Karnataka High Court
Sri Narayan P M vs The Regional Transport Authority on 4 March, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 4TH DAY OF MARCH, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE
WRIT PETITION NO.34269 OF 2024 (MV)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.34320 OF 2024 (MV)
IN WP NO.34269/2024:
BETWEEN:
1. SRI RAJAVARMA BALLAL,
S/O K PANDYARAJA BALLAL,
AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS,
"BALLAL MOTORS",
R/AT "SWAYARJITH",
KUNTIKAN, BEJAI, MANGALORE,
DAKSHINA KANNADA-575004.
2. SMT NAGALAKSHMI J ADYANTHAYA,
W/O JEEVANDAS ADYANTHAYA,
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS,
VISHAL MOTORS,
R/AT KRISHNA NEAR KMC HOSPITAL,
ATTAVAR, MANGALORE,
DAKSHINA KANNADA-575001.
3. SMT SHILPASHREE SHETTY,
D/O H SANKAPPA SHETTY,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
PRADEEPTHA MOTORS,
NO.19-44, DEEPTHI MAIN ROAD,
HOSANGADI ARAMANE, MAROOR VILLAGE,
MAROOR POST, PERANJA BELTHANGADY,
DAKSHINA KANNADA-574227.
(NOTE: BENEFIT OF SENIOR CITIZEN NOT CLAIMED)
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI ASHOK HARANAHALLI, SR. COUNSEL FOR
SRI ABHIJIT HARANAHALLI, ADVOCATE)
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AND:
1. THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,
NEAR A B SHETTY CIRCLE,
OPP TO NEHRU MAIDAN, MANGALORE,.
DAKSHINA KANNADA-575001,
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN.
2. THE SECRETARY,
REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,
NEAR A B SHETTY CIRCLE,
OPP TO NEHRU MAIDAN, MANGALORE,
DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT-575001.
3. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR,
KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, K
H ROAD,
SHANTHINAGAR, BANGALORE-560027
(MANGALORE DIVISION).
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI S H RAGHAVENDRA, AGA FOR R1 & R2, SRI JAYAKUMAR S PATIL, SR. COUNSEL A/W SRI HAREESH BHANDARY T, ADV. FOR C/R3) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER / PROCEEDINGS PASSED BY THE R-2 IN NO.KA.PRA.SA.PRA.D.K MNG/THA.PA/15/2024-25 DTD. 09.12.2024 IN GRANTING TEMPORARY PERMIT FAVOUR OF R-3 ON THE ROUTE MANGALORE TO KARKALA AND BACK VIA VAMANJOOR, GURUPURA, KAIKAMBA AND MOODABIDRI FOR THE PERIOD 09.12.2024 TO 08.04.2025 VIDE ANNX-A AND CONSEQUENTLY QUASH THE TEMPORARY PERMITS IN T.P.NO.39/2024-25 AND T.P.NO.40/2024-25 VIDE ANNX-A1 AND ANNX-A2 RESPECTIVELY.
IN WP NO.34320/2024:
BETWEEN:
1. SRI NARAYAN P M, S/O LATE SUBBA POOJARY, AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, -3- PROP NISMITHA MOTORS, MISMITHA TOWERS, MAIN ROAD, MOODABIDRI, MANGALORE-575001 (SENIOR CITIZENSHIP BENEFIT NOT CLAIMED).
2. SMT. PUSHPA, W/O LATE MUDDU POOJARY, AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS, 2-11-C (1) KADALAKERE ROAD, NEAR DIVINE GRACE FLAT MARPADY, MOODABIDRI, MANGALORE-574227 DAKSHINA KANNADA, (SENIOR CITIZENSHIP BENEFIT NOT CLAIMED).
3. SRI SHEIKH MOHAMMED MATHEEN, S/O LATE PACHA SAHEB, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, NO.6-100, ARIF MANZIL, GOWRIKERE, BEHIND JAIN JUNIOR COLLEGE, PRANTHYA VILLAGE, B.T.C. MOODBIDRI POST, MOODBIDRI, SUB DISTRICT MANGALORE, DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT-574227.
