 whenever work was available. The respondent did not work for 240 days in 12 calendar months prior to the date of his termination. The appellant denied to have engaged new workers. The appellant denied to have retained in service the persons who are juniors to the respondent. The nature of the work which respondent did was of seasonal one and the respondent did not work for 240 days. Thus the dispute was liable to be dismissed.
4. It seems that before the Labour Court the respondent alone adduced evidence. The appellant did not adduce evidence. The Labour Court held that the appellant was working continuously for more than 240 days in a year as required under Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court further held that the termination of the respondent amounts to retrenchment as defined under Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court further held that one month.s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment was not given to the respondent nor wages in lieu of notice were paid to the respondent, so also retrenchment compensation was not paid as required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Thus the services of the respondent were terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F and as such the termination of the respondent is illegal. Hence the Labour Court directed reinstatement of the respondent with continuity of service. However, as the respondent was not diligent in challenging the termination, the Labour Court refused back wages.
5. The order of the Labour Court was assailed by the appellant on the ground that there was no evidence to show that the respondent continuously worked for 240 days in the preceding year. However, in view of the fact that the Labour Court found the evidence of the respondent trustworthy whereas no evidence was led by the appellant, the learned Single Judge held that there was no reason to interfere with the order of the Labour Court. The petition was, therefore, summarily dismissed. The said order is under challenge.
6. We have heard Mr. A.M. Deshpande, AGP for the appellant and Mr. S.T. Harkare , Advocate for the respondent. We have also gone through the pleadings of the parties and the orders of the Labour Court and the learned Single Judge.
7. It was vehemently urged by Mr. A.M. Deshpande that in order to claim protection of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is necessary for the workman to prove that he actually worked under the employer for not Page 1298 less than 240 days in a year as defined under Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act. Mr. Deshpande submitted that the the burden of proving this fact is on the workman and not on the employer. Mr. Deshpande submitted that the respondent workman has failed to adduce such evidence and hence the Labour Court was not justified in holding the termination of the respondent as retrenchment under Section 2 (oo) and in violation of Section 25F of the I.D. Act. In order to substantiate his submissions, Mr. Deshpande relied on the several cases.
8. Mr. Harkare on the other hand submitted that in the present case the respondent/workman has adduced evidence showing that he was in continuous service of the appellant as defined under Section 25B of the ID Act. He too placed for our perusal a number of judgments on the question of burden of proof and its discharge.
9. Before we take up analysis of the numerous judgments relied on by both the learned Counsel, it may be useful to recount the recent reiteration on the value of judicial precedent by the Apex Court in Sarva Shramik Sanghatana v. State of Maharashtra reported at . We may usefully reproduce below for ready reference paragraphs 14 to 17 of the aforesaid judgment since we would be considering the numerous judgments cited in the light of the observations in paras 14 to 17:
14. On the subject of precedents Lord Halsbury, L.C., said in Quinn v. Leathem : (ALL ER p.7G-1) Before discussing Allen v. Flood and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make; and one is to repeat what I have very often said before.that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.
We entirely agree with the above observations.
15. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat (vide SCC p. 221, para 18) this Court observed:
18. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it.
Page 1299
16. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. (vide SCC p. 130, para 59) this Court observed:
59. ...It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision.
17. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment this Court also observed: (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9-12)
9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the decision is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton (AC at p.761), Lord MacDermott observed: (All ER p.14C-D) The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge....
10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. Lord Reid said, Lord Atkin's speech...is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.' (ALL ER p. 297g) Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No.2), observed: (All ER po.1274d) One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. As if it were an act of Parliament;
And in British Railways Board v. Herrington Lord Morris said: (All ER p. 761c) There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.
11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
Page 1300
12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: 'Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.
* * * Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches.
My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.
10. The learned AGP Shri Deshpande relied on judgment in Ranip Nagar Palika v. Babuji Gabhaji Thakore and Ors. reported in 2007 (13) SCALE 436, in which the Apex Court has taken a review of number of decisions on the question. In that case the workmen had claimed that they had been working continuously since 1991 till termination by oral order dated 16.5.1994. The employer had taken the stand that the workmen had been engaged only as daily rated helpers and that their appointments were not in terms of the recruitment rules. They worked only for few days and after November 1993 there was no engagement, as their services were no longer required. In the claim petition filed before the Labour Court, the workmen had not given any particulars as to how they completed 240 days of service. There was no such pleading. Further all the relevant records were produced before the Labour Court. In this context after review of several decisions the Court held in para 15 as under:
It was held in all these cases that the burden of proof lies on the workman to show that he had worked continuously for 240 days for the preceding one year and it is for the workman to adduce evidence apart from examining himself to prove the factum of being in employment of the employer.
