Punjab-Haryana High Court
Jamuna Giri vs Presiding Officer, Industrial ... on 19 November, 1998
Equivalent citations: (1999)121PLR493
JUDGMENT N.K. Aggarwal, J.
1. This is a petition by workman, Jamuna Giri, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, for quashing the order dated September 10, 1996 passed by Labour Court, Faridabad, whereby on the employer's application, ex parte award passed in favour of the workman was set-aside on payment of Rs. 2,000/- as costs.
2. Petitioner was an employee of Gates India Automotive Industrial Products (respondent No. 2) on a monthly salary of Rs. 900/- since February 1, 1972. His services were terminated on August 25, 1990. The petitioner served a demand notice on the employer. The matter was referred to the Labour Court on January 9, 1991 after conciliation failed. The employer did not appear before the Labour Court. Ex parte award was announced in favour of the petitioner-workman by the Labour Court on September 23, 1991. It was published in the official gazette on October 14, 1991. The Labour Court ordered reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service and full back wages. The petitioner was, however, not allowed by the employer to join duty. The petitioner sent a letter to the employer on July 20, 1992 by registered A.D. Post, stating that he may be taken on duty. On the petitioner's application, Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer also sent a notice to the employer on December 3, 1992. When nothing happened, the petitioner filed an application before the Labour Court for payment of wages under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The employer then moved on September 22, 1992 an application before the Labour Court for setting-aside the ex parte award. That application was dismissed in default by the Labour Court on February 1, 1993. The employer again moved, on October 24, 1993, an application for setting-aside the ex parte award and also for the restoration of his application. The Labour Court, by order dated September 10, 1996, set aside the ex parte award after accepting the plea of the employer that there was no service of notice on him.
3. Sri A. P. Bhandari, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has argued that the order of the Labour Court, setting-aside the ex parte award, is wholly without jurisdiction and invalid. The Labour Court had announced the award ex parte on August 23, 1991. The award was published in the official gazette on October 14, 1991. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court ceased to exist after 30 days from the publication of the award. The application filed by the employer on September 22, 1992 was, therefore, not maintainable inasmuch as the Labour Court had become functus officio at that time.
4. Respondent No. 2 has, in his reply, defended the order passed by the Labour Court, setting-aside the ex parte award. It has been stated that the ex parte award was rightly set-aside on the employer's application because it was found by the Labour Court that the notice about the pending proceedings had not been properly served on the employer. Since the ex parte award had been announced without notice to the employer, it was rightly set-aside by the Labour Court. The Labour Court had power of review. The ex parte award was liable to be set aside on sufficient cause having been shown. Even if the Labour Court became functus officio after 30 days from the publication of the award in the official gazette, it had power to set aside the ex parte award on the ground that the other party had no knowledge of the proceedings in the absence of service of notice.
5. Sri Akash Jain, learned Counsel for the respondent, has placed reliance on a decision of the Karnataka High Court in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Bangalore and another v. Sindhanoor Veerabhadrappa and another 1988 (3) S.L.R. 106. It has been held therein that the Labour Court does not become functus officio on the mere fact that the award was published in the gazette and 30 days had elapsed. If the workman was prevented for sufficient cause from appearing before the Labour Court, the Labour Court was competent to set-aside the ex parte award.
6. Sri Akash Jain has also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Adarsh Foundry and Engineering Works v. Presiding Officer and another 1994 (3) Recent Services Judgments 417. It was held therein that if the petitioner was never served, all the proceedings leading to the rendering of the award by the Labour Court are rendered void. The award was rendered by the Labour Court without effecting service on the petitioner in that case.
7. On a consideration of the rival contentions, it is found that the aforesaid decision of this Court would not help the respondent employer. In that case, the question of the publication of the award was not considered. The only question, before the Court was whether the ex parte award was rightly not recalled by the Labour Court once it was found that the petitioner was never served. The question whether the Labour Court, after the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award in the official gazette, became functus officio was neither raised before the Court nor considered.
8. Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others, (1981-I-LLJ-327) (SC) has held that where an application is filed to set-aside an ex parte award within 30 days of the publication of the award, the Tribunal, under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not become functus officio. This view was reiterated in Satnam Verma v. Union of India, (1985-I-LLJ-79) (SC). In the latter case, it was noticed that the first date of hearing of the reference before the Labour Court was February 23, 1982. The workman was given the date February 26, 1982. He appeared on February 26, 1982 and he found that the matter was disposed of ex parte on February 23, 1982. On the same day, he moved an application pointing out that his information about the date was incorrect. The Labour Court rejected the request, though the request had been promptly made by the workman. It was held that the Labour Court was in error in rejecting the application even on merits.
9. This Court had in Warring Co-op. Agriculture Services Society Ltd. v. State of Punjab and others, 1987 Labour & Industrial Cases 359, an occasion to examine a question about the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was held that proceedings in a reference under Section 10 are not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days after the publication of the award. Till then, the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and upto that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. Impliedly, thereafter it becomes functus officio and cannot entertain an application for setting aside an ex parte award.
10. After considering the rival contentions, it is found that the legal position is no more res-integra. The Supreme Court has in Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra) and Satnam Verma's case (supra), clearly laid down that Labour Court has jurisdiction upto 30 days from the date of publication of the award. It became functus officio thereafter. In the light of this ratio, the case of the petitioner herein is found to have merit. Ex parte award had been announced by the Labour Court on August 23, 1991. It was published on October 14, 1991. Application for setting-aside the ex parte award was filed on September 22, 1992. Thus, the Labour Court had become functus officio by that time. Though, an application under Section 33-C(2) was pending before the Labour Court but that was not a matter in reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The employer could participate in the proceedings filed by the workman for the recovery of wages under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court could not go beyond the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Act and set aside the ex parte award. The Labour Court had jurisdiction to consider and decide the workman's application under Section 33-C(2) and if the employer wanted to participate in the said proceedings, the matter could be considered by the Labour Court. If an ex parte order had been passed in the proceedings under Section 33-C(2), that could be set-aside. The Labour Court, however, had no power to go beyond the scope of the proceedings pending under Section 33-C(2) and set-aside the original award announced on August 23, 1991 and published on October 14, 1991.
11. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The order of the Labour Court, dated September 10, 1996, is held to be without jurisdiction and invalid and is, therefore, quashed. The respondent-employer may, however, seek his remedy as permissible in law.
12. No order as to costs.