Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Tatikonda Papaiah And Ors. vs Land Acquisition Officer/Revenue ... on 29 December, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996(1)ALT584
ORDER G. Bikshapathy, J.
1. The Writ Petition is filed seeking appropriate Writ or Direction declaring the proceedings No. B/737/91 dated 18-11-1992 of 1st respondent. Land Acquisition Officer, Peddapalli as arbitrary and illegal and for consequential direction to pass Award under Section 28-A of Land Acquisition Act, on the basis of the Award of the Subordinate Judge, Peddapalli in O.P.No. 392/87.
2. The facts are many in the case. However for the purpose of deciding the issue, the relevant facts are narrated hereunder:
In the year 1983, the 1st Respondent issued a notification for acquisition of lands in Ladnapoor village of Singareni Collaries Company Limited. The land belonging to more than 250 persons was affected in the land acquisition proceedings. Aggrieved by the order of the Award of the Land Acquisition Officer, some of the Claimants filed applications under Section 18 of the Act for determination of compensation by the Civil Court. The Subordinate Judge by Award dated 27-4-1989 in O.P.No. 329 of 1987enhanced the compensation. The lands which were the subject matter of the Award before the Subordinate Court, Peddapalli were acquired under a common notification, but however some of the Claimants could not make any application for reference.
3. It is the case of the petitioners that consequent on the enhancement of the compensation they filed applications under Section 28-A of the Act before the 2nd respondent Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition Unit, within three months and in some cases within a period of three months computed after excluding the time for obtaining the certified copies. By G.O.Rt.No. 329 date 1 16-8-1986 issued by the Government a separate Land Acquisition Unit was established at Godavarikhani and therefore directed all the pending cases before the 1st respondent shall be transferred to the Special Tahsildar, Godavarikhani. The 1st Respondent appears to have informed that all the cases have transferred to the 2nd Respondent and they will be dealt by the said Officer. Therefore, the 2nd Respondent shall be deemed to have jurisdiction to receive the application under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act. Accordingly, the applicants made applications to the 2nd Respondent and they were accepted, the Award enquiry was fixed on 28-12-1989. However, on 13-3-1990 all the applications filed by the Claimants were transferred to 1st respondent. It is also the case of the petitioners that 1st Respondent in formed the Singareni Collaries Company Limited on 4-5-1991 to deposit the enhanced compensation on the basis of the Award in O.P.No. 329/87 and further action was also initiated by the 3rd respondent to send the acquaintance roll for taking further action. As the Award proceedings have not been processed the claimants have filed Writ Petition No. 103369/91 seeking directions to pass the Award and for payment of compensation. The said Writ Petition was disposed of at the admission stage on 1-10-1991 with the following directions:
"If the Revenue Divisional Officer comes to a conclusion that the applications are filed within the prescribed time limit, he shall pass the Award re-determining the compensation within a period of one month after hearing the parties on the plea of limitation".
It is the case of the petitioners that on 30-12-1991 1st Respondent completed the Award enquiry and prepared the draft award and submitted the same to the District Collector, Karimnagar on 4-1-1992 seeking instructions to pass final Award under Section 28-A of the Act. In the said communication it has been clearly stated by the authority that all the applications were received within time as required under Section 28-A of the Act.
In fact no such approval is necessary under the Act. The District Collector in return on 10-8-1992 directed the 1st Respondent to pass an Award in terms of the orders of the High Court. However, the 1st Respondent reopened the entire matter and issued notices to the Claimants for further enquiry and also to Singareni Collaries Company Limited. On the question whether the Applications filed by the Claimants was within time and whether there was compliance of Section 28-A etc. In fact after considering the said conditions only a draft award was prepared and a repetative procedure has been resorted to by the 1st respondent unnecessarily.
The 1st Respondent accepted that the lands or the Claimants have been covered by the same Notification, which was the subject matter in the Civil Court in O.P.No. 329/87. The 1st respondent also held that under Section 28-A the applications were filed before the 2nd respondent and they were transferred to the 1st respondent after 20 months and therefore they are not valid and therefore they are not maintainable. The said rejection is being assailed in this Writ Petition.
4. It is the case of the petitioners that at the time of submitting the applications under Section 28-A in 1989 the 2nd Respondent alone has got jurisdiction, as he was specifically appointed to look after the acquisition proceedings consequent of creation of separate unit at Godavarikhani. The 2nd Respondent having conducted the enquiry and on the instructions of the District Collector, they are transferred to 1st respondent and they have been disposed of.