4. SRI JEEVANDHAS ADHYANTHAYA, S/O LATE SHANKAR ADHYANTHAYA, AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, PROP VISHAL MOTORS, SANOOR POST, KARKALA, UDUPI DISTRICT-574104, (SENIOR CITIZENSHIP BENEFIT NOT CLAIMED).
...PETITIONERS (BY SRI PUTTIGE R RAMESH, SR. COUNSEL A/W SRI A S PARASARA KUMAR, ADVOCATE) AND:
1. THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY NEAR A B SHETTY CIRCLE, OPP TO NEHRU MAIDAN, MANGALORE, DAKSHINA KANNADA-575001 REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN.-4-
2. THE SECRETARY REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, NEAR A B SHETTY CIRCLE, OPP TO NEHRU MAIDAN, MANGALORE, DAKSHINA KANNADA-575001.
3. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, K H ROAD, SHANTHINAGAR, BANGALORE-560027.
(MANGALORE DIVISION).
...RESPONDENTS (BY SRI SH RAGHAVENDRA, AGA FOR R1 & R2, SRI JAYAKUMAR S PATIL, SR. COUNSEL A/W SRI HAREESH BHANDARY T, ADV. FOR C/R3 ) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO CALL FOR RECORDS. QUASH THE ORDER/ PROCEEDINGS PASSED BY THE R-2 IN NO.KA.PRA.SA.PRA.D.K. MNG/THA.PA./15/2024-25 DTD. 09.12.2024 IN GRANTING TEMPORARY PERMIT FAVOUR OF R-3 ON THE ROUTE MANGALORE KSRTC BUS STAND AND BACK TO KARKALA AND BACK VIA VAMANJOOR, GURUPURA, KAIKAMBA AND MOODABIDRI FOR THE PERIOD 09.12.2024 TO 08.04.2025 VIDE ANNX-AE.
THESE PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 14TH FEBRUARY, 2025 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE CAV ORDER Writ Petition No.34269/2024 is filed by Private Transport Operators who are having transport permits to ply the bus on a particular route. The petitioners are aggrieved by the temporary permit dated 09.12.2024 issued by 2nd respondent in favour of 3rd respondent on a route from Mangaluru to Karkala via Vamanjoor, Gurupura, Kaikamba and Moodibidri for the period covering from 09.12.2024 to 08.04.2025. Writ petition No.34320/2024 is by some other permit holders impugning the same permit named above.
2. Petitioners in both the petitions named above have questioned the said permits on similar grounds. Thus, both petitions have been heard together.
3. The petitions have been filed on the premise that on the date of issuance of permits in favour of 3rd respondent, petitioners were having the permits to ply the vehicles on the said routes, and the impugned permits have been issued in favour of 3rd respondent, though the pre conditions required for issuing temporary permits did not exist.-6-
4. Sri Ashok Haranahalli and Sri Puttige Ramesh, the learned Senior counsel representing the learned counsel for the petitioners in the respective petition, urged in unison that the impugned permits are issued under Section 87(2)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'Act, 1988'). It is urged that the permits can be issued under Section 87(2)(i) of the Act, 1988 only in a situation where the Competent Authority was restrained from issuing the permit by any Court or any other Authority, which is not the case here.
5. It is also contended that the application seeking temporary permit can be filed only for 4 months. If the application is not considered within 4 months, it would lapse.
Since 3rd respondent's application dated 31.07.2023 seeking temporary permit was not considered within 4 months, said application should be deemed to have been rejected and if the applicant needs a temporary permit, has to apply afresh seeking temporary permit. However, the grounds for issuing temporary permit without there being an application in the prescribed format, the Authority could not have passed the order granting permit in favour of 3rd respondent. -7-
6. It is also contended that though impugned permits can be assailed under Section 90 of the Act, 1988, the Writ Petition is maintainable as the order is without jurisdiction as there was no application seeking issuance of permit, as the earlier application filed had spent its life.
