State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Ashok Juneja And Another vs M/S Barnala Builders And Others on 16 October, 2024
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
PUNJAB, CHANDIGARH.
1) Revision Petition No.21 of 2023
Date of institution : 24.03.2023
Reserved On : 27.09.2024
Date of decision : 16.10.2024
1. Ashok Juneja, aged about 67 years, S/o Sh. Jagdish Mitter, R/o
H.No.887, Sector 2, Panchkula.
2. Sangeeta Juneja, aged about 62 years, W/o Ashok Juneja, R/o
H.No.887, Sector-2, Panchkula.
....Petitioners/Complainants
Versus
1. M/s Barnala Builders, SCO No.2, Maya Garden City, Nangla
Road, Zirakpur, through its Authorized Representative/Partner.
2. Maya Garden Magnesia C/o M/s Barnala Builders, opp.
McDonalds, NH-22, Chandigarh-Ambala Highway, Zirakpur, SAS
Nagar, Mohali, through its Partner.
3. Satish Jindal S/o Angrej Lal R/o H.No.288, Sector-10,
Panchkula, Partner of M/s Barnala Builders, SCO No.2, Maya
Garden City, Nangla Road, Zirakpur.
4. Deepak Aggarwal, Partner of M/s Barnala Builders, SCO No.2,
Maya Garden City, Nangla Road, Zirakpur
....Respondents/OPs
2) Revision Petition No.22 of 2023
Date of institution : 24.03.2023
Reserved On : 27.09.2024
Date of decision : 16.10.2024
Pardeep Kaur aged 41 years W/o Dhanvinder Singh R/o Nagla,
Dhakauli, SAS Nagar, Mohali.
....Petitioner/Complainant
Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 2
Versus
1. M/s Barnala Builders, SCO No.2, Maya Garden City, Nangla
Road, Zirakpur, through its Authorized Representative/Partner.
2. Maya Garden Magnesia C/o M/s Barnala Builders, opp.
McDonalds, NH-22, Chandigarh-Ambala Highway, Zirakpur, SAS
Nagar, Mohali, through its Partner.
3. Satish Jindal S/o Angrej Lal R/o H.No.288, Sector-10,
Panchkula, Partner of M/s Barnala Builders, SCO No.2, Maya
Garden City, Nangla Road, Zirakpur.
4. Deepak Aggarwal, Partner of M/s Barnala Builders, SCO No.2,
Maya Garden City, Nangla Road, Zirakpur
....Respondents/OPs
Revision Petitions under Section 47 (1) of
the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 against
the order dated 08.02.2023 passed by the
District Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission, S.A.S. Nagar (Mohali).
Quorum:-
Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Daya Chaudhary, President
Ms. Simarjot Kaur, Member
1) Whether Reporters of the Newspapers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes/No
2) To be referred to the Reporters or not? Yes/No
3) Whether judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes/No Present:-
For the Petitioner : Sh. Vivek Gupta, Advocate For the Respondents : Sh. Jatin Bansal, Advocate with Ms. Keerti Sandhu, Advocate.
JUSTICE DAYA CHAUDHARY, PRESIDENT This order of ours shall dispose off two Revision Petitions i.e. Revision Petition No.21 2023 and Revision Petition No.22 of 2023, as similar questions of law and facts are involved therein.
Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 3However, the facts are being extracted from Revision Petition No.21 2023.
Revision Petition No.21 2023
2. The present Revision Petition has been filed by the Petitioners/Complainants under Section 47 (1) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (in short, 'the Act') being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 08.02.2023 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, S.A.S. Nagar (Mohali) (in short, "the District Commission"), whereby the written version of the Respondents /OPs had been taken on record and the Application filed by Petitioners for striking off the defence of the OPs had been dismissed being infructuous and the case had been adjourned for evidence of the parties.
3. It would be apposite to mention here that hereinafter the parties will be referred, as had been arrayed before the District Commission.
4. Briefly, the facts of the case, which are necessary for the disposal of the present Revision Petition, are that the Petitioners/Complainants had filed the Complaint before the District Commission. On issuance of notices to the OPs, they appeared through Counsel before the District Commission on 03.02.2022 and filed Memo of Appearance before the District Commission. Thereafter, the case was adjourned to 02.05.2022 for filing written version as well Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 4 as Power of Attorney (POA). On the next dated i.e. 02.05.2022, POA was filed by the by the Counsel for the OPs but the written version was not filed and on the request of the Counsel for the OPs, the case was adjourned to 18.05.2022 but on said date also, again the time was sought to file the written version. Further, the case was adjourned for 10.06.2022. On 10.06.2022, instead of filing the written version, the OPs had filed an Application for dismissal of the Complaint and it was adjourned to 14.07.2022 for filing reply and consideration of the said Application. On 14.07.2022, the Complainants sought time to file reply to said Application and the case was adjourned to 20.07.2022. On 20.07.2022, the Complainants filed reply to the Application for dismissal of the Complaint and also filed an Application for striking off the defence of the OPs on the ground that the OPs had not filed the written version within the statutory period of 45 days. Thereafter, the case was adjourned on a number of occasions and ultimately, the OPs had withdrawn their Application for dismissal of the Complaint on 30.01.2023. Even thereafter, the time was again given to the OPs to file the written version. Thereafter, on 08.02.2023, the written version of the OPs was taken on record by the District Commission and the Application filed by the Complainants for striking off the defence of the OPs was dismissed as infructuous. The allegations of favouritism were levelled towards the OPs by the District Commission.
Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 55. Said order dated 08.02.2023 passed by the District Commission is subject matter of challenge in the present Revision Petition.
6. Mr. Vivek Gupta, learned Counsel for the Petitioners/Complainants has submitted that the impugned order passed by the District Commission is erroneous and illegal, as the OPs had not filed their written version within the statutory period of 45 days as per provisions of the Act. Said period of 45 days had already expired on 21.03.2022 from the date of first appearance of the OPs before the District Commission on 03.02.2022. Learned Counsel has further submitted that no Application was moved or any request was made by the OPs for extension of time to file the written version and even no time was sought to file the written version since 10.06.2022.
