Jharkhand High Court
Chandeshwar Kumar Singh vs Bharat Coking Coal Limited Through Its ... on 29 July, 2024
Author: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
Bench: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (S) No. 1626 of 2023
Chandeshwar Kumar Singh, aged about 48 years, son of late Ram Raj
Singh, resident of New Quarter, Near Bhowra High School, P.O.-
Bhowra, P.S. - Jorapokhar, District-Dhanbad
... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. Bharat Coking Coal Limited through its CMD at Koyla Bhawan,
P.O. Koyla Nagar, P.S. - Saraidhela, District - Dhanbad, Jharkhand.
2. The Director (Personnel), Bharat Coking Coal Limited at Koyla
Bhawan, P.O.- Koyla Nagar, P.S.- Saraidhela, District - Dhanbad,
Jharkhand.
3. The Project Officer, Bhowra South Colliery, Eastern Jharia Area,
Bharat Coking Coal Limited P.O. & P.S.- Bhowra, District - Dhanbad,
Jharkhand.
4. The Area Manager (Personnel), Eastern Jharia Area, Bharat Coking
Coal Limited P.O.- Bhowra, P.S.- Sudamdih, District - Dhanbad,
Jharkhand.
5. The Manager (Personnel) Bhowra South Colliery, Bharat Coking
Coal Limited P.O. & P.S.- Bhowra, District - Dhanbad, Jharkhand.
... ... Respondents
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CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Rahul Kumar, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Rajesh Lala, Advocate
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Lastly heard on 16.05.2024
11/29.07.2024
1. This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs:-
"(a) for issuance of appropriate writ(s) / order(s) / direction(s) in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the letter contained in Ref. No. BCCL/EJA/PS/BS(S)/2022/411(N) dated 11.11.2022 (Annexure-8) issued under the signature of respondent Project Officer, whereby the petitioner has been denied salary for the period from 14.11.2019 to 8.7.2020 on the ground of no work no pay, although the petitioner who had been taken into custody on account of a frivolous criminal case on 13.11.2019 and released on 23.12.2019 had immediately upon release had represented and prayed for allowing him to resume his duty, but the respondents committed delay in allowing the petitioner to resume his duties, forcing him to sit idle for the said period even though the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) had filed closure report in the connected criminal case and the Enquiry Officer has also exonerated the petitioner.
And/Or
(b) The petitioner consequently and upon quashing of the impugned letter dated 11.11.2022 (Annexure-8) prays for a direction upon the respondent authorities to pay him salary for the period from 14.11.2019 to 8.7.2020 when the petitioner was forced to sit idle.
And/Or
(c) The petitioner further prays for a direction upon the respondent authorities to consider and treat the period from 14.11.2019 to 8.7.2020 as continuous in service for the purposes of monetary benefits and pension.
And/Or The Petitioner further prays for issuance of any other order or orders as Your Lordships may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.
Arguments of the Petitioner
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was taken into custody by Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) for the alleged offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act on 13.11.2019 and was allowed regular bail by this Court on 20.12.2019. Ultimately, the CBI could not collect any evidence against the petitioner and closure report was submitted and after due compliance of issuing notice to the informant the case was ultimately dropped against the petitioner on 28.01.2022.
3. The learned counsel submits that in the meantime, a charge sheet was issued for disciplinary proceeding on 02.12.2019 on account of unauthorized absence and the proceeding was dropped and the petitioner was exonerated by holding that the charge of misconduct of habitual/ unauthorized absence was not proved against the petitioner. This happened vide order dated 09.07.2020.
4. In the meantime, another development took place during the pendency of investigation by CBI. Another charge sheet dated 19.03.2020 was issued wherein a charge has been levelled against the petitioner in relation to taking of illegal gratification. The proceeding in connection with the second charge sheet dated 19.03.2020 is still pending and an inquiry officer has been appointed in which the petitioner is participating.
5. The learned counsel submits that any point of time right from 13.11.2019 till date the petitioner has not been put under suspension. He has further submitted that a decision was taken by the respondent through note sheet dated 24.02.2020 to take him back into service but 2 the follow up order was passed on 09.07.2020 (Annexure-5). There is no explanation on the part of the respondents as to why there was delay in connection with issuance of follow up orders during the period from 24.02.2020 to 09.07.2020.
