Punjab-Haryana High Court
Dr. Naginder Singh vs The Punjab University, Chandigarh And ... on 25 May, 1989
Equivalent citations: AIR1990P&H157, AIR 1990 PUNJAB AND HARYANA 157
Author: M.M. Punchhi
Bench: M.M. Punchhi
ORDER M.M. Punchhi, J.
1. This writ petition is styled as a public interest litigation.
2. And who is the petitioner? He is Dr. Naginder Singh, Director, Medical Diagnostic Centre, New Dayanand Medical College" and Hospital, Ludhiaha. He claims to have an excellent academic record. He also had enough interests to get associated with the affairs of the Punjab University, respondent J, and priorly as a student leader,' as stated. Later he was a Member of the Punjab University Senate during the 4 years term (1976-1980), as well as a Member of the Punjab University Academic Council within the years 1978-1980. Now he is not in the Senate having lost the recent election, and he is here to challenge, the very constitution thereof, contending sepcifically. that S. 13 of the Punjab University Act, 1947 (for short, the Act) in so far as it 'gives an arbitrary, unguided and uncanalised power to the Chancellor, respondent 2, to nominate 'Members on the Senate, is ultra vires the Consititu-tion and the basic structure on which it is founded. Sub-sec. (J). of S. 13 relates to the composition of the University Senate and the break-up thereof. It reads as follows :
"13. Ordinary Fellows :
(1) The number of ordinary fellows shall not exceed eighty five and of such number.
(a) Fifteen shall be elected by the Registered Graduates from amongst themselves, among whom.
(i) two shall be elected to represented the districts of Ferozepur, Hoshiarpur and Ludhiana in the Senate of Punjab, two to represent the State of Haryana and one to represent the Union Territory of Chandigarh; and
(ii) the remaining ten shall be elected from any area including any of the areas mentioned in sub-Cl. (i);
(b) two shall be elected by Professors on the Staff of the Teaching Departments of the University from amongst themselves, provided that one member each from the Arts and Science Departments shall be elected;
(c) two shall be elected by Readers and Lecturers on the staff of the Teaching Departments of the University from amongst, themselves, provided; that one member each from, the Arts and Science Departments shall be elected;'
(d) three shall be elected by the Principals of Teachnical and Professional Colleges from amongst themselves, among whom one shall be elected to represent the districts of Feroze-pur, Hoshiarpur and Ludhiana in the State of Punjab, one to represent the State of Haryana and one to represent the Union Territory of Chandigarh and three shall be elected by the staff of such colleges from amongst themselves, among whom one shall be elected to represent the districts of Ferozepur, Hoshiar-pur and Ludhiana in the State of Punjab, one to represent the State of Haryana and one to represent the Union Territory of Chandigarh :
(e) eight shall be elected by the Heads of affiliated Arts Colleges, from amongst themselves, among whom three shall be elected to represent the districts of Ferozepur, Hoshiarpur and Ludhiana in the State of Punjab, four to represent the State of Haryana and one to represent the Union Territory of Chandigarh;
(f) eight shall be elected by the Professors, Senior Lecturers and Lecturers of affiliated Arts Colleges from amongst themselves, among whom three shall be elected to represent the districts of Ferozepur, Hoshiarpur and Ludhiana in the State of Punjab, four to'represent the State of Haryana and one to-represent the.Union Territory of Chandigarh;
(g) omitted by Government of India Notification dated 6-12-1989;
(h) six shall be elected by the various faculties of the University;
(i) two shall be elcted by the members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly from amongst themselves, and two shall be elected by the members of the Haryana Legislative Assembly from amongst themselves, provided that the member elected is scholar of any University degree; and
(j) remainder shall be nominated by the Chancellor."
Summing up the break-up in paragraph 5 of the petition, the petitioner asserted that in a house of 85 members, only 41 are to be elected and the remaining 44 members, being non-elected, are supposedly nominated by the Chancellor. The petitioner whshes to deduce that the providing of elected members is rendered otiose when the Chancellor can by nomination create an opposing majority. Thus it results in the naked usurpation of powers of the Senate in the hands of the Chancellor.
3. Total miscalculation. The elected members, on count, turn out to be 49. This would be evident by adding members described in sub-Cl. (a) to (i). The remainder, which may be nominated by the Chancellor, are required to be of such number which totally do not exceed 85. It means that the Chancellor can nominate up to 36 persons and they obviously constitute a minority visa-vis the elected ones., Instantly, the Chancellor has nominated 34 members. The mere fact that amongst the 49 elected seats, some seats are lying vacant for one reason or the other, does not alter the legal position and the contention with regard to the nominees of the Chancellor dominating the scene, is utterly baseless, and hence rejected.