Even no reply to the Application filed by the Complainants for striking off the defence was filed by the OPs. Learned Counsel has further submitted that after the first appearance of the OPs, the District Commission had adjourned the case for filing the written version even beyond the period of 45 days contrary to the provisions of the Act as well as the settled law as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra). The Application filed by the OPs for dismissal of the Complaint was not maintainable as per provisions of the Act. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the written reply of the OPs cannot be taken on the Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 6 record. Learned Counsel has also relied upon the following judgments in support of his contentions:
i) Diamond Exports & Ors. v. United India Insurance Company Limited & Ors. Civil Appeal No.7546 of 2021 decided on 14.12.2021 (SC);
ii) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (P) Ltd. (2020) 5 SCC 757 (SC);
iii) Shri Harish v. Registrar (Legal), State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (Bombay) (Nagpur Bench), Writ Petition No.289 of 2024 decided on 13.03.2024 (Bombay High Court);
iv) M/s Adinath Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. Ms. Kamini Kapoor (DSDRC) RP No.2 of 2023 decided on 30.11.2023;
v) Care Diagnostic Centre v. Richa Joshi RP No.28 of 2023 decided on 29.09.2023 (Punjab State Consumer Commission);
vi) Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd. v. Sumeetinder Singh RP No.67 of 2023 decided on 19.12.2023 (Punjab State Consumer Commission); and
v) Kulwant Rai v. M/s Altus Space Builders Pvt. Ltd. RP No.21 of 2022 decided on 19.12.2022 (UT, Chandigarh State Commission).
7. Mr. Jatin Bansal assisted by Ms. Keerti Sandhu, learned Counsel for the Respondents/OPs has submitted that there is no force in the arguments raised by learned Counsel for the Petitioners. Learned Counsel has further submitted that in response to notice issued in the Complaint, the OPs had appeared and filed Application for dismissal of the Complaint and reply to said Application was filed after availing a number of opportunities. The Complainants had also filed an Application for sticking off the defence of the OPs.
Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 7Thereafter, the Complaint remained pending for consideration of the Applications. Learned Counsel has further submitted that the OPs had withdrawn the Application for dismissal of the Complaint on 30.01.2022 and the District Commission had granted time to the OPs to file the written reply, which was filed on 08.02.2023 without any further delay. There is no merit in the Revision Petition and the same is liable to be set aside.
8. We have heard the oral arguments raised by learned Counsel for both the parties. We have also carefully perused the impugned order passed by the District Commission and all other relevant documents available on the file.
9. Admittedly, the notice in the Complaint filed by the Petitioners/Complainants was issued to the OPs on 28.10.2021 for appearance before the District Commission for 03.02.2022. As per the office report made by the concerned official of the District Commission, the notices were sent to the OPs through Regd. Post on 21.12.2021 but the same were not received back. The OPs had had appeared through Counsel On 03.02.2022 by filing Memo of Appearance before the District Commission and the case was adjourned to 02.05.2022 for filing written version as well as Power of Attorney (POA). On 02.05.2022, the POA was filed by the by the Counsel for the OPs and time was sought to file the written version and the case was adjourned to 18.05.2022. On 18.05.2022 also, Counsel for the OPs had sought Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 8 time to file the written version and the case was further adjourned to 10.06.2022. On 10.06.2022, instead of filing the written version, the OPs had filed an Application for dismissal of the Complaint and the matter was adjourned to 14.07.2022 for filing reply and consideration on the said Application. On 14.07.2022, the Complainants had sought time to file reply to said Application and the case was adjourned to 20.07.2022. On 20.07.2022, the Complainants had filed reply to the Application for dismissal of the Complaint and they had also filed an Application for striking off the defence of the OPs on the ground that the OPs had not filed the written version within the statutory period of 45 days. Thereafter, the case was adjourned on a number of occasions and ultimately, the OPs had withdrawn their Application for dismissal of the Complaint on 30.01.2023. Even thereafter, the time was again given to the OPs to file the written version. Thereafter, the written version of the OPs was taken on record by the District Commission on 08.02.2023 and the Application filed by the Complainants for striking off the defence of the OPs was dismissed as infructuous.
10. The issue involves in the present case is as to whether the time/period of 45 days i.e. 30+15 days as fixed under Section 38 (2) (a) of the Act, 2019, which is the maximum time limit to file the written reply/written statement, can be further extended or not Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 9
11. In the present case, the notice was issued to the OPs on 28.10.2021, which was sent through Regd. Post on 21.12.2021 but the same was not received back. At the most, the notice sent through Regd. Post was presumed to be served upon the OPs within a maximum period of 7 days i.e. up to 28.12.2021 from the date of dispatch. The period of 45 days (30+15) for filing the reply was to be considered after 28.12.2021. The statutory period of 45 days had expired on 11.02.2022 after sending the notice by Registered Post on 21.12.2021, which was presumed to be served on 28.12.2021.
However, the OPs had appeared before the District Commission on 03.02.2022 and the District Commission kept on adjourning the case and up to 10.06.2022 no written version was filed by the OPs. Meaning thereby, the written version was not filed by the OPs within the period of 45 days from the date of service of notice upon them.
12. The issue involved in the present Revision Petition is squarely covered by the judgment dated 29.09.2023 passed by this Commission in Revision Petition No.28 of 2023 (Care Diagnostic Centre & Ors. v. Richa Joshi & Ors.). This Commission in said case while discussing and relying upon the various judgments including the judgment of the Constructional Bench of Five Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra) has held that the period for filing the written reply cannot be extended beyond the statutory period of 45 days (30+15) as Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 10 prescribed under Section 13 (2) (a) of the Act of 1986 and Section 38 (2) (a) of the Act of 2019. The relevant paras of said judgment are reproduced as under:
"14. As per the judgment passed by the Three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of J.J. Merchant & Ors. v. Shrinath Chaturvedi (2002) 6 SCC 635, there is no power to condone the delay beyond the period of 45 days in filing the written reply. The relevant portion of said judgment is reproduced as under:
"For having speedy trial, this legislative mandate of not giving more than 45 days in submitting the written statement or the version of the case is required to be adhered. If this is not adhered, the legislative mandate of disposing of the cases within three or five months would be defeated."
