Madras High Court
Veena Ravindran vs State (Inspector Of Police on 10 September, 2014
Author: M.Venugopal
Bench: M.Venugopal
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS Date: 10.09.2014 Coram THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.VENUGOPAL Crl.O.P.No.3712 of 2009 and M.P.No.1 of 2009 1.Veena Ravindran 2.T.V.S.Bhasker 3.T.Suresh Babu ... Petitioners/A2 to A4 -Vs.- State (Inspector of Police, C.B.I., Chennai. ... Respondent/Complainant Criminal Original Petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., praying, to call for the records in C.C.No.30 of 2004 on the file of the 11th Additional Special Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai and to quash the same. For Petitioners : Mr.Vaibhav R.Venkatesh For Respondent : Mr.N.Chandrasekaran Special Public Prosecutor (CBI cases) Date of Reserving orders : 21.08.2014 ------- O R D E R
The Petitioners/A2 to A4, have focussed the instant Criminal Original Petition praying for passing of an order by this Court in calling for the records in C.C.No.30 of 2004 on the file of the Learned 11th Additional Special Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai. Petitioners' Contentions:
2. According to the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners/A2 to A4, the charges framed against the Petitioners/A2-A4 are that in the year 2001, they had entered into a conspiracy with the 1st Accused/S.P.Damodaran to cheat Union Bank and in pursuance of the same obtained loans in excess of the limits sanctioned to them, that in the process, the relative sanction advice Ex.P6 in the Bank was forged, that payment vouchers Exs.P15 to P18 were also forged and that the Bank suffered wrongful loss to the tune of Rs.23 lakhs and resultantly the Petitioners/Accused have wrongfully gained. Accordingly, they were charged under Sections 120-B, 420, 467, 467 r/w 471 IPC. As regards, A1/public servant is concerned, apart from the above charges, he is charged in respect of offences under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
3. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners/Accused urges before this Court that as per D-6, the full amount was paid by the Petitioners.
4. Advancing the arguments, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the main charge levelled against the Petitioners is one of cheating under Section 420 of IPC, which is compoundable in nature.
5. Expatiating his contention, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners, vehemently projects an argument that there was no charge that any of the Petitioners had committed the offence of forgery or of conspiracy with A1 to commit the criminal misconduct.
6. That apart, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners brings it to the notice of this Court that even before filing of the charge sheet in the present case, out of total sum of Rs.22.50 Lakhs, a sum of Rs.19 Lakhs was paid by the Petitioners to the Bank and D-7 series would prove the remittance in this regard.
7. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners contends that the present case is one where crime was registered by the Respondent not on the basis of any complaint by the Bank, but, suo motu, by the Respondent/CBI. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the Petitioners/Accused cannot go before the trial Court and seek the relief of compounding in view of the fact that there is no original complaint.
8. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners refers to the judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 20.08.2008 in Crl.A.No.1302 of 2008 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.6355 of 2005) between Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another, wherein, the dispute between the Company and its Bank was set at rest on the basis of a compromise arrived at between them and the amounts due were paid. Further in the aforesaid judgement, it was also observed that technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of quashing criminal proceedings. In effect, the plea taken on behalf of the petitioners is that the aforesaid judgement in Crl.A.No.1302 of 2008, squarely applies to the facts of the present case and accordingly, they seek for quashing the proceedings in C.C.No.30 of 2004, on the file of the trial Court.
9. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners/Accused relies on the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 28.02.2014 in Crl.A.No.517 of 2014 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.6138 of 2006) between CBI, ACB, Mumbai Vs. Narendra Lal Jain & Others, wherein, in paragraph No.11, it is observed as follows:
In the present case, having regard to the fact that the liability to make good the monetary loss suffered by the bank had been mutually settled between the parties and the accused had accepted the liability in this regard, the High Court had thought it fit to invoke its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. We do not see how such exercise of power can be faulted or held to be erroneous. Section 482 of the Code inheres in the High Court the power to make such order as may be considered necessary to, inter alia, prevent the abuse of the process of law or to serve the ends of justice. While it will be wholly unnecessary to revert or refer to the settled position in law with regard to the contours of the power available under Section 482 Cr.P.C. it must be remembered that continuance of a criminal proceeding which is likely to become oppressive or may partake the character of a lame prosecution would be good ground to invoke the extraordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
10. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another, reported in 2012 (5) CTC 526, at Special Page 529, wherein it is observed as under:
Section 320 of the Code articulates public policy with regard to the compounding of offences. It catalogues the offences punishable under IPC which may be compounded by the parties without permission of the Court and the composition of certain offences with the permission of the court. The offences punishable under the special statutes are not covered by Section 320. When an offence is compoundable under Section 320, abatement of such offence or an attempt to commit such offence or where the accused is liable under Section 34 or 149 of the IPC can also be compounded in the same manner. A person who is under 18 years of age or is an idiot or a lunatic is not competent to contract compounding of offence but the same can be done on his behalf with the permission of the court. If a person is otherwise competent to compound an offence is dead, his legal representatives may also compound the offence with the permission of the court. Where the accused has been committed for trial or he has been convicted and the appeal is pending, composition can only be done with the leave of the court to which he has been committed or with the leave of the appeal court, as the case may be. The revisional court is also competent to allow any person to compound any offence who is competent to compound. The consequence of the composition of an offence is acquittal of the accused. Sub-section (9) of Section 320 mandates that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this Section. Obviously, in view thereof the composition of an offence has to be in accord with Section 320 and in no other manner.
11. Also, in the aforesaid decision, at Special Page 559 in Paragraph No.57, it is laid down as follows:
The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victims family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.
12. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners invites the attention of this Court to the judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 20.08.2008 in Crl.A.No.1302 of 2008 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.6355 of 2005) between Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another, wherein, in Paragraph Nos.23 & 24, it is observed as follows:
23. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues of the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim against the Company. What, however, remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit facilities beyond the limit to which the Company was entitled. The dispute involved herein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. The question which is required to be answered in this case is whether the power which independently lies with this Court to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised?
24. On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) and the compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also clause 11of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are satisfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise.
13. Apart from the above, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners cites, the following decisions.
(i) In the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 09.07.1996 in Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, SIU (X), New Delhi Vs. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., Calcutta, reported in (1996) 5 SCC 591, at Special Page 608 and 609 in Paragraph No.29, it is held as follows:
In the facts of the case, it appears to use that there is enough justification for the High Court to hold that the case was basically a matter of civil dispute. The Banks had already filed suits for recovery of the dues of the Banks on account of credit facility and said suits have been compromised on receiving the payments from the concerned Companies. Even if an offence of cheating is prima facie constituted, such offence is compoundable offence and compromise decrees passed in the suits instituted by the banks, for all intents and purposes, amount to compounding of the offence of cheating. It is also to be noted that long time has elapsed since the complaint was filed in 1987. It may also be indicated that although such FIRs were filed in 1987 and 1989, the Banks have not chosen to institute any case against the alleged erring official despite allegations made against them in the FIRs. Considering that the investigations had not been completed till 1991 even though there was no impediment to complete the investigations and further investigations are still pending and also considering the fact that the claims of the Banks have been compromised on receiving payments, we do not think that the said complaints should be pursued any further. In our view proceeding further with the complaints will not be expedient. In the special facts of the case, it appears to us the decision of the High Court in quashing the complaints does not warrant any interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. We, therefore, dismiss these appeals.
(ii) In the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.S.Joshi & Others Vs. State of Haryana & Another, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675, at Special Page 682, in Paragraph No. 13, it is observed as follows:
The observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different context, in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad & Ors. [(2000) 3 SCC 693] are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in matrimonial dispute by the courts, it was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their "young" days in chasing their "cases" in different courts. There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of Indian Penal Code. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.
For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment and allow the appeal and quash the FIR above mentioned. Respondent's Submissions:
14. In response, the Learned Special Public Prosecutor (CBI Cases) for Respondent/Complainant contends that the main case in C.C.No.30 of 2004 on the file of the trial Court is pending for final arguments and in fact nearly 13 witnesses were examined on the side of the prosecution and 35 exhibits were marked. Furthermore, the prosecution had closed its side on 19.09.2007.
15. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that in the present case, charge sheet was filed on 14.06.2004 and the payments which they claim relate to one time settlement with an intention to escape from the clutches of Law. Moreover, the payments were made vide letter dated 07.05.2004 and most of the cheques were post dated and further the dates were given as 18.08.2004.
16. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent, forcefully projects an argument that the Respondent/Complainant registered a case on 30.07.2003 for alleged criminal conspiracy, cheating, forgery and abuse of official position by the accused persons and that the investigation established the allegations made against A1 to A4. Indeed, the charges against A1 to A4 were framed under Sections 120-B r/w 420, 467, 467 r/w 471 IPC and Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for a wrongful loss caused to the Bank to an extent of Rs.23 Lakhs, by forging the official documents.
17. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent brings it to the notice of this Court that the present case was registered on a source information and after the filing of the charge sheet, the trial Court had framed necessary charges against the accused and the present Crl.O.P.No.3712 of 2009 filed by the Petitioners are only to procrastinate the trial proceedings and as such the same is not per se maintainable.
18. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent contends that now the stage is set for hearing of final arguments in the main case and therefore prays for dismissal of the Criminal Original Petition filed by the petitioners.
Respondent's Citation:
19. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent relies on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. A. Ravishankar Prasad and Others, reported in (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1063, wherein at Special Page 1073 in Paragraph Nos.41 to 47, it is held as follows:
41. It is also not possible to conclude that material on record taken on face value make out no case under section 120-B read with section 420 IPC against the respondents. Prima facie, we are of the opinion that this is one case where adequate material is available on record to proceed against the respondents.
42. In our considered view it was extremely unfortunate that the High Court in the impugned judgment has erroneously invoked inherent power of the court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court ought to have considered the entire material available to establish a case against the respondents under section 120-B read with section 420 IPC.
43. It is significant that the respondents and the other bank officials share the charges under section 120-B read with section 420 IPC. Quashing the charges against the respondents would also have very serious repercussions on the pending cases against the other bank officials.
44. In four cases, 92 witnesses have already been examined. The trial of the case was at the advanced stage. At this sage, the High Court has seriously erred in quashing the charges against respondent nos.1 and 2. Quashing the proceedings at that stage was clearly an abuse of the process of the court. The court neither considered the entire material nor appreciated the legal position in proper perspective.
45. The impugned judgment is wholly unsustainable in law and is accordingly set aside. Unfortunately, because of unnecessary interference by the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. the trial of this case could not be completed and concluded.
46. Before parting with the case we would like to observe that mere re-payment of loan under a settlement cannot exempt the accused from the criminal proceeding in the facts of this case.
47. We would like to observe that any observations made in this case have been made to decide the present case. The trial 24 court may decide the case without being influenced by any observations made by this court. Analysis:
20. At the outset, this Court, relevantly points out that under Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, all conspirators need not have taken part in the whole illegal act. As a matter of fact, the illegal act committed by one of the conspirators can be construed as committed by all the conspirators.
21. At this stage, this Court pertinently points out that the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is an extraordinary nature and does not mean to be employed to obstruct justice or cause an impediment in its dispensation.
22. It cannot be ignored that once a trial has started in the given case, petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C for quashing the proceedings does not lie as per the decision in Zoom Vision, Rep. By Y.Hariharan, Managing Partner & Others Vs. P.Manickam and Co., rep. by its Partner M.Nagarajan, reported in 2001 (4) Crimes Page 96.
23. It is to be remembered that in the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another, reported in (2011) 2 MLJ (Crl) 201 (SC), it is held that 'Non-Compoundable offences cannot be permitted to be compounded by the Court directly or indirectly'.
24. Also, this Court aptly points out the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central bureau of investigation V. Jagjit Singh reported in (2014) I Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 29, wherein in paragraphs 14 and 15, it is observed and laid down as follows:
14. In the present case, the specific allegation made against the respondent-accused is that he obtained the loan on the basis of forged document with the aid of officers of the Bank. On investigation, having found the ingredients of cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property of the bank (Section 420 IPC) and dishonestly using as genuine a forged document (Section 471 IPC), charge sheet was submitted under Sections 420/471 IPC against the accused persons.