11. In this case the Apex Court had referred to judgment in R.M. Yellati v. the Asst. Executive Engineer . A three Judges Bench of the Apex Court was considering the correctness of judgment of High Court of Karnataka whereby the High Court allowed writ petition filed by the Executive Engineer and set aside the order of the Labour Court directing reinstatement with 50 % back wages, the Court had set aside the Page 1301 judgment of the Division Bench and restored the award of the Labour Court. In that case the workman had also produced the certificate issued by the Executive Engineer to the effect that the workman had worked from 22.11.1988 to 20.6.1994. Though the workman had been cross-examined on behalf of the Management, there was no material to disbelieve the certificate and, therefore, the Labour Court came to conclude in favour of the workman which conclusion was ultimately upheld by the Apex Court. In the backdrop of these facts, the Court observed in para 17 of the judgment that the provisions of the Evidence Act do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the judgments of the Supreme Court, the three Judges. Bench found that the Apex Court had repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The next few sentences in para 17 are significant and in fact succinctly lay down the law. They may be usefully reproduced as under:
This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon the facts of each case.
After applying these principles, the Court held in favour of the workman.
12. The learned AGP had also relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in Chief Engineer, Ranjit Sagar Dam v. Sham Lal reported at . In that case the learned Judge, Labour Court had held that the burden was on the employer to prove that the workman had not worked for 240 days. Even the High Court seems to have taken the same view. In this context again after taking a review of several decisions Page 1302 including Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan reported at , Manager Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore v. S. Mani and Ors. and R.M. Yellatti referred to above, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court inter alia holding that the burden to prove that he had worked for 240 days, lay on the workman.
13. It may be useful to have a look at that the decision in Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan referred to in the judgments, which have been discussed in the preceding paragraphs, and on which the learned AGP placed reliance. In that case the workman had claimed to have worked for from 1.3.1990 to 15.7.1992 which claim was refuted by the employer specifically pointing out that the engagement of the workman in the years 1990, 1991 and 1992 was 56 1/2 days, 64 days and 122 1/2 days respectively. The Labour Court, however, held in favour of the workman on the basis of evidence tendered by the workman. Specific direction was given to the employer to produce muster rolls from 17.6.1991 to 12.11.1991 which were not produced by the employer. The learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court dismissed writ petition of the employer and so did a Division Bench hearing appeal against the Single Judge.s orders. In this context in para 6 of the judgment the Court observed that it was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked upto 240 days in the year preceding his termination. The Court observed that the workman had filed an affidavit which is own statement in his favour and therefore, could not be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. It may be also useful to refer to the observations of the Apex Court in para 7 of the judgment where the Court observed that one of the stands taken by the employer was that the engagement was made keeping in view the temporary needs and it was seasonal in character on which no definite finding was recorded by the Labour Court or the High Court. The Apex Court, therefore, remitted the matter back to the Labour Court for considering the evidence and coming to a definite conclusion as to whether the workman had worked for 240 days.
14. The learned AGP had placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas reported at . The Tribunal had observed that neither the Management nor the workman cared to produce muster rolls which was their joint liability and had further observed that the workman did not even summon the muster roll though the Management had not produced the same. The workman approached the High Court since the Tribunal has Page 1303 rejected his claim. The High Court held that the employer did not produce the relevant record before the Tribunal and, therefore, an adverse inference must be drawn against him, as the employer was in possession of the best evidence and it was not necessary for the workman to call upon the employer to produce the evidence. In this context the Apex Court held in para 13 of the judgment that the burden of proof was on the workman to show that he had worked for 240 days in the preceding twelve months prior to his alleged retrenchment. Apart from examining himself in support of his contention, the workman had not produced or called for any document from the office of the employer including the muster rolls. He had not examined any other witness in support of his case. The Apex Court found that no reason had been assigned by the High Court as to why exercise of discretional jurisdiction by the Tribunal was bad in law. The Court observed that presumption as to adverse inference was non-obligatory because non-production may be justifiable on reasonable grounds. The workman had also produced copies of some muster rolls before the Apex Court and the Court, therefore, observed in para 21 of the judgment that if he was in possession of the said documents, there was no reason as to why he has not produced the same before the Tribunal. The Apex Court, therefore, allowed the appeals.