15. Thereafter, another judgment of Two Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 16 SCC 20, it was held that the time/period for filing the written reply cannot be extended beyond the period of 45 days.
16. In the judgment passed by a Two Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. M/s Mampee Timbers & Hardwares Pvt. Ltd. decided on 10.02.2017, it was held that in some suitable cases, the delay could be condoned beyond the stipulated period of 45 days, as the aforesaid judgment of case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 16 SCC 20 was referred to a Constitution Bench.
17. In the aforesaid case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. II (2020) CPJ 1 (SC), the Constitutional Bench had upheld the law as laid down in the case of J.J. Merchant (supra).
18. Thereafter, in one subsequent judgment of case M/s Daddy's Builders Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Manish Bhargava & Anr. dated 11.02.2021 passed by Two Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the delay was not condoned by holding that even as per the view taken in the judgment of case of M/s Mampee Timbers (supra) , there was no mandate on the Fora that in those cases, the delay beyond the stipulated period of 45 days could be condoned. However, nothing had been said about such suitable case. Ultimately, by relying upon the judgment of case Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra), the delay was not condoned.
19. Thereafter, in one latest judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Diamond Exports & Anr. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. (Three Judges Bench) 2022 (4) SCC 169, the order passed by the Hon'ble National Commission condoning the delay was upheld. However, in the said judgment of the Apex Court, it was held that the delay could be condoned only in those cases, where the Applications seeking condonation of delay were pending or decided before 04.03.2020 i.e. the date on which the judgment of case Hilli Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 11 Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra) was delivered by the Constitutional Bench.
20. By considering these aspects, we deem it appropriate to discuss almost the similar provisions under Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC, which lay down the maximum period for filing written statement i.e. 30+90 days in a suit. Said provision has been held to be directory in nature in the case titled as Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India AIR 2005 (SC) 3353.
21. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner(s)/OPs have emphasized in their respective arguments that the provisions for filing reply within a period of 30+15 days are applicable to the Complaints filed before the District Commission and not to the State Commission. In the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra), no such discussion was there and the State Commission was having wider power vis a vis the District Commission. In Section 49 of the Act of 2019, it has been provided that the provisions relating to the Complaints under Sections 35 to 39 are applicable for disposal of the Complaints by the State Commission, with such modification as may be necessary. It has also been submitted that the State Commission while dealing with the Complaints originally filed before the State Commission, can modify the provisions contained in Sections 35 to 39 of the Act, which includes Section 38. Learned Counsel have also emphasized that the State Commission can extend the time as provided under Section 38 of the Act even beyond the period of 45 days (30+45) days in such like cases.
22. However, same issue was there before the Hon'ble National Commission in Consumer Case No.28 of 2021 titled as Kutumb Welfare Society v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (Noida) & Anr. The order passed by the Hon'ble National Commission in the said case on 13.06.2022 is reproduced as under:
" Mr. Prabhakar Tiwari, learned Counsel appearing for the Opposite Party No.2 has not filed Written Version so far. Time for filing the Written Version as provided under Section 13 (1)
(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 now replaced by Section 38 (2) (a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 which is in force since 20/24.07.2020 has expired. This Commission does not have the power to condone the delay beyond 30 + 15 days as provided in the statute. Right of Opposite Party No.2 to file the Written Version stands closed.
Rejoinder and Evidence by way of Affidavit be filed by the Complainant, within four weeks. Thereafter, the Opposite Party no.1 shall file Evidence by way of Affidavit, within four weeks.
List for Final Hearing on 14.12.2022 before the appropriate Bench as per Roster.
In the meanwhile, learned Counsel for the Parties may file Written Submissions after exchanging them."
23. Said order dated 13.06.2022 was challenged by the OP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by way of filing SLP Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 12 (Civil) Diary No(s).31629/2022 and it was dismissed vide order dated 04.11.2022. The order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 04.11.2022 is reproduced as under:
"Delay condoned.
It is not in dispute that the written statement was filed beyond the period of 45 days. The period of limitation to file is 30 days which can be condoned up to 15 days only.
As observed and held by this Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (P) Ltd. (2020) 5 SCC 757, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the prescribed period mentioned in the Statute.
In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission has committed any error in refusing to condone the delay which was beyond 45 days.
The present Special Leave Petition stands dismissed. Pending Application stands disposed of."
24. On perusal of said order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is apparent that in the beginning it has been mentioned that in that case, the written statements were filed beyond the period of 45 days, whereas the period of limitation to file reply was 30 days and it was mentioned that the delay could be condoned up to 15 days only. By relying upon the judgment passed by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra), it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the Hon'ble National Commission had not committed any error in refusing to condone the delay, which was beyond the period of 45 days and the SLP filed by the OP was dismissed. Meaning thereby the order passed by the Five Judges Bench in the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra) was relied upon and followed.
25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while deciding the issues in Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra), had emphasized on the provisions of Section 13 (2) (a), from which it is clear that the notice along with copy of the Complaint, which was to be sent to the OP, is always with the directions to file written reply within a period of 30 days with further provision that such period of 30 days is extendable by the District Commission but not beyond a period of 15 days i.e. the maximum period for filing the written version is 45 days from the date of receipt of notice along with copy of the Complaint.