5. It is the case of the petitioners that a draft award was submitted by the 1st respondent to the District Collector, wherein it was clearly accepted that the applications are within time. Hence, the reason given in the impugned order that they are filed with a delay of 20 months is absolutely unjustified. It is also one of the reason in the impugned order that the receipt of the compensation under protest is not recorded and therefore the application cannot be entertained.
6. It is lastly submitted by the petitioners that requirement of Section 28-A have been complied with by the Claimants and therefore the rejection on extraneous grounds is wholly illegal and arbitrary.
7. The 3rd Respondent Singareni Collaries Company Limited filed counter affidavit stating that the Writ Petition is not maintainable as the same is filed by the single petitioner on behalf of the other Claimants. There were discrepancies in the signatures of the Claimants, different documents at different times, therefore, a single person may be one of the Claimants cannot file the Writ Petition. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapalli after conducting necessary enquiry passed orders on 18-11-1992 and the said proceedings are quite legal and valid. It is also stated in the counter affidavit that a total extent of Ac. 435.27 gts. in Ladnapoor village was acquired and some of the Claimants were not satisfied with the Award filed an application for reference and Civil Court on such reference enhanced the compensation. During the pendency of the O.P., before the Subordinate Judge, Peddapalli, a Special Unit was created at Godavarikhani from 22-6-1988 and the enhanced compensation was also deposited in the Court. The petitioner and other Claimants filed an application before the Special Tahsildar-2nd Respondent for re-determination of compensation, the said Special Tahsildar is not a person appointed to perform the functions of the Collector, therefore filing of application before him cannot be said to be in conformity with the Law while the process of verification of the Claimants was in progress, some of the Claimants Arelli Ramachandram and 200 others filed Writ Petition No. 10369/91, the same was disposed of on 1-10-1991 with the directions already extracted supra. Consequent on the directions, enquiry was conducted by the 1st respondent and the orders were passed on 18-11-1992 rejecting their applications under Section 28-A of the Act. The applications under Section 28-A of the Act were filed before the 2nd Respondent between 6-7-1989 and 26-7-1989. They ought to have been filed before the Land Acquisition Officer or the Revenue Divisional Officer, who is the notified authority and the applications so filed before the Special Tahsildar-2nd Respondent transferred to the Land Acquisition Officer, after a period of 20 months. Even in the said applications, there were number of irregularities. All the applications were attested by one Advocate. There is no corresponding entry in the Inward Register which confirm that the petitioners have not filed in normal course in the office. Further, no certified copy of the judgment was delivered along with the applications. Some more irregularities have been pointed out by the Company to contend that number of manipulations were made to show that the applications were filed within time. Therefore, the 3rd respondent submits that the impugned order is quite legal and valid and the same cannot be interfered with.
8. The petitioner filed an application in W.P.M.P.No. 7408/95 in W.P. No. 17379/92 for impleading them as petitioners No. 2 to 220 and the 3rd respondent has filed objection for impleading them.
9. The Government Pleader also submitted that the orders passed by the 1st respondent are quite legal and valid and they are in conformity with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.
10. Before going into the merits of the case, it is necessary to decide the application for impleadment.
11. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition it is stated in the petition that all the proposed petitioners are aggrieved by the impugned order dated 18-11-1992 and it is a common order covering all the petitioners. However, initially one person by name Tatikonda Papaiah on behalf of all the petitioners filed the Petition in representative capacity. But as an abundant caution and in order to avoid technical snags the present Application is filed to implead all the petitioners in the Writ Petition.
12. In opposition the learned counsel appearing for Singareni Collaries submits that there is no provision under the Rules for impleading the Petitioners, more over when the Writ Petition itself is filed by Tatikonda Papaiah is not maintainable, the question of adding the parties at this juncture would not arise. He further submits that in any event it is a different cause of action for each petitioner as the land lost by them in the acquisition proceedings differs from person to person and the relief which they claimed by virtue of the land acquisition are different, hence separate Writ Petitions ought to have been filed. He also further submits that in any event, all the petitioners should be directed to pay the separate court fees, even though they joined together in the Writ Petition.