6. The learned counsel has relied upon a judgment passed by this court reported in 2003 SCC Online Jhar 184 (Bhanu Pratap Lall versus B.C.C.L. and Others) decided on 22nd April 2003. He submits that the short question which fell for consideration in the said writ petition was as to whether the petitioner would be entitled for subsistence allowance/full salary during the period he was in custody when admittedly no order of suspension was passed and the order of suspension was passed after he was released from jail custody. The learned counsel submits that the relevant provision of the certified standing orders was considered and it was observed that the provision of the standing order manifestly demonstrated that the employer can suspend a workman on the ground of contemplation of disciplinary proceeding or when a criminal proceeding against him is under investigation or trial and in that event the workman shall be entitled to subsistence allowance. The Hon'ble Court recorded that the petitioner remained in custody till 16.01.2001 and thereafter he was released from custody and respondents had issued office order on 20.01.2001 putting the petitioner under suspension. The learned counsel has referred to paragraph 7 of the aforesaid judgment to submit that the Court observed that in the event of acquittal from criminal charge, the petitioner would be entitled to get full remuneration during the period he remained in jail custody, but certainly he must be deemed to be under suspension from the day he was taken into custody, otherwise he cannot be denied salary for the said period on the principle of 'no work no pay'. The learned counsel submits that the said writ petition was allowed.
7. The learned counsel has also relied upon a judgement passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2009) 2 SCC 592 (Somesh Tiwari versus Union of India and Others) (paragraph 22 and 23) to submit that there can be no mechanical exercise of the normal rule of 3 'no work no pay' and there can be no absolute proposition of law in this behalf and the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2007) 7 SCC 689 has been taken into consideration in para 23 of the said judgment regarding the manner in which the principle of 'no work no pay' is to be applied.
8. Learned counsel has also placed a judgment passed by this Court in W.P. (S) No. 4486 of 2009 decided on 28.03.2022 and has submitted that said case is distinguishable on facts in as much as in the present case the petitioner was made accused in the criminal case while discharge of his official duty and it is not a case where the petitioner has got himself involved in a criminal case in his individual capacity other than official duty. He has referred to paragraphs 27 and 28 of the said judgment whereby the judgement passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore Vs. Superintending Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) and Another" reported in (1996) 11 SCC 603 and judgment passed by this court in LPA No. 555 of 2014 decided on 04.09.2015 has been taken into consideration. He submits that when the prosecution is not initiated at the behest of the employer, then under such circumstances the principle of 'no work no pay' shall apply in view of the fact that the employer cannot be made to suffer on account of private dispute in which the employee may be involved. Argument of Respondents.
9. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents while opposing the prayer of the petitioner has submitted that the judgments which have been cited by the petitioner clearly demonstrate that the principle of 'no work no pay' cannot be mechanically applied. He submits that in the present case it was the private act of the petitioner while he was made accused in a case of illegal gratification and such act of taking illegal gratification cannot be said to be an incident of acting in his official capacity. The learned counsel further submits that the petitioner was taken into custody and when a charge sheet was issued with regard to his unauthorized absence from duty and when the petitioner gave cogent explanation for his absence being 4 in custody, the said charge sheet was dropped, but at the same time when the matter was still under investigation by CBI, another disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner which is pending.
10. He submits that the fact as to whether the petitioner would be entitled to any portion of the back wages or any amount during the period he has remained out of service or out of duty would essentially depend upon the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding and it should be left to the disciplinary authority to take a call in the matter. If the petitioner is finally exonerated in the proceeding initiated pursuant to 2nd charge sheet, then also the grant of full back wages may not be automatic.
11. The learned counsel has also submitted that the petitioner having not been put under suspension, is not entitled to any subsistence allowance and it is the conscious act of the employer whether to suspend a person or not to suspend a person.
12. He also submits that the judgment passed by this court in the case of Bhanu Pratap Lal (supra) is distinguishable in the sense that even when the person is exonerated of charges or is not convicted in the criminal proceedings, he is entitled for payment of the subsistence allowance already paid to him and the wages which he would have got if he had not been suspended except where he was suspended for a period not exceeding 10 days.