26. The word "shall" has been used, which is mandatory. Normally, the word "shall" prima facie is to be considered mandatory but the intention of the legislature is also to decide the Complaint at the earliest. The meaning has to be ascribed to the word "shall" as mandatory or directory. Whenever any statute uses or used the word "shall", it is prima facie mandatory. The impact of such provision is to comply with the provision in dispute within the time bound period, which shows the serious concern and the same is to be followed by considering the object of legislation, so that the very purpose of legislation is not defeated or frustrated. Moreover, in a Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 13 number of judgments, the use of word "shall" prima facie has been considered mandatory but it is the duty of the Court to ascertain the real and actual intention of the legislature by a careful examination of the object and the statute, so that the object of providing speedy justice in a time bound manner can be achieved. However, in some of the arguments raised by the learned Counsels for the Petitioners/OPs, the provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC have been relied upon just in support of their contentions, but the language of relevant Sections of the Act is not para materia to Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC. The time of 120 days as provided under Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC, 1908 is actually means not to be mandatory but only directory and the Courts are having discretion to grant time beyond the period of 120 days. However, Section 13 (2) (b) (ii) of the Act of 1986 clearly provides the consequence of the Complaint to be proceeded ex parte, if the OP had failed to file the written version within the time so granted under Section 13 (2) (a) i.e. within a period of 45 days. Accordingly, the time so provided under Section 13 (2) of the Act of 1986 or Section 38 of the Act of 2019 is to be read as mandatory and not directory. Moreover, the objective of the Consumer Protection Act is to provide speedy justice, as is clear from the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Assn. of India (2011) 14 SCC 337. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the said case as under:
".....The 1986 Act was enacted for the better protection of the interests of consumers by making provision for the establishment of consumer councils and other authorities for the settlement of consumer disputes. The object and purpose of enacting the 1986 Act is to provide for simple, inexpensive and speedy remedy to the consumers who have grievance against defective goods and deficient services. This benevolent piece of legislation intended to protect a large body of consumers from exploitation."
27. In another case titled as CCI Chambers Coop. Hsg. Society Ltd. v. Development Credit Bank Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 233, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
".....It cannot be denied that fora at the national level, the State level and at the district level have been constituted under the Act with the avowed object of providing summary and speedy remedy in conformity with the principles of natural justice, taking care of such grievances as are amenable to the jurisdiction of the fora established under the Act. These fora have been established and conferred with the jurisdiction in addition to the conventional courts. The principal object sought to be achieved by establishing such fora is to relieve the conventional courts of their burden which is ever-increasing with the mounting arrears and whereat the disposal is delayed because of the complicated and detailed procedure which at times is accompanied by technicalities. Merely because recording of evidence is required, or some questions of fact and law arise Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 14 which would need to be investigated and determined, cannot be a ground for shutting the doors of any forum under the Act to the person aggrieved."
28. The observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court even in the case of J.J. Merchant & Ors. (supra) is also relevant, which is reproduced as under:
"....There is legislative mandate to the District Forum or the Commissions to dispose of the Complaints as far as possible within prescribed time of three months by adhering strictly to the procedure prescribed under the Act. The opposite party has to submit its version within 30 days from the date of the receipt of the Complaint by him and Commission can give at the most further 15 days for some unavoidable reasons to file its version."
29. Further in the case of Dr. Rabindra Nath Jana v. Alpana Bera Sasmal & Ors. 2017 (1) CPR 141 (NC), the Hon'ble National Commission has observed as under:
"Consumer Fora have no jurisdiction to extend period of limitation of 30 days provided under Section 13 (2) of the Act beyond a further period of 15 days- Written statement was sought to be filed in State Commission after expiry of 45 days from date of service of notice of Complaint along-with Application for condonation of delay- State Commission was fully justified in declining to condone delay in filing of written statement."
30. In another case titled as KAD Housing Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. M.L. Varma & Anr. 2016 (4) CPR 510 (NC), the Hon'ble National Commission has observed as under:
"6.......It is evident, therefore, that in terms of Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, it was obligatory on the part of the appellants/OPs to file the written version to the Complaint within the prescribed period of 30 days, extendable by 15 days. The plea taken by them that the notice got misplaced by the security personnel does not help them to seek extension of time on this ground."
31. As per provisions of Section 41 of the Act of 2019, the appeal can be filed against the order passed by the District Commission before the State Commission within a period of 45 days from the date of the order. However, the State Commission can entertain an appeal so filed beyond said period of 45 days provided the appellant is able to make a sufficient cause for condoning the delay. Section 41 of the Act of 2019 is reproduced as under:
"41. Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Commission may prefer an appeal against such order to the Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 15 State Commission on the grounds of facts or law within a period of forty-five days from the date of the order, in such form and manner, as may be prescribed:
Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period........"
32. Similarly, as per Section 69(1) of the Act of 2019, the District Commission, the State Commission or the Hon'ble National Commission do not admit a Complaint unless it is filed within a period of 2 years from the date of accrual of cause of action. However, discretion has been granted to condone the delay if the Complainant is able to show sufficient cause for not filing the Complaint within such period. Section 69(1) of the Act of 2019 is reproduced as under:
"69. (1) The District Commission, the State Commission or the National Commission shall not admit a Complaint unless it is filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action has arisen.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a Complaint may be entertained after the period specified in sub-
section (1), if the Complainant satisfies the District Commission, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, that he had sufficient cause for not filing the Complaint within such period:
Provided that no such Complaint shall be entertained unless the District Commission or the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, records its reasons for condoning such delay."
33. However, no such discretion or power has been conferred by the legislation under Section 13(2)(a) of the Act of 1986 or Section 38 (2) (a) of the Act of 2019 for filing reply to the Complaint beyond the extended period of 45 days (30+15 days). There is no question of making out/considering any sufficient cause for not filing the reply within the said period. The Courts are not empowered to carve out an exception in a specific provision of the statute, which is mandatory and if it is done, it would amount to insert a new provision into the statute, which is not permissible.
34. The Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court while deciding the issues in the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra) has discussed the various provisions of the Consumer Protection Act. In Para Nos.8 to 17 it has been held as under:
"8. A bare reading of Section 13(2)(a) of the Act makes it clear that the copy of the Complaint which is to be sent to the opposite party, is to be with the direction to give his version of (or response to) the case (or Complaint) within a period of 30 days. It further provides that such period of 30 days can be extended by the District Forum, but not beyond 15 days.Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 16
9. Sub Section 2(b)(i) of Section 13 of the Act provides for a Complaint to be decided on the basis of the response by the opposite party and the evidence of the Complainant and the opposite party, where allegations contained in the Complaint are denied or disputed by the opposite party. SubSection 2(b)(ii) of Section 13 of the Act provides that where no response is filed by the opposite party, the Complaint may be decided ex parte on the basis of evidence brought forth by the Complainant.
