Punjab-Haryana High Court
Shiv Charan (Dead) Through L.Rs. vs Sukh Ram And Anr. on 14 November, 2002
Author: Viney Mittal
Bench: Viney Mittal
JUDGMENT Viney Mittal, J.
1. The defendants are in second appeal in this Court. They are aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated April 8, 1982 passed by the learned District Judge, Faridabad, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff respondent Sukh Ram (hereinafter called as plaintiff) was decreed, and the judgment and decree dated May 29, 1981, passed by the learned Senior Sub Judge, Faridabad has been reversed.
Relevant facts.
2. A suit for declaration, and in the alternative for possession, was filed by the plaintiff on the ground that one Het Lal s/o Nathwa was the owner in possession of the land to the extent of share detailed in the plaint. As per the plaintiff, the aforesaid Het Lal gifted away his share in the said land to the plaintiff vide two registered gift deeds dated March 30, 1970 and since the aforesaid date, the plaintiff claimed that he was the lawful owner of the land which was under the joint ownership of the plaintiff and Bodi-defendant No. 1 in equal shares. However, in the revenue record, the names of defendants No. 2 and 3 namely, Shiv Charan and Ganga Lal wrongly appeared as pattedars in the column of cultivation, inspite of the fact that Het Lal had got a lease deed set aside on July 19, 1968, which was executed by him in their favour. The plaintiff claimed that Het Lal gifted his entire immovable property to him including the residential house, Gait and Nohra. After the cancellation of the lease deed,defendants No. 2 and 3 had no possessory title nor had any tenancy rights in their favour and the entries qua them in the revenue record showing them as Pattedars/tenants at will were incorrect and liable to be corrected. The plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to physical possession of the land after the execution of the gift deeds by Het Lal in his flavour. It was further stated that on the basis of the wrong and unlawful entries in the revenue records, the defendants were unlawfully interfering into the lawful possession of the plaintiffs, and in any case, had no legal right to claim any right in the land.
3. A written statement was filed by the defendants-appellants (hereinafter called as 'defendants'). An objection was taken with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to the effect that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and, therefore, the Civil Court could not adjudicate the matter. It was also claimed that they were in possession of the suit land as perpetual lessees vide lease deed dated August 23, 1966. They claimed that they were in possession of the same as lessee under Bedi, defendant. A further plea was also taken with regard to their having become owners of the land by way of adverse possession. The defendants claimed that Het Lal had leased out the land in their favour vide registered lease deed dated August 23, 1966 and put them in possession. Since that time, they are occupying the land as lessees. They admitted that Het Lal had filed a suit challenging the lease deed dated August 23, 1966 but claimed that it ended into a compromise and thereunder the lease deed dated August 23, 1966 was cancelled qua the share of Het Lai and also thereby Het Lal was restrained from alienating his share in the said land to anybody by gift or otherwise and the possession of the land remained with the lessees which was never delivered back to Het Lal.
4. The learned Trial Court held the plaintiff to be the owner of the land in dispute. However, the rest of the pleas raised by the plaintiff were negatived i.e. it was held that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit land and also held that the entries in the revenue record showing the defendants as Pattedars are unassailable and could not be corrected. Consequently, the suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed.
5. The plaintiff felt aggrieved. By way of first appeal, he approached the learned District Judge. Vide judgment and decree dated April 8, 1982, his appeal was allowed and after reversing the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, the suit filed by him was ordered to be decreed.
6. The defendants are now aggrieved and have approached this Court by way of the present Regular Second Appeal.
7. I have heard Shri M.S. Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellants and Shri M.L. Sarin, learned senior counsel for the respondents and with their assistance have also gone through the record of the case.
8. Both the Courts below, concurrently, have found it as a fact that the plaintiff had become owner of the suit land because of the gift deed dated March 30, 1970 executed by Het Lal in his favour. Thus the said finding with regard to the ownership of the plaintiff is a finding of fact and is not even open to challenge in this Court. Even otherwise also, nothing has been shown to me by the learned counsel for the appellants that the said finding suffered from any infirmity or was in any manner contrary to law.
9. The only plea raised by Shri M.S. Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellants with regard to the aforesaid finding is that vide compromise dated July 19, 1968, in a suit filed by Het Lal, he (Het Lal) had agreed that in future he will not transfer the land in question by sale, mortgage or gift etc. and would continue to cultivate the land himself. Shri Jain submits that on the basis of aforesaid compromise, the perpetual lease in favour of the defendants had been cancelled. On that basis, Shri Jain submits that after the aforesaid compromise, it was not open to Het Lal to execute any gift-deed or sale-deed. In my view, the aforesaid submission of Shri Jain has no merit. It is not in dispute that Het Lal was the absolute owner of the property in dispute. Even if at some stage, he had stated or undertaken that he would not execute any gift deed or sell the land, which was his absolute ownership, then the said statement/undertaking could not be treated to be any impediment to the exercise of his absolute rights of ownership. As an absolute owner, Het Lal was free to deal with his property in any manner he liked. It is not even the case of the defendants that Het Lal had ever received any consideration while making the aforesaid statement. A mere statement/undertaking putting himself under a restraint with regard to the enjoyment of his absolute ownership, could not be treated as creating any vested rights in favour of the defendants.
10. The learned First Appellate Court on the basis of the evidence on the record and on the basis of the various pleas raised by the parties, has itself held that 99 years lease in favour of Shiv Charan and Ganga Lal defendants stood cancelled but however, they continued as tenants at will, originally under Het Lal and thereafter, under the plaintiff. In these circumstances, the plaintiff was not held entitled to actual physical possession.
11. Nothing has been shown by the learned counsel for the parties that the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court was in any manner wrong. There is no illegality, infirmity or perversity in the judgment given by the learned First Appellate Court, wherein firm findings of fact have been recorded. No question of law, much less, any substantial question of law arises in the present appeal.
12. Thus the present appeal, having no merit, is dismissed. No order as to costs.