Rejoinder of the petitioner.
13. In response, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that during the period when the petitioner was in jail custody or was not allowed to join duty and if the petitioner is not treated to have been suspended, then the automatic consequence will be his entitlement for payment of full back wages. He has also submitted that the petitioner was prevented from working for the reasons beyond his control.
14. During the course of hearing, it is also not in dispute that the note sheet dated 24.02.2020 is not a part of the records of the writ petition and the content of the same is not known to this court and the 5 fact also remains that the closure report by CBI in the case was filed on 23.06.2020. The note sheet is dated 24.02.2020 and the closure report of the CBI was filed on 23.06.2020. The petitioner was directed to join vide letter dated 09.07.2020 and on 09.07.2020 the petitioner was also directed to intimate the authorities regarding the status of the criminal case on monthly basis.
15. It has also been submitted that even if the petitioner is paid the subsistence allowance the same will ultimately depend upon final outcome of the enquiry arising out of 2nd charge sheet. Findings of this Court
16. The records reveal that the petitioner was arrested by Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on 13.11.2019 in connection with RC Case No. 09(A)/2019-(D) [State through CBI Vs. Shri Chandeshwar Kumar Singh] and was released on bail on 23.12.2019. Upon his release, the petitioner was not allowed to resume his duty nor was put under suspension. Prior to his release, a charge sheet bearing No. 142 dated 02.12.2019 was issued to the petitioner for his unauthorized absence, with effect from 14.11.2019 under Clause 26.1.1 of Certified Standing Order, which reads as follows:
"Habitual absence from duty without information for more than 10 days, habitual late attendance or wilful habitual absence from duty without sufficient cause."
To the aforesaid charge sheet, the petitioner submitted his explanation on 27.12.2019 that he was in judicial custody.
Thereafter, another charge sheet was issued to the petitioner vide charge sheet no. 178 dated 19.03.2020, under clause 26.1.13 which reads as under:
"Taking or giving, offering or asking for bribes or any illegal gratification whatsoever or indulging in corrupt practices."
To the 2nd charge sheet dated 19.03.2020, the petitioner filed an explanation on 26.03.2020.
17. With respect to 1st charge sheet dated 02.12.2019, the enquiry committee was constituted on 13.06.2020. A report was submitted on 6 20.06.2020. As per the enquiry report, the charge of misconduct of habitual/unauthorized absence from duty under Clause 26.1.1 of Certified Standing Order of BCCL against the petitioner was not proved. Pursuant to the enquiry report dated 20.06.2020, the petitioner was allowed to join duty vide letter dated 09.07.2020 and thereafter, the petitioner continued to work.
18. In the meantime, with respect to the 2nd charge sheet, an enquiry officer was appointed vide letter dated 21.02.2023 and the disciplinary proceedings in connection with the 2nd charge sheet dated 19.03.2020 is still pending.
19. The petitioner, upon joining, filed an application dated 15.02.2022 stating that the criminal proceeding against the petitioner has been dropped by the concerned Court by acceptance of the final form and therefore, he claimed salary for the period 14.11.2019 till 09.07.2020. Out of aforesaid period, the petitioner had remained in judicial custody for the period from 14.11.2019 to 23.12.2019 and could rejoin his duties only from 09.07.2020 pursuant to office order dated 09.07.2020.
20. Although the learned counsel for the petitioner has mentioned during his argument that vide note-sheet dated 24.02.2020 a decision was taken to allow the petitioner to join the service, but there is no averment in the entire writ petition with regard to the said note-sheet, but it has been referred in the office order dated 09.07.2020 by which the petitioner was allowed to resume duty. In such circumstances, since the petitioner did not raise any grievance in the writ petition regarding time gap in issuance of order allowing him to resume duty i.e. the period from 24.02.2020 to 09.07.2020, there was no occasion for the respondents to explain the reasons for the time gap in issuance of the letter dated 09.07.2020.