10. SubSection 2(c) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act further provides that where the Complainant fails to appear on the date of hearing before the District Forum, the District Forum may either dismiss the Complaint for default or decide it on merits. The aforesaid provision [subSection 2(c)] was inserted by Act 62 of 2002, w.e.f. 15.03.2003. Similarly, Section (3A) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, which was also inserted by Act 62 of 2002, provides for deciding every Complaint as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to decide the Complaint within a period of three months from the receipt of notice by the opposite party, and within five months, if the Complaint requires analysis or testing of commodities. It also provides that no adjournment shall ordinarily be granted by the District Forum, and if the same is to be granted, costs may be imposed, and further that reasons be recorded if the Complaint is disposed of after the time so provided.
11. From the above, it is clear that as mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Consumer Protection Act, the District Forum is to provide speedy disposal of consumer disputes. The same has been further reiterated by the legislature by insertion of Section 13(2)(c) and 13(3A) by Act 62 of 2002.
12. Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act clearly contemplates where time can be extended by the District Forum, and where it is not to be extended. Like, under sub-
Section (3A) of Section 13, despite the best efforts of the District Forum, in situations where the Complaint cannot be decided within the period specified therein, the same can be decided beyond the specified period for reasons to be recorded in writing by the District Forum at the time of disposing of the Complaint. Meaning thereby that the same would not be mandatory, but only directory. The phrase "endeavour shall be made", makes the intention of the legislature evident that the District Forum is to make every effort to decide the case expeditiously within time, but the same can also be decided beyond the said period, but for reasons to be recorded.
13. On the contrary, subSection (2)(a) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act provides for the opposite party to give his response 'within a period of 30 days or such extended period not exceeding 15 days as may be granted by the District Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 17 Forum'. The intention of the legislature seems to be very clear that the opposite party would get the time of 30 days, and in addition another 15 days at the discretion of the Forum to file its response. No further discretion of granting time beyond 45 days is intended under the Act.
The question of natural justice is dealt with by the legislature in subSection (3) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, which clearly provides that "No proceedings complying with the procedure laid down in the subSection (1) and (2) shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been complied with." The legislature was conscious that the Complaint would result in being decided ex parte, or without the response of the opposite party, if not filed within such time as provided under the Consumer Protection Act, and in such a case, the opposite party will not be allowed to take the plea that he was not given sufficient time or that principles of natural justice were not complied with. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of sub- Section (3) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act.
14. The maximum period of 45 days, as provided under the Consumer Protection Act, would not mean that the Complainant has a right to always avail such maximum period of 45 days to file its response. Regulation 10 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 clearly provides that ordinarily such notice to the opposite party to file its response shall be issued for a period of 30 days, but the same can be even less than 30 days, depending upon the circumstances of each case.
15. Now, reverting back to the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act to consider as to whether the provision of sub Section 2(a) of Section 13 granting a maximum period of 15 days in addition to 30 days has to be read as mandatory or not, we may also consider the other provisions of the Consumer Protection Act where the legislature intended to allow extension of period of limitation.
Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act provides for filing of an appeal from the order of the District Forum to the State Commission within a period of 30 days. However, it leaves a discretion with the State Commission to entertain an appeal filed after the expiry of the said period of 30 days, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within the stipulated period. Similarly, discretion for filing an appeal before the National Commission beyond the period of 30 days has also been provided under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act.
Section 24A provides for the limitation period of 2 years for filing the Complaint. However, subSection (2) of Section 24A gives a discretion to entertain a Complaint even after the period of 2 years, if there is a satisfactory cause for not Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 18 filing the Complaint within such period, which has to be recorded in writing.
16. Regulation 14 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 also deals with limitation. In addition, the same provides for limitation while dealing with appeals (under Section 15 and 19) and Complaint (under Section 24A). SubRegulation (2) of Regulation 14 provides for condonation of delay for sufficient reasons to be recorded.
17. The legislature in its wisdom has provided for filing of Complaint or appeals beyond the period specified under the relevant provisions of the Act and Regulations, if there is sufficient cause given by the party, which has to be to the satisfaction of the concerned authority. No such discretion has been provided for under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act for filing a response to the Complaint beyond the extended period of 45 days (30 days plus 15 days). Had the legislature not wanted to make such provision mandatory but only directory, the provision for further extension of the period for filing the response beyond 45 days would have been provided, as has been provided for in the cases of filing of Complaint and appeals. To carve out an exception in a specific provision of the statute is not within the jurisdiction of the Courts, and if it is so done, it would amount to legislating or inserting a provision into the statute, which is not permissible.
By specifically enacting a provision under subSection (3) of Section 13, with a specific clarification that violation of the principles of natural justice shall not be called in question where the procedure prescribed under subSections (1) and (2) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act has been followed or complied with, the intention of the legislature is clear that mere denial of further extension of time for filing the response (by the opposite party) would not amount to denial or violation of the principles of natural justice. This provision of Section 13(3) reinforces the time limit specified in Section 13(2)(a) of the Act."
35. It is also the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners/OPs that there can be some cases, where extreme hardship is there, which is beyond anybody's reach. The Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court while deciding the issues in the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra) has also dealt with the issue of hardship in Para Nos.18 & 19 as under:
"18...........Further, hardship cannot be a ground for changing the mandatory nature of the statute, as has been held by this Court in Bhikraj Jaipurai vs Union of India AIR 1962 SC 113=(1962) 2 SCR 880 and Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. Vs Custodian (2004) 11 SCC Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 19
472. Hardship cannot thus be a ground to interpret the provision so as to enlarge the time, where the statute provides for a specific time, which, in our opinion, has to be complied in letter and spirit.
