Karnataka High Court
Mrs. Leela Palani vs J.R. Manjunath on 17 November, 1988
Equivalent citations: ILR1989KAR1616
ORDER Chandrakantaraj Urs, J.
1. This revision petition under Section 115 of the C.P.C. is directed against the order dated 12-1-1988 made by the Principal District Judge, Kolar, in Misc. Petition No. 15/1987 on his file.
2. The petitioner is the respondent in the Court below. She is aggrieved by the order under revision by which O.S.No. 6/1983 pending in the Court of the Civil Judge, K.G.F. is withdrawn to the Court of the District Judge, Kolar, to be tried and disposed of in accordance with law by the latter Court. The facts leading to this petition may be stated briefly and they are as follows: Respondents 1 to 4 filed a suit for declaration of the title to their respective shares In the suit schedule property and also for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from executing the decree she had obtained in HRC.No. 51/1976 as they were not parties to the eviction proceedings and that the order obtained by the defendant therefore would not be binding on them. The plaintiffs also filed an application for interim injunction to restrain execution of the said decree obtained under the Karnataka Rent Control Act. The learned Civil Judge granted the temporary injunction, That was questioned in Appeal M.A.No. 10/1983 before the District Judge by the defendant. She succeeded in the appeal and the temporary injunction was set aside. Aggrieved by that order of the learned District Judge, Kolar, C.R.P.No. 3168/1983 was filed in this Court and that revision petition came to be with drawn, in the light of the contentions raised by the petitioner (who was respondent therein) in that revision petition that the Court of the Munsiff which was the proper Court, to execute the eviction order passed under the Karnataka Rent Control Act was not a Court Subordinate to the Court of the Civil Judge at K.G.F. and therefore it was not competent for that Court to entertain O.S. No. 6/1983 muchless issue temporary injunction. The very next day after the withdrawal of the revision petition, O.S.No. 1/1987 was filed in the Court of the Principal District Judge at Kolar with identical prayer for identical relief, on identical allegations as in O.S. No. 6/1983 on the file of the Civil Judge at K.G.F. Soon thereafter a petition under Section 24 of the C.P.C. was filed seeking transfer of O.S.No. 6/1983 pending in the Court of the Civil Judge at K.G.F. to the Court of the Principal District Judge, Kolar, for being tried and disposed of along with O.S.No. 1/1987 pending in the Court of the District Judge. That petition having been allowed, the present revision petition is preferred against that order of the District Judge.
3. Mr. H.R. Venkataramaniah, learned Counsel for the petitioner has strenuously contended that the Karnataka Civil Courts Act, 1964, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has not conferred any original jurisdiction on the District Court and therefore it is not competent to try the suit filed in that Court or by transfer to its file a case from any Court subordinate to it. He also contended that object of Section 24 of the C.P.C. is not meant to serve that purpose. He has placed strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of LAKSHMI NARAIN v. FIRST ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, ALLAHABAD AND ORS. , in the said case certain provisions of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act as well as the provisions of the C.P.C. 1908 fell for consideration. It was held therein that Section 24 of the C.P.C. postulated that the Court to which the suit or appeal or other proceedings was transferred should be competent to try or dispose of the same. After having ruled in that manner with reference to Section 31 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, it was impossible to hold that the District Courts were competent to hear appeals of the valuation of Rs.10,000/- or less in suits decided before the Civil Courts Act came into force and appeals from which were pending before the High Court. He has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of RAJA SOAP FACTORY AND OTHERS v. S.P. SHANTHARAJ AND ORS.. In the said case the Supreme Court considered the question whether during closure of the District Court on account of vacation, the High Court of Mysore was competent to entertain the filing of original suit even though the High Court was at the apex of Civil Courts in the State. The Supreme Court negatived the contention that the erstwhile Mysore High Court could do so on the ground that under the relevant provisions of the Mysore Act 1 of 1884 and Mysore Act 5 of 1962, nor Section 151 of the C.P.C. would confer jurisdiction on the High Court to entertain the original suits as it was not conferred with original jurisdiction by the statutes. That dicta, as pointed out by the learned Counsel, was followed by this Court in the case of K.N. PANJAWANI v. MRS. T.N.K. NAYAR AND ANR. 1983(1) KLJ 529. In Panjawani's case a learned Judge of this Court ruled that the Karnataka High Court is not a Court of ordinary original civil jurisdiction and cannot entertain a suit during Dasara vacation (or the winter vacation), when the City Civil Court and other Civil Courts were closed for the vacation, and no vacation Judge had been appointed for those Courts during the vacation. In the said decision, the learned Judge, reiterated that in terms of Sections 52 and 57 of the States Reorganisation Act, the new High Court could exercise the jurisdiction which was being exercised by the old Mysore High Court and there being no notification conferring ordinary original jurisdiction under Section 12 of the Mysore Act 1 of 1884, the erstwhile Mysore High Court had no original jurisdiction at all and further that power conferred on the Government under Section 12 of the 1884 Act was repealed by Karnataka Act 5 of 1962 and as such there was no scope for treating the Karnataka High Court as a Court of original jurisdiction.
