Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
M.Purushotham Reddy, vs Shaik Thosif Ahamad Sajid Khan, on 7 November, 2025
APHC010507512023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3521]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY,THE SEVENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY-FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 959/2023
Between:
M.PurushothamReddy, ...PETITIONER
AND
Shaik Thosif Ahamad Sajid Khan and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Shaik Mohammed Ismail
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. Ayesha Azma S
2. Public Prosecutor (AP)
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
Criminal Revision Case has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731, challenging the impugned order dated 19.05.2023 passed in Crl.M.P. No.707 of 2022 in Crl.A. No.___ of 2022, arising out of the acquittal judgment rendered in C.C. No.145 of 2018 on the file of the learned Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class for Prohibition and Excise Offences, Kadapa, whereby the application filed by the de-facto 1 the Cr.P.C 2 complainant/victim seeking condonation of delay of 77 days in preferring the appeal was dismissed.
2. The learned Trial Court passed the judgment of acquittal on 13.07.2022. The de facto complainant applied for a certified copy of the judgment on 12.09.2022, and the same was furnished to him on 13.10.2022. Thereafter, he preferred a Criminal Appeal on 29.10.2022. Along with the appeal, a petition was filed seeking for condonation of delay of 77 days under Articles 114(a), 114(b), and 115(b) of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 2. However, the learned Appellate Court declined to condone the delay on the ground that it was inordinate and that no satisfactory explanation had been offered for the same. It is to be borne in mind that the petitioner is the de-facto complainant, and he was unaware of the date on which the judgment of acquittal was pronounced by the learned Trial Court acquitting the unofficial respondents. In fact, the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contain any provision either for affording an opportunity to the victim to be heard at the stage of final arguments or for issuing notice to the de-facto complainant/victim at the time of pronouncement of judgment. Indeed, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra3 at paragraph Nos.22 andd 23 it is held as under:
22. It cannot be gainsaid that the rights of a victim under the amended CrPC are substantive, enforceable, and are another facet of human rights. The victim's right, therefore, cannot be termed or construed restrictively like a brutum fulmen [Ed.: The literal translation from the Latin approximates to "meaningless thunderbolt or lightning", and is used to convey the idea of an "empty threat" or something which is ineffective.] . We reiterate that these rights are totally independent, incomparable, and are not accessory or auxiliary to those of the State under the CrPC. The presence of "State" in the proceedings, therefore, does not tantamount to according a hearing to a "victim" of the crime.2
the Limitation Act 3 , (2022) 9 SCC 321 3
23. A "victim" within the meaning of CrPC cannot be asked to await the commencement of trial for asserting his/her right to participate in the proceedings. He/She has a legally vested right to be heard at every step post the occurrence of an offence. Such a "victim" has unbridled participatory rights from the stage of investigation till the culmination of the proceedings in an appeal or revision. We may hasten to clarify that "victim" and "complainant/informant" are two distinct connotations in criminal jurisprudence. It is not always necessary that the complainant/informant is also a "victim", for even a stranger to the act of crime can be an "informant", and similarly, a "victim" need not be the complainant or informant of a felony.
3. The learned counsel for petitioner has relied upon the decision in Peethambaran v. State of Kerala4 at paragraph No.9 and 10 it is held as under:
9. On consideration of the above two judgments, the following propositions emerge:--
(i) A victim has a right to appeal against a judgment of acquittal or a judgment imposing a lesser sentence.
(ii) No leave petition is required to be filed nor is leave required to be obtained for filing an appeal by the victim and the rights of the victim under the amended Code are substantive in nature.
(iii) An affidavit explaining the delay is sufficient while a petition to condone the delay is not required.
(iv) Since a petition to condone the delay cannot be filed, a corresponding order is also not contemplated.
10. In view of the above propositions culled out form the binding precedents, it is evident that a delay condonation petition is not required to be filed by a victim who prefers an appeal even after a delay of more than 90 days. The only requirement is to file an affidavit explaining the delay. If the Appellate Court is satisfied with the explanations offered, the court is entitled to proceed to consider admission of the appeal.
4. Further, the learned counsel for petitioner has relied upon the decision in Keshavu Devi v. Puran Chand5 at paragraph No.14 and 19, it is held as under:
"14... A Full Bench of Kerala High Court held in Sobhanakumari K. v. Santhosh (23.10.2017 - KERHC): MANU/ KE/ 2167/2017, that the victim can file an appeal under proviso to Section 372 of CrPC within a reasonable period. It was observed:-
"27. The reference is answered thus:4
2023 SCC OnLine Ker 1642 5 MANU/HP/0111/2025 4
(i) Clause (b) of Article 115 of the Limitation Act applies to an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C by a victim against an order convicting the accused for a lesser offence or against an order imposing inadequate compensation. If such an appeal lies only to the High Court, It shall be filed within 60 days from the date of the order appealed against. If it lies to the Court of Session, It shall be filed within 30 days from the date of the order appealed from.
(ii) No period of limitation is prescribed for an appeal by a victim under the said proviso from an order of acquittal. Article 114 of the Limitation Act does not apply to such an appeal. But the victim shall bring his appeal within a reasonable period of 90 days from the date of the order, whether it is to be filed in the High Court or in the Court of Session. If such appeal is filed beyond the reasonable period, the victim shall file an affidavit explaining why he could not file it within the reasonable period. The decisions in Yohannan's case (supra) and Vinod's case (supra) holding so hold the correct law.