4. Under S. 9 of the Act, the Central Government is empowered to appoint a Chancellor. It has been stated at the Bar that before the trifurcation of the State of Punjab into the present State of Punjab, the State of Haryana and the Union Territory of Chandigarh, the Governor of Punjab traditionally by name was being appointed as Chancellor of the University. But with effect from November 1, 1966, the day of trifurcation, the Chancellor traditionally now is the Vice President of India, by name. Needless to say that a person manning the high office of the Vice President of India is a man of high dignity, and in the exercise of his power he cannot be attributed any legal mala fide. Yet what is asserted by the petitioner here is that the exercise of nomination the has separately given a list of the 34 nominees) is indicative of his having politicised the academic body.
5. The argument does not appeal to us without any details as to how factually it is politicised. The argument loses sight of the fact that the power of nomination is not vested in a minor official but in a top-ranking person i.e. the Vice President of India, and the power vested in him under S. 13 of the Act is not necessarily discriminatory, and abuse of power by him cannot be assumed-just because a discretion is vested in him. Besides, there is a presumption that public officials, more so high public officials, will discharge their duties honesty and in accordance with the rules of law. See in this connection M/s. Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner con-tended that instantly the present Chancellor is the Vice President of India, but the provisions-of the Act have to be tested on the assumption the the Chancellor was always not a high ranking authority and could well be an ordinary public official, to which no such presumptions could be raised. He further asserted that since this was a public interest litigation, he had a right to point out the defect in law, as according to him, it was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. He relied on Smt, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 and in particular, to the views expressed in paragraph 65 of the report, where the scope of Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution has elaborately been discussed. In the same paragraph, it was observed by the Court :
"..... When power is vested in a high authority like the Central Government, abuse of power cannot be lightly assumed. And in any event, if there is abuse of power, the arms of the Court are long enough to reach it and to strike it down. The power conferred on the Passport Authority to imposed a passport under S. 10(3)(c) cannot, therefore, be regarded as discriminatory and it does not fall foul of Art. 14. But every exercise of such power has to be tested in order to determine whether it is arbitrary or within the guidelines provided in S. 10(3)(c)."
Applying the same test, we cannot hold that when the discretion is vested in the Central Government to appoint a Chancellor, the Central Government would in turn appoint an ordinary mortal to be the Chancellor and that the Chancellor's exercise of power in nominating members of the Senate under S. 13 would in all events be arbitrary and unjust. We have no hesitation thus in holding that the provisions of S. 13(1)(j) is not unconstitutional, and thus it is a valid piece of legislation. Not a word has been said in the petition with regard to the exercise of such power by the Chancellor, as to how it is arbitrary, and if so on what ground. Thus, we reject the contention of the petitioner in this regard as well.
7. Lastly, we fail to see how the instant litigation is a public interest litigation. It is pure and simple an attempt to seek declaration about the validity of a law without any specific injury to the petitioner. In our law without any specific injury to the petitioner. In our view, such a writ for mer declaration to test the validity of law, does not He. As held in S. P. Gupta v. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149, the individual who moves the Court for judicial redress must be acting bona fide with a view to vindicating the cause of justice and if he is acting for personal gain or private profit or out of political motivation or other oblique consideration, the Court should not allow itself to be activited at the instance of such person and must reject his application at the threshold. It was further held that as a matter of prudence and not as a rule of law, the Court may confine this strategic exercise of jurisdiction to cases where legal wrong or legal injury is caused to a determinate class or group of persons or the constitutional or legal right of such determinate class or group of persons is violated and as far as possible, not entertain cases of judicial redress. The petitioner's learned counsel failed to identify and determine the class or group of persons who are aggrieved against the vesting and use of the power of nomination of Senate Members by the Chancellor of the University. The petitioner was a part of the Senate in the yester years and, as stated earlier, he fought the election this time too, but failed. He has rather patently filed the instant petition with oblique motives having lost the election to the Senate, with political motivation by accusing the Chancellor of politicising the Senate by nomination. Thus, on the facts of this case, we are of the considered view that the petitioner lacks locus standi to initiate the instant litigation as a public interest litigation and thus we reject his petition at the very threshold.
8. Dismissed in limine. No costs. This also disposes of Civil Misc. No. 2915 of 1989 for addition of those 34 nominated, as respondents to the petition.
9. Petition dismissed.