4. The thrust of the argument is that the District Court not being conferred with original jurisdiction under the Act and having regard to Section 15 of the C.P.C. question of instituting suit for declaration and injunction relating to immovable property can only be in the Court that could entertain in terms of Section 16 of the Act, occurring in Chapter III which deals with jurisdiction of Courts. Section 16 of the Act reads as follows:
"16. Jurisdiction of Civil Judge. - The jurisdiction of the Court of a Civil Judge shall extend to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature."
5. It is therefore contended that by conferment of jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining all original suits and proceedings in the Court of the Civil Judge, by implication, there was exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Court of the District Judge despite what is stated in Section 14 of the Act and as such if the District Court was not competent to entertain and try any original suit, it was not open to it to transfer the same to its file in exercise of its power under Section 24 of the C.P.C.
6. On the other hand Mr. M.G. Ramaiah, learned Counsel for the respondents has contended that having regard to the correct position in law of which the respondents became aware only when the earlier revision petition was pending they approached the District Court at Kolar after withdrawing the revision petition in the High Court having regard to the pronouncements of the Supreme Court and this Court as well as the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Act and the Specific Relief Act. The contentions for the respondents In other words to some extent rely upon the submissions made for the petitioner.
7. Mr. Ramaiah does not dispute the correctness of the decision of this Court in Panjawani's case supra-He has drawn my attention specially to the definition of 'District' in Sub-section (4) of Section 2 of the C.P.C.
He has pointed out having regard to the definition of 'District' where the High Court has no ordinary original civil jurisdiction, it is the Court of the District Judge which is the Principal Civil Court and Section 14 of the Act does no more than give full expression to it. He has further pointed out that there is neither cause nor justification to hold that by reason of Section 16 of the Act impliedly District Court's jurisdiction is divested as a Court of original civil jurisdiction.
8. In other words the force of the contention is that Section 16 of the Act conferring jurisdiction on the Court of the Civil Judge in respect of all original suits and proceedings must be read subject to Section 14 of the Act as a Rule of convenience and may not be so read as to make Section 14 of the Act redundant in the legislation on Civil Courts in the State. The learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of BIPAN KUMAR v. SHAM SUNDER . In the said decision Section 15 of the C.P.C. fell for consideration and the Court held that Section merely prescribes a Rule of procedure and is not intended to deprive the Court of a higher grade of jurisdiction to entertain a suit that should have been filed in a Court of lower grade. The correctness of the decision is unquestionable. It is only when Section 15 of the C.P.C. is so understood provisions contained in Sections 14 and 16 of the Act become meaningful and there will be no need to imply that Section 16 ousts the jurisdiction of the District Court obtaining under Section 14. Such a view, i.e., that Section 15 of the C.P.C. is only a Rule of procedure for convenience gives meaning to the definition of 'District' in Sub-section (4) of Section 2 of the C.P.C. Sub-section (4) of Section 2 of the C.P.C. is as follows:
"2 (1)(2)(3) xxx xxx xxx (4) "District" means the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter called a "District Court"), and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court:"
The plain language employed leaves no room for doubt or debate that the District Court is the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of a District except where the local limits of any given area is covered by the latter clause of the sub-section where the High Court may exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
9. Therefore, this Court must Rule that the District Court, Kolar has jurisdiction to entertain Original Suit No. 1 of 1987 and proceed with the same in accordance with law. The view taken as above finds support from decisions of other High Courts notably Calcutta and Punjab High Courts (See A.I.R. 1943 Calcutta, 450 Mohini Mohan and Ors. v. Kunjabehari Das and Ors and ) Arya Printinidhi Sabha v. Dev Raj Vir Bhan and Anr..
10. What remains to be considered is the question whether the order under revision passed in Misc. Petition No. 15 of 1987 is correct in law?
11. This limb of the litigation between the parties started with the filing of the original Suit No. 6 of 1983 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Kolar Gold Fields, plaintiffs seeking declaration of their title to suit schedule property and also an injunction permanently restraining the defendant (present revision petitioner) from executing the eviction decree (order) obtained by her in H.R.C.No. 51 of 1976 on the file of the Munsiff, Kolar Gold Fields. While narrating the undisputed facts of the case earlier in the course of this order that has been pointed out. Respondents-plaintiffs initially met with success in as much as they obtained a temporary injunction restraining the petitioner-defendant from executing the eviction order obtained by her in H.R.C.No. 51 of 1976 on the file of the Munsiff, Kolar Gold Fields. But the District Court vacated the temporary injunction on appeal and this Court did not have occasion to examine the correct legal position earlier when the respondents-plaintiffs withdrew their revision petition and filed Original Suit No. 1 of 1987 in the Court of the District Judge, Kolar.
12. Mr. M.G. Ramaiya, learned Counsel for the respondents does not dispute that what prompted the respondents to file O.S.No. 1 of 1987 in the District Court, Kolar, was the stand taken by the petitioner that Munsiff's Court, Kolar Gold Fields was not a Court subordinate to the Court of the Civil Judge, Kolar Gold Fields.
