Karnataka High Court
C S Puttaraju vs State By Cbi, Acb on 11 March, 2024
Author: M. Nagaprasanna
Bench: M. Nagaprasanna
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF MARCH, 2024
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.3934 OF 2023 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
C.S.PUTTARAJU
S/O SANNA THAMMEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
RESIDING AT
MELUKOTE ROAD
CHINAKURALI
PANDAVAPURA TALUK
MANDYA DISTRICT - 571 455.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI D.R.RAVISHANKAR, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI NAGENDRA NAIK R., ADVOCATE)
AND:
STATE BY CBI, ACB
NO.36, BELLARY ROAD
GANGANAGAR, BENGALURU - 32
REPRESENTED BY ITS
SPL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BENGALURU - 560 001.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI P.PRASANNA KUMAR, SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR)
2
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA R/W SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 17/01/2023 IN
SPL.C.NO. 577/2021 PASSED BY THE LEARNED LXXXI ADDITIONAL
CITY CIVIL AND SESSION JUDGE AND SPECIAL JUDGE FOR CBI
CASES BENGALURU (CCH-82) AS PER ANNEXURE-A.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 15.12.2023, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court calling in question order 17-01-2023 passed by the LXXXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City in Special Case No.577 of 2021 rejecting the application filed for his discharge from the proceedings and directing framing of charges against the petitioner.
2. The facts, in brief, germane are as follows:-
Government of Karnataka accords its approval for formation of a layout by the Mandya Urban Development Authority ('MUDA' for short) on 12-06-1998. The MUDA on 26-02-2002 passes a resolution for formation of a layout called Vivekananda Nagar layout in Sy.No.507 of Mandya and carves out 2354 sites with an intention 3 to allot the same to general public who would apply pursuant to a notification. On 23-03-2002 out of the so formed 2354 sites, 2051 sites are allotted to the applicants by way of lottery and out of 2051 sites so allotted through lottery, 416 site allottees rejected the said allotments on the ground that the sites were situated in a loose soil area and it was not conducive for construction of houses and another 93 sites which were allotted stood cancelled on the score that the allottees did not pay the prescribed amount in terms of allotment. Between 2004 and 2006 the remaining 416 sites which were rejected by the allottees remained un-allotted as there were no takers for such allotment. Later MUDA communicated to other applicants who did not get their allotments through lottery, seeking their willingness to buy sites on full market value as fixed by the Sub-Registrar. 314 applicants came forward. It is then those 314 applicants were allotted sites on payment of full market value by a resolution of the Board.
3. The petitioner was nowhere in the picture till this part of the story. The petitioner got elected as Member of the Legislative Assembly from Melukote constituency. He becomes a Member of 4 MUDA and also Member of the Board of MUDA in the capacity of being an MLA. Therefore, he is an ex-officio Member of the Board on the strength of his election as MLA. In the year 2009, 107 sites still remained un-allotted with MUDA even after a lapse of 8 years after formation of the layout. The Board of MUDA then resolves to allot certain un-allotted sites to its employees and also to general public in exercise of powers conferred on it under the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities (Allotment of Sites) Rules, 1991. The MUDA, pursuant to a resolution, tried to sell the sites under various schemes called "Ondhe Kanthu", and "Nimma Ayike" inter alia. Even then MUDA was unable to sell 107 sites in the layout.
4. On 17-03-2009, MUDA decides to allot sites in favour of its employees and others and sought permission for such allotment of sites from the Urban Development Department of Government. The Urban Development Department on 02-06-2009 in response to the communication by MUDA clarifies that MUDA has powers under the Rules aforesaid to make allotments in favour of deserved applicants. In view of the said clarification and the averment in the petition being that MUDA was facing financial difficulties, it had 5 decided to allot 107 sites to interested persons of its own officers and employees exercising its right under the aforesaid Rules on full market value. According to the said decision, applications were called by publishing the same in the local newspaper, pursuant to which, 114 applications were received as against 107 sites. Out of 107 sites, 13 sites were allotted to the employees of MUDA and the rest were allotted to the general public. The petitioner becomes the beneficiary of allotment of one site bearing No.562 measuring 15x24 meters in the said layout. It is here the issue in the lis has its genesis.
5. On 31-10-2013 after a lapse of 4 years of such allotment in favour of the petitioner and other employees, a complaint comes to be registered against the Commissioner of MUDA and its employees. The name of the petitioner did not figure anywhere. A FIR was registered pursuant to the reference made by the learned Sessions Judge. Even while registering FIR, the accused was only one Upendra Nayak, the then Commissioner of MUDA and others. During the pendency of investigation on 23-12-2014 Government of Karnataka refers the investigation to the Central Bureau of 6 Investigation ('CBI'). It is then the CBI registers a separate crime in RC 21(A)/2014 for offences punishable under Section 120B r/w Sections 406, 409 and 420 of the IPC and Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(c) & (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ('the Act' for short) against the then Commissioner and other employees of MUDA. The CBI then conducts investigation and file a charge sheet before the concerned Court on 31-12-2015 and the learned Sessions Judge takes cognizance of the offences punishable under Section 120B r/w Sections 406, 409 and 420 of the IPC and Sections 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(c) & (d) of the Act. The petitioner springs into the proceedings as accused No.5 in the charge sheet.
6. Accused No.8 files Criminal Petition in Criminal Petition No.6993 of 2016 before this Court seeking quashing of entire proceedings before the concerned Court. This Court on 19-01-2017 quashed the proceedings against accused No.8 on the ground that the sites so formed are not stray sites and allotments made by MUDA to the employees and the general public are valid and there was no illegality in the process of allotment. The CBI questions this order before the Apex Court. The Apex Court sets the order aside 7 and remits the matter back to the stage of trial before the concerned Court. The Court then on 29-03-2021 takes cognizance of the offence against the petitioner which has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition.
