Madras High Court
N.Sethumadhavan vs N.Tamil Selvi on 5 August, 2022
Author: M.Sundar
Bench: M.Sundar
Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Dated : 05.08.2022
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE Mr.JUSTICE M.SUNDAR
Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022
N.Sethumadhavan
Sri Ram Promoters
Door No.22/594, Alagirisami Salai
K.K.Nagar, Chennai – 600 078. ... Petitioner
Vs
N.Tamil Selvi ... Respondent
Arbitration Original Petition filed under Section 34(2)(b) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 praying (i) to set aside the arbitral
award dated 12.03.2021 passed by the sole Arbitrator Mr.P.Ganesan, District
Judge (Retd) in its entirely; (ii) to direct the respondent to pay the costs and
(iii) to grant such further relief as this Court may deem fit under the
circumstance of the case.
For Petitioner : Mr.Avinash Wadhwani
along with Ms.K.Abhirame
For Respondent : Mr.C.Uma Shankar
for Mr.D.Dhanasekaran
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https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022
ORDER
Captioned 'Arbitration Original Petition' [hereinafter 'Arb.OP' for the sake of brevity, convenience and clarity] has been presented in this Court on 19.07.2021 under Section 34 of 'The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act No.26 of 1996)' [hereinafter 'A and C Act' for the sake of brevity, convenience and clarity] assailing an 'arbitral award dated 12.03.2021 bearing Reference No.High Court Arbitration file 70/2018/MHCAC/Hct.Ms.' [hereinafter 'impugned award' for the sake of convenience and clarity].
2. Mr.Avinash Wadhwani, learned counsel along with Ms.K.Abhirame for sole petitioner and Mr.C.Uma Shankar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr.D.Dhanasekaran, counsel on record for caveator [to be noted, lone respondent in captioned Arb.OP has lodged a caveat] are before this Court.
3.. Short facts shorn of granular particulars that are not imperative for appreciating this order are that a 'Memorandum of Understanding dated 12.09.2014' [hereinafter 'said MOU' for the sake of brevity and convenience] was entered into between the parties i.e., 'N.Sethumadhavan, petitioner in 2/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 captioned Arb.OP' [hereinafter 'builder' for the sake of convenience] and 'N.Tamil Selvi, respondent in captioned Arb.OP' [hereinafter 'land owner' for the sake of convenience]; that said MOU was for development of 'land admeasuring 30 cents or thereabouts comprised in Survey No.228/2A Part, New Patta No.2410, New Survey No.228/2A1 (according to New Patta) in Jallidianpettai Village [earlier Tambaram Taluk in Sholinganallur Taluk] situate within Chennai Registration District and Chennai Corporation' [hereinafter 'said land' for the sake of convenience and clarity]; that said land is part of a larger extent of 70 cents of land; that said MOU was for development of said land by putting up apartments [flats therein]; that the flats are to be put up by builder and the developed property is to be shared in a 50% each ratio; that this development/construction had to be completed within a time frame of fifteen months from the date of said MOU or from the date on which land owner hands over possession of said land to builder or from the date on which planning permission is obtained for development; that three different reckoning dates have been mentioned for computing the fifteen months time frame; that this makes the computation of this time frame a conundrum of sorts; that therefore it will suffice to notice that fifteen months time frame has been fixed qua said MOU; that post said MOU, land 3/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 owner executed a registered General Power of Attorney in favour of builder and one Mr.S.Kumar; that thereafter an agreement captioned SUPPLEMENTAL DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT dated 17.04.2017 came to be executed between land owner and 'M/s.SRI RAM PROMOTERS, a Partnership firm' [hereinafter 'builder firm' for the sake of convenience] represented by builder and one Mr.S.Kumar who have been described as partners of builder firm; that this 17.04.2017 agreement shall hereinafter be referred to as 'second agreement'; that the terms of said MOU were altered in and by this second agreement; that the sharing ratio was changed from 50% each to 60% to the builder firm and 40% to the land owner; that no time frame is fixed; that there is specific reference to said MOU in second agreement and there is a covenant to the effect that no other claims subsist between the parties qua said MOU; that there are three reckoning dates for computing the fifteen months time frame qua said MOU and therefore, the computation of fifteen months of time frame is a