Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Sukhdev Kumhar on 2 March, 2026
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2026:CGHC:10914
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ACQA No. 458 of 2025
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Incharge, Police Station Sitapur, District
Surguja (C.G.)
... Appellant
versus
1 - Sukhdev Kumhar S/o Late Jageshwar Kumhar, Aged About 60 Years,
Occupation - Agriculture, R/o Village Kapatbahri-Kumharpara, Police Station
Sitapur, District - Surguja (C.G.)
2 - Kanaksai S/o Late Jageshwar Kumhar, Aged About 45 Years, Occupation -
Agriculture, R/o Village Kapatbahri-Kumharpara, Police Station Sitapur, District -
Surguja (C.G.)
3 - Thurchuram Kumhar S/o Late Jageshwar Kumhar, Aged About 48 Years,
Occupation - Agriculture, R/o Village Kapatbahri-Kumharpara, Police Station
Sitapur, District - Surguja (C.G.)
4 - Amir @ Amit Kumhar S/o Chhotu @ Chatku, Aged About 22 Years, Occupation -
Agriculture, R/o Village Kapatbahri-Kumharpara, Police Station Sitapur, District -
Surguja (C.G.)
5 - Ajit Kumhar S/o Kanaksai, Aged About 22 Years, Occupation - Agriculture, R/o
Village Kapatbahri-Kumharpara, Police Station Sitapur, District - Surguja (C.G.)
6 - Santosh Prajapati S/o Late Changde @ Pradhan Kumhar, Aged About 40 Years,
Occupation - Agriculture, R/o Village Bilaspur (Ghoghar), Police Station Batouli,
District - Surguja (C.G.)
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
Digitally signed by
MOHAMMED
AADIL KHAN
Date: 2026.03.09
13:14:01 +0530
For Appellant : Mr. Vinod Tekam, Govt. Advocate.
For Respondents : Mr. Gagan Pandey, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Amarnath
Pandey, Advocate.
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Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.
Order on Board 02-03-2026
1. The present is acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/State under Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 09- 09-2015 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Surguja place Ambikapur in Sessions Case No.25/2015 whereby the respondents/accused have been acquitted from the offence under Section 306/34 of the IPC.
2. Brief facts of the case are that on 02-12-2014 deceased Jasmatiyabai committed suicide by hanging herself by jackfruit tree in kitchen-garden of her house. In the next morning her dead body was seen by her son PW-3 Vinod and merg intimation was informed to police. The dead body was sent for its postmortem to Community Health Center Sitapur where Doctor N. Nikunj PW-1 conducted postmortem on the dead body of the deceased and gave his report Ex.-P/1 in which he opined that the deceased died due to asphyxia due to hanging. The statement of the witnesses were recorded and the FIR was registered against the respondents/accused for the offence under Section 306, 34 of the IPC. After due investigation charge sheet was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Sitapur. The case was committed to the learned Sessions Judge Surguja place Ambikapur for its trial.
3. The learned trial Court has framed charge under Section 306/34 of the IPC.
The accused persons denied the charge and claimed trial.
4. In order to prove the charge against the respondents/accused persons the prosecution has examined as many as 8 witnesses. Statement of the accused persons under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. have also been recorded in which they denied the circumstances that appeared against them, pleaded innocence and have submitted that they have been falsely implicated in the offence. It has also been submitted by the accused persons with respect to their ancestral land a civil litigation is pending at Sitapur Civil Court and a 3 temporary injunction order has been passed in their favour. They have no nexus with the alleged incident of suicide of the deceased and there was no altercation with her on the date of incident.
5. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties, the learned trial Court acquitted the respondents/accused persons from the alleged offence holding that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, there is no ingredients of abetment to commit suicide to the deceased or to instigate her to commit suicide, which is under challenge in the present acquittal appeal.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. But for minor omissions and contradiction the evidence of prosecution witnesses are reliable to convict the respondents/accused persons for the offence in question. The son of the deceased Vinod PW-3, mother of the deceased Sukhanibai PW-5 have clearly deposed that on the date of incident itself there was a threat to the deceased by accused persons with respect to the land dispute. He would further submit that on 25-11-2014 the incident of altercation occurred between the deceased and the respondents/accused persons for which the deceased has lodged a report to police and since no action was taken by police, the deceased made a complaint to SDO(police). She was returning back from the office of SDO (Police) on the way the accused persons threatened her with dire consequences which culminated into her suicide which directly connects the accused persons with the offence of abatement to commit suicide. The minor discrepancies in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses have been considered by the learned trial Court while acquitting the respondents/accused persons which is against the settled principle of law that minor discrepancies cannot be considered in creating doubt upon prosecution's case. Though the witnesses are relatives of the deceased, but merely on that ground they cannot be considered to be 4 interested witnesses as they are real witness of the incident. Therefore, there are sufficient and overwhelming evidence to convict the respondents/accused persons for the offence in question and the judgment of acquittal is liable be set aside.