19. A Division Bench of Bombay High Court also took similar view in Amit v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (05.05.2015-BOMHC): MANU/MH/0993/2015 and held as under:-
13....In our humble opinion, and with respect to the Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court providing for the limitation for filing of an appeal against acquittal does not fall within the realm of the judicial function. It is for the Legislature to provide for limitation under Article 114 when the occasion has arisen as a result of insertion of proviso to Section 372 with effect from December 31, 2009. Till then, the settled principle that such appeals must be filed within a reasonable time should hold the field. In that view of the matter, the only way out for us is to make a recommendation to the Law Commission through the Ministry of Law & Justice to consider amendment to Article 114 of the Limitation Act for providing for limitation in relation to the appeals to be filed under the proviso to Section 372, Criminal Procedure Code. Further, the appellate Court has always a power to consider the reason about the date of knowledge of the order appealable by the victim as sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. With respect, it would not be be appropriate to hold that the limitation should be counted from the date of knowledge acquired by the victim without the same being projected as a reason to condone the delay.
5. The learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 3 has brought to the notice of this Court the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Tata Steel Ltd v. Atma Tube Products Ltd6 wherein at paragraph Nos.126, 135, and 136, it is held as under:
"126... Various High Courts have experienced difficulty in determining the period of limitation for an appeal preferable by a victim under proviso to Section 372 of the Code. A Division bench of Patna High Court in RAghunath Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2011(6) RCT (Crl.) 133, has viewed that since the period of limitation for filing an appeal against the acquittal under Section 378 is ninety days and no period of limitation has been provided for filing an appeal under Section 372 by a „victim‟, the 6 MANU/PH/0175/2013 5 same period of limitation as provided under Article 114 of the Limitation Act will be applicable for filing an appeal under Section 372 of the Code also. The Full Bench of Gujarat High Court in BhavubenDineshbhai Makwana‟s case (supra) too, with reference to Article 114(a) of the Limitation Act, has held that the period of ninety days should be the reasonable period is the longest period of limitation for filing an appeal against an order of acquittal prescribed by the Legislature.
135...The Supreme Court in Japani Sahoo v. Chander Shekhar Mohanty, MANU/SC/3080/2007 : (2007) 7 SCC 374, observed that mere delay in approaching the court of law would not be itself afford a ground for dismissing the case though it may be a relevant circumstance in reaching the final verdict. There is no gainsaying that where no period of limitation is expressly provided to prefer an appeal, the aggrieved person is expected to approach the appellate court within a reasonable period. The „reasonableness‟ of the period within which an appeal may be preferred, however, is purely a question of fact and will have to be determined keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.
136... The Legislative intentment behind Articles 114 & 115(b) of the Limitation Act in prescribing the period of limitation for appeals to the High Court or to the Court of Session against different type of orders, is the best guiding factor to determine reasonableness of the period of limitation for an appeal preferable at the instance of a „victim‟ also. It would, therefore, be redasonable to view that for appeal against acquittal filed by the „vicitm‟ to the High Court the period of limitation would be 90 days and where such appeal lies to the Sessions Court the period shall be 60 days. For appeal against any other order, the reasonable period would be 60 days to the High Court and 30 days for appeals to the Sessions Court from the orders passed by the Magistrate, as the case may be. To be more specific, the period of limitation for the purpose of filing appeal(s) by a victim shall be as under:
(a) In case acquittal-
(i) Where appeal 90 Date of order
days
Lies to the High Appealed
Court against
(ii) Where appeal 60 Date of order
lies to any days appealed
other Court against
(b)Any other sentence or order-
(i) To the High 60 The date of
Court days sentence or
order
(II) To any other 30 The date of
court days sentence or
order
6. In the year 2009 an amendment to Section 372 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' by way of a proviso was inserted conferring a statutory right upon the victim to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal. It is also to be noted that no corresponding amendment has been brought to Article 114 of 'the Limitation Act.,' pursuant to introducing a proviso by way of an amendment carried out to Section 372 of 'the Cr.P.C'. The right of appeal is a substantive right and appeal is continuation of the original proceedings. A substantive right cannot 6 be curtailed merely on the ground of delay, which is not inordinate, and moreover sufficient cause was shown. The reasons assigned by the petitioner are bona fide and convincing, and the delay, which in effect amounts only to 17 days, has been satisfactorily explained.
8. As the petitioner, victim/complainant, was not given notice prior to the pronouncement of judgment, it would be unreasonable to expect him to file an appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that an application for grant of certified copy was filed by the petitioner, immediately after he came to know about passing of judgment by the learned Trial Court. The petitioner has shown sufficient cause for the delay, and the learned Appellate Court ought to have considered the same and condoned the delay. The impugned order suffers from perversity and is liable to be set aside.
9. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Case is allowed, setting aside the order dated 19.05.2023 passed in Crl.M.P. No.707 of 2022 in Crl.A. No._of 2022 in C.C. No.145 of 2018 on the file of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Kadapa. No order as to costs.
As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.
________________________ Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Dt: 07.11.2025 KMS 7 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 959/2023 07.11.2025 W KMS