13. The learned counsel for the Petitioners Mr. Rama Krishna Reddy submits that this is an application filed for impleadment of the petitioners, who are aggrieved by the order of the 1st respondent dated 18-11-1992. He submits that Tatikonda Papaiah was authorised to file the Writ Petition on behalf of the aggrieved land losers. As it involves a common question of law and the grounds to be urged by all the petitioners is nothing but similar. However, in view of the provision of Rule 16(A) of the Writ Rules and in order to avoid legal complications in challenging the impugned notification a separate application has been filed to implead the petitioners in the Writ Petition.
14. The Writ proceedings Rules, 1977 have been framed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by virtue of the powers vested in it under Article 225 of the Constitution of India. Under Rule 16 it is open for the High Court either sue motu or on application to strike down the names of the parties or to join them in order to effectively and completely adjudicate to settle the question in the Writ Petition. The Rule 16 is extracted below:
"(a) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without any application and on such terms as may appear to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined or whose presence may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the settle all the questions in the petition, be added.
(b) At the hearing of the petition or application, any person who desires to be heard in opposition to the petition or application and appears to the Court to be a proper person to be heard may be heard, subject to such conditions as to costs as the Court may deem fit to impose" In view of this Rule, the learned counsel submits that it is open for the petitioners to get impleaded in the proceedings pending before this Court. He also submits that since the notification challenged by the persons is the common and it arises out of common cause of action. Hence two or more persons having common interest can join in a single Writ Petition in which event only one set of Court fees is liable to be paid. Under Rule 4(a) of the said Rules, two or more persons having a common cause of action may join in a single Writ Petition paying a single set of Court fees. He also submits that on earlier occasion a similar Writ Petition was filed on behalf of the affected land losers in W.P.No. 17379/92 seeking direction to the Land Acquisition Officer to pass Awards under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act in pursuance of the orders of the Civil Court in O.P.No. 392/87 and for a direction for payment of compensation. No such objection was raised on earlier occasions and the said Writ Petition was disposed of with directions. In view of this the learned counsel for the petitioners submit that it is not open for the Singareni Collaries Limited to make an objection for the second time, when the Writ Petition was filed seeking to challenge the proceedings of the 1st respondent dated 18-11-1992.
15. (1) The learned counsel also refers to the decision of this Court referred in Annum Adinarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh,( 1957 An.W.R. 345). In the said case, it was held that "the application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a proceeding in a Court of Civil Jurisdiction. The provision of Order 1 and 2 can be made applicable to the proceedings in a Writ Application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Ordinarily, two or more persons can join in a single Petition to enforce separate claims, but whether the right to relief arises from the same act or transaction and there is a common question of law or fact or whether though the right to relief claimed does not arise from the same act or transaction, the petitioners are jointly interested in the cause of action, one petition is maintainable at their instance"
(2) In G. Kondaiah and Ors. v. The Managing Director, A.P. Agricultural Development Bank, Hyderabad and Ors.,( 1985 (3) APLJ 376) the Division Bench of this Court while dealing with a similar type of situation held as follows:
"The legal position may now be summarised. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a proceeding in a Court of Civil Jurisdiction. The provisions of Order 1 and 2 can be invoked as far as they can be made applicable to the proceedings in a Writ application under Article 226. Ordinarily, two or more person s cannot join in a single petition to enforce separate claims. But where the right to relief arises from the same act or transaction and there is a common question of law or fact or where, though the right to relief claimed does not arise from the same act or transaction, the petitioners are jointly interested in the causes of action, one petition is maintainable at their instance"
(3) The Division Bench further observed in para 7 as follows:
"This Court after Mota Singh's case applied the rule of Jural relationship whenever the issue is raised in this Court. In view of the numerous bench decisions, it is obligatory for each individual petitioner to pay Court fee unless jural relationship is established"
(4) It is to be noted that the payment of Court fee was in issue before the Division Bench. However we are concerned with the impleadment of parties in the W.P.M.P. (5) In Mota Singh v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court was dealing with the payment of tax. The Court held that each owner of transport vehicle has his own independent cause of action. It further held that each one has his own cause of action, arising out of the liability to pay tax individually and the petition of each one would be a separate and independent petition. Therefore, they were directed to pay separate set of Court fee. Thus, it has to be seen that when the liability of each person is cryptalised, independent petitions have to be filed as each case bears its own facts. Hence persons seeking differ reliefs based on their respective merits of case cannot be filed together.