This Court, in the case of Rohitash Kumar vs Om Prakash Sharma (2013) 11 SCC 451 has, in paragraph 23, held as under:
"23. There may be a statutory provision, which causes great hardship or inconvenience to either the party concerned, or to an individual, but the Court has no choice but to enforce it in full rigor.
It is a well settled principle of interpretation that hardship or inconvenience caused, cannot be used as a basis to alter the meaning of the language employed by the legislature, if such meaning is clear upon a bare perusal of the statute. If the language is plain and hence allows only one meaning, the same has to be given effect to, even if it causes hardship or possible injustice." While concluding, it was observed "that the hardship caused to an individual, cannot be a ground for not giving effective and grammatical meaning to every word of the provision, if the language used therein, is unequivocal." Further, it has been held by this Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Govardhane vs Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 10 SCC 765 that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes and that the Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds, even if the statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party.
19. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondent is that by not leaving a discretion with the District Forum for extending the period of limitation for filing the response before it by the opposite party, grave injustice would be caused as there could be circumstances beyond the control of the opposite party because of which the opposite party may not be able to file the response within the period of 30 days or the extended period of 15 days. In our view, if the law so provides, the same has to be strictly complied, so as to achieve the object of the statute. It is well settled that law prevails over equity, as equity can only supplement the law, and not supplant it.
This Court, in the case of Laxminarayan R. Bhattad vs State of Maharashtra (2003) 5 SCC 413, has observed that "when there is a conflict between law and equity the former shall prevail." In P.M. Latha vs State of Kerala (2003) 3 SCC 541, this Court held that "Equity and law are twin brothers and law should be applied and interpreted equitably, but equity cannot override written or settled law." In Nasiruddin vs Sita Ram Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC 577, this Court observed that "in a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 20 the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom." In E. Palanisamy vs Palanisamy (2003) 1 SCC 123, it was held that "Equitable considerations have no place where the statute contained express provisions." Further, in India House vs Kishan N. Lalwani (2003) 9 SCC 393, this Court held that "The period of limitation statutorily prescribed has to be strictly adhered to and cannot be relaxed or departed from by equitable considerations." It is thus settled law that where the provision of the Act is clear and unambiguous, it has no scope for any interpretation on equitable ground."
36. The Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held in the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra) as under:
"20. It is true that 'justice hurried is justice buried'. But in the same breath it is also said that 'justice delayed is justice denied'. The legislature has chosen the latter, and for a good reason. It goes with the objective sought to be achieved by the Consumer Protection Act, which is to provide speedy justice to the consumer. It is not that sufficient time to file a response to the Complaint has been denied to the opposite party. It is just that discretion of extension of time beyond 15 days (after the 30 days period) has been curtailed and consequences for the same have been provided under Section 13(2)(b)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act. It may be that in some cases the opposite party could face hardship because of such provision, yet for achieving the object of the Act, which is speedy and simple redressal of consumer disputes, hardship which may be caused to a party has to be ignored.
21. It has been further contended that the language of Section 13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act is pari materia to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short 'the Code') and if time can be extended for filing of written submission in a suit under the aforesaid provision of the Code, the same would apply to the filing of response to Complaint under the Consumer Protection Act as well, and hence the provision of Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act would be directory and not mandatory.
In this regard, what is noteworthy is that Regulation 26 of the Consumer Protection Regulation, 2005, clearly mandates that endeavour is to be made to avoid the use of the provisions of the Code except for such provisions, which have been referred to in the Consumer Protection Act and the Regulations framed thereunder, which is provided for in respect of specific matters enumerated in Section 13(4) of the Consumer Protection Act. It is pertinent to note that nonfiling of written statement under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code is not followed by any consequence of such nonfiling within the time so provided in the Code.Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 21
Now, while considering the relevant provisions of the Code, it is noteworthy that Order VIII Rule 1 read with Order VIII Rule 10 prescribes that the maximum period of 120 days provided under Order VIII Rule 1 is actually not meant to be mandatory, but only directory. Order VIII Rule 10 mandates that where written statement is not filed within the time provided under Order VIII Rule 1 "the court shall pronounce the judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit". A harmonious construction of these provisions is clearly indicative of the fact that the discretion is left with the Court to grant time beyond the maximum period of 120 days, which may be in exceptional cases. On the other hand, subSection (2)(b)(ii) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act clearly provides for the consequence of the Complaint to be proceeded ex parte against the opposite party, if the opposite party omits or fails to represent his case within the time given.
It may further be noted that in Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code, for suits filed under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, a proviso has been inserted for 'commercial disputes of a specified value' (vide Act 4 of 2016 w.r.e.f. 23.10.2015), which reads as under:
"Provided further that no Court shall make an Order to extend the time provided under Rule 1 of this Order for filing the written statement" From the above, it is clear that for commercial suits, time for filing written statement provided under Order VIII Rule 1 is meant to be mandatory, but not so for ordinary civil suits. Similarly, in our considered view, for cases under the Consumer Protection Act also, the time provided under Section 13(2)(a) of the Act has to be read as mandatory, and not directory.
Once consequences are provided for not filing the response to the Complaint within the time specified, and it is further provided that proceedings complying with the procedure laid down under sub Section (1) and (2) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act shall not be called in question in any Court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been complied with, the intention of the legislature is absolutely clear that the provision of subSection 2(a) of Section 13 of the Act in specifying the time limit for filing the response to the Complaint is mandatory, and not directory.
22. After noticing that there were delays in deciding the Complaints by the District Forum, the legislature inserted sub Section (3A) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act providing for a time limit for deciding the Complaints. From this it is amply clear that the intention of the legislature was, and has always been, for expeditious disposal of the Complaints. By providing for extension of time for disposal of the cases filed, for reasons to be recorded, the legislature has provided for a discretion to the Forum that wherever necessary, the extension of the time can be provided for, and where such further extension is not to be granted [as in the case of Section Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 22 13(2)(a)], the legislature has consciously not provided for the same, so as to achieve the object of the Act.