13. That stand was correct cannot be questioned or doubted. In the case of LADLI PARSHAD JAISWAL v. THE KARNAL DISTILLERY CO., LTD. KARNAL AND ORS. Supreme Court has explained the meaning of the expression "Court subordinate" occurring in Section 115 of the C.P.C. in contrast to the expression "Court immediately below" used in Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India. It is laid down that a Court subordinate to the High Court means a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court.
14. The Orissa High Court In the case of NARAYAN MISRA v. SURENDRANATH DAS AND ORS . has explained succinctly the position with specific reference to Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act. It has ruled that Court of Munsiff is not subordinate to that of the subordinate Judge within the meaning of Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act. The fact that the Munsiff's Court Is of lower grade does not make it subordinate to the Court of the Subordinate Judge. Judicial subordination is not sufficient to make it 'Court Subordinate' occurring in Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act.
15. The view of the Orissa High Court stands affirmed by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of COTTON CORPORATION OF INDIA LIMITED v. UNITED INDUSTRIAL BANK LIMITED AND ORS ., wherein it has been ruled that superior Court may injunct a person prosecuting legal proceedings in a subordinate Court but may not even injunct a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction under Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act.
16. In view of the afore mentioned decisions of the Supreme Court and other High Courts, there is no doubt that while the Court of the Civil Judge, Kolar Gold Fields, was competent to entertain Original Suit No. 6 of 1983 for declaration of title and injunction, it was not competent to grant relief of injunction prayed for therein as the Courts of the Civil Judges in the scheme of things under the Act have no power of superintendence over the Courts of the Munsiff though they exercise appelIate powers against the orders and Judgments of the Courts of Munsiffs.
17. It is in these peculiar circumstances that respondents-plaintiffs have been compelled to do what they have done.
18. Lastly, I must examine the contention of Mr. H.R. Venkataramanaiah that the District Judge had no competence to transfer the Original Suit No. 6 of 1983 to his own file having earlier vacated the injunction in the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of temporary injunction granted by the Civil Judge, Kolar Gold Fields. The contention overlooks the language of Section 24 of the C.P.C.
19. Section 24 of the C.P.C. reads as follows:
General power of transfer and withdrawal.
"24(1) On the application of any of the parties and after notice to the parties and after hearing such of them as desired to be heard. or of its own motion without such notice, the High Court or the District Court may at any stage-
(a) transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before it for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same, or
(b) withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any Court subordinate to it, and
(i) try or dispose of the same; or
(ii) transfer the same for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same; or
(iii) re-transfer the same for trial or disposal to the Court from which it was withdrawn.
(2) Where any suit or proceeding has been transferred or withdrawn under Sub-section (1), the Court which (is thereafter to try or dispose of such suit or proceeding) may, subject to any special directions in the case of an order of transfer, either re-try it or proceed from the point at which it was transferred or withdrawn .
(3) For the purposes of this section, -
(a) Courts of Additional and Assistant Judges shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Court;
(b) "proceeding" includes a proceeding for the execution of a decree or order.
(4) The Court trying any suit transferred or withdrawn under this Section from a Court of Small Causes shall, for the purposes of such suit, be deemed to be a Court of Small Causes.
(5) A suit or proceeding may be transferred under this Section from a Court which has no jurisdiction to try it."
Powers conferred on the High Court and the District Court are wide and two fold. The power of transfer is exercisable on the motion of parties or suo moto. While notice and hearing is mandatory when power is exercised on the motion of one or the other of the parties to a proceeding, it is not so when pending suits or proceedings are transferred suo moto by the High Court or the District Court. The transfer may relate to a suit or proceeding pending before the High Court or the District Court and such transfer is permissible subject to the condition that the Court subordinate is competent to try or dispose of the same. (See ).
20. Similarly High Court or District Court may withdraw any suit or proceeding pending in a subordinate Court and deal with it in one of the manners specified in Sub-clauses (i), (ii) or (iii) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the C.P.C.
21. I have already held that the District Court, Kolar is competent to entertain and proceed with O.S. No. 1 of 1987. O.S.No. 6 of 1983, which it has withdrawn to its own file from the Court of the Civil Judge, Kolar Gold Fields, is said to be more or less identical with the pleadings and reliefs in O.S.No. 1 of 1987 on the file of the District Court. Therefore, there is no impediment to try and dispose of that suit along with O.S.No. 1 of 1987. To my mind, it appears, two suits to be tried together between the same parties on the same cause of action and decided on the same evidence is a luxury and superfluity that should not be permitted. In the course of hearing arguments, Mr. Ramaiya, learned Counsel for respondents submitted that he will withdraw one of the suits without prejudice to respondents prosecuting the other suit. It is a matter which respondents should decide subject to the orders of the District Court.
22. For the above reasons, the order under revision does not suffer from any jurisdictional error and must therefore be sustained. There is no merit in this Revision Petition and it is dismissed but without costs.