7. Heard Sri D.R. Ravishankar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri P. Prasanna Kumar, Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent.
8. The learned senior counsel Sri D.R. Ravishankar appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the petitioner is not an officer of the Board. Being an MLA he was an ex-officio Member of MUDA. The petitioner has not participated in any allotment process. Therefore, the allegation that he has abused his official position to get an allotment of site would not arise. There is no evidence against the petitioner either documentary or material even oral, to frame the charge for the offences punishable under the Act. It is his emphatic submission that even assuming that all the documents and witnesses statements are true, no offence is attracted against the petitioner. The petitioner, without any rhyme 8 or reason, has been dragged into the proceedings. The learned senior counsel would further submit that the CBI is dragged into these proceedings without any rhyme or reason. He would submit that there are two proceedings instituted - one by the local Police and the other by the CBI. The Investigating Officer of the local Police files 'B' report and the CBI, the charge sheet and, therefore, there is divergent findings on the same set of facts. He would contend that mere irregularity in the allotment process cannot be construed to be a crime. He would, by taking this Court through the documents appended to the petition, seek to demonstrate that, in plethora of applications when there were no takers of the sites that were formed, MUDA has conducted the same process of allotment to others and in favour of its members inter alia and no finger is pointed by any person. The committee being transparent has followed due process of law. There was no mala fide intention in the allotment of sites.
9. Per-contra, the learned Special Public Prosecutor Sri P.Prasanna Kumar appearing for the respondent would seek to contend that the complaint comes to be registered on a meeting 9 that was convened by MUDA on 08-09-2009 in which out of 14 Members, 9 Members have attended the meeting and decisions were taken on various subjects. Money for work like underground drainage and drinking water facility in the layout was sought to be funded by way of sale of sites. It is his submission that investigation reveal that the petitioner being an MLA of Melukote constituency between 2009 and 2014, during his tenure has conspired with accused No.1 and other Members with regard to allotment of sites through MUDA. It is his submission that in the said meeting the petitioner was aware that stray sites were to be auctioned and the petitioner was ineligible for allotment of site as his wife has already been allotted a site in Mysore Urban Development Authority. Therefore, that fact was concealed and allotment was got made. He would submit that this is a criminal offence committed by the petitioner only to grab one site contrary to the Rules and Regulations. Therefore, it becomes an offence under Sections 409 and 420 of the IPC and the provisions of the Act.
10
9.1. He would submit that the petitioner had approached this Court seeking quashment of initiation of proceedings by the CBI against him in Criminal Petition No.5305 of 2021 and this Court in terms of its order dated 31-01-2022 dismissed the said petition holding that sanction accorded to prosecute the petitioner was in accordance with law and did not warrant any interference. The petitioner himself challenges this before the Apex Court in S.L.P.(Criminal) No.3833 of 2022. The Apex Court, in terms of its order dated 13-05-2022, while admitting the petition, tagged it along with the case of accused No.8 in the same crime. He would, therefore, contend that these grounds were urged and even considered and, therefore, the second petition on the same set of facts would not be maintainable.
10. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner would join the issue in submitting that the earlier petition was filed and considered only with regard to sanction being accorded for prosecution. There was no consideration of any other point. Even otherwise, the Apex Court itself permitted the petitioner to file a discharge application before the concerned Court. Therefore, no 11 fault can be found with the second petition being preferred by the petitioner calling in question the rejection of the order of discharge.
11. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record.
12. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. To consider whether the proceedings against the petitioner should be permitted to be continued or otherwise, a little walk in the history in reiteration to what is narrated hereinabove would become necessary. The Board of MUDA resolves to form a layout in the name of Vivekananda Nagar Layout in Sy.No.507 of Mandya seeking to carve out 2354 sites with an intention to allot them to general public. Notification was issued and MUDA receives 2051 applications in respect of 2354 sites that were published for allotment. The allotment of 2051 sites to those applicants was made through a process of lottery. Out of the persons who were allotted, 416 allottees rejected those allotments, as the allotments were made on loose soil area. 93 sites stood cancelled as the 12 allottees did not come up with payment. Therefore, there were two chunks of allotments - one 416 sites and the other 93 sites. Between 2004 and 2006 again MUDA resolved to call for willingness for allotment of 416 sites from those persons who did not get allotment in the lottery. 314 applications were received and sites were allotted to those persons at full market value. This is the first part of the story. The petitioner is nowhere in the picture in the first part of the story.
13. In 2009, the petitioner gets elected as a Member of the Legislative Assembly and being a Member of Legislative Assembly he becomes an ex-officio Member of the Board of MUDA. After that MUDA again resolves in the year 2009 to allot certain sites to its employees and issues a publication. The publication is issued on 17-09-2009. The publication reads as follows:
"¥ÀæPÀluÉ ªÀÄAqÀå £ÀUÀgÁ©üªÀÈ¢Þ ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀªÀÅ ªÀÄAqÀå £ÀUÀgÀzÀ «ªÉÃPÁ£ÀAzÀ £ÀUÀgÀ §qÁªÀuÉAiÀÄ°è SÁ° EgÀĪÀ ªÀ¸Àw ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÀ£ÁðlPÀ £ÀUÀgÁ©üªÀÈ¢Þ ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀ (¤ªÉñÀ£À ºÀAaPÉ) ¤AiÀĪÀÄ 1991 gÀ C£ÀéAiÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ ¢£ÁAPÀ:8-9-09gÀAzÀÄ £ÀqÉzÀ ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀzÀ ¸À¨ÉsAiÀÄ «µÀAiÀÄ ¸ÀASÉå 3gÀ ¤tðAiÀÄzÀAvÉ ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀjUÉ ºÀAaPÉ ªÀiÁqÀ®Ä CfðUÀ¼À£ÀÄß CºÁ餸À¯ÁVzÉ.
