Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Chief Manager, Andhra Bank And Anr. vs Sudha Nagaraj K. on 1 April, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1996(2)ALT599, (1998)IIILLJ947AP
Author: M.H.S. Ansari
Bench: M.H.S. Ansari
JUDGMENT P.S. Mishra, C.J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the appellants. Writ petitioner-respondent sent a letter of resignation on January 19, 1990 stating inter alia as follows:
"I, the undersigned, working in the Bank since March 29, 1979, presently working in Gaganmahal Road Branch, wish to tender my resignation due to domestic reasons.
Kindly accept my resignation and relieve me as early as possible."
2. She followed the above writing another letter dated February 19, 1990 and yet another letter dated February 27, 1990 in which she stated inter alia:
"I had tendered my resignation on January 19, 1990, wherein I had given a notice of one month. However, I had to proceed to Warangal on February 12, 1990. As such, I could not put in continuous service of 30 days, during the notice period, in accordance with the rules in force. Later, I could only attend for a few days.
As I do not intend to continue further in the bank, I request you to adjust all my dues and send my terminal benefits or dues, if any, to the address given above....."
3. Before, however, the appellant-bank responded to the communications of the writ petitioner-respondent, the latter wrote a letter on September 19, 1990 that she was withdrawing her resignation. The appellant-bank this time responded vide its letter dated February 13, 1991 stating inter alia;
"With reference to your letter dated September 19, 1990, addressed to our General Manager (Personnel), requesting to permit to withdraw your resignation letter dated January 19, 1990, we inform you that your request has not been considered favourably. Hence, we hereby relieve you from the Bank Services from March 28, 1990 which was the last working day (sic.) at our branch."
4. Learned single Judge has held on the above facts that the bank's order terminating the services of the writ petitioner-respondent on the alleged letter of resignation is invalid.
5. The Supreme Court in its majority judgment in Union of India v. Gopal Chandra, (1978-I-LLJ-492) has stated categorically that in the absence of a legal, contractual of constitutional bar, a prospective resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or the, office tenure of the resigner. In the case of Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal, (1989-I-LLJ-368) the Supreme Court has dealt with the Regulation 20(2) of the Bank (it has been contended before us on behalf of the appellants that they have a similar provision) and interpreted the same as follows (Para 6) :
"6. Much reliance was placed on the terms of the proviso to Clause (2) of Regulation 20 to justify the action of the bank in terminating the respondent's services earlier but we do not think that the proviso can be interpreted in the manner suggested by learned counsel for the Bank. The resignation letter of the officer has to give at least three months' advance notice under the main part of the clause. What the proviso contemplates is that in a case where the employee desires that his resignation should be effective even before the expiry of the period of three months or without notice being given by him, the bank may consider such a request and waive the period or requirement of notice if it considers it fit to do so.That question does not arise in the present case because the employee had not requested the bank to reduce the period of notice or to waive the requirement of notice. Dr. Anand Prakash seeks to interpret the proviso as empowering the Bank, even without any request on the part of the employee, to reduce the period or waive the requirement of notice. In other words, he says the bank has power to accept the resignation with immediate effect even though the notice is only of a proposed future resignation. We do not think this contention can be accepted. As we have already mentioned, resignation is a voluntary act of an employee. He may choose to resign with immediate effect or with a notice of less than three months if the bank agrees to the same. He may also resign at a future date on the expiry, or beyond the period, of three months but for this no further consent of the bank is necessary. The acceptance of the argument of Dr. Anand Prakash would mean that, even though an employee might express a desire to resign from a future date the resignation can be accepted, even without his wishes, from an earlier date. This would not be the acceptance of a resignation in the terms in which it is offered. It amounts really to forcing a date of termination on the employee other than the one he is entitled to choose under the regulations. As rightly pointed out by the High Court, the termination of service under Clause (2) becomes effective at the instance of the employee and the services of the employee cannot be terminated by the employer under this clause."
6. Learned single Judge has in our opinion committed no error at all. Learned counsel for the appellants, however, has urged before us that when a letter of resignation was sent by the petitioner-respondent and the regulation provided that one months's notice was required, since the period of one month expired the resignation automatically became effective. This argument, in our opinion, is not at all acceptable. The communications above disclose that the writ petitioner-respondent continued to work even after the expiry of the period of one month from the date of the letter of resignation and further correspondence on the subject reveals that she had the impression that unless she worked continuously for one month i.e., for the period of notice the performance remained outside of the regulation which has prescribed a notice period. The appellant-bank also continued the same by not at any time, until her withdrawal letter reached it, stating whether it intended to accept the resignation tendered by her.
7. Since in our Opinion no error has been committed by the learned single Judge in this behalf, we find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.