conundrum of sorts (as already alluded to supra) but it is submitted before this Court without any disputation that fifteen months time frame computed in any one of the three methods had elapsed before the date of the second agreement i.e., before 17.04.2017; that the development was ultimately completed; that the flats 4/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 were handed over to the land owner though some disputation erupted about the quantum; that disputes erupted as the land owner made a claim on the ground of delay in completion of construction; that the parties resorted to arbitration before a learned retired District Judge, who constituted the 'Arbitral Tribunal' [hereinafter 'AT' for the sake of brevity]; that before AT, land owner has made a claim complaining of alleged delay in handing over flats; that the builder who was arrayed as sole respondent [though there is a mention about the name of the builder firm also] made a counter claim under six different heads mentioning them to be additional charges incurred qua the development of said land; that AT entered upon reference, adjudicated upon the arbitrable disputes and made the impugned award by allowing the claim of the land owner partly i.e., awarding a sum of Rs.25,12,800/- and dismissing the counter claim of the builder; that the builder has presented the captioned Arb.OP in this Court assailing the impugned award.
4. Learned counsel for petitioner in captioned Arb.OP (builder) [to be noted, name of builder firm has also been mentioned] submitted that his campaign against the impugned award is predicated on three grounds and they are as follows :
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https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 a. AT has not applied Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 as the second agreement is a clear novation qua said MOU;
b. Time is not the essence of the contract in any building contracts and therefore, binding precedents have given a go by;
c. The impugned award falls foul of Dyna Technologies principle i.e., ratio laid by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Crompton Greaves Ltd. reported in (2019) 20 SCC 1 regarding reasons for an award, particularly two of the three facets set out in Dyna Technologies namely unintelligible and inadequate. (to be noted, improper is the third facet qua Dyna Technologies principle).
5. Learned counsel in continuation of his campaign drew the attention to one covenant in the second agreement, which says that there are no other claims between the parties in connection with said MOU. To be noted, this covenant reads as follows :
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https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 'There are no other claim between the parties in connection with the original MOU dated 12.09.2014.'
6. In the light of the aforementioned covenant, the impugned award prima facie appears to be vitiated in giving a complete go by to this covenant. This prima facie view comes across as an infraction of Section 28(3) of A and C Act and therefore, this Section 34 Court is inclined to admit the captioned Arb.OP. To be noted, captioned Arb.OP is in the Admission Board and therefore, it is being heard in accordance with Rule 8 of 'The Madras High Court (Arbitration) Rules, 2020' [hereinafter 'MHC Arb Rules' for the sake of convenience and clarity] and the relevant rule is Rule 8.
7. Mr.D.Dhanasekaran, learned counsel on record for caveator [sole respondent] accepted notice and Mr.C.Uma Shankar, learned counsel appearing on his behalf agreed to argue the matter on merits. Therefore, with the consent of both sides, main Arb.OP was taken up and heard out.
8. Elaborating on his aforementioned three submissions, learned counsel for petitioner drew the attention of this Court to pleadings before AT, particularly paragraph No.19 of the counter statement of builder and paragraph No.19 of the rejoinder of land owner which read as follows : 7/24
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 'Paragraph No.19 of the counter statement of builder:
'19. In addition, despite having executed a general power of attorney, in favour of a partner and the subsequent novation of the memorandum of understanding, with a partnership, the claimant deliberately feigns ignorance of the persons involved in the project. Consequently, this claim is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties.' 'Paragraph No.19 of the rejoinder of land owner:
'19. In so far as Para 19 are concerned, the respondent has not officially informed the claimant of his partners even till date and the claimant is not expected to know about the changes effected in his constitution unless conveyed to her. There cannot be any presumption in this regard.'