7. It is also contended that the permit is granted by changing the route mentioned in the earlier application and on that count also, the order is liable to be set-aside.
8. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners would rely on the following judgments:
(a) Sharanappa Basappa Gole vs. The Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Gulbarga Region, Gulbarga and Another1
(b) S.Sridhar Raj vs. The Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Kolar and Others2
(c) Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs. Pauli Govis3
(d) WHIRLPOOL Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others4 1 AIR 1959 MYS 226 (DB) 2 AIR 1959 MYS 120 (DB) 3 ILR 1996 Kar 295 4 (1998) 1 SCC1 -8-
(e) Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore and Etc. vs. Karnataka State Transport Authority and Others5
(f) Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Limited vs. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council and Another6
(g) Raghavendra Bhat vs. The Secretary, Regional Transport Authority and Another7
(h) M/s. Basant Roadways vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Others8
(i) Jagjit Bus Service vs. State Transport Commissioner9
9. Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent-Corporation though raised a preliminary objection relating to the maintainability of the Writ Petitions, in view of the alternative remedy under the Act, 1988 being available to the petitioners, has also addressed his arguments on the merits of the matter and would contend that the Writ Petition is not maintainable on 5 AIR 2005 Kar 205 6 2025 SCC OnLine SC 127 7 WP No.9433/2024 8 (1986) 4 SCC 504 9 (1987) 4 SCC 131 -9- the premise that the petitioners have no locus to question the impugned order.
10. Elaborating his stand on the locus standi of the petitioners, it is urged that no averment is found in the petition stating that the petitioners are prejudicially affected by the impugned permits granted in favour of 3rd respondent.
11. In addition, it is also urged on behalf of the respondent-Corporation that the respondents do not have any exclusive claim over the route and the temporary route permit for 4 months issued in favour of 3rd respondent does not affect the petitioners' right to operate under the existing permits in their favour. On this count, it is submitted that there is no cause of action for the petitioners.
12. It is further urged by the learned Senior counsel for the respondents that the application once submitted does not lapse on expiry of the tenure of the permit in case, the application is not considered within the period for which the application for temporary permit is filed. The application can be considered for the subsequent period and the same has
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been considered based on the subsequent application filed by 3rd respondent on payment of additional fees for seeking temporary permit.
13. It is also his contention that public interest is to be considered while granting or refusing the permit and there was a public demand to ply the bus in that route. And keeping in mind, the larger public interest, the Authority has issued temporary permit in favour of 3rd respondent and same cannot be interfered in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
14. Learned Senior counsel would also contend that on earlier occasion, permanent permit was issued in favour of 3rd respondent in respect of the same route and the said order was called in question by the petitioners and the Appellate Authority has remanded the matter to the Competent Authority under the Act, 1988 and the Competent Authority is yet to take a decision on the application seeking permanent permit. Pending the said decision, the respondent-Corporation has requested the Authority to consider issuing temporary permit to meet the public
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demand in the said route and the same has been considered and no fault can be found in the impugned order.
15. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents would rely on the following judgments:
(a) G.V.Chandrashekar & Others vs. State Transport Authority in Karnataka & Another10
(b) G.V.Chandrashekar & Others vs. State Transport Authority in Karnataka & Another 11
(c) Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs. Karnataka State Transport Authority & Others12
(d) L.Sathish & Others vs. Regional Transport Authority & Others13
(e) Parbbhani Transport Co-operative Society Ltd vs. The Regional Transport Authority, Aurangabad 14
(f) The Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Bairagarh, Bhopal vs. (M.P.) vs B.P. Upadhyaya 10 WP No.16763-765/99, Dated 02.07.1999 11 W.A.No.4813-15/1999, Dated 24.07.1999 12 W.P.No.52894-52897/2013, Dated 24.03.2014 13 W.P. No.10121-124/2014, Dated 11.03.2014 14 AIR 1960 SC 801
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Regional Transport Authority, Raipur and Others15
(g) Rajasthan in Jairamdas vs. Regional Transport Authority and Another.16
(h) M.Sai Venkata Ramana vs. Regional Transport Authority, Kakinada17
(i) J.V.Shivaganesh vs. Regional Transport Authority, Bengaluru Rural & Others18
16. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioners by way of reply would dispute the stand that second application is filed. It is urged that the law requires the application to be filed in a specific format and if it does not meet the requirement of the prescribed format, it is not an application in the eye of law. It is also urged that the requirement of temporary permit if pleaded in earlier application, and if anything pleaded in the alleged second application, filed are different. Thus, it is urged that the second application cannot be construed as an application for revival of earlier application. It is further urged that the temporary need cannot be equated with the permanent need and reasons, if 15 AIR 1966 SC 156 16 AIR 1957 Rajasthan 162 17 1999 (5) ALD 523 18 W.P.No.56/2025, Dated 07.01.2025
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any, assigned in the impugned permit are not supported by governing law.
17. This Court has considered the contentions raised at the bar and perused the records.
18. Though the impugned order can be questioned under Section 88 of the Act, 1988, because the impugned permits expire in the month of April, 2025, this Court is of the view that notwithstanding the statutory remedy available to the petitioners, and also given the fact that the case is heard on merits, the petitions require to be decided on merits.
19. Sofar as the first contention relating to the situation contemplated under Section 87(2)(i) of the Act, 1988 is concerned, it is noticed from the said provision that temporary permit may be granted under the said provision where no permit can be issued under Sections 72 or 74 or 76 or 79 of the Act, 1988 because of restraint order of the Court or other Competent Authority restraining issue of permit. Admittedly, in this case, no Court or Competent Authority has restrained the Authority from passing orders granting permit. Thus, there is no hesitation in holding that the case
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is not made out to grant the permit under Section 87(2)(i) of the Act, 1988.
20. However the question is whether the impugned permits are issued on the sole ground under Section 87(2)(i) of the Act, 1988 or whether it also takes into account, the situation contemplated in Section 87(1)(c) of the Act, 1988 is the point for consideration as admittedly, the first application dated 31.07.2023 is filed under Section 87(1)(c).
21. In the application dated 31.07.2023 under Section 87(1)(c) of the Act, 1988, the respondent- Corporation claimed that the permit is required to be issued to meet the particular temporary need. Later in December 2024, referring to the application dated 31.07.2023, temporary permit is sought citing reasons mentioned therein.
22. The impugned order assigns two reasons for issuing permit.
(a) Considering the demand from the students from rural area and the public, it is felt necessary to provide bus service from rural area to urban area. (Unnumbered
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last but one paragraph in page No.2 of the impugned order).
(b) In the public interest, in exercise of power under Section 87(2)(i) of the Act, 1988.
As already noticed, the second reason is not justified as the pre-condition contemplated under the said provision was not there. Thus, the Court is required to consider whether the situation contemplated under Section 87(1)(c) of the Act, 1988 is made out.
23. As rightly contended by the learned Senior counsel for the respondent-Corporation, Constitution bench of the Apex Court in The Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Bairagarh, Bhopal case supra has held that contention that whenever there is a permanent need, there cannot be a temporary need is an erroneous view. The Apex Court has held that both temporary need and permanent need may co-exist.
24. It is also relevant to note that respondent- Corporation had applied for permanent permits. Same were granted in favour of the corporation and in the Revision Petitions filed by the private operators, the orders issued
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granting pakka permits were set aside and the matter is remitted to the Authority under the Act, 1988 and the applications are pending consideration.
25. In this background, the respondent-Corporation which had also sought temporary permit on 31.07.2023, filed application in December 2024, to grant temporary permit, pending consideration of the application for grant of permanent permit. There, the reference is also made to the application dated 31.07.2023. The application also cited certain festivals as the reason to assume that there will be more travelers during the period commencing from December 2024 to March 2025.