(6) The learned counsel for Singareni Colleries Limited realied on the decision of this Court in Sivangula Ramaiah and Ors. v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Miryalguda, wherein it was held that an independent Court fee has to be paid by each land owner. It is a case where the dispute arose with regard to the payment of Court fee in an appellant proceedings. It is not a case where a common order of rejection was passed.
(7) Therefore, the said decision has no application to the facts of the present case.
(8) Again the learned counsel tried to take the assistance of the decision (2nd cited supra) wherein it was held that it is obligatory to pay court fees unless jural relationship is established. As already stated, the petitioners have been dealt with in a integrated manner and the decision rendered by the Land Acquisition Officer applies to all the parties irrespective of their individual nature of their relief. He also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in The Schedule Caste Co-operative Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., wherein the issue relating to the payment of court fees arose under different circumstances. In any event we are not concerned with the court fee in this petition. Hence the decision is not applicable. Payment of court fee is different from the addition or deletion of parties.
(9) To consider the issue appropriately, the nature of the orders which is being assailed in this Writ Petition has to be considered. From the order of the authority dated 18-11-1992 it is seen that Arelli Ramachander and others filed applications under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act and they were heard in a common proceeding as the cause of action for all the petitioners is one and the same. The issues which were discussed and determined by the authorities is also common, to all the persons. The petitioners are neither disintegrated nor their cases were seperately discussed in each and every application. Thus, when once all the applications are clubbed together and a common order is passed without reference to any grievance of an individual, the position that would emerge for consideration is whether a single Writ Petition can be filed challenging the order of the authority. More over in the impugned order it is addressed to all the individuals through Advocates. It is a matter relating to the petition filed by the land loosers under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act which is rejected on various grounds. So far as the Jural relationship is concerned, the parties are common in all the proceedings and the issues are also identical as between the State and Claimants. It is always open for is Court that in order to effectively a judicate the matter and render the decision, either to strike out the parties which are not necessary or to add the parties which are found to be necessary for proper adjudication. Under Rule 4-A which was introduced with effect from 10-4-1986 two or more persons having a common cause of action may join in a single Writ Petition paying single set of court fee. Admittedly, all the petitioners are persons before the Land Acquisition Officer whose applications were dismissed by a single order. If there are separate orders rejecting the case of each and every person on different grounds, the situation would have been different. In as much as in the present Writ Petition, the grounds of rejection is common to all the persons irrespective of the extent of relief which they might be able to get in the final proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer. The primary duty of this Court is to render justice and in order to effectively and completely settle the matter between the parties, it is always open for this Court to add or delete the parties under Rule 16. Therefore, a single Writ Petition is maintainable and the proposed petitioners can be added as parties to the Writ Petition for the proper and effective adjudication of the case in the Petition. Accordingly, I allow W.P.M.P.No.7408/95.
16. The next issue that arises for consideration is whether the impugned order dated 18-11-1992 is valid.
17. As already started earlier, the Writ Petition No. 10369/91 was filed by 216 land losers seeking direction to the 1st respondent Land Acquisition Officer to pass the Award in pursuance of the applications filed under Section 28-A of the Act and that this Court disposed of the said Writ Petition on 1-9-1991 with a direction that if the applications are within time, the Land Acquisition Officer shall pass the Award. Pursuant to the said orders of this Court, the 1st respondent Land Acquisition Officer appears to have conducted enquiry and he sent the draft Award along with his covering letter dated 14-10-1991 to the Collector and sought his instructions for passing the final Award under Section 28-A of the Act.
19. It is pertinent to state that the Land Acquisition Officer is the only competent authority under the Land Acquisition Act to deal with the petition under Section 28-A of the Act. There is no provision under the Act to send the Draft Awards to the Collector for his approval or opinion. In the said letter there is a clear reference to the orders of this Court dated 1-10-1991. It is specifically stated in the said letter as follows:
"In view of the above, it is submitted that all the petitions were received within the stipulated time for re-determination of the compensation under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act".