9. Learned counsel submitted that the second agreement is with a partnership firm. Therefore, the parties have changed, in this view of the matter, an issue of non-joinder of necessary parties plea was raised but AT had fallen in error in not dealing with this aspect though a specific issue (issue No.2) was framed regarding non-joinder of necessary parties. It was also argued that the aforementioned covenant in the second agreement which says that there are no claims as between the parties with regard to said MOU, has not been discussed anywhere and therefore, it falls foul of Section 31(3) 8/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 of the A and C Act.
10. In response to the above argument, learned counsel for land owner pointed out that description in the cause title before AT itself talks about the builder [natural person] and it gives the name of the builder firm [partnership firm] also. It was also pointed out that Issue No.2 regarding non-joinder has been dealt with and answered by AT in paragraph Nos.17 and 18 of the arbitral award, wherein AT has come to the conclusion that the other partners are mere name lenders and therefore, it does not cloth them with any right and they are unnecessary parties. To be noted, partnership deed is dated 10.03.2016 and it was there before AT as Ex.R-10. As regards novation, it was contended by learned counsel for respondent that the entire said MOU ought to have been re-written and all terms of the said MOU ought to have stood replaced by the second agreement but this is not the case and therefore, there is no novation and the question of Section 62 qua The Indian Contract Act, 1872 does not arise.
11. The petitioner counsel pressed into service Associate Builders, Ssangyong Engg. and Patel Engg. Ltd., being the ratio in Associate Builders v. DDA reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204, 9/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI reported in (2019) 15 SCC 131 and Patel Engg. Ltd v. North Eastern Electric Power Corpn. Ltd. reported in (2020) 7 SCC 167. As alluded to supra, learned counsel also placed reliance on Dyna Technologies.
12. Learned counsel for respondent pressed into service one case law namely the Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt.Ltd. v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., reported in AIROnline 2021 SC 708 to say that a mere erroneous application of law cannot be categorised as patent illegality.
13. This Section 34 Court carefully considered the rival submissions. This Section 34 Court does not intend to go into appreciation of evidence as that would tantamount to re-appreciation which is forbidden vide proviso to patent illegality ground (Section 34(2A) of A and C Act]. Law is also clear that there cannot be any review of an arbitral award on merits post Ssangyong case law.
14. Before proceeding further, this Section 34 Court deems it appropriate to set out the rules of the game [if one may say so] qua a Section 34 legal drill. To put it in legal parlance, this Court deems it appropriate to set out the statutory perimeter within which a Section 34 legal drill should 10/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 perambulate. A Section 34 legal drill is neither an appeal nor a revision, it is not even a full-fledged judicial review, it is a mere challenge to an arbitral award and that challenge should be such that it fits in nay, fits in snugly in one of the slots adumbrated in Section 34 of the A and C Act, which has been repeatedly described by this Court as pigeon holes. Furthermore, a Section 34 legal drill is a summary procedure. This principle was first laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in oft-quoted Fiza Developers case law i.e., Fiza Developers and Inter-Trade Private Limited Vs. AMCI (India) Private Limited reported in (2009) 17 SCC 796 and subsequently the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Emkay Global Financial Services Ltd. v. Girdhar Sondhi reported in (2018) 9 SCC 49 held that Fiza Developers ratio is a step in the right direction. Drawing inspiration from Fiza Developers ratio, clause 8.5 of Practice Directions thereat, now forming part of MHC Arb Rules was made and the same reads as follows :
Clause 8.5 of MHC Arbitration Rules:
'8. Challenge to an award under Section 34 of the Act: 8.1 ......................
8.2 .....................
8.3 .....................11/24
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8.5 Proceedings under Section 34 of the Act shall be disposed of by a summary procedure.' To be noted, the said Rules and Practice Directions was made by this Court in exercise of powers under Section 82 of A and C Act. Section 34 is a default provision and challenge to an arbitral award is a delicate balance between sanctity of finality of arbitral award and judicial intervention ingrained in Sections 35 and 5 respectively of A and C Act on one side and judicial review being an essential part of Rule of law on the other. Therefore, this Court reminds itself that it is not sitting on appeal qua arbitrable dispute/s.