26. It is required to be noticed in the first instance, the petitioners who have the permits to ply the vehicles in a particular route do not have the exclusive right to exclusively operate on the said routes. Under the existing law, the permit can be issued only to the State Road Transport Corporation, provided the conditions for issuing the permits are met.
27. It is further noticed that while issuing the temporary permit, the law does not mandate the opportunity
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of hearing to the person who is already having the permit. The requirement is, the person seeking permit should apply for it. No doubt, the law prescribes the application in a particular form. Admittedly, the application dated 31.07.2023 is in a prescribed form. However, no orders are passed on the said application. Technically one can say that the application has become infructuous as 4 months period specified in the application seeking temporary permit has expired. However, as already noticed, for the same route, the permanent permits were issued in favor of respondent- Corporation and later in a revision filed by private operators the permits were set aside and the matter is remitted to the Authority and the matter is still pending consideration before the Authority.
28. In this factual context, the application dated 31.07.2023, which is in a prescribed format, and not considered on merit, can be said to be revived/modified pursuant to application dated 07.12.2024 for the period specified in the application dated 07.12.2204. In other words, again in the context of the peculiar facts of the case, the application dated 07.12.2024 can be construed as an
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application for modification of the permit period mentioned in application dated 31.07.2023. The view taken by the coordinate bench in W.P.No.51756/2012 though in a slightly different scenario, seems to support the above said view.
29. This Court is also of the view that the second application dated 07.12.2023, not being in prescribed format cannot be a ground for the petitioners to raise an objection in this behalf given the fact that the petitioners do not have a right of hearing when an application seeking temporary permit is being considered. Merely because 2nd application is not in prescribed format, it cannot be considered that the petitioners' interest if any, is prejudiced on account of 2nd application not being in a prescribed format. What is required to be noticed is that there must be an application seeking a permit for certain period for a certain route. There must be payment of prescribed fees. The application discloses the reason. These basic requirements have been taken care of in the subsequent application dated 07.12.2024 as well.
30. For the reasons recorded above, the contention that no application was pending consideration seeking temporary permit does not appear to be correct and the said
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contention is too technical to merit consideration, particularly in a situation when the petitioners and the like have no say under law, when the applications seeking temporary permit are to be considered by the Authority in the first instance.
31. In addition, it is also contended on behalf of the petitioners that the application seeking permanent permit/pakka permit was pending consideration in terms of the remand order passed by the Appellate Authority, as such the present application for temporary permit could not have been issued. Under the scheme of the Act, 1988, there is no bar to consider the application seeking temporary permit when the application seeking permanent permit is pending consideration.
32. It is further relevant to note that the petitioners have not raised a grievance that the petitioners are going to be affected by the impugned permits on the ground that under impugned permits, the timings permitted, clash with the timings permitted under the petitioners' permit.
33. Section 80 of the Act, 1988 deals with the procedure for applying the permits. The very nature of the permit under Section 87 is temporary permit and at the
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most, it can be for a period of more than 4 months and not beyond that period. The conditions enumerated for issuance of the temporary permits are referred to in Section 87 Clauses (a) to (d). In the instant case, it is noticed that the applicant-respondent-Corporation has sought permit to meet a particular temporary need.