15. The debt which was due to the Bank was recovered by the Bank pursuant to an order passed by Debts Recovery Tribunal. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is a compromise between the offender and the victim. The offences when committed in relation with Banking activities including offences under Sections 420/471 IPC have harmful effect on the public and threaten the well being of the society. These offences fall under the category of offences involving moral turpitude committed by public servants while working in that capacity. Prima facie, one may state that the bank as the victim in such cases but, in fact, the society in general, including customers of the Bank is the sufferer. In the present case, there was neither an allegation regarding any abuse of process of any Court nor anything on record to suggest that the offenders were entitled to secure the order in the ends of justice.
25. That apart, this Court worth recalls and recollects the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Limited Vs. State through Deputy Superintendent of Police and another with Criminal Appeal No.1959 of 2013 between Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Limited Vs. State and Others, reported in (2014) 3 SCC 755 at Special Pages 758 to 760, whereby and whereunder in paragraph No.8 to 14, it is observed and laid down as follows:
8. On behalf of the appellant all the three aforesaid grounds for exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C have been seriously assailed. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the practice of the bank to permit overdraft facility to credit worthy customers cannot be equated with simple civil contracts and agreements. In the latter case, a party may not be permitted to initiate criminal proceedings only on breach of terms of the agreement by the other party, unless it can be shown that the guilty party acted with dishonest or fraudulent intentions since the conception of the contract or agreement. But in the former case, a customer of Bank committing fraud will stand on a different footing.
9. The aforesaid submission has merits. In the case of CBI vs. A. Ravishanker Prasad [3] ((2009) 6 SCC 351 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1063) the accused respondents who were customers of a nationalized bank sought to justify the fraudulent transactions on the basis of agreements evident from letter of credit, open cash credit and also on the ground that loan had been repaid under a settlement and therefore, criminal proceedings on account of forgery, cheating, corruption etc. should not be permitted. This court set aside the order of the High Court interfering with a criminal proceeding and reiterated the settled propositions of law which permit exercise of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of process of the Court and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It was reiterated that such extraordinary power should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution.
10. This judgment also supports the other submission on behalf of the appellant that the High Court erred in interfering with criminal proceeding on the ground that bank could recover the loss caused by fraud through orders of Debt Recovery Tribunal or through the proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act or civil proceedings. Even if the accused voluntarily at a later stage settles the monetary claim, that cannot be made a ground to quash the criminal proceedings unless the well established principles for exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are made out.
11. It is also a law settled by this Court and reiterated in the case of Monica Kumar (Dr.) vs. State of U.P.[4](2008) 8 SCC 781 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 649) that criminal proceedings can continue even if the allegation discloses a civil dispute also. It is only when the dispute is purely civil in nature but still the party chooses to initiate criminal proceeding, the criminal proceeding may be quashed. For such purpose also the Court, save and accept in very exceptional circumstances would not look to any document relied upon by the defence.
12. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent accused has placed reliance upon judgment of this Court in the case of Rajeshwar Tiwari vs. Nanda Kishore Roy[5] (2010) 8 SCC 442 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 915, wherein this Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellant which was initiated by private complainant by merely alleging that acting on behalf of the employer the appellant had deducted a particular amount wrongly as income tax from his monthly salary. This Court found that the employer was under statutory obligation to deduct income tax and the allegation did not make out a case for adjudication by the Magistrate on criminal side. In paragraph 29 of the report on which reliance has been placed, only the established law has been reiterated that when adequate materials are available to show that a proceeding is of civil nature or that it is an abuse of process of court, the High Court could be justified in quashing the same.
13. On going through the relevant facts, particularly the charge- sheet, we find that it is not a case requiring interference in exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The proceedings cannot be termed as an abuse of the process of court because the allegations if accepted in entirety are most likely to make out criminal offence alleged against the accused respondents. The interest of justice is also not attracted in the present case to warrant interference with the criminal proceedings.
14. In our considered view, the High Court ought to have taken note of the fact that on two previous occasions the respondents accused failed to get any relief under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and they did not challenge an order passed by the High Court at the instance of the appellant bank for concluding the trial within a limited time.