15. In M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram reported at on which the learned AGP has placed reliance, the Apex Court was considering the case of workman engaged on daily wages on a project work. Before the Labour Court the workman had applied for production of muster rolls 1987 to 1992. However, they had not produced any material to show that they worked for 240 days continuously in a given year, though some of them examined themselves before the Labour Court. On behalf of the Electricity Board the Engineers in charge was examined and muster rolls for the period from 1986 to 1990 were also produced. On considering this evidence the Labour court held that the workmen had not worked for 240 days and rejected their applications. The Industrial Court drew an adverse inference because must rolls beyond 1990 were not produced and challenge to the order of the Industrial Court was dismissed by the High Court. This is how the employer was required to approach the Apex Court. In this context after elaborately considering the evidence in the form of muster rolls, the Apex Court found that the Industrial Court or the High Court erred in drawing adverse inference and observed that initial burden of establishing factum of their continuous for 240 days in a year rests with the workmen. The Court had referred to its decision in Municipal Corporation , Faridabad v. Siri Niwas which has been discussed in the preceding paragraph.
16. In Shriram Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Mahak Singh reported at rejecting the appeal of the employer, the Apex Court held that while the Tribunal erred in rejecting the contention Page 1304 of the workman, the High Court had adopted correct approach while deciding the controversy rightly drawing an adverse presumption for non-production of the attendance registers and the muster rolls for the years 1991 onwards. The best evidence having been withheld, the High Court was entitled to draw such adverse inference. The Court held that the workmen had discharged their initial onus by production of documents in their possession.
17. In Municipal Council, Sujanpur v. Surinder Kumar reported at (2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 172, the Apex Court had noted that the workman had been appointed in violation of the rules at the instance of a Member of Legislative Assembly who was Minister at the relevant time, and that no such appointment could have been made. While allowing the appeal the Court, however, granted monetary compensation quantified at Rs.50,000/-. In para 12 of this judgment, the Court observed that the Labour Court and the High Court proceeded wrongly on the premise that the burden of proof to establish non-completion of 240 days of work within a period of twelve months preceding the termination, was on the management and that the burden was in fact on the workman. The Court also held that it is also a trite law that only because some documents have not been produced by the management, an adverse inference would not be drawn against the management.
18. In Reserve Bank of India v. Gopinath Sharma and Anr. reported at , while allowing the appeal the Court had noted that on behalf of the Management one witness had been examined to state that the workmen had not completed 240 days in a calendar year. This witness on behalf of the Management had not been cross-examined and thus the evidence had gone unchallenged. The Tribunal had, therefore, rejected the workman.s case. The High Court held that even if the stand taken by the Bank that the respondent workman had not completed 240 days in a calendar year is taken to be true, it will not make much difference. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court erred in holding in favour of the workman though there was documentary evidence that the workman had worked only for 58 days and that workman had not cross- examined the employer.s witness.
19. In Surendranagar Distt. Panchayat v. Gangaben Laljibhai reported at , the Labour Court noted that the details pertaining to attendance of the respondent and xerox copies of the salary register and muster roll had been produced. The Apex Court held that the Labour Court and the High Court proceeded on the basis as if the burden of proving that the employee concerned has not worked for 240 days in the preceding year immediate to the date of termination lay on the employer, which view was held to be untenable. The Court reiterated that the burden lay on the workman and it was for the workman to adduce evidence apart from examining himself to prove the factum of being in employment of the Page 1305 employer. The Court observed that the Labour Court as also the High Court lost sight of the fact that the photo copies of the appellant.s attendance and salary registers were produced and the workman had not adduced any evidence except making his oral statement.
20. In Director Vocational Education & Training v. Nashim Shaikh Chand reported at (2006) 10 Supreme Court Cases 301, the employer had produced documents i.e. muster rolls to show that the workman had not worked for 240 days. Those documents were not considered by the Labour Court. The Industrial Court, however, scrutinized the documents and held in favour of the employer. The High Court set aside the decision of the Industrial Court and restored the order of the Labour Court. In this context the Apex Court observed that the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not have interfered with the order of the Industrial Court unless the High Court found that the revisional Court exercised its jurisdiction improperly and, therefore, set aside the orders of the Labour Court and the High Court and affirmed that of the Industrial Court.
21. The object of taking a review of all these judgments is to avoid confusion as to the exact position of law on this subject. About the proposition, that a workman who claims to have continuously worked for 240 days must prove that he has so worked and so the initial burden would lie on him there can be no doubt. It would be illogical to expect a party to prove a negative of a fact. Therefore, the expectation that an employer must prove that the workman had not put in 240 days in the preceding year would be illogical and, therefore, the employer would not carry the initial burden.