23. In SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited vs K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited (2019) 12 SCC 210, this Court, was dealing with a case relating to the filing of written statement under the Code, in respect of a case under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. After noticing the amendments brought in Order V Rule 1, Order VIII Rule 1 and Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code with regard to 'commercial disputes of specified value' under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 by way of insertion of the Provisos in the aforesaid provisions, this Court held that "....the clear, definite and mandatory provisions of Order V read with Order VIII Rule 1 and 10 cannot be circumvented by recourse to the inherent power under Section 151 to do the opposite of what is stated therein". It was, thus, held that there was no scope for enlarging the time for filing of written statement beyond the period of 120 days in commercial suits, as the provision with regard to such suits would be mandatory, and not directory. The said judgment has been affirmed by a Bench of three Judges in Desh Raj vs Balkishan decided on 20.01.2020 in Civil Appeal No.433 of 2020.
24. In Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. Vs Custodian (2004) 11 SCC 472, this Court was dealing with the provisions of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, and the question was whether the Special Court has power to condone the delay in filing the petition under Section 4(2) of the said Act. While holding, that the said provision would be mandatory, it was held in paragraph 13 as under:
"13. It is not for the courts to determine whether the period of 30 days is too short to take into account the various misfortunes that may be faced by notified persons who wish to file objections under Section 4(2) of the Act nor can the section be held to be directory because of such alleged inadequacy of time." Then, after considering the decisions of this Court in Topline Shoes Ltd. vs. Corporation Bank (2002) 6 SCC 33 and Dr. J. J. Merchant vs. Shrinath Chaturvedi (2002) 6 SCC 635, this Court held that "the period for filing an objection in Section 4(2) in the Act is a mandatory provision given the language of the Section and having regard to the objects sought to be served by the Act."
25. Certain other cases, which have been referred to by the learned Counsel for the parties, have, in our considered opinion, no direct bearing on the facts and issue involved in the present case relating to the Consumer Protection Act, and thus, the same are not being dealt with and considered here.
26. We may now deal with the decisions rendered by this Court, which have been referred to in the Reference Order.
Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 2327. Division Bench of this Court has referred this Question, after observing that there is an apparent conflict between the decisions of this Court in Topline Shoes (supra); Kailash Vs. Nanhku (2005) 4 SCC 480 and Salem Advocate Bar Association vs. Union of India (2005) 6 SCC 344 on the one hand; and Dr. J. J. Merchant (supra) and NIA vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (2015) 16 SCC 22, on the other hand.
28. In Topline Shoes (supra), a Division Bench of this Court, while dealing with the provisions of Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, has held that the said provision would be directory and not mandatory. While holding so, the Bench relied on the principles of natural justice, and also that no consequence of nonfiling of the response to the Complaint within 45 days is provided for in the Consumer Protection Act.
In paragraph 8 of the said judgment, this Court held:
"It is for the Forum or the Commission to consider all facts and circumstances along with the provisions of the Act providing time frame to file reply, as a guideline and then to exercise its discretion as best as it may serve the ends of justice and achieve the object of speedy disposal of such cases keeping in mind the principles of natural justice as well".
(emphasis supplied) It is true that in Clause 4 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Consumer Protection Act, the legislature provided that "quasi-judicial bodies will observe the principles of natural justice", however, the same is to be observed generally, and not where the same is specifically excluded. In the said judgment, subSection (3) of Section 13 has neither been referred, nor taken note of. The same mandates that no proceedings complying with the procedure laid down in sub- Sections (1) and (2) of Section 13 shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been complied with. From this it is evident that while considering the provisions of Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, the law mandates that the principles of natural justice cannot be said to be violated by adopting the said procedure and that the time of 30 days plus 15 days provided for filing the response to the Complaint would be sufficient and final.
In case of Topline Shoes (supra), this Court was also of the view that in the Consumer Protection Act, "no consequence is provided in case the time granted to file reply exceeds the total period of 45 days". While observing so, the Bench did not take into account the provisions of Section 13(2)(b)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, which provides that where the opposite party fails to file response to the Complaint within the specified time provided in Clause (a), "the District Forum shall Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 24 proceed to settle the consumer dispute......... on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the Complainant........". After the said judgment, by Amendment Act 62 of 2002 (w.e.f. 15.03.2003), the legislature has provided that the District Forum shall proceed to settle the consumer dispute "ex parte on the basis of the evidence". The word "ex parte" has been added by the Amending Act. As we have observed herein above, the consequence of not filing the response to the Complaint within the stipulated time is thus clearly provided for in the aforesaid subSection, which has not been noticed by the Bench while deciding the aforesaid case.
29. In the case of Kailash vs. Nanhku (supra), this Court was dealing with an election trial under the Representation of People Act, 1951, and while considering the provision under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code, it held the same to be directory, and not mandatory. While holding so, the Court was of the view that "the consequences flowing from nonextension of time are not specifically provided" in the Code. The decision in the said case has no bearing on the question under consideration, as the present reference before us is under the Consumer Protection Act, where, as we have already observed, consequences are specifically provided for.
In passing, in paragraph 35 of the said judgment, the Bench referred to the case of Topline Shoes (supra), where the provision of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act was considered to be directory, and not mandatory. In our view, the same would not have the effect of affirming the decision of Topline Shoes (supra) since the Court, in the aforesaid case, was dealing with the provisions of the Code and not the specific provisions of Consumer Protection Act.
We are thus of the opinion that Kailash vs Nanhku (supra) has not overruled the decision in Dr. J. J. Merchant (supra) with regard to the provision of the Consumer Protection Act.