26. A very wide power, is conferred on the Hon'ble High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Ofcourse, the said power is to be exercised by the Hon'ble High Court with great care and circumspection and that too sparingly. In short, the Hon'ble High Court cannot exercise its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., as an Appellate / Revisional Court, in the considered opinion of this Court. In a proceeding under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., it is not for the Hon'ble High Court to enter into an arena of an enquiry as to whether the evidence relied on by the Respondent/Prosecution is reliable or not, since, in the considered opinion of this Court that would be the ambit and function of the trial Court. Even if a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C is entertained by the Hon'ble High Court then there can be no stay of trial under the Prevention of Corruption Act. At best it is for the litigant to convince the concerned Court to expedite the hearing of the trial of the main case.
27. No wonder, the question to exercise the inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C, is not essentially one of jurisdiction, but is that of judicial discretion, in the considered opinion of this Court. Also that, in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., the Hon'ble High Court is not entitled to express any views on matters which related to the realm of appreciation of evidence to decide the credibility of the case presented.
28. It cannot be gainsaid that the prohibition is incorporated in sub Section 3 of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In reality, the sub Section 3 consists of three clauses. It is in Clause (c) of sub Section that the prohibition is couched in unexceptional terms. It is not correct to say that Clause (c) to Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, has a power to grant stay in exercise of inherent powers of Hon'ble High Court.
29. One cannot ignore a main fact that the question whether the accused person had 'MENS REA' (Guilty mind) or not, can only be decided based on proper materials adduced during the trial of the main case and the inherent powers cannot be pressed into service when the main case in C.C.No.30 of 2004 is in the stage of hearing of final arguments by the trial Court, from 2007.
30. As far as the present case is concerned the payment of amounts in question were made after the completion of investigation and filing of the charge sheet and the prime plea taken on behalf of the Respondent/Complainant is that the final hearing of the charge sheet would not alter any of the charges framed against the Petitioners/Accused and the 1st Accused, notwithstanding the fact that the payment of amounts in question were made after the completion of the investigation.
31. Continuing further, ordinarily the inherent powers of High Court should not be permitted to be exercised with a view to stifle a genuine, reasonable and legitimate prosecution, as opined by this Court. One cannot ignore a vital fact that the material collected during the investigation and the evidence adduced before the trial Court would decide the fate of the accused persons in Criminal Law. When the main case in C.C.No.30 of 2004 on the file of the trial Court is pending for hearing of final arguments then the appreciation of evidence is clearly not permissible in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Even a meticulous analysis of the main case in C.C.No.30 of 2004 pending on the file of the trial Court, is not necessary in order to find out whether a case would end in conviction or acquittal, when admittedly the main case is only pending for hearing of final arguments (after the completion of evidence both on Prosecution and Defence sides).
Conclusion:
32. In the upshot of qualitative and quantitative discussions and this Court on a careful consideration of respective contentions and in view of the fact that the charges framed against A1 to A4 are under Sections 120-B r/w 420, 467, 467 r/w 471 IPC and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and caused a wrongful loss to the Bank to an extent of Rs.23 Lakhs by forging the official documents and in effect that the charges relate to substantive offences like conspiracy, cheating, forgery and abuse of official position as stated supra, and also this Court bearing in mind the charges levelled against the Petitioners/A2-A4 along with A1, are serious in nature, this Court comes to an irresistible conclusion that the Petitioners/Accused are only to take part in the final trial proceedings of the main case in C.C.No.30 of 2004 on the file of the trial Court by addressing necessary arguments and to await for the verdict, turning on the merits of the case (notwithstanding the fact that the dues were paid to the Bank by means of One Time Settlement). Viewed in that perspective, the Criminal Original Petition fails.
33. In the result, the Criminal Original Petition is dismissed. Liberty is granted to the Petitioners/A2 to A4 to raise all factual and legal pleas before the trial Court in C.C.No.30 of 2004 including the issue of payment of amounts under One Time Settlement to the Bank and to seek appropriate remedy, if they so desire / advised, in the manner known to law and in accordance with law. Connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.
10.09.2014 Index :Yes Internet : Yes ars To
1. The 11th Additional Special Judge for CBI cases, Chennai.
2. The Inspector of Police, CBI, Chennai.
3. The Public Prosecutor High Court, Madras.
M.VENUGOPAL,J ars Crl.O.P.No.3712 of 2009 10.09.2014