21. However, much after resumption of duty pursuant to the letter dated 09.07.2020, the criminal case against the petitioner was dropped by the court upon acceptance of final form vide order dated 28.01.2022.
722. After disposal of the criminal case, the petitioner filed a representation dated 30.03.2022 for payment of salary etc. for the period from 14.11.2019 to 08.07.2020, inter alia, stating that the petitioner was never suspended from service. The representation has been rejected vide impugned order dated 11.11.2022 on the principles of ''no work no pay''.
23. The office order dated 09.07.2020 reveals that the proceeding in connection with unauthorized absence with effect from 14.11.2019 ended in submission of enquiry report in favour of the petitioner holding that he was not guilty of willful or habitual unauthorized absence from duty, which was in turn followed by decision vide note sheet dated 24.02.2020 and then followed by issuance of letter dated 09.07.2020 permitting the petitioner to join his duty.
24. So far as the criminal case is concerned, the petitioner remained in custody from 14.11.2019 to 23.12.2019 and charge-sheet for disciplinary enquiry arising out of the same incident was issued to the petitioner vide charge memo dated 19.03.2020 and the disciplinary enquiry is pending. However, no order of suspension was passed against the petitioner. Rather, the petitioner was permitted to resume duty vide letter dated 09.07.2020.
Points for consideration.
25. The point for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled for any monetary benefit by way of salary and all other service benefits for the period from 14.11.2019 to 23.12.2019 (custody period) and then for the period from 24.12.2019 to 08.07.2020 as the petitioner had given his joining on 27.12.2019 but was not allowed to join duty till 08.07.2020 AND whether the impugned order dated 11.11.2022 refusing any relief on the principles of ''no work no pay'' is sustainable in the eyes of law.
26. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1996) 11 SCC 603 [Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore Vs. Superintending Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) and Another] and also the judgment passed by this Court in LPA No. 555 of 2014 (Chandrajeet Kumar @ Chandrajeet Paswan 8 Vs. The State of Jharkhand and Others), the law has been settled that when a criminal case is instituted at the behest of private third party and the employee is convicted, then the employer is a sufferer and accordingly, the employer cannot be saddled with any liability of payment of salary etc. for the period during which an employee did not work.
27. The judgement of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) has been followed by this court in W.P.(S) No. 4486 of 2009. Paragraphs 14, 27 and 28 of the judgment passed in W.P.(S) No. 4486 of 2009 (Dakshin Kumar Mahato @ Dakshineshwar Mahato Vs. The State of Jharkhand and others) are quoted as under:
"14. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, has opposed the prayer and has relied upon the judgement passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1996) 11 SCC 603 (Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore Vs. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) and Another) and also the judgement passed by this Court in L.P.A. No. 555 of 2014 to submit that when a criminal case is instituted at behest of private third party and the employee is convicted, then the employer i.e. the State of Jharkhand is a sufferer and cannot be saddled with any liability of the payment of salary for the period for which the employee did not work.
27. In the judgement passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Gujarat Electricity Board, (1996) 11 SCC 603, the appellant was convicted in a private dispute under section 302/34 of IPC and solely on account of his conviction he was dismissed from service and was acquitted subsequently. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while denying back wages on the principle of "no work no pay"
held in para 3 as under: -
"3. The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of 9 conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting interference."
28. It has been held by this Court in the judgment passed in L.P.A. No. 555/2014((Chandrajeet Kumar @Chandrajeet Paswan versus State of Jharkhand and others) decided on 4th September, 2015, by clearly making a distinction between the conviction, where prosecution is instituted at the behest of the department, and other conviction, where prosecution arises out of private disputes with third parties and unconnected with discharge of official duties. It has been held that when the prosecution was never initiated at the behest of the employer, but was initiated at the behest of private parties, it is the State of Jharkhand who is the sufferer and consequently, the State of Jharkhand cannot be saddled with a liability to payment of salary for the period for which no work was done, as no service was rendered by such a person. While deciding the aforesaid LPA, the Hon'ble Division Bench of this court has taken into consideration a large number of judgements decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court including that of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) which has been heavily relied upon by the respondents. This court is of the considered view that the present case is squarely covered by the judgement passed in the aforesaid L.P.A. cited and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents."