30. Again, in the case of Salem Advocates Bar Association (supra), this Court was dealing with a case under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code and in paragraph 20, it has been held as under:
"20..........The use of the word "shall" is ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the provision but having regard to the context in which it is used or having regard to the intention of the legislation, the same can be construed as directory. The rule in question has to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. The rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. The rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice and not its mistress. In the present context, the strict interpretation would defeat justice."Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 25
Thereafter, the Court proceeded to refer to the provisions of Order VIII Rule 1, along with Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code. On a harmonious construction of the said provision, it held that the provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code would be directory, and not mandatory. Relevant paragraph 21 of the said judgment is below:
"21. In construing this provision, support can also be had from Order 8 Rule 10 which provides that where any party from whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 or Rule 9, fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the court, the court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such other order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. On failure to file written statement under this provision, the court has been given the discretion either to pronounce judgment against the defendant or make such other order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. In the context of the provision, despite use of the word "shall", the court has been given the discretion to pronounce or not to pronounce the judgment against the defendant even if the written statement is not filed and instead pass such order as it may think fit in relation to the suit. In construing the provision of Order 8 Rule 1 and Rule 10, the doctrine of harmonious construction is required to be applied. The effect would be that under Rule 10 Order 8, the court in its discretion would have the power to allow the defendant to file written statement even after expiry of the period of 90 days provided in Order 8 Rule 1. There is no restriction in Order 8 Rule 10 that after expiry of ninety days, further time cannot be granted. The court has wide power to "make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit". Clearly, therefore, the provision of Order 8 Rule 1 providing for the upper limit of 90 days to file written statement is directory".
As such in our view, the said judgment would hold the field with regard to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code and would not be applicable to cases dealing with the provisions of Section 13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, or such other enactment wherein a provision akin to Section 13(2) is there and the consequences are also provided.
........................................ ........................................
41. To conclude, we hold that our answer to the first question is that the District Forum has no power to extend the time for filing the response to the Complaint beyond the period of 15 days in addition to 30 days as is envisaged under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act; and the answer to the second question is that the commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt of the notice accompanied with the Complaint by the opposite party, and not mere receipt of the notice of the Complaint."
Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 2613. Similar view was taken by this Commission in the case of Sumeetinder Singh (supra).
14. Identical issue was also there before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, UT, Chandigarh in the case of Kulwant Rai (Supra), wherein it has been held that the written reply cannot be filed beyond the statutory period of 45 days as provided under the Act. The State Commission had also directed the District Commissions to refrain from adjourning the matters for filing written reply and evidence beyond the period of 45 days as provided under the Act.
15. Similarly, in Revision Petition No.22 of 2022, the notice in the Complaint filed by the Petitioner/Complainant was issued to the OPs on 28.10.2021 for appearance before the District Commission on 03.02.2022. As per the office report made by the concerned official of the District Commission, the notice was sent to the OPs on 26.01.2022 through Regd. Post but the same was not received back. At the most, the notice sent through Regd. Post was presumed to be served upon the OPs within a maximum period of 7 days from the date of dispatch i.e. up to 02.02.2022. The period of 45 days (30+15) for filing the reply can be considered after 02.02.2022. The statutory period of 45 days had already expired on 19.03.2022 after the date of service on 02.02.2022. However, on 03.02.2022 the OPs had appeared before the District Commission through Counsel, who had filed his Memo of Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 27 Appearance before the District Commission and the case was adjourned to 02.05.2022 for filing written version as well as Power of Attorney (POA). On 02.05.2022, Power of Attorney was filed by the by the Counsel for the OPs and time was sought to file the written version and the case was adjourned to 18.05.2022. On 18.05.2022 also, Counsel for the OPs had sought time to file the written version and the case was further adjourned to 10.06.2022 subject to last opportunity.
However, on 10.06.2022, instead of filing the written version, the OPs had filed an Application for dismissal of the Complaint and the case was adjourned to 14.07.2022 for filing reply and consideration on the said Application. On 14.07.2022, the Complainants had sought time to file reply to said Application and the case was adjourned to 20.07.2022. On 20.07.2022, the Complainants had filed reply to the Application for dismissal of the Complaint and they had also filed an Application for striking off the defence of the OPs on the ground that the OPs had not filed the written version within the statutory period of 45 days. Thereafter, the case was adjourned on a number of occasions and ultimately on 30.01.2023, the OPs had withdrawn their Application for dismissal of the Complaint. Even thereafter, the time was again given to the OPs to file the written version. Ultimately, on 08.02.2023, the written version of the OPs was taken on record by the District Commission and the Application filed by the Complainants for striking off the defence of the OPs was dismissed as infructuous.
Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 2816. In view of the above discussion as well as the settled law as laid down by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra) and Care Diagnostic Centre & Ors. (supra) the period for filing the written reply cannot be extended beyond the statutory period of 45 days (30+15) as prescribed under Section 38 (2) (a) of the Act of 2019.
However, the District Commission had committed a material illegality by extending the time for filing the written version beyond the statutory period of 45 days in violation of the provisions of the Act.
17. Accordingly, finding force in the contentions raised by learned Counsel for the Petitioners/Complainants, both the Revision Petitions i.e. Revision Petition No.21 of 2022 and Revision Petition No.22 of 2022 are allowed and the impugned orders dated 08.02.2023 passed by the District Commission are set aside. The written replies along with documents, if any, filed by the OPs before the District Commission in both the Complaints are ordered to be taken off the record.
18. Before parting with the judgment, it is relevant to mention that in a number of cases, the District Commissions are granting the time over and above the statutory period of 45 (30+15) for the purpose of filing the written version in the Consumer Complaints, in utter disregard/violation to the provisions of the Act. Therefore, we deem it appropriate to direct Revision Petition No.21 of 2023 29 all the District Commissions to strictly apply the provisions of Section 38 (2) (a) of the Act of 2019 of the Act and not to adjourn the matters for filing the written version beyond the period of 45 (30+15) as provided under the Act, so that the purpose of speedy disposal of the Consumer Cases within the maximum period of 3 months as provided under Section 38(7) of the Act is not frustrated/defeated.
19. Since the main cases have been disposed off, so all the pending Miscellaneous Applications, if any, are accordingly disposed off.
20. The copy of this order be sent to the parties as well as to all the District Commissions in the State of Punjab for the strict compliance of the provisions of Section 38 (2) (a) of the Act of 2019 of the Act.
(JUSTICE DAYA CHAUDHARY) PRESIDENT (SIMARJOT KAUR) MEMBER October 16, 2024.
(Gurmeet S)