Thus, the Land Acquisition Officer has acted in the right earnest manner in obedience to the direction of this Court. The Land Acquisition Officer on receipt of the Petitioner from Sri Arelli Ramachander and 219 others, under Section 28-A, consequent on the judgment of the Sub-Court in O.P.No. 392 and 304/87, wrote letter to Singareni Collaries on 14-5-1995 to deposit further amounts, obviously under the impression that the applications under Section 28-A have to be allowed in tune with the judgment of the civil court. In that letter also the L.A.O. had categorically stated that the petitioners have submitted their petitions within limitation. But, however in the counter altogether a different version was brought out. It is stated that the Revenue Divisional Officer conducted the enquiry and submitted the report on 4-1-1992 on which the Collector directed to take action keeping in view the instructions of the Commissioner, Land Revenue dated 27-2-1992. The relevant para in the counter affidavit is extracted below:
"Pursuant to the said orders, the Land Acquisition Officer and Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapalli conducted enquiry and submitted a report to the Collector vide ref. No. B/737/91, dt. 4-1-1992 and sought instruction for passing the award under Section 248-A. The Collector in his ref. No. B1/7591/91, dt. 10-8-1992 returned the draft award along with connected records and issued instructions to the Land Acquisition Officer and Revenue Divisional Officer to hear all the parties and consider the issued by the Commissioner of Land Revenue in G1/2360/91, dated 27-2-1992".
20. It is also the case of the Land Acquisition Officer that in pursuance of the directions dated 10-8-1992 notices were issued and enquiry was conducted and final orders were passed on 18-11-1992. It is curious to note that in the impugned order dated 18-11-1992 it is stated that the Commissioner Land Revenue has issued instructions dated31-12-1990and3-10-1992 regarding the verification of application under Section 28-A. This was not at all referred to in the counter and on the other hand the Collector directed the Land Acquisition Officer to process the Section 28-A applications in pursuance of the directions of this Court and the instructions of Commissioner, Land Revenue dated 27-2-1992. Thus, there are any amount of inconsistencies in the stand taken by the Land Acquisition Officer.
Be that as it may, this Court in specific terms disposed of the Writ Petition on 1-10-1991 to verify whether Section 28-A applications are within time and proceed further if they are in time. The relevant portion in the order is extracted below:
"I ordered notice before admission on 12-8-1991. The case was adjourned on a couple of occasions to enable the Government Pleader and the counsel for the Singareni Colleries to get the instructions. Today when the matter has come for admission the learned Government Pleader for land acquisition has stated that he has not yet received any instructions. The learned Standing Counsel for Singareni Colleries Sri K. Srinivasa Moorthy submits that according to the information furnished by his client the applications made under Section 28-A were not filed within the period of limitation and therefore their request cannot be complied with. As there is a dispute on the question whether the applications were filed within the period of limitation notwithstanding what has been stated in the communication dated 14-3-1991 addressed by the Revenue Divisional Officer to the General manager, Singareni Colleries, I deem it just and proper to dispose of the Writ Petition with a direction that Rule-2 shall decide whether applications were filed within the period of limitation as laid down in Section 29-A of Land Acquisition Act, after fixing the date of hearing for this purpose which shall be done not later than one month from the date of receipt of this order. As M/s. Singareni Colleries is also a respondent in this writ petition and they have to ultimately bear the burden of enhanced compensation, it is desirable to send notice of hearing to Rule 3 also. If the Revenue Divisional Officer comes to the conclusion that the applications are filed within the prescribed time limit, he shall pass the award determining the compensation within a period of one month after hearing the parties on the plea of limitation"
Therefore any enquiry on this aspect ought to have been confined to the limitation issue only. But as per the counter, the Land Acquisition Officer was directed to go into the following issues:
"1. Whether the draft notification Under Section 4(1) covered by the applications filed Under Section 28A and the draft notification of the application Under Section 18 in which the court has awarded enhanced compensation is one and the same.
2. Whether the applications Under Section 28-A are filed before the concerned Land Acquisition Officer within three months from the date of award passed by the court.
3. Whether the claimants have received the amount awarded by the Collector Under Section 11 with protest or not.
4. Whether each application is enclosed by a certified copy of court award. If a joint application has been filed along with one certified copy of court award whether the signatures of all the applications are available on the application for certified copy of award or signed on vakalath.