¤ªÉñÀ£ÀUÀ¼À «ªÀgÀ, CAzÁdÄ ¨É¯É, £ÉÆAzÀt ±ÀÄ®Ì ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¥ÁægÀA©üPÀ oÉêÀtÂUÀ¼À «ªÀgÀUÀ¼ÀÄ F jÃw EªÉ. CªÀ±ÀåPÀvÉUÀ£ÀÄUÀÄtªÁV vÀÄA§¨ÉÃPÁzÀ £ÉÆAzÀt ±ÀÄ®ÌzÀ «ªÀgÀUÀ¼ÄÀ 13 PÀæ. ¸ÀA. ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀUÀ¼À C¼ÀvÉ ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀzÀ ¨É¯É ¥ÁægÀA©üPÀ £ÉÆAzÀt ±ÀÄ®Ì («ÄÃ. UÀ¼À°è) (gÀÆ. UÀ¼À°è) oÉêÀt (gÀÆ. UÀ¼À°è) (gÀÆ. UÀ¼À°è) 1 6 x 9 78,000-00 7,800 200-00 2 9 x 12 1,56,000-00 15,600 600-00 3 12 x 18 3,12,000-00 31,200 1,200-00 4 15 x 24 5,20,000-00 52,000 2,000-00
1. ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀPÁÌV Cfð ¸À°è¸ÀĪÀ ¥ÀæwAiÉƧâ CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ F ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀzÀ°è ªÀ¸Àw ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀPÁÌV ¥ÀæxÀªÀĪÀiÁV ºÉ¸ÀgÀ£ÀÄß £ÉÆAzÁ¬Ä¸À¨ÉÃPÀÄ.
2. ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀPÁÌV ºÉ¸ÀgÀÄUÀ¼À£ÀÄß £ÉÆAzÁ¬Ä¸À®Ä EaѸÀĪÀ CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ:17-9-2009 jAzÀ 26-11-2009gÀªÀgÉUÉ ¨É¼ÉUÉ 10-30 jAzÀ C¥ÀgÁºÀß 2.30gÀªÀgÉUÉ PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ PÉ®¸ÀzÀ ¢£ÀUÀ¼À°è ªÉÄð£À PÉÆõÀÖPÀzÀ°è ¤¢ðµÀÖ ¥Àr¹gÀĪÀ C¼ÀvÉUÉ vÀPÀÌ £ÉÆAzÀt ±ÀÄ®Ì ºÁUÀÆ gÀÆ.25.00UÀ¼À £ÉÆAzÀt PÁqÀÄð ±ÀĮ̪À£ÀÄß ¥ÁªÀw¹ ºÉ¸ÀgÀ£ÀÄß £ÉÆAzÁ¬Ä¸ÀvÀPÀÌzÀÄÝ. ¢£ÁAPÀ:26-11-09gÀ £ÀAvÀgÀ ºÉ¸ÀgÀ£ÀÄß £ÉÆAzÁ¬Ä¸À¯ÁUÀĪÀÅ¢®è. ¸ÀAzÁAiÀÄ ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁzÀ £ÉÆÃAzÀt ±ÀĮ̪À£ÀÄß ªÀÄgÀÄ ¥ÁªÀw ªÀiÁqÀĪÀÅzÁUÀ°Ã CxÀªÁ ¸Àj ºÉÆA¢¸ÀĪÁzÀUÀ°Ã AiÀiÁªÀÅzÀPÀÆÌ CªÀPÁ±À E®è. £ÉÆÃAzÀt PÁrð£À MAzÀÄ ¥ÀæwAiÀÄ£ÀÄß CfðUÉ ®UÀwÛ¸À¨ÉÃPÀÄ.
3. CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ F ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀzÀ°è ªÁ¸ÀzÀ ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀPÁÌV ºÉ¸ÀgÀ£ÀÄß £ÉÆÃAzÁ¬Ä¸À®Ä ¤UÀ¢ü¥Àr¹zÀ PÉÆ£ÉAiÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀzÀ ¤PÀl ¥ÀƪÀðzÀ ºÀ¢£ÉÊzÀÄ ªÀµÀðPÉÌ PÀrªÉÄ E®èzÀ CªÀ¢üAiÀĪÀgÉUÉ PÀ£ÁðlPÀ gÁdåzÀ ¤ªÁ¹AiÀiÁVgÀ¨ÉÃPÀÄ. F PɼÀPÀAqÀ ¸ÀAzÀ¨sÀðUÀ¼À°è ªÉÄð£À F CªÀ¢üAiÀÄ°è ¸Àr°¸À¯ÁVzÉ.
C) PÀ£ÁðlPÀ gÁdåzÀ ¤ªÁ¹AiÀiÁVzÀÄÝ PÉÃAzÀæzÀ ¸À±À¸ÀçÛ ¥ÀqÉAiÀÄ°èzÀÄÝ, PÀ£ÁðlPÀ gÁdåzÀ ºÉÆgÀUÉ ¸ÉÃªÉ ¸À°è¸ÀÄwÛgÀĪÀ ªÀåQÛUÀ¼ÁzÀ°è D) PÀ£ÁðlPÀ gÁdå ¤ªÁ¹AiÀiÁVzÀÄÝ GzÉÆåÃUÀ CxÀªÁ G£ÀßvÀ ªÁå¸ÀAUÀPÁÌV gÁdåzÀ ºÉÆgÀUÉ ºÉÆÃVgÀĪÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀ£ÁðlPÀ gÁdåzÀ°è ªÁ¹¸À®Ä ªÁ¸ÀÛ«PÀªÁV GzÉÝò¸ÀĪÀ ªÀåQÛUÀ¼ÁVzÀÝ°.
4. CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ ¥Áæ¥ÀÛªÀAiÀĸÀÌgÁVgÀ¨ÉÃPÀÄ. ªÀÄvÀÄÛ CªÀgÁUÀ°Ã CªÀgÀ PÀÄlÄA§ ªÀUÀðzÀªÀgÁUÀ°Ã F ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀzÀ ªÁå¦ÛAiÀÄ°è ªÀÄ£É CxÀªÁ ¤ªÉñÀ£À ºÉÆA¢gÀ¨ÁgÀzÀÄ (PÀÄlÄA¨zÀ ªÁå¦ÛAiÀÄ°è UÀAqÀ CxÀªÁ ºÉAqÀw, ªÀÄPÀ̼ÀÄ CªÀ®A©vÀ vÀAzÉ vÁ¬ÄAiÀÄgÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¸ÀºÉÆÃzÀgÀgÀÄ M¼À¥ÀqÀÄvÁÛgÉ)
5. £ÀªÀÄä gÁdåzÀ CxÀªÁ zÉñÀzÀ AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà ¨sÁUÀzÀ°è E½¹zÀ ¨É¯ÉAiÀÄ°è ¤ªÉñÀ£À CxÀªÁ ªÀÄ£É ºÀAaPÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉ¢gÀĪÀªÀgÀÄ CfðAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¸À°è¸À®Ä ºÀPÀÄ̼ÀîªÀgÁVgÀvÀPÀÌzÀÝ®è.
6. ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀPÉÌ Cfð ¸À°è¸ÀĪÀªÀgÀÄ F PɼÀUÉ £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹gÀĪÀ jÃvÁå ªÁ¶ðPÀ ªÀgÀªÀiÁ£ÀPÌÉ C£ÀÄUÀÄtªÁV CzÀPÉÌ ¸ÀjºÉÆAzÀĪÀ C¼ÀvÉAiÀÄ ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀPÉÌ ¥ÀgÀ¸ÀàgÀ ¸ÀA§AzsÀ G¼ÀîªÀgÁVgÀvÀPÀÌzÀÄÝ.
¤ªÉñÀ£ÀzÀ C¼ÀvÉ ªÁ¶ðPÀ ªÀgÀªÀiÁ£À (gÀÆ. UÀ¼À°è) 6 X 9 «Ä 12,000-00 CxÀªÁ PÀrªÉÄ 14 9 X 12 «Äà 12,001-00 jAzÀ 36,000-00 12 X 18 «Äà 36,001-00 jAzÀ 60,000-00 15 X 24 «Äà 60,001-00 ªÉÄîàlÄÖ.
7. £ÉÆÃAzÀtÂzÁgÀgÀÄ ¤UÀ¢üvÀ £ÀªÀÄÆ£É CfðUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¢£ÁAPÀ jAzÀ gÀªÀgÉUÉ PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ°è gÀÆ.50.00 UÀ¼À Cfð ±ÀÄ®Ì ¤Ãr ¥ÀqÉAiÀħºÀÄzÀÄ.
8. ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀPÉÌ Cfð ¸À°è¸À §AiÀĸÀĪÀ ¥ÀæwAiÉƧ⠣ÉÆÃAzÀtÂzÁgÀgÀÄ ªÉÄð£À PÉÆõÀÖPÀzÀ°è ¤¢ðµÀÖ¥Àr¹gÀĪÀ C¼ÀvÉUÉ vÀPÀÌ ¥ÁægÀA©üPÀ oÉêÀtÂAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¢£ÁAPÀ:1-10-2009 jAzÀ 30-11-2009 gÉƼÀUÉ C®ºÁ¨Ázï ¨ÁåAPï, ªÀÄAqÀå zÀ°è dªÀiÁ ªÀiÁqÀvÀPÌÀ zÄÀ Ý. dªÀiÁ ªÀiÁrzÀ ¨ÁåAPï ZÀ®¤ß£À MAzÀÄ ¥ÀÛwAiÀÄ£ÀÄß CfðUÉ ®UÀwÛ¸ÀvÀPÀÌzÀÄÝ.
9. ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀUÀ¼À ªÀÄAdÆgÁwAiÀÄÄ PÀ£ÁðlPÀ £ÀUÀgÁ©üªÀÈ¢Þ ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀ (¤ªÉñÀ£À ºÀAaPÉ) ¤AiÀĪÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ 1991 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ZÁ°ÛAiÀÄ°ègÀĪÀ ¤AiÀĪÀÄUÀ¼À£ÀÄß C£ÀĸÀj¹ ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß ªÀÄAdÆgÀÄ ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁUÀĪÀÅzÀÄ. F ¤AiÀĪÀÄUÀ½UÉ ªÀÄAdÆgÁwzÁgÀgÄÀ §zÀÞgÁVgÀvÀPÀÌzÀÄÝ. ¤ªÉñÀ£À ªÀÄAdÆgÁUÀzÀ CfðzÁgÀgÀÄUÀ½UÉ §rØ gÀ»vÀªÁV ¥ÁægÀA©üPÀ oÉêÀtÂAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ªÀiÁvÀæ »A¢gÀÄV¸À¯ÁUÀĪÀÅzÀÄ.
10. ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀªÀÅ ¤AiÀĪÀÄUÀ¼À£ÀÄß C£ÀĸÀj¹ CºÀð C¨sÀåyðUÀ¼À£ÀÄß UÀÄgÀÄw¹, CªÀgÀªÀgÀ CªÀ±ÀåPÀvÉ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ CºÀðvÉ DzsÁgÀzÀ ªÉÄÃgÉUÉ ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ºÀAZÀĪÀ ºÀPÌÀ £ÄÀ ß PÁ¢j¹PÉÆArzÉ. ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀzÀ F ºÀPÀÌ£ÀÄß CfðzÁgÀgÁUÀ°Ã CxÀªÁ ¨ÉÃgÉ AiÀiÁgÉà DUÀ° ¥Àæ²ß¸À®Ä ºÀQÌgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀUÀ¼À ºÀAaPÉAiÀÄ°è ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀzÀ wêÀiÁð£ÀªÉà CAwªÀÄ wêÀiÁð£ÀªÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
11. CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ ¸ÀļÀÄî ªÀiÁ»wUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¤Ãr, ¤ªÉñÀ£À ªÀÄAdÆgÀÄ ªÀiÁr¹PÉÆArgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ PÀAqÀÄ §AzÀ°è, AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà ªÀÄÄ£ÀÆìZÀ£É ¤ÃqÀzÉ ªÀÄAdÆgÁwAiÀÄ£ÀÄß gÀzÀÄÝ¥Àr¸À¯ÁUÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀPÉÌ ¸ÀAzÁAiÀÄ ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁzÀ ¤ªÉñÀ£À ªÀiË®åzÀ ±ÉÃ.12.5gÀµÀÄÖ ªÀÄÄlÄÖUÉÆÃ®Ä ºÁQPÉƼÀî¯ÁUÀĪÀÅzÀÄ. ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀªÀÅ ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀUÀ¼À ºÀAaPÉAiÀÄ ºÀPÀÌ£ÀÄß ºÁUÀÆ wgÀ¸ÀÌj¸ÀĪÀ ºÀPÀÌ£ÀÄß ºÉÆA¢gÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
12. CfðUÀ¼À£ÀÄß RÄzÁÝV CxÀªÁ CfðUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¹éÃPÀj¸À®Ä UÉÆvÀÛ¥Àr¹zÀ ¢£ÁAPÀPÌÉ ªÀÄÄAavÀªÁV ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀzÀ PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ°è vÀ®Ä¥ÀĪÀAvÉ CAZÉAiÀÄ ªÀÄÆ®PÀ PÀ¼ÀÄ»¸ÀvÀPÌÀ zÄÀ Ý. ¤UÀ¢ü¥Àr¹zÀ ¢£ÁAPÀzÀ £ÀAvÀgÀ ¹éÃPÀj¹zÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ zÉÆõÀ¥ÀÆjvÀªÁzÀ ºÁUÀÆ ¥ÀæPÀluÉUÉ «gÀÄzÀÞªÁV vÀ¥ÁàV ¸À°è¸ÀĪÀ CfðUÀ¼À£ÀÄß wgÀ¸ÀÌj¸À¯ÁUÀĪÀÅzÀÄ.
13. ºÉaÑ£À «ªÀgÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ PÉ®¸ÀzÀ ¢£ÀUÀ¼À°è PÉ®¸ÀzÀ ªÉüÉAiÀÄ°è ¥ÀqÉAiÀħºÀÄzÀÄ.
14. ¥ÀÆtðªÁV ¨sÀwð ªÀiÁrzÀ CfðUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¹éÃPÀj¸À®Ä PÉÆ£ÉAiÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ:30-11-09 ¸ÀªÀÄAiÀÄ 5.30UÀAmÉAiÀĪÀgÉUÉ."
(Emphasis added) The conditions in the notification is unequivocal. Condition Nos.4 and 5 has clearly indicated that the applicant or his family members should not have secured a site that would come within Mandya 15 Urban Development Authority and any other site from any Society anywhere. It was further conditioned that entire site money should be paid by the applicant on or before 5.30 p.m. of 30-11-2009. Out of 107 sites, 13 sites are allotted to the employees of MUDA and the rest were allotted to general public. The reason for such allotment is also found in a resolution dated 01-03-2010, relevant portion of which reads as follows:
"..... ..... .....
¸ÀzÀj §qÁªÀuÉUÉ CªÀ±ÀåPÀªÁV MzÀV¸À¨ÉÃPÁzÀ PÀÄrAiÀÄĪÀ ¤ÃgÀÄ, M¼ÀZÀgÀAr ªÀåªÀ¸ÜÉ PÀ®à¸À®Ä ¤ªÉñÀ£À ¥ÀqÉzÀªÀgÀÄ vÀUÁzÉ ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛzÀÝjAzÀ ªÀÄÆ¯É ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀUÀ¼À ºÀgÁdÄ ¥ÀæQæAiÉÄUÉ PÀæªÀĪÀ»¹zÀÝgÀÆ ¸ÀºÀ ºÀgÁf£À°è ©qïzÁgÀgÀÄ ¨sÁUÀªÀ»¸ÀzÉ C£ÉÃPÀ ºÀgÁdÄ ¥ÀæQæAiÉÄUÀ¼ÀÄ ¸ÀºÀ gÀzÁÝVgÀÄvÀÛªÉ.