28. This Court further finds that the matter regarding disciplinary proceedings arising out of the 2nd charge sheet which arises out of the same incident for which the petitioner was arrested by CBI, is still pending.
29. In such circumstances, this Court is not inclined to direct the respondents to pay salary for the intervening period in view of the fact that the same would depend upon the ultimate outcome of the disciplinary proceedings instituted against the petitioner and while doing so, the respondent authorities are bound to consider the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to the matter of grant of salary etc. for the intervening period i.e. from the date the petitioner remained in judicial custody till the date he was permitted to join duty pending disciplinary proceedings in connection with the same incident which led to criminal case. As held in the aforesaid judgements, the law is well settled that when the prosecution was never initiated at the behest of the employer, it is the employer who is the sufferer and consequently, the employer cannot be saddled with a 10 liability to pay salary for the intervening period even if the employee is acquitted later in the criminal case.
30. In the present case, it is not clear from the records as to whether the criminal case against the petitioner was initiated at the behest of the employer or at the behest of third party. Further the fact remains that the petitioner was never suspended from service even when he was in custody.
31. The petitioner has relied upon a judgment passed by this Court in the case reported in 2003 SCC OnLine Jhar 184 (Bhanu Pratap Lall Vs. B.C.C.L. and others) in which Bharat Coking Coal Limited was the respondent as in the present case. In the said judgment the short question which fell for consideration was as to whether the petitioner of the said case would be entitled to subsistence allowance and/or full salary during the period when he was in jail custody and the order of suspension was issued after the petitioner was released from jail. In the said case, the various provisions of the standing order of the respondent were taken into consideration in paragraphs 5 and 6 as follows:
"5. Before deciding the issue I would first like to quote the relevant provisions of the Certified Standing Order of the respondents-Company Clauses 27.21 to 27.25 are worth to be noticed which are as under:
"27.21: Where a disciplinary proceedings against a workman is contemplated or is pending or where criminal proceedings against him in respect of any offence are under investigation or trial and the employer is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to place the workman under suspension, he may, by an order in writing, suspend him with effect from such date as may be specified in the order. A statement setting put in detail the reason for such suspension shall be supplied to the workman within a week from the date of suspension.
27.22: During the period of his suspension, the workman shall not enter the work premises except with the permission of the management, nor shall he leave station without the permission of the management.
27.23: If during the inquiry it is found that the workman is guilty of a misconduct other than that stated in the order of suspension and/or charge sheet, the workman shall be liable to punishment for such misconduct but before any punishment is imposed on him he shall be afforded opportunity of explaining and defending his action in respect of such other misconduct.
27.24: The payment of subsistence allowance will be subject to a written declaration by the workman that he is not 11 engaged in any other employment business, profession or vocation.
27.25: If after enquiry or conclusion of the criminal proceeding a workman is held guilty of the charges alleged against him or some other charges brought in the course of the enquiry or is convicted in the criminal proceedings and is consequently discharged or dismissed, he shall not be entitled to any remuneration for such period other than the subsistence allowance already paid to him. If a penalty other than dismissal, discharge or removal is imposed on him or he is exonerated or charges against him are dropped or he is not convicted in the criminal proceedings, he shall be paid the difference of subsistence allowance already paid to him and the wages which he would have got if he had not been suspended except in case where he is suspended, nor exceeding ten days, as a measure of punishment".