15. In this view of the matter, non-joinder of necessary parties has certainly been pleaded by the builder and the land owner has responded by saying, details of the partnership have not been given. This Court further reminds itself that arbitral proceedings are not bound by 'Code of Civil Procedure, 1908' [hereinafter referred to 'CPC' for the sake of brevity] or 'The Indian Evidence Act, 1892' and this is ingrained in Section 19 of the A and C Act, which reads as follows :
12/24
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 '19. Determination of rules of procedure:
(1) The arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).
(2) Subject to this Part, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting its proceedings.
(3) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (2), the arbitral tribunal may, subject to this Part, conduct the proceedings in the manner it considers appropriate.
(4) The power of the arbitral tribunal under sub-section (3) includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence.'
16.This Court notices that the name of the land owner [natural person] has been shown as respondent and the name of the builder firm namely the name of the firm 'SRI RAM PROMOTERS' along with the name of one partner alone [to be noted, the builder firm is constituted atleast by three partners as can be culled out from the case file] has been shown as petitioner in the cause title. Without re-appreciating evidence, without getting into the realm of re-appreciation of evidence, it will suffice to mention absent of details of other partners of the partnership deed [i.e., partnership deed dated 13/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 10.03.2016, Ex.R10 before AT] and as to who represents the partnership firm, the petitions filed both before AT and this Court is of no avail as a 'partnership firm' is not an entity in law and it is only compendious name. Therefore, though the manner in which this description of parties has been done is a loose approach, which may not pass muster in a civil Court, it just scrapes through by the proverbial cat's whisker owing to the facts and circumstances of case on hand and because these are arbitrable proceedings, wherein CPC or The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not apply. As already alluded to supra, this non-joinder issue has been framed as Issue No.2 and the same has been answered by AT in paragraph Nos.17 and 18 of the arbitral award, which read as follows :
'17. Issue No.2:
Whether the claim is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?
The second issue is with regard to non-joinder of necessary parties. The MOU (Ex.C1) entered into between the claimant and the respondent in the individual capacity of both parties. But in the supplementary agreement (Ex.C3) the second party arrayed as M/s.Sriram Promoters represented by its partners. Except the cause title in page number 2 to 5 they have not 14/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 whispered any thing with regard to the partnership firm and its one of the partner Thiru.Kumar participation in the supplementary agreement. On perusal of the supplementary agreement, it reflects that it was executed for the purpose of reducing the share of the claimant, for which non refundable advance amount of Rs.75 lakhs was treated as consideration and share of the claimant was reduced from 50 to 39. Originally, as per MOU buildings and UDS shared as 50:50. After supplementary agreement, their share changed hence to clarify the same they have mentioned about the number of houses and car park area to be allotted to each party were narrated. Except the above, nothing was disclosed. So the original MOU terms and conditions between the claimant and respondent were not changed. The partnership firm of the respondent and his partner have nothing to do with the agreement and MOU since they have not paid anything in addition to the MOU mentioned amount. The non refundable deposit already paid by the respondent itself and it was now adjusted by reducing the share of the claimant, since she was not able to repay that amount. The above said Rs.75 lakhs was originally paid by the respondent himself as refundable deposit and now it was treated as non-refundable. The respondent's partnership firm as well as the partner Thiru.Kumar have not invested anything towards the above said two agreements. So there is no liability or obligation cast upon the claimant towards the partnership firm and the said Thiru.Kumar. The whole 15/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 liability and obligation cast upon the claimant towards the respondent alone. Mere adding of names of partnership firm and a partner alone could not create any rights. In paragraph No.2 of the supplementary agreement (Ex.C3) it has been specifically mentioned as :
“Since the vendor could not repay the entire refundable security deposit of Rs.75 lakhs to the developers the said amount is adjusted in the reschedule allotment”
18.In the original MOU (Ex.C1) the respondent has not shown his partnership firm or his partner. He entered into that agreement in the individual capacity alone still the same position is continued. Utilizing the position of the claimant i.e., not able to refund the security amount, the name of the firm and a partner was included in the Ex.C3. Hence the inclusion of two names will not change the rights and obligations between the claimant and respondent towards each other. Therefore, the mere name lenders namely the partnership firm and a partner will not cloth with any right and they are unnecessary parties to this proceedings. Hence the claim is not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. The issue no.2 is answered accordingly.'