7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents/accused persons supported the impugned judgment of acquittal.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court.
9. From perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court it transpires that the learned trail Court has elaborately considered the civil dispute between the parties and that the litigation is pending before the Civil Court Sitapur. The learned trial Court has also considered that since the land dispute was going on between the parties on 25-11-2014 there was an altercation between the parties, but at that time the deceased was not on the spot and the incident of 25-11-2014 was reported by her son Vinod. It has also been observed that with respect to the alleged incident of 01-12-2014 other witnesses of the vicinity have not been examined by the prosecution who may be independent witnesses and considering the relation between the parties and the witnesses, it is very difficult to consider the truthfulness of the evidence of the complainant in view of the ongoing civil dispute between the parties.
10. From perusal of the evidence of PW-3 Vinod who is son of the deceased it also appears that 01-12-2014 when they were returning back after lodging of report near village Mangari the accused persons met them and asked not to come at village Kapatbahri.
The manner in which the allegation of threat was given by the accused persons does not demonstrate any grievance and it only reflects that the accused persons asked them not to come village Kapatbahri. When the deceased has already prosecuted a civil suit and report has already been 5 lodged with respect to the offence of 25-11-2014 it cannot be said that merely saying that not to come to village Kapatbahri would amount to instigate the deceased to commit suicide or any threat with dire consequences which may have effect of instigation or abetment to commit suicide.
Further, PW-3 Vinod has admitted in para 23 of his cross-examination that at the time of incident of 01-12-2014 he neither informed the persons of vicinity nor called them for help.
11. PW-4 Lalit who is husband of the deceased has stated in his evidence that there was civil dispute with respect to land between the deceased and the accused persons and for that reason the deceased has committed suicide. This witness has turned hostile and not supported the incident of 01-12-2014.
12. PW-5 Sukhanibai is mother of the deceased. Though she stated that on the date of incident the accused persons came to her house and threatened them with dire consequences, but her evidence is materially contradictory with the evidence of PW-3.
13. The only evidence comes on record that on 01-12-2014 there was a threat given by the accused persons to the deceased with respect to the civil litigation.
When the civil litigation is already pending and with respect to the incident of 25-11-2014 they already reported to police, it cannot be said that if any incident occurred on 01-12-2014 that itself is suffice to hold that the accused persons have abetted the deceased to commit suicide or instigated her to commit suicide.
14. To constitute the offence of abetment to commit suicide, the law is settled by the Supreme Court in case of Gurucharan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 2017(1)SCC 433, in which it was observed as under:-
"20. Section 306 of the Code prescribes the punishment for abetment of suicide and is designed thus:
"Abetment of suicide. If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with 6 imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
21. It is thus manifest that the offence punishable is one of abetment of the commission of suicide by any person, predicating existence of a live link or nexus between the two, abetment being the propelling. causative factor. The basic ingredients of this provision are suicidal death and the abetment thereof. To constitute abetment, the intention and involvement of the accused to aid or instigate the commission of suicide is imperative. Any severance or absence of any of this constituents would militate against this indictment. Remoteness of the culpable acts or omissions rooted in the intention of the accused to actualize the suicide would fall short as well of the offence of abetment essential to attract the punitive mandate of Section 306 IPC. Contiguity, continuity, culpability and complicity of the indictable acts or omission are the concomitant indices of abetment. Section 306 IPC, thus criminalises the sustained incitement for suicide.
22. Section 107 IPC defines abetment and is extracted hereunder:
"107. Abetment of a thing. A person abets the doing of a thing, who-First-Instigates any person to do that thing: or Secondly Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1- A person, who by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that doing.
Explanation 2- Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."
Not only the acts and omissions defining the offence of abetment singularly or in combination are enumerated therein, the explanations adequately encompass all conceivable facets of the culpable conduct of the offender relatable thereto.