22. The next question is how the workman is expected to discharge this burden? Does it follow from the observations in the judgments quoted above (underlined for the sake of convenience) that a workman is expected to tender a particular quantum of evidence, or to examine a particular number of witnesses in support of his plea? The Evidence Act, which does not apply to matter under the Industrial Disputes Act, too does not lay down that any particular number of witnesses must be examined to prove a particular fact. A fact is held as proved when a Judge upon considering the matter before him either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a man of ordinary prudence would believe that it exists. Just as it would be futile to expect an employer to prove a non-existent fact, namely that a workman had not worked for 240 days, it would be futile to expect a workman to produce non-existent evidence. The best evidence rule would mandate that if the workman has in his possession any documentary evidence which would support his word on oath, he must produce such evidence, and, if he is not doing so, it would result in discrediting his word. The observations of the Apex Court that in addition to his own word, the workman must put in something more has to be read with this caveat. The difficulties and dangers in examining another workman in support of his own claim may be imagined. Ordinarily out of fear of reprisal a workmen who is already in employment is unlikely to step into the witness box to support the case of a colleague who has been thrown out. Workman.s examining another workman who has been similarly thrown out would not cut ice with the Court because the Court may feel that two lies do not make Page 1306 one truth. Therefore, ultimately in the matter of appreciation of evidence, it is for the Judge who sees the parties in person and receives their evidence to decide whether he would believe them or not. Whether burden on workman is discharged by him or not would have to be decided by applying law declared in following few sentences from para 17 in judgment of three-Judge Bench in R.M. Yellati, which we wish to again reproduce, for, there would be no clearer pronouncement on the subject.
This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon the facts of each case."
A careful re-reading of this passage would show that the Court does not hint at necessity of examining anyone in addition to the workman, while at the same time saying that affidavit alone would not be sufficient. What is expected of workman is to tender 'cogent evidence', by stepping in the witness box (& thereby allowing the truth of his version to be tested by cross-examination)
23. Lastly, there could be no doubt that an employer, not carrying the burden of proof, would not be expected to produce any documents to negative the claim of workman. Consequently an employer would not be subjected to an adverse inference. The Court would in fact be influenced by such non-production, if in spite of workman.s seeking production of such documents, they are not produced, depending on whether such suppression was deliberate. When the parties join an issue and when a party has a clinching piece of evidence in his possession, he would be expected to assist the Court and produce the same before the Court. However, as the Apex Court has held mere non-production of evidence, without anything more, should not lead to an adverse inference being drawn. If an employer could demolish the case of the workman on the basis of evidence tendered by the workman himself, Page 1307 the employer would not be expected to tender evidence to disprove the facts, foundation whereof itself has not been laid. The concept, that burden of proof would lie on the party who would fail if no evidence was tendered, would, as a corollary, require that such a party must stand on its own and would not be able to draw strength from the inadequacies or weakness of the case set up by the defence.
24. To sum up, the Apex Court had unequivocally laid down that initial burden would be on the workman and since such burden would be on the workman, there would be no question of an adverse inference being drawn because of mere non-production of any material by the employer. Whether such adverse inference ought to be drawn or not would depend on facts and circumstances of each case. The Apex Court could not be read to have laid down that a workman must examine at least one witness in addition to himself, or must produce some documents in addition to his oral testimony in order to discharge the initial burden on him. For, so holding would amount to an assumption that the workman has some evidence to tender, in addition to his own word, which he is withholding, which assumption may be factually incorrect. Therefore, should the evidence of the workman (tested by cross-examination and not merely an affidavit) be adequate to inspire confidence of its truthfullness, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court would be entitled to accept such a word without insisting upon corroboration, which in fact may not exist. In other words it is not the quantity of evidence that is to be seen by the Court of first instance, but the quality, in order to come to correct factual conclusions. Ordinarily, higher Courts would be slow to interfere in finding of facts recorded by the Courts of first instances unless such findings are recorded without any foundation or are perverse in nature.
25. A perusal of the judgment of the Labour Court would show that the respondent examined himself and stated that he was getting wages on muster roll. He was cross-examined on behalf of employer. The appellant, however, did not adduce oral evidence but filed xerox copies of some muster rolls which were not proved. In these circumstances the Labour Court found the evidence of the respondent/workman about his having worked continuously with the appellant/employer for more than 240 days in a year trustworthy. The learned Single Judge was right in observing that it is not a case where there was no evidence at all on the record. The Labour Court accepted the evidence of the respondent/workman as trustworthy and recorded his finding accordingly. We do not find any infirmity in the judgment of the learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. There is no substance in the appeal. Hence we pass the following order:
The L.P.A. is dismissed.