34. As can be seen from the impugned permit, the Authority which issued the permit, in addition to referring to Section 87(2)(i) has also observed as under:
"PÀ£ÁðlPÀ gÁdå ¸ÀªÀÄUÀæ AiÉÆÃd£É C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£É ¢:07.03.2019gÀ C£ÀéAiÀÄ PÉ.J¸ï.Dgï.n.¹.AiÀĪÀjUÉ ªÀiÁvÀæ ¥Àgª À Á¤UÉ ¤ÃqÀ®Ä CªÀPÁ±À«zÀÄÝ UÁæ«ÄÃt ¨sÁUÀzÀ «zÁåyðUÀ¼À ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀ ¨ÉÃrPÉAiÀÄAvÉ UÁæ«ÄÃt ¨sÁUÀ¢AzÀ £ÀUg À À ¥Àz æ ÃÉ ±À §¸ÀÄì ¸Ë®¨sÀå MzÀV¸ÀĪÀÅzÀÄ CªÀ±ÀåPÀªA É zÀÄ PÀAqÀħA¢gÀÄvÀz Û "É
35. Though in the above said paragraph, the Authority has not observed that the permit issued is in recognition of the temporary need, this Court is of the view that the order which is more of an administrative order has to be construed as the order has recognised the temporary requirement envisaged in Section 87(1)(c) of the Act, 1988 since the permit is valid only for 4 months. In addition, in the application dated 07.12.2024, 3rd respondent has explained
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the demand for the period December 2024 to March 2025. Though permit extends for a week in April as well, said fact cannot be a ground to invalidate the permit as the permit is valid only for 4 months commencing from 09.12.2024. Though the impugned order/permit does not specifically refer to the application dated 07.12.2024, on overall consideration of the materials on record, one can conclude that grounds urged in the second application must have formed the basis to grant the permit.
36. Learned Senior counsel would rely on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Babu Vergheese supra to contend that when the law mandates on particular thing to be done in a particular manner, either it should be done in the same manner or should not be done at all. Said ratio cannot be stretched too far to hold that the order granting temporary permit, based on an application which is in a proper format, post one more application dated 07.12.2024, though not in the prescribed format. For this reason, this Court is of the view that the order on the application cannot be construed as one without jurisdiction.
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37. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Babu Vergheese supra cannot be read as a Statue and it is to be read in the context. The factual background of the present cases do not enable the petitioners to take shelter under the said judgment.
38. For the aforementioned reasons, this Court is of the view that the impugned permits do not give a cause of action for the petitioners to raise a contention relating to application dated 07.12.2024 not being in a format prescribed.
39. It should also be borne in mind that the petitioners' permit to ply the vehicles in the permitted route has remained intact. As already noticed, the petitioners do not have the monopoly over the route covered by the permit. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioners' are prejudiced so as to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction.
40. In a situation where the Authority has given a finding that there is a demand from the students and the public from the rural area, for providing the bus services by the State Road Transport Corporation, this Court does not
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find valid reasons to interfere in the order issuing temporary permits in favour of respondent-Corporation, that too in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India when the issuing Authority has concluded that the bus services are to be provided in the public interest. The larger public interest appears to have weighed in the mind of competent authority while granting the permission. It is relevant to note that it is note that the petitioners during the hearing have not contended that there is no demand.
41. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners to substantiate his contention relating to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the writ petition despite alternative remedy need not be discussed elaborately as this Court has decided the case on merits.
42. Learned Senior counsel has relied upon the judgments of this Court in Sharanappa Basappa Gole, as well as S. Sridhar Raj supra to contend that the permits granted without application is without jurisdiction and same has to be se-aside.
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43. This Court has already recorded the reasons as to why in the present cases, the grant of permit cannot be construed as one without application.
44. Likewise the judgment in the case of Kanchan vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Others19, holding that the grant of permit without application is unsustainable as already noticed, in the factual background of this case, it cannot be considered as one without application.
45. It is also relevant to note that in the impugned order, the authority has assigned reasons for issuing the permit and those reasons have been already discussed. Thus, the contention that the order is without assigning reasons has no substance.
46. To sum up the facts obtained in the case, one cannot hold that the permits are issued without application. It cannot be concluded that the permits are issued only in exercise of power under Section 87(2)(i) of the Act, 1988. Considering the contents of application dated 31.07.2023 and the application dated 07.12.2024, this Court is of the 19 (AIR, 2006 SC 3444)
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view that the impugned permits are issued under Section 87(1)(c) of the Act, 1988.
47. Accordingly, the Writ Petitions are dismissed.
48. It is made clear that the observations made in this order are only confined to the questions raised in connections with the temporary permits and shall not be treated as observations on the applications seeking permanent permits.
Sd/-
(ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE) JUDGE BRN/GVP