5. Whether the applicants had filed Section 18 petitions earlier and received the enhanced compensation in any other O.P"
The Land Acquisition Officer was specifically directed by this court to verify the aspect of limitation and the applications are within time, further action has to be taken. Giving a go bye to the directions, an enquiry appears to above conducted on irrelevant issue and finally the application was rejected on the following grounds as spelt out in the counter in para 7:
"In reply to the allegations made in paras 8 and 9 it is submitted that in pursuance of the instructions issued by the Collector on 10-8-92 notices were issued to all the interested parties asking them to produce evidence for fulfilling the conditions prescribed by the C.L.R. for entertaining the applications Under Section 28-A. After examining the evidence produced and hearing the arguments advanced by their advocates orders were passed on 18-11-92 rejecting the applications for the following grounds:
(1) The applications Under Section 28-A were not filed before the Land Acquisition Officer and Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapalli, within limitation.
(2) The awardees have not received the compensation under protest under the attestation of the Land Acquisition Officer.
(3) That the petitions Under Section 28-A were not enclosed by certified copies of decree in O.P.No. 392/87"
21. The only relevant ground that could be considered in this Writ Petition is whether the rejection of 28-A applications on the ground that they were not filed before the R.D.O. Peddapalli, within the limitation. Section 28-A is extracted below:
"Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court:--(1) Wherein an award under this part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector, may, not-withstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18; by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court:
Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this Sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under Sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants.
(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under Sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18"
As can be seen from the letter of the Revenue Divisional Officer dt.d 14-10-1991, the Revenue Divisional Officer himself confirmed that the applications are in time. This report is sent in pursuance of the directions of this Court dt. 1-10-1991. Even in his letter dated 14-5-1991 to the Singareni Colleries it was affirmed that the applications are within time. It is not understood under what circumstances, another enquiry was sought to be held at the instance of the Collector. When once it is confirmed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, who is the competent authority that the applications as filed under Section 28-A are in time, the Collector cannot usurp the jurisdiction of the Revenue Divisional Officer and direct the authority again to verify with reference to the instructions of the Commissioner, Land Revenue. Interference of the Collector in discharge of the statutory duties of Revenue Divisional Officer appears to be unwarranted. It has also created complication. The Revenue Divisional Officer held that the applications were filed before the Special Tahsildar, Godavarikhani who is not the competent authority to receive Section 28-A applications.
22. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that though this issue is beyond the directions granted by this Court, yet he stated that a seperate land acquisition office was established at Godavarikhani ill 1989 to look after the land acquisition matters of Singareni Colleries Company exclusively and hence as on the date of filing of the applications, the office was functioning at Godavarikhani and therefore they were filed on 6-7-1989 and 26-7-1989. If the Special Tahsildar is not the competent authority, having received the applications, he could have either returned the same to the applicants, so that the applications could have filed the same before the appropriate authority. But, on the other hand, the Collector, who is the administrative superior to the Revenue Divisional Officer by his reference dated 10-10-1991 directed the Special Tahsildar to transferring all the applications to Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapalli. Thus, the learned Counsel submits that the conduct of the authority establishes that they had no objections for receipt of the applications by their subordinate office at Godavarikhani. Even the Collector did not say that the applications should be returned or rejected. The Special Tahsildar was only concerned with the acquisitions of the land in Singareni Colleries Company and even according to the Revenue Divisional Officer, all the files were transferred to Godavarikhani on the establishment of the office at Godavarikhani. In all fairness applicants were under the bonafide impression that the applications were required to be filed at Godavarikhani Office only. In view of the fact that the applications so received at Godavarikhani were directed to be transferred to the Peddapalli by the Collector and after necessary enquiry the Revenue Divisional Officer confirmed in his letter dated 14-5-91 and 14-10-1991 that the applications are filed within the limitation, it shall be deemed that they are filed before the Revenue Divisional Officer. Therefore, filing an application before the Special Tahsildar, Godavarikhani was treated as an application before the Revenue Divisional Officer by the authorities themselves. In such a situation, at this belated hour, it would not be open for them to come out with the contention that the Special Tahsildar, Godavarikhani was not competent authority to receive the applications under Section 28-A and hence the applications are not maintainable.
23. The matter can also be viewed from another angle. If the Special Tahsildar had returned the applications as and when they are filed, the applicants could have filed these applications before the Revenue Divisional Officer within time. The authorities having allowed the applications to lie over in their office for further process, by their conduct have allowed the petitioners to form a bonafide opinion that the applications were duly received and in such circumstances it is not open for them now to say that the applications ought to have been filed before the Revenue Divisional Officer. It is not open for the authorities to approbate and reprobate the landholders who are admittedly illiterates and own only small extents of lands which they lost under the land acquisition. They cannot be denied the benefit of Section 28-A on technical and trivial ground. Though under the provision of the Act, applications under Section 28-A are required to be filed before the competent authority i.e. the Land Acquisition Officer at Peddapally, yet the facts and circumstances under which the applications were received and dealt with would clinchingly establish that the authorities treated the office of Special Tahsildar, Godavarikhani as the authorised receiving agency on behalf of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapalli. It is not disputed that the date of filing the application before the 3rd respondent is take the applications are within time. Under these circumstances. I hold that the finding of the Land Acquisition Officer that the applications were not filed before the appropriate authority and the rejection on that ground is illegal and arbitrary.
Though other grounds on which the rejection was effected by the 1st respondent are not relevant as they are not covered by the directions of this Court in the order dated 1-10-1991 and as the parties have advanced the arguments in respect of the other two issues also, the same are dealt with in this order.
The other ground on which the application was rejected is that the awardees have not received the compensation under protest and therefore they cannot make any application under Section 28-A of the Act.
24. The learned counsel for the Respondents submits that no protest has been made by the Awardees and the amounts were received without any protest, they cannot make any application for enhancement. It is also the case of the learned counsel for the petitioner that they did make a protest while receiving the application. It is not necessary to go into these disputed facts. Suffice to say that the learned Judge of this Court in Guduchuttu Lingaiah v. Land Acquisition Officer, Manuguru, held that the Awardees need not register their protest and that would not invalidate the applications either for reference under 18 or re-determination of compensation under Section 28-A. The learned Judge held that for invocation of Section 28-A it does not matter whether the petitioner received the amount of compensation under protest or without protest. The statute does not create any such prohibition restricting the right of the Awardee for re-determination of higher compensation. When the statute itself does not prescribe such a condition, it is not open for the authorities to deny the statutory right by means of an executive order or by drawing adverse inferences. The Supreme Court in D. Krishnaveni v. State of Orissa, clearly held that "Section 28-A would apply to the Claimants who received the compensation without protest and faced with statutory bar of reference"
25. Yet, another ground on which rejection was made is that the applications as filed did not contain certified copies of the decree in O.P. No. 392/87. Again this issue is also repelled by this Court in C. Narasinga Rao and Ors. v. Mandal Revenue Officer, Mahabubnagar,( W.P. No. 5781/92, dated 25-11-92 =) wherein it was held that there is no statutory requirement that the applications should be accompanied by the certified copies of the decree. Therefore, the rejection on that ground is also illegal and untenable.
26. Another ground was raised by the learned counsel for Singareni Colleries and also Govt. Pleader that most of the petitions have filed applications before the Land Acquisition Officer seeking reference under Section 18 of the Act and their applications were rejected on the ground of limitation and in respect of some other applications, he submits mat the Awards were passed by the Civil Court and they were also complied with. Therefore, it is submitted that the applications are to be rejected on that ground.
27. The learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Rama Krishna Reddy submits that all the applicants have not filed applications before the Land Acquisition Officer for reference. But, however in some cases, applications were filed and they were rejected on the question of limitation. But he however maintains that there is no final adjudication of applications under Section 18 and therefore the applicants are entitled to file applications under Section 28-A of the Act. He relies on the decisions of the Supreme Court in The Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India, and 6th cited supra.
28. In the Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India (8th cited supra), the Supreme Court held "it is obvious on a plain reading of Sub-section (1) of Section 28-A that applies only to those claimants who had failed to seek a reference under Section 18 of the Act. The redetermination has to be done by the Collector on the basis of the compensation awarded by the Court in the reference under Section 18 of the Act and an application in that behalf has to be made to the Collector within 30 days from the date of the award. Thus only those claimants who had failed to apply for a reference under Section 18 of the Act are conferred this right to apply to the Collector for redetermination and not all those like the petitioners who had not only sought a reference under Section 18 but had also filed an appeal in the High Court against the award made by the reference court. The newly added Section 28-A, therefore, dearly does not apply to a case where the claimant has sought and secured a reference under Section 18 and has even preferred an appeal to the High Court."
29. The learned Counsel for Rule-3 submits that the petitioner had filed application for reference and since that applications were rejected for reference, it should be construed as having availed a reference and thus the applications under Section 28-A are barred. The learned counsel for petitioners submits that the interpretation sought to be placed by the counsel for R-3 is wholly misplaced. I find force in the submission of learned counsel for petitioners. The Supreme Court clearly set out the parametres of application under Section 28-A, when it held that 28-A does not apply to case where the claimant has sought and secured a reference under Section 18 and has even preferred an appeal to the High Court. In as much as there is no reference was made to the civil court, it cannot be said that the claimants have sought and secured a reference under Section 18.
30. In D. Krishnaveni and Anr. v. State of Orissa and Ors. (7th reference cited supra), the same view was expressed by the Supreme Court. Para 3 of the judgment is extracted below:
"It is contended that when the High Court awarded higher compensation by operation of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, the appellants also reentitled to the same benefit. The point is now squarely covered by two judgments of this Court in Scheduled Castes Co-op. Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India and Babua Ram v. State of U.P. Therefore, the appellants having failed to avail of the remedy of appeal and having already availed the remedy of reference under Section 18. they are not entitled to seek redetermination of the compensation on the basis of the award of the High Court granting enhanced compensation. Section 28-A would apply to the claimants who received the compensation without protest and faced with statutory bar of reference and would not apply to those who had already availed the remedy of reference and got no benefit or lesser benefit thereunder. Equally the bar of res judicata clearly would apply to the appellants".
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the claimants who had availed the remedy of reference and appeal are not entitled for redetermination under Section 28-A. It has clearly stated as to which of the claimants are entitled to invoke Section 28-A. In categorical terms the Supreme Court held that Section 28-A would not apply to those who had already availed the remedy of reference and got no benefit or lesser benefit thereunder. Taking clue from this finding, the learned counsel for Rule-3 submits that since the petitioners availed remedy of reference they cannot seek redetermination under Section 28-A. I cannot accept the said contention. What is to be seen is whether the remedy of reference was availed. When once the application for reference is made and it is rejected 'on limitation' point or any other ground, can it be said that the claimants availed the remedy of reference under Section 18. In my opinion the correct interpretation would be that until and unless the reference is made, it cannot be said that the remedy is availed. This is reinforced by the order of Supreme Court that availed the remedy of reference and got no benefit or lesser benefit". The reference should result in no benefit or lesser benefit. The result cannot be known unless the reference is made.
In Survesh Kumar and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr., (D.B.) the Division Bench consisting of Justice M.M. Punchi, as he then was and Justice A.L.L. Bahari, an identical issue was decided. In the said case the Petitioner owned some land which was acquired by the State. An award was made in 1971 and the petitioner received compensation in 1971 itself. He filed an application to the Collector for referring the case to the District Judge. As the application was filed after the expiry of the period of limitation, it was rejected. Some others who were aggrieved by the award made timely applications, their cases were referred to the District Judge who enhanced the compensation in 1986 by giving them the benefit of the amendment. The petitioners filed an application before the Collector for giving them similar benefits. The request was declined on the ground that their application was rejected as time barred.
The Supreme Court held that, not making of an application, as conceived of in Section 28-A is not only an application factually not made but also includes an application which when made is not entertained for whatever reason, by the Collector. It is different if an application is so made and is rejected on merits within the limited domain of the Collector on merits. An application which was not entertained being time-barred was as good as an application not made. In this situation, the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of Section 28-A. Section 28-A is not fettered by any such impediment. It postulates redetermination of the amount of compensation of one on the basis of the award of the court made in favour of another. The Court in the context means the District Judge. The right accrues to a person whose land was acquired by the same notification under Section 4 who may have been aggrieved by the award of the Collector and may not have made an application to the Collector".
31. In view of the position cleared by the Supreme Court and Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court, it has to be held that so long as the applications did not culminate into reference, the claimants could seek redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Act. It is always open for the Land Acquisition Officer to satisfy itself and if it finds that the claimants had availed the remedy of reference under Section 18, he could refuse to redetermine the compensation in respect of land for which the claimants availed the remedy.
32. For the foregoing reasons, the Writ Petition is liable to be allowed.
33. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 18-11-1992 in proceedings No. B/737/91 is quashed. The respondent Land Acquisition Officer is directed to entertain the applications for redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Act subject to the condition that the Claimants had not availed the reference remedy and pass appropriate orders within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of this order. No costs.