17. The above view cannot be construed as an implausible view. To be noted, under a Section 34 legal drill, the Section 34 Court would make judicial intervention only if the view taken by AT is an implausible view. It 16/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 is also to be noted that 'mere' erroneous application of law also passes muster qua a patent illegality ground of challenge vide proviso to sub-section (2A) of Section 34 of A and C Act.
18. This takes this Court to the novation aspect of the matter.
Novation turns on appreciation of evidence and in this case, it turns on appreciation of Ex.C1 an Ex.C3 namely said MOU dated 12.09.2014 and second agreement i.e., Supplemental Development Agreement dated 17.04.2017. AT, on appreciation of evidence has come to the conclusion that this is not a case of novation and that Ex.C3 is supplemental to Ex.C1. This takes this Court to a crucial point that has been canvassed in the case on hand, completely ignoring one covenant in Ex.C3, which has been extracted and reproduced supra.
19. The above at best would turn on Section 28(3) of the A and C Act. As the AT has come to the conclusion that Ex.C1 and Ex.C3 have to be read together, the aforementioned covenant now becomes a clause which is operating between the parties. If this clause is applied, it is clear that there is no time frame.
20. In the normal circumstances, this Court would not have construed 17/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 Exs.C1 and C3 to be typically commercial documents as envisaged in the celebrated Nabha Power case rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nabha Power Limited (NPL) v. Punjab State Power Corporation Limited (PSPCL) reported in (2018) 11 SCC 508 authored by Hon'ble Mr.Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul after making a survey of various international scenario. In the case on hand Nabha Power cannot be applied owing to the manner in which the agreements have been made and the way the contracting parties have gone about making the agreements. To put it differently, considering the facts and circumstances of the case on hand and the manner in which Exs.C1 and C3 have been made, this may not be a case of Nabha Power fact scenario but the issue presents itself in a different form, i.e., different form as the question of awarding compensation on the ground of delay would not arise if there is no time frame or if the originally agreed 15 months time (which itself is a conundrum owing to the reckoning dates) is taken away. It is made clear that this Court is not going into the merits of the matter. This is being mentioned only to emphasis that absent Nabha Power principle also, the aforementioned covenant becomes all too important as that takes away the substratum of the impugned award. In other words, if aforementioned covenant is taken into account, there is no time frame and that would take 18/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 away the very substratum of the award. In this regard, the findings written by AT captured in paragraph No.20 are very critical. Relevant portion of paragraph 20 of arbitral award reads as follows :
'20. Except the above said time schedule no other clause was stipulated in the MOU with regard to extension of time for completion of the construction. In the supplementary agreement (Ex.C3) also they have not whispered anything with regard to time schedule for completion. Under such circumstances, how it is possible to find out whether time is the essence of contract or not?' This means that AT has clearly noticed that the contracting parties have clearly removed the time frame for the development of said land. AT has therefore come to the conclusion that time frame is the essence of contract but this Court refrains itself from going into the same as that may pass muster under mere erroneous application of law. What is of relevance is, the aforementioned covenant in Ex.C3 has been noticed by AT but with no discussion on the same, AT has awarded compensation on the ground of delay.