F §qÁªÀuÉAiÀÄ°è »AzÉ d«ÄãÀÄ ªÀÄAdÆgÁwzÁgÀgÉ£À߯ÁzÀ PÉ®ªÀjUÉ ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÒ£ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ DzÉñÀzÀAvÉ ªÀiÁ£Àå f¯Áè¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ, ªÀÄAqÀågÀªÀjUÉ 13 JPÀgÉ 14.08 UÀÄAmÉ d«ÄãÀ£ÀÄß ºÁUÀÆ «zÀÄåvï G¥ÀPÉÃAzÀæ ¸Áܦ¸À®Ä 3.00 JPÀgÉ ¥ÀæzÉñÀªÀ£ÀÄß PÀ£ÁðlPÀ «zÀÄåvï ¥Àæ¸ÀgÀt ¤UÀªÀÄ ¤AiÀÄ«ÄvÀ, ªÀÄAqÀå gÀªÀjUÉ ªÀ»¸ÀĪÀÅzÀÄ C¤ªÁAiÀÄðªÁVzÀÄÝ, F ¸ÀܼÀzÀ°è ºÀAaPÉ ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁVzÀÝ PÉ®ªÀÅ ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß gÀzÀÄÝ¥Àr¹ 131§zÀ° ¤ªÉñÀ£À ¤Ãr ªÀåªÀ¸ÉÜ ªÀiÁrgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ºÁUÀÆ 2 JPÀgÉ 03 UÀÄAmÉ ¥ÀæzÉñÀªÀ£ÀÄß ¸ÀPÁðgÀzÀ DzÉñÀ ¸ÀASÉå.£ÀCE 12 ªÉÄÊC¥Áæ 07 ¢£ÁAPÀ:
16-7-2008gÀAvÉ PÉƼÀZÉ ¤ªÁ¹UÀ½UÉ ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ºÀAaPÉ ªÀiÁqÀ®Ä ªÀ»¸À¯ÁVzÉ.
EwÛÃZÉUÉ ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ºÀgÁdÄ ªÀiÁqÀzÀAvÉ PÉ®ªÀgÀÄ MvÁ۬ĹzÀÝgÀ ªÉÄÃgÉ CUÀvÀå ¸Ë®¨sÀå PÀ°à¸À®Ä ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¸ÀPÁðgÀzÀ CAVÃPÁgÀzÉÆqÀ£É (¥ÀvÀæ¸ÀASÉå:£ÀCE 559 ªÉÄÊC¥Áæ 2007 ¢£ÁAPÀ:25-2-2009gÀAvÉ) M¼ÀZÀgÀAr ªÀåªÀ¸ÉÜUÉ 4.25 PÉÆÃn gÀÆ. ºÁUÀÆ PÀÄrAiÀÄĪÀ ¤Ãj£À ªÀåªÀ¸ÉÜUÉ 4.00 PÉÆÃn gÀÆ. UÀ¼ÀÄ ¨ÉÃPÁVzÀÄÝ, ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀªÀÅ DyðPÀ ªÀÄÄUÀÎnÖ£À°èzÀÝ PÁgÀt ºÁUÀÆ vÀvÀìA§AzsÀ ªÀÄÄRåªÁV M¼ÀZÀgÀAr ªÀåªÀ¸ÉÜ PÁªÀÄUÁjUÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÉÊUÉƼÀî®Ä F §qÁªÀuÉAiÀÄ°è ®¨sÀå«zÀÝ ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß ¢£ÁAPÀ:8-9-2009 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 8-1-2010gÀ CªÀ¢üUÀ¼À°è ¸À¨sÉAiÀÄ ¤tðAiÀÄUÀ¼ÀAvÉ 107 ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ºÀAaPÉ ªÀiÁr F ºÀAaPɬÄAzÀ PÉÆæÃrüPÀj¹gÀĪÀ 3.00 PÉÆÃn gÀÆ.UÀ¼À£ÀÄß M¼ÀZÀgÀAr ªÀåªÀ¸ÉÜUÉ PÀ£ÁðlPÀ £ÀUÀgÀ ¤ÃgÀÄ ¸ÀgÀ§gÁdÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ M¼ÀZÀgÀAr ªÀÄAqÀ½UÉ vÀéjvÀªÁV vÀÄA§ÄªÀÅzÀÄ CUÀvÀåªÁVzÉ. (¤tðAiÀÄUÀ¼À ¥ÀæwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ®UÀwÛ¹zÉ.) 16 «zÀÄåvï ¸Ë®¨sÀå PÁªÀÄUÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ CAwªÀÄ ºÀAvÀzÀ°èzÀÄÝ, ¤ÃgÀÄ ¸ÀgÀ§gÁdÄ AiÉÆÃd£ÉUÀ½UÁV CUÀvÀå«gÀĪÀ ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß «£Áå¸À ¥ÀæzÉñÀzÀ°è G½¢gÀĪÀ ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ºÀgÁdÄ ªÀÄÆ®PÀ ºÀAaPÉ ªÀiÁr ¸ÀA¥À£ÀÆä® PÉÆæÃrüPÀj¹PÉƼÀî®Ä ¥ÀæAiÀÄw߸À¯ÁUÀÄwÛzÉ.
F ¸ÀA§AzsÀ £ÀUÀgÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ UÁæªÀiÁAvÀgÀ AiÉÆÃd£Á ¤zÉÃð±ÀPÀgÀÄ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ gÀªÀgÄÀ ¢£ÁAPÀ:18-2-2010gÀAzÀÄ PÉüÀ¯ÁVzÀÝ ¸Àà¶ÖÃPÀgÀtPÉÌ F PÀbÉÃj¬ÄAzÀ ¢£ÁAPÀ:20-2-2010gÀAzÀÄ ªÀiÁ»w ¤ÃqÀ¯ÁVzÉ. (¥Àæw ®UÀwÛ¹zÉ) PÀ£ÁðlPÀ £ÀUÀgÁ©üªÀÈ¢Þ ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀUÀ¼À ¤ªÉñÀ£À ºÀAaPÉ ¤AiÀĪÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ 1991 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀzÀ ¸À¨sÉAiÀÄ ¤tðAiÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ ¸ÀPÁðgÀzÀ ¤zÉÃð±À£ÀUÀ¼ÀAvÉ ¤ªÉñÀ£ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ºÀAaPÉ ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁVzÉ.