6. From bare perusal of the provisions of the Standing order quoted hereinabove it is manifest that the employer can suspend the workman on the ground of contemplation of disciplinary proceeding or when a criminal proceeding against him is under investigation or trial, in that event the workman shall be entitled to subsistence allowance. Admittedly on the basis of the FIR lodged against the petitioner, he was arrested by the CBI on 26-9-2000 on the allegation of accepting bribe. The petitioner remained in custody till 16-1-2001 and, thereafter, he was released from custody. However, the respondents issued office order on 20-1-2001 putting the petitioner under suspension." It has been held in paragraph 7 of the said judgement that during the period the petitioner remained in custody, the petitioner must be deemed to have been placed under suspension the day he was taken into custody otherwise he cannot be denied salary for the said period on the principles of 'no work no pay'. It has further been held that the employee of the said case was entitled to subsistence allowance for the period he remained in custody. Paragraph 7 of the said judgement is quoted as under: -
"7. It cannot be disputed that in the event the petitioner is acquitted from the criminal charge, he will be entitled to get full remuneration during the period he remained in jail custody. But, certainly the petitioner must be deemed to have been under suspension the day he was taken into custody otherwise he cannot be denied salary for the said period on the principle of no work no pay. In my opinion the principle of no work no pay as canvassed by Mr. Banerjee, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, does not apply in cases where a regular and permanent employee is taken into custody on the allegation of misconduct or on the allegation of committing offence. But the clauses aforesaid clearly pro vide that if a criminal proceeding in respect of any of the offence is under investigation or trial then the workman may be placed under suspension. Normally the investigation commences from the date when a cognizable offence is alleged against a person and he is taken into custody. The respondents, therefore, cannot deny payment of subsistence allowance to the workman for the period he remained in custody on the basis of a criminal charge."
12The period during which the petitioner had remained in jail was treated to be period of suspension, although no formal order of suspension was passed. This Court allowed subsistence allowance to the petitioner of the said case for the period during which the petitioner remained in jail although he was not suspended while in jail and was suspended only when he was released from jail.
32. In the present case, the petitioner was never suspended, either during the period he remained in custody or even thereafter, and after being exonerated with regard to the 1st charge sheet, the petitioner was permitted to join. In view of the judgment passed in the case of Bhanu Pratap Lall (Supra), the petitioner is deemed to have been suspended from the date he was taken into judicial custody i.e. from 14.11.2019. Thereafter, the petitioner was released from custody on 23.12.2019 and gave his joining on 27.12.2019 mentioning that he had remained in judicial custody during the period from 14.11.2019 to 23.12.2019, but in spite of giving his joining, he was neither suspended nor allowed to join his duty and a charge sheet in connection with the same incident for which he was taken into judicial custody was issued to the petitioner on 19.03.2020. However, even at this point, the petitioner was not suspended, rather the petitioner was allowed to join his duty by virtue of decision mentioned in note sheet of the competent authority who gave approval on 24.02.2020 to allow the petitioner to join his duty and in spite of the fact that 2nd charge sheet was issued to the petitioner on 19.03.2020, the petitioner was allowed to join his duty and continued to perform his duty.
33. The petitioner having been suspended notionally on account of having been taken in judicial custody by virtue of the judgment passed by this court in the case of Bhanu Pratap Lall (Supra), his suspension stood revoked only when he was permitted to join his duty, and he actually joined his duty. This Court is of the considered view that there cannot be automatic revocation of suspension upon being released from judicial custody once the petitioner is deemed to be under suspension having been taken into judicial custody. Therefore, 13 the period from 14.11.2019 to 08.07.2020 is the period during which the petitioner is to be treated under suspension. This Court is of the considered view that the claim for any amount for the period from 14.11.2019 to 08.07.2020 has to be decided by the disciplinary authority while finally deciding the disciplinary proceedings arising out of 2nd charge sheet keeping in view the ratio of the aforesaid judgement by the Hon'ble supreme court in the case of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) followed in L.P.A. No. 555/2014 (Chandrajeet Kumar @Chandrajeet Paswan versus State of Jharkhand and others) decided on 4th September, 2015.
34. In order to enable the disciplinary authority to pass an appropriate reasoned order in connection with the claim of the petitioner for payment for the period from 14.11.2019 to 08.07.2020, the impugned order is set-aside and it is directed that the disciplinary authority while finally deciding the matter regarding 2nd chargesheet shall also decide the aforesaid claim of the petitioner by a reasoned order.
35. The points formulated in paragraph 25 above are accordingly answered by setting aside the impugned order dated 11.11.2022 and by directing the disciplinary authority as aforesaid to take a reasoned decision in accordance with law at the time of passing the final order arising out of 2nd disciplinary proceedings.
36. This writ petition is accordingly disposed of with aforesaid observations and directions.
37. Pending interlocutory application, if any is closed.
(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) Binit/Pankaj/AFR 14