Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
M. Veeresham vs L.H. Gopal Krishna Rao on 19 October, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2002(1)ALD48, 2002(1)ALT181
ORDER
1. The tenant of a non-residential premises belonging to the respondent, is the petitioner in this Civil Revision Petition. The respondent filed RC.No.2/91 before the Additional Rent Controller, Secunderabad, seeking eviction of the petitioner under Section 10 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). In the petition, it was alleged that the petitioner committed wilful default of payment of rents and that the premises is required for personal occupation of the respondent. The petitioner resisted the petition and denied the allegations made in RC.No.2/91. Before the Rent Controller, P.Ws. 1 and 2 were examined on behalf of the respondent (owner) and documents P1 to P1 1 were marked on his behalf. The petitioner (tenant) examined himself as RW.l and no documents were marked on his behalf. On an appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the Rent Controller, through its order dated 28-2-1994, recorded a finding that the petitioner committed wilful default on payment of rents and ordered eviction. However, the contention of the respondent as to the bonafide requirement was rejected. The petitioner filed an appeal, being RA.No.207/94 in the Court of the Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, against the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. The appellate Court, through its order dated 15-7-1999, confirmed the findings recorded by the Rent Controller. The petitioner assails the order of the Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court in this Civil Revision Petition.
2. Sri P.V. Sanjeeva Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner addressed his arguments mainly on two aspects, viz., (a) that the RC itself was not properly presented and it ought not to have been entertained by the Rent Controller. According to him, the petition was presented in the name of the respondent through GPA one Mr. Pandu. The document of GPA was not produced before the Court and, as such, the signing of the petition by the so-called GPA as well as pursuing the further proceedings by the said person are without authority of law and the Rent Controller ought not to have entertained the petition at all; and (b) that on his own showing, the respondent was suffering from epilepsy and in view of the provisions of Section 2 of the Mental Ill-health Act, 1987, he was not entitled to be represented by the GPA. According to him, this factor goes to the root of the matter and the entire proceedings become incompetent and nullity. He did not address any arguments on the question of wilful default and had almost accepted the findings of the courts below.
3. Mr. E. Phani Kumar, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the contentions referred to above cannot be accepted for the reason that there were no pleadings on those aspects and they being the questions of fact cannot be raised for the first time in revision. He further states that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the courts below on the question of wilful default cannot be interfered with in the revision.
4. Sri Sanjeeva Rao, submits that admittedly the RC was filed through Mr.Pandu, the GPA holder of the petitioner. It has been elicited in the evidence that he did not produce the GPA authorizing him to file the petition or to pursue the same. In the absence of such a document, the petition signed and presented by almost a stranger could not have been entertained at all. On account of this fact, the entire proceedings become void.
5. To appreciate this contention, it is necessary to note that the fact that the respondent is the owner of the premises has not been disputed. The only controversy is as to the competence of the said Pandu who signed the petition on behalf of the respondent. Section 2(vi) of the Act defines the word landlord' as under:
"Landlord" means the owner of a building and includes a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another person or on behalf of himself and other or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant:"
It is, therefore, to be seen whether the said Pandu can be treated as agent of the respondent. The word 'agent' is defined under Section 182 of the Indian Contract Act to mean a person employed to do any act for another or to represent another in dealings with third persons. The Contract Act also deals with the method in which an agency can be created. Section 186 of the Contract Act provides that an agency can be express or it can be implied. It is, therefore, evident that no particular form is prescribed in law, for the purpose of creating an agency. As long as the principal authorised any person to act in his behalf, the person so authorised is entitled to be treated as agent The Act also does not stipulate any special procedure for constituting an agency for the purpose of Section 2(vi) of the Act.
6. The learned counsel invited my attention to Rule 2(b) of the Rules made under the Act, which is as follows:
"2(b) "Recognised agent" means
(i) A person holding a power of attorney authorising him to act on behalf of his principal or
(ii) An agent empowered by written authority under the hand of his principals:
Relying upon this definition, Sri Sanjeeva Rao submits that the person who acted as an agent of the respondent was not constituted in either of the forms stipulated under Rule 2(b). Therefore, there is non-compliance with the provisions of the Rules.
7. This contention is also without basis. The reason is the Act by itself did not define as to who can be treated as an agent. It is well settled principle that the terms and expressions occurring in the Act cannot be defined by Rules. Further, what is defined under Rule 2(b) is 'recognised agent'. The definition of 'recognised agent' is not without purpose. The Rules provided for the procedure for presentation, adjudication and execution of the petitions, orders, etc. under the Act. Rule 7 deals with the procedure of presentation of applications under the Act. Rule 7(3) reads as under:
"7(3) Every application shall be signed by the applicant or his counsel and be presented to the Controller by the applicant himself personally or by his recognised agent or by counsel at any time during office hours on a working day."
It is in the context of Rule 7(3) that the expression 'recognised agent' is defined. The "recognised agent" occurring in Rule 7(3) has conferred a status almost that of a counsel. This has nothing to do with the signing of petitions or authority of an agent to act on behalf of the owner of the building. Therefore, the definition contained in Rule 2(b) of the Rules is of no assistance to the petitioner.
8. The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in UNITED BANK OF INDIA v. NARESH KUMAR, , and submits that even assuming that there was any non compliance as to the signing or verification of the petition, it was only a minor aspect which do not, in any way, affect the validity of the proceedings.
9. A reading of the judgment in Naresh Kumar's case (supra) would indicate that the authorisation to sign the pleadings can be express or implied and any lapse in that regard does not invalidate the proceedings. It is apt to refer to certain observations in the said judgment:
"Procedural defects which do not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. There is sufficient power in the courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case. As far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity which is curable (para 9)"
"A person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any individual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The court can, on (he basis of the evidence on record, and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer (para 10)".
Following the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above said judgment, this contention is rejected.
10. The learned counsel further submits that on his admission, the respondent was suffering from epilepsy and this ailment disables him from pursuing the proceedings through an agent. It needs to be noticed that no plea in this regard was raised by the petitioner, when he submitted his counter in the RC. No evidence was adduced to establish the health condition of the respondent. It is also not shown as to which provision of the Mental Ill-health Act debars a person with the ailment of epilepsy from prosecuting the proceedings through an agent. Even assuming that there is a provision in the said Mental Ill-health Act which disabled a person suffering from a particular ailment from initiating the proceedings through agent, the person taking a plea on the basis of the same has to make a definite averment in the pleadings, adduce evidence and establish the fact. In the absence of these things, matters that disable a landlord from recovering his property from the tenant cannot be inferred. The said plea does not appear to have been raised either before the Rent Controller or the appellate Court. It cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in the revision. The proceedings under the Act are by and large summary in nature. Special and summary procedure is provided under the Act and the Rules to relieve the proceedings from the rigor, technicalities and procedures, which are applicable to the civil proceedings. The emphasis in the proceedings is to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the grounds stipulated under the Act, particularly Section 10 of the Act, are established by the parties or not. Once the said findings are arrived at on the basis of evidence and such findings were confirmed in appeal and not challenged in the revision, the same cannot be unsettled on hyper technicalities.
11. In view of the foregoing discussion, the concurrent finding of fact that the petitioner committed wilful default in payment on rents does not call for any interference. Accordingly, the revision is dismissed. Three months' time from the date of this order is granted to the petitioner to vacate the premises. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.