21. As already alluded to supra, in the light of the aforementioned covenant, there is no time frame at all and therefore, the very substratum of 19/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 the award goes. This brings the discussion back to sub-section (3) of Section 28 of the A and C Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 28 was amended with retrospective effect on and from 23.10.2015. On and from 23.10.2015, the statutory requirement is while on deciding and making the award, AT has to take into account the terms of the contract. In the case on hand, AT has held that there is no novation and that Ex.C1 and Ex.C3 have to be read together, that being the case, the term of the contract necessarily means that there is no time frame. This means that the aforementioned clause has been given a go by and the aforementioned term of contract giving a go by has not been taken into account as there is no discussion in the award by AT. It is to be noted that Dyna Technologies will come into play to a limited extent of saying that this will fall in one of the three facets i.e., unintelligible, as no reason has been provided qua aforementioned covenant. If only AT had given some plausible explanation qua aforementioned covenant, then the dynamics and dimensions of this Section 34 legal drill may have taken a different form. Equally, if the claim of the land owner was not predicated on delay, the dimensions would have been different. In this regard, this Court reminds itself of the ratio of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Associate Builders case law wherein it was held that violation of a provision of the A and C Act would be 20/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 fatal to an award. To be noted, this position qua Associate Builders case has not changed qua Ssangyong Engg. or the amendment to A and C Act which kicked in on and from 23.10.2015.
22. To be noted, this Court is not going into the question of patent illegality argument, the judgement in Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd., is not being discussed.
23. A sum sequittur of the narrative discussion and dispositive reasoning is, captioned Arb.OP succeeds on the ground of violation of Section 28(3) as AT has not taken into account a crucial term of the contract i.e., 'there are no other claim between the parties in connection with the original MOU dated 12.09.2014', while deciding and making the impugned award. Impugned award set aside, Arb.OP allowed.
24. After the order was dictated, both learned counsel submitted that the consequence of an arbitral award being set aside, is re-arbitration vide paragraph 52 of oft-quoted McDermott principle i.e., ratio laid down in McDermott International Vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., reported in (2006) 11 SCC 181).
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25.Mr.C.Uma Shankar, learned counsel very fairly submitted that it would be desirable to go for re-arbitration rather than carrying the matter in an intra appeal which would consume time. Both sides agreed for rearbitration and requested this Court to appoint an arbitrator for rearbitration.
26. Owing to aforementioned fair approach, Hon'ble Mr.Justice V.Parthiban (Retd.,), a former Judge of this Court, residing at No.5069, Z-Block, 12th Street, Anna Nagar (West), Chennai – 600 040 [Ph: 26280804, 26214850, Mob: 9444094401], is appointed as sole Arbitrator. Hon'ble sole Arbitrator is requested to enter upon reference qua MOU dated 12.09.2014, Supplemental Development Agreement dated 17.04.2017, adjudicate upon all arbitrable disputes that have arisen between the parties and render an award by holding sittings in the 'Madras High Court Arbitration Centre under the aegis of this Court' (MHCAC) in accordance with the Madras High Court Arbitration Proceedings Rules 2017 and fee of the Hon'ble Arbitrator shall be as per Madras High Court Arbitration Centre (MHCAC) (Administrative Cost and Arbitrator's Fees) Rules 2017. 22/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022
27. Captioned Arb.OP disposed of in the aforesaid manner. There shall be no order as to costs.
05.08.2022 Index : Yes / No Speaking order / Non-speaking order ds Note: Registry is directed to communicate a copy of this order forthwith to
1.The Hon'ble Justice V.Parthiban (Retd.,), Former Judge of Madras High Court No.5069, Z Block, 12th Street, Anna Nagar (West), Chennai – 600 040.
[Ph: 26280804, 26214850, Mob: 9444094401].
2.The Director Tamil Nadu Mediation and Conciliation Centre cum – Ex Officio Member Madras High Court Arbitration Centre Madras High Court, Chennai – 600 104.
23/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 M.SUNDAR. J., ds Arb O.P.(Com. Div.) No.337 of 2022 05.08.2022 24/24 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis