Karnataka High Court
Shri. Narasimha S/O Laxmanrao Durg vs The Central Pension Accounting on 13 September, 2023
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 13TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2023
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION NO. 103245 OF 2023 (S-R)
BETWEEN:
SHRI. NARASIMHA S/O LAXMANRAO DURG,
AGE. 81 YEARS, OCC. RETIRED FROM SERVICE,
R/O 61, VAIBHAV HUKKERI NAGAR,
P.B. ROAD, DHARWAD-580004.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. ROHIT .S. PATIL FOR
SRI. SHRIKANT .T. PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE CENTRAL PENSION ACCOUNTING,
OFFICE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
MINISTRY OF FINANCE,
DEPARTMENT OF EXPENDITURE,
TRIKOOT-II, BHIJAJI CAMA PLACE,
RAMA KRISHNA PURAM, NEW DELHI-110066.
2. OFFICE OF THE PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTANT GENERAL(PAG),
BENGALURU, AMBEDKAR VEEDHI ROAD,
VIDHANA SOUDHA, DR. AMBEDKAR ROAD,
SAMPANGI RAMA NAGARA, BENGALURU,
Digitally signed
by
VIJAYALAKSHMI VIJAYALAKSHMI
KARNATAKA-560001.
M KANKUPPI M KANKUPPI
Date: 2023.11.04
13:40:59 +0530
3. THE DIRECTOR OF ATOMIC MINERAL AND DIRECTORATE
FOR EXPLORATION AND RESEARCH,
DEPARTMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY,
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, BEGUMPET,
HYDERABAD-500016.
4. THE MANAGER,
STATE BANK OF INDIA,
CENTRALIZED PENSION PROCESSING CENTER,
BENGALURU-560009.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. MADANMOHAN .M. KHANNUR, AGA;
SRI. SHANTI BHUSHAN, DSGI, A/W
SRI. VENKATESH M. KHARVI, CGSC, FOR R1)
2
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICELS 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
BE ISSUED QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ENDORSEMENT ISSUED BY
RESPONDENT NO.3 DATED 29/12/2021 BEARING NO.AMD/51(25)
98-PEN/2021/3271 VIDE ANNEXURE-D IN THE ENDS OF JUSTICE
AND ETC.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN
'B' GROUP, THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
1. The petitioner is before this Court calling in question the endorsement dated 29.12.2021, which rejects the claim of the petitioner and a consequential relief of direction by issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus to consider the representation of the petitioner is also sought.
2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Sri.Srikant T Patil; learned DSGI-Sri.Shanti Bushan along with Sri.Ventakesh M Kharvi, CGSC appearing for the respondent No.1 and Sri.M.M.Khannur, learned AGA for respondent No.2.
3. Petitioner, an octogenarian has knocked at the doors of this Court claiming the benefit of 20% of additional quantum of pension with effect from 21.6.2019.
Accordingly to the petitioner he is entitled to 20% of 3 additional quantum of pension ones he steps into the age of 80 years. The petitioner draws his right from the office memorandum dated 12.5.2017, which grants benefit to the petitioner and the like. The quantum of age related pension/family pension is as is found in the office memorandum. Insofar as the petitioner is concerns, it reads as follows:
Age of pensioner/family Additional quantum of pensioner pension From 80 years to less than 25% of revised basic 85 years pension/family pension
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the issue in the lis is no longer res integra as the several constitutional Courts have taken the view in favour of the petitioner. He would take this Court to the order passed by the Co-ordinate bench, which has granted similar relief to the identically situated persons.
5. The learned DSGI Sri. Shanti Bhushan along with Venkatesh Karvi in all fairness would submit that issue stands answered by the Co-ordinate bench of this Court, 4 Gauhati, Panjab and Haryana High Courts, in the orders that are passed.
6. In the light of the issue being answered by the several courts a deeper delving into the issue becomes unnecessary. It would become germane to notice the orders passed by the Co-ordinate bench and the Division Bench of Gauhati High Court.
7. The Co-ordinate bench of this Court in WP.105189/2014 has held as follows:
2. It is stated, the petitioner retired from service on 30.4.1992 after attaining the age of superannuation. As per G.O. dated 13.10.2010, the petitioner is entitled to receive 20% additional quantum of pension from 80 to 85 years. The petitioner has completed 79th year on 13.4.2013. His 80th year starts from 13.4.2013. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of G.O. dated 13.10.2010 from 13.4.2013. The petitioner has given representation to extend the benefit. The second respondent has issued communication dated 3.1.2014 as per Annexure-E rejecting the 5 request of the petitioner and stating that the petitioner completes 80th year on 13.4.2014 and thereafter his request will be considered.
Aggrieved by the said communication, the petitioner has filed this writ petition.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned communication cannot be sustained in law. He also submitted that the matter is covered by the decision of this court in W.P.No.18753/2011 wherein it has been held that the benefit has to be extended from the first day of 80th year and not after completion of 80th year. Therefore, the impugned endorsement cannot be sustained in law.
4. As against this, the learned AGA submitted that the matter is covered by the decision of this court in W.P.No.18753/2011.
5. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.
6. I find considerable force in the submission of the learned counsel for the 6 petitioner. In W.P.No.18753/11 this court has held that the benefit has to be extended from the first day of 80th year and not from the first day of 81st year. Perusal of Annexure-A shows that from 80 to 85 years 20% additional quantum of pension needs to be paid. The decision in W.P.No.18753/2011 is squarely applicable to this case. Therefore, the 2nd respondent was not justified in issuing the communication at Annexure-E. The petitioner is entitled to 20% additional quantum of pension from the first day of 80th year i.e. 13.4.2013.
Therefore, the impugned communication cannot be sustained in law.
Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned communication dated 3.1.2014 vide Annexure-E is hereby quashed.
The respondents are directed to pay 20% additional quantum of pension in terms of Annexure-A from the first day of 80th year i.e. 13.4.2013 with 6%interest per annum.
78. The Division Bench of Gauhati High Court in WP.No.4224/2016, disposed of on 15.3.201 has held as follows:
15. The High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 (already referred to as "the Act" herein) was enacted to regulate the salaries and certain conditions of service of the judges of High Court. Section 14 deals with pension payable to judges in accordance with the scale and provision in part-I of the first schedule. While Section 17 deals with extra- ordinary pensions, Section 17A provides for family pensions and gratuities.
16. The High Court and Supreme Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Amendment Act, 2009 was enacted to amend the Act and also the Supreme Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act,1958.
As per Section 4 of this Act, after Section 17A in the Act, the following section should be inserted as Section 17 B :-
"17-B.Additional quantum of pension or family pension-Every retired Judge or after his death, the family, as the case may be, shall been titled to an additional quantum of pension or family pension in accordance with the following scale:-8
Age of pensioner or family Additional quantum of pensioner pension or family pension From eighty years to less than Twenty percent of basic eighty five years pension or family pension From eight five years to less than Thirty percent of basic ninety years pension or family pension From ninety years to less than Forty percent of basic ninety five years pension or family pension From ninety five years to less Fifty percent of basic than hundred years pension or family pension From hundred years or more Hundred percent of basic pension or family pension
17. Therefore, in the contextual facts of the present case, as per Section 17B, every retired judge shall be entitled to an additional quantum of pension in accordance with the scale mentioned therein. In this case, we are concerned with the first slab as per which, a retired judge from 80 years to less than85 years would be entitled to additional quantum of pension @ 20% of basic pension.
18. Petitioner had retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 29-
07- 1998. His date of birth is 30-07-1936. Therefore, on 29-07-2015 he completed 79 years of age. He entered into the 80th year of age on 30-07-2015 and completed 80 years on 29-07- 2016. According to the petitioner, 9 he would be entitled to the first scale of benefit as per Section 17B w.e.f. 30-07-2015 when he stepped into his 80thyear. On the other hand, stand of the respondents is that the benefit of the first scale under Section 17B would be available to the petitioner on his completion of 80th year i.e. from 30-07- 2016.This is the bone of contention which we are called upon to answer in this proceeding.
19. Therefore, question for consideration is, whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, petitioner would be entitled to the additional quantum of pension @ 20% of basic pension from 30-07-2015 or from 30- 07-2016 as per the first scale provided under Section 17B of the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954, as amended?
20. To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the meaning of the expression "from eighty years" as appearing in Section 17B. As noticed above, the benefit of additional quantum of pension would be entitled to a retired judge from eighty years to less than eighty five years. What precisely would be the meaning of the expression "from eighty years"?
21. In Collins English Dictionary, the word "from" has been defined to mean 10 indicating the point of departure, source, distance, cause, change of state etc. Mr. Goswami had also argued that the word "from" is used to specify a starting point in spatial movement i.e. to specify starting point in an expression of limits. In Black's Law th Dictionary, 6 Edition, the word "from" has been defined to mean implying a starting point, whether it be of time, place or condition, and having a starting point of motion, noting the point of departure, origin, withdrawal etc. However, it has been explained that the word "from" does not have an absolute and invariable meaning but should receive an inclusion or exclusion construction according to the intention with which such word is used.
22. Therefore, as per the dictionary meaning, the expression "from eighty years"
would indicate the starting point of eighty years. However, as a note of caution, it has also been clarified that inclusiveness or exclusiveness associated with the expression would have to be interpreted having regard to the intention for use of such word or expression.
23. Petitioner is right when he says that Section 17B was inserted in the parent Act in the year 2009 to provide some succour to the ageing retired judges. Long back Winston 11 Churchill had said that service rendered by judges demands the highest qualities of learning, training and character. These qualities are not to be measured in terms of pounds, shilling and pence according to the quantity of work done. After rendering such service to the nation, it is the duty of the State to ensure that a retired judge who has entered the autumn of his life is adequately looked after. A retired judge at the fag end of his life has peculiar problems on account of his advanced years and failing health. It is to cater to such a situation that Parliament in its wisdom had amended the Act in the year 2009 by inserting Section 17B entitling every retired judge to additional quantum of pension or in case of death, the family to additional quantum of family pension in the scale mentioned.
24. If this is the object behind insertion of Section 17B, we must adopt such an interpretation which effectuates the object of the provision and which does not frustrate the object.
25. Justice G.P. Singh in his seminal work Principles of Statutory Interpretation dealt with the subject of purposive construction of statutes. According to him, when material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions, the most firmly 12 established rule for construction of such words of all statutes is the rule laid down in Heydon 's case. This rule which is also known as 'purposive construction' or 'mischief rule', requires consideration of four matters while construing an Act -
(i) What was the law before the
making of the Act;
(ii) what was the mischief or
defect for which the law did not
provide;
(iii) what is the remedy that the Act has provided; and
(iv) what is the reason of the remedy.
The rule than directs that the courts must adopt that construction which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.
25.1 In Bengal Immunity Co.-Vs-State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661, Supreme Court succinctly explained the rule holding that it is a sound rule of construction of a statute for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, including beneficial ones. After discerning and considering the four things as noticed above, the court is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy; to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the 13 mischief; and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act.
25.2. According to Lord Reid, "the word mischief is traditional". He expanded it to include "the facts presumed to be known to Parliament when the Bill which became the Act in question was before it" and "the unsatisfactory state of affairs" disclosed by these facts "which Parliament can properly be supposed to have intended to remedy by the Act".
25.3 As has been observed by the Supreme Court, to interpret a statute in a reasonable manner, the Court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator. So done, the rules of purposive construction have to be resorted to which would require the construction of the Act in such a manner as to see that the object of the Act is fulfilled.
25.4. In selecting different interpretations, Court would adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible. A construction that results in hardship, serious inconvenience, injustice, absurdity or anomaly or which leads to 14 inconsistency or uncertainty has to be avoided.
25.5. Of course this rule would have no application when the words are susceptible to only one meaning and no alternative construction is reasonably open.
26. While on purposive construction, it would be useful to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company Limited -Vs- Nusli Neville Wadia, (2008) 3 SCC 279, which was placed before us by learned counsel for the petitioner. In that case, Supreme Court was considering the question as to who should lead evidence in a proceeding under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act,1971. In the context of that question, Supreme Court observed that a literal construction would lead to an anomalous situation because the landlord may not be heard at all or may not even be permitted to adduce any evidence in rebuttal. In such a situation, the rules of purposive construction have to be resorted to which would require the construction of the Act in such a manner so as to see that the object of the Act is fulfilled.
15Referring to Purposive Interpretation in Law by Aharom Barak, Justice Sinha speaking for the Bench explained purposive construction as under :-
"Hart and Sachs also appear to treat purpose' as a subjective concept. I say appear because, although Hart and Sachs claim that the interpreter should imagine himself or herself in the legislator's shoes, they introduce two elements of objectivity: First, the interpreter should assume that the legislature is composed of reasonable people seeking to achieve reasonable goals in a reasonable manner; and second, the interpreter should accept the non- rebuttable presumption that members of the legislative body sought to fulfill their constitutional duties in good faith. This formulation allows the interpreter to inquire not into the subjective intent of the author, but rather the intent the author would have had, had he or she acted reasonably."
27. Let us now revert back to Section 17 B of the Act which though quoted above, is again extracted hereunder for convenience of the deliberation:-
"17-B, Additional quantum of pension or family pension-Every retired Judge or after his death, the family, as the case may be, shall be entitled to an additional quantum of pension or family pension in accordance with the following scale:-16
"Age of pensioner or Additional quantum of family pensioner pension or family pension From eight five years to Thirty percent of basic less than ninety years pension or family pension From ninety years to less Forty percent of basic than ninety five years pension or family pension From ninety five years to Fifty percent of basic less than hundred years pension or family pension From hundred years or Hundred percent of basic more pension or family pension"
28. If we look at the first two slabs, we find that the first slab is from 80 years to less than 85 years and the second slab is from 85 years to less than 90 years. The second expression in both the slabs is quite clear : it is either less than 85 years or less than 90 years. Now, if we apply the interpretation given by the respondents to the first expressions i.e., from 80 years and from 85 years, consequence would be that on completion of 80 years to less than 85 years are tired judge would be entitled to the first scale of additional pension and again on completion of 85 years to less than 90 years, the retired judge would be entitled to the second scale of additional pension. In this process, not only the 80th year would stand excluded, even the 85th and 90th years would be excluded. Likewise, the 95th year as well as the 100thyear would also be excluded.
17This could not be and certainly was not the intention of the law makers. Therefore, by applying purposive interpretation, we have no hesitation in our mind that the interpretation put forward by the respondents is not only unreasonable and irrational leading to an anomalous situation, it would also defeat the very object behind insertion of Section 17B in the Act.
29. This question can also be looked at from another angle. When we say "from 2016 on wards" what do we mean? Whether it would be from 01-01-2016 i.e., from the first day of the year 2016 or on completion of the year 2016 on 31-12-2016? The answer is quite apparent; it has to be from the first day of the year itself.
30. In the course of hearing, Mr. Goswami had also brought to our notice a Single Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court, Dharwad Bench in the case of Siddangouda Shivabasanagouda Ayyangoudra-Vs-Principal Accountant General (A&E), decided on 03- 09-2014. In that case also an identical issue had cropped up; petitioner had retired from service on 30-
04-1992 on attaining the age of superannuation. Petitioner claimed entitlement to receive 20% additional
quantum of pension from 80 to 85 years on the strength of Government Order dated 13-10- 18 2010. Petitioner had completed 79th year on 13-04- 2013. His 80th year started from 13-04-2013. Therefore, he claimed entitlement to the above benefit from 13-04-2013. Respondents rejected such claim of the petitioner and declared that petitioner would complete his 80th year on 13-04- 2014 and thereafter his request would be considered. Following an earlier decision of the Court, the writ petition was allowed. Karnataka High Court quashed the impugned decision and directed the respondents to pay 20% additional pension from the 1stday of 80thyear i.e. from 13-04-2013 with 6% interest per annum.
31. The decision of Karnataka High Court is a logical outcome of the line of reasoning adopted by us.
32. Therefore, on a thorough consideration of the matter, we hold that the benefit of additional quantum of pension as per Section 17B of the Act in the first slab would be available to be a retired judge from the first day of his 80th year. In so far petitioner is concerned, he would be entitled to the said benefit from 30-07-2015 which was the first day of his 80th year. Ordered accordingly.
199. In the light of issue being answered by the aforesaid orders, the petition deserves to succeed and the prayer sought is deserves to be granted.
10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
i) Writ Petition is allowed.
ii) The endorsement dated 29.12.2021 stands quashed.
iii) The matter is remitted back to the respondent to pass appropriate orders on the representation dated 10.1.2022 bearing in mind the observations made in the course of the order.
iv) The respondents shall comply the orders within 6 months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order, failing which the petitioner would become entitled to the interest at 6% p.a. 20 from the date the amount fell due till the date of its payment.
Sd/-
JUDGE vb/ct:bck List No.: 1 Sl No.: 17