27. The pith and purport of Section 306 IPC has since been enunciated by this Court in Randhir Singh vs. State of Punjab (2004)13 SCC 129, and the relevant excerpts therefrom are set out hereunder.
"12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing. In cases of conspiracy also it would involve that mental process of entering into conspiracy for the doing of that thing. More 7 active role which can be described as instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person can be said to be abetting the commission of offence under Section 306 IPC.
13. In State of W.B. Vs. Orilal Jaiswal (1994) 1 SCC 73, this Court has observed that the courts should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty."
28. Significantly, this Court underlined by referring to its earlier pronouncement in Orilal Jaiswal (supra) that courts have to be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case to ascertain as to whether cruelty had been meted out to the victim and that the same had induced the person to end his/her life by committing suicide, with the caveat that if the victim committing suicide appears to be hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life, quite common to the society to which he or she belonged and such factors were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to resort to such step, the accused charged with abetment could not be held guilty. The above view was reiterated in Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal (2010) 1 SCC 707.
29. That the intention of the legislature is that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit an offence and that there ought to be an active or direct act leading the deceased to commit suicide, being left with no option, had been propounded by this Court in S.S. Chheena vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan (2010) 12 SCC 190."
15. Recently in Mahendra Awase Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025(4)SCC 801, the Supreme Court held as under:
12. As is clear from the plain language of the Sections to attract the ingredient of Section 306, the accused should have abetted the commission of a suicide. A person abets the doing of a thing who Firstly instigates any person to do that thing or Secondly engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing 8 or Thirdly intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
13. In Swamy Prahaladdas vs. State of M.P. and Another, [1995 Supp (3) SCC 438), the appellant remarked to the deceased that 'go and die and the deceased thereafter, committed suicide. This Court held that:-
"3..... Those words are casual nature which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarrelling people. Nothing serious is expected to follow thereafter. The said act does not reflect the requisite 'mens rea' on the assumption that these words would be carried out in all events......"
14. In Madan Mohan Singh vs. State of Gujarat and Another, (2010) 8 SCC 628, this Court held that in order to bring out an offence under Section 306 IPC specific abetment as contemplated by Section 107 IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to bring about the suicide of the person concerned as a result of that abetment is required. It was further held that the intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for attracting Section 306.
15. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707, this Court held as under:-
"12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable."
16. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC.
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17. M. Mohan vs. State, (2011) 3 SCC 626 followed Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618, wherein it was held as under-
41. This Court in SCC para 20 of Ramesh Kumar has examined different shades of the meaning of "instigation". Para 20 reads as under: (SCC p. 629) "20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation."
In the said case this Court came to the conclusion that there is no evidence and material available on record where from an inference of the appellant accused having abetted commission of suicide by Seema (the appellant's wife therein) may necessarily be drawn."
18. Thereafter, this Court in Mohan (supra) held:-
45. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court are clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide."
19. As has been held hereinabove, to satisfy the requirement of instigation the accused by his act or omission or by a continued course of conduct should have created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide. It was also held that a word uttered in a fit of anger and emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.
16. From the aforesaid law laid down by the Supreme Court and the evidence available on record, it would certainly not be held that the respondents accused persons, by their act, created the circumstances which left the deceased with no other option, except to commit suicide. 10
17. The trial court after adverting entire evidence considered that prosecution could not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and comes to the conclusion that there is lack of evidence with respect to abetment to commit suicide or instigate the deceased to commit suicide. The view taken by the trial court is one of the plausible view which cannot be said to be perverse or illegal under the facts and circumstances as well as evidence available on record
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and Ors Vs. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440, has considered the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal in judgment at Para 25 which reads as under;
"25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 Cr.P.C., the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that ensures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters."
19. Recently, applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984, has held as follows:-
"8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is 11 not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all."
20. After considering the material available on record as well as the well-
reasoned judgment passed by the learned trial court and being very much conscious of the existing legal position as held in case of Kistoora Ram (Supra) and Jafarudheen (Supra) that in an appeal against acquittal if two views are possible on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution and the trial court taking one view favoured the accused, reversion of the findings of acquittal by the appellate court taking the other possible view into consideration, is not permissible in law. I therefore, of the considered opinion that the judgement impugned acquitting the accused/respondents is just and proper and does not call for any interference.
21. For the foregoing reasons, the acquittal appeal is devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Aadil