¸ÀPÁðgÀzÀ ªÀiÁUÀð¸ÀÆaUÀ¼ÀÄ F PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ°è ®¨sÀå«®èzÀ PÁgÀt ¥Á®£É ªÀiÁqÀ¢gÀĪÀÅzÀPÉÌ PÀëªÉÄAiÀiÁa¸ÀÄvÁÛ, ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀzÀ°è ¤ªÉñÀ£À ºÀAaPÉ ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀ ¸À¨ÉsAiÀÄ £ÀqÀªÀ½UÀ½UÉ C£ÀĪÉÆÃzÀ£ÉUÁV «£ÀAw¸ÀÄvÉÛãÉ."
(Emphasis added) It is here the petitioner comes into the picture along with others.
On 17-09-2009, as observed hereinabove, a public notice was issued calling for applications from eligible persons for such allotment. On 18-09-2009 in terms of Section 17(3) of the Karnataka Urban Development Authority Act and the Rules the allotment details was to be published in two local newspapers. It was no doubt published but not in newspapers having wide circulation, but it was published in newspapers of having circulation of less than 1000 copies.17
14. The petitioner on 16-10-2009 files an application for allotment of site in terms of the earlier resolution of allotment of sites to the members and employees of MUDA. In the said application it is alleged that the petitioner declares that his family has not been allotted any site within the MUDA jurisdiction. This is found to be the bone of contention of breach of trust or cheating by the petitioner. The application filed by the petitioner declares that no member of his family has been allotted any site in MUDA. The questionnaire in the application is as follows:
"12) ¤ÃªÁUÀ°Ã ¤ªÀÄä PÀÄlÄA§zÀªÀgÁUÀ°Ã :
ªÀÄAqÀå £ÀUÀgÀ, ¥ÀæzÉñÀzÀ°è ªÀÄ£É CxÀªÁ ¤ªÉñÀ£À ºËzÀÄ
¥ÀqÉ¢gÀÄ«gÁ? AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà ªÀÄAqÀ½ ¸ÀAWÀ CxÀªÁ E®è
¸ÀA¸ÉܬÄAzÀ £ÀªÀÄä gÁdåzÀ CxÀªÁ zÉñÀzÀ AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà ✔
¨sÁUÀzÀ°è E½¹zÀ ¨É¯ÉAiÀÄ°è ¤ªÉñÀ£À / ªÀÄ£É ¥ÀqÉ¢gÀÄ«gÁ?
(Emphasis added) The question is specific whether the petitioner or any of his family members have been allotted any site in the jurisdiction of MUDA or the petitioner has acquired any site/house on concessional price anywhere. The petitioner answers in the negative. This is found to be a criminal offence by the prosecution. I fail to understand what criminality can be attached to a person who was eligible for 18 allotment of site. It is alleged that the wife of the petitioner was an allottee of site by the Mysore Urban Development Authority. It is admitted fact that neither the petitioner nor any other member of the family of the petitioner has been allotted a site in the jurisdiction of Mandya Urban Development Authority. Therefore, how could this spring to become a criminal action, is the question left unanswered by the prosecution in the entire proceedings. Past practices in MUDA:
15. MUDA is not facing this special problem for the first time. In the year 2002 when the layout was initially formed, applications were invited from general public. In response to the said notification 4549 applications were received. The sites were allotted through a lottery to 2055 applicants. Large number of allottees became defaulters and substantial number of allottees sought refund after surrendering sites. Out of 2055 allottees only 385 have completed the formalities and 667 allottees surrendered the sites. 1003 allottees did not even remit balance payments and therefore, those sites stood cancelled. What happened to the sites left over is required to be noticed. In the year 2003 MUDA formed a scheme 19 called Hecchuvari Badti Prakarana and negotiated with the original allottees and requested them to pay additional interest and accordingly collected `99.91/- lakhs as additional interest. Despite these efforts, large number of sites remained unsold. MUDA needed funds for maintaining the area and development of infrastructure. Another scheme was floated by MUDA called Ondhe Kanthu. In the said scheme 426 sites are sold and 391 original applicants did not show any interest or even pay any amount. This was carried forward and another scheme was formulated by name called Nimma Ayike and paper publication was issued to the general public to select whatever sites they want. In this process 344 sites were sold. Out of the proceeds MUDA cleared certain loans availed from Nationalised Banks in order to form the layout, but completed sites could not be sold as there was no demand or no takers for the sites. This was investigated into by the CBI pursuant to the complaint registered by the very same complainant i.e., Mr. K.Mathai, former Commissioner of MUDA. The CBI itself investigated into the matter after registering the FIR in RC 2(A)/2017 for the very same offence and filed a 'B' report holding that though the allotment Rules were violated, the decision was not 20 arbitrary by the accused and the allegations are not substantiated and it was also observed that the alleged loss that was projected was hypothetical. The finding of investigation which is germane to be noticed while filing the 'B' report by the CBI is as follows:
"18. Investigation disclosed that only the allotment rules were violated and there is no arbitrary decision taken by any of the FIR named accused persons who had worked in the MUDA in different capacities and were members of the MUDA Board and the decisions were taken by the Board collectively and the purpose/exigencies for allotment of sites through the newly evolved schemes were also discussed and approved by the meeting but the same were implemented without the same being ratified by the Government/Urban Development Department as required under the KUDA Act, 1987. The allegations in the FIR including the criminal conspiracy, abuse of official position, cheating and misappropriation are not substantiated against any of the accused persons named in the FIR or any other persons. Similarly investigation did not disclose commission of any other offence by the FIR named accused persons or any other persons. It is further disclosed that the allegation of the financial loss caused to the MUDA is also not substantiated as the quantum of loss projected by the complainant is also hypothetical. As such prosecution is not recommended against any person including the FIR named persons for want of evidence. However, allotment of sites under the Ondhu Kanthu and Nimma Ayike scheme and regularization of defaulted allotments under Hechchuvari Badathi Prakarana were in violation of the KUDA allotment Rules, 1991 and therefore, the Urban Development Department/Government has to review these allotments and take appropriate steps deemed fit. A detailed report of investigation is sent to the Government in this respect.21
19. Hence, this Final Report is submitted before the Hon'ble Court to close the case for want of evidence. It is respectfully submitted that final report may be accepted and necessary orders be passed in accordance with law."
(Emphasis added) The CBI holds that investigation disclosed that only Allotment Rules are violated and there was no arbitrary decision taken by any of the FIR named accused persons who had worked in MUDA in different capacities and Members of the Board of MUDA, as it was a collective decision to meet the exigencies for allotment of sites through the evolved scheme. What the MUDA has now done is repeating the old practice; what the CBI has now done is going away from 'B' report. Therefore, on identical allegations in the past if identical offences were held to be not attracting any provisions of the Act or the IPC, it is ununderstandable as to how the petitioner could be alleged of offences punishable under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Act. Section 13(1)(d) of the Act reads as follows:
"Section 13 : Criminal misconduct by a public servant :
(1)....
(d) if he,--22
(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or"
For an offence under Section 13(1)(d) it must satisfy three ingredients viz., by corrupt or illegal means obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or a pecuniary advantage by abusing his position as a public servant while holding office as a public servant without any public interest. Therefore, the soul of Section 13(1)(d) of the Act is that any accused should have enriched himself by illegal means of a valuable thing or payment of pecuniary advantage by abusing the office. It, therefore, becomes necessary to notice the charge framed against the petitioner. The CBI has filed a charge sheet on investigation in the subject crime. The allegation against the petitioner is found at paragraph 52 of the charge sheet. It reads as follows:
"52. Sri C.S. Puttaraju (A-5), S/o late Sannathamme Gowda is a resident of Chinakuruli Village, Pandavapura Taluk, Mandya District. He was the MLA of the assembly Constituency of Melukote for the period from 2009 to 2014 representing the 23 political party Janatha Dal (Secular) and was the Member, MUDA, Mandya during the said tenure. Sri C.S. Puttaraju (A-5) conspired with A-1 and other members of MUDA and allotted with MUDA site through the MUDA meeting held on 8-09-2009 knowing very well that, stray sites are to be auctioned and that he is not eligible to get the site allotted to himself. He has concealed his marital status in the MUDA application form submitted for site allotment. He also concealed the details of MUDA site already allotted in the name of his wife with an intention to get allot the MUDA site in his name."
(Emphasis added) The allegation is that the petitioner, accused No.5 conspired with accused No.1 and other members of MUDA and got allotted a site through MUDA in a meeting held on 08-09-2009 knowing very well that stray sites are to be auctioned and that he is not eligible to get the site allotted. It is further alleged that he has concealed the details of allotment in the name of his wife in Mysore Urban Development Authority with an intention to enrich himself. It is, therefore, necessary to notice whether the aforesaid content of the charge against the petitioner did have any factual backing.
16. It is an admitted fact that decision to allot sites to its members was taken after two proceedings - one, the MUDA itself decides to allot sites to the members and the general public as 24 there were no takers for the sites and the MUDA had to maintain the sites and develop infrastructure for the allottees who had already paid the entire amount. This was done in the past as well. The decision is taken on 08-09-2009. By then, the petitioner had stepped into the Board of MUDA as an ex-officio Member on the strength of him being an MLA of the constituency. The petitioner did not participate in any of the meetings held by the Board of MUDA. This is an admitted fact. What happens after the allotment and registration of FIR is that site is allotted on 16-10-2009 in favour of the petitioner as was allotted to others. On 05-01-2010 possession certificate comes to be issued. On 07-05-2010 MUDA executes a sale deed in favour of the petitioner for the allotted site. On 16-11-2010 khata in favour of the petitioner is issued. The petitioner then executes a sale deed in respect of the allotted property from MUDA in favour of one Khalak Sharief. Two proceedings which became the bone of contention here is that the petitioner seeks cancellation of allotment from MUDA on 27-12- 2011 and the allotment gets cancelled. The petitioner then re- purchased the said property from the said Khalak Sharief. This is termed to be a fraud. Nowhere it is said that the petitioner was 25 ineligible for allotment of the site. The only projection of ineligibility is allotment of a site in favour of his wife by the Mysore Urban Development Authority. The question itself posed in the application was very vague. The notification was clear that an applicant is debarred from getting a site if he or his family members have secured a site in the jurisdiction of Mandya Urban Development Authority, as the words used "F ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀzÀ ªÁå¦ÛAiÀÄ°è". Therefore, it cannot be termed to be a fraud.
17. With all these facts, accused No.8 files a criminal petition before this Court in Criminal Petition No.6993 of 2016. This Court on 19-01-2017 quashed the proceedings against the said accused. This was called in question before the Apex Court by the CBI. The matter was pending consideration before the Apex Court in S.L.P.No.6971 of 2017. Against the petitioner cognizance was taken by the concerned Court without obtaining sanction from the hands of the competent authority. This was called in question before this Court by the petitioner in Criminal Petition No.5305 of 2021 on the ground that sanction ought to have been taken either under Section 19 of the Act or under Section 197 of the IPC. Both these grounds 26 come to be rejected by a coordinate Bench of this Court by its order dated 31-01-2022. The petitioner called the said order in question before the Apex Court in S.L.P.No.3833 of 2022. The same was directed to be tagged along with S.L.P.No.6740 of 2020. The Apex Court, in terms of its order dated 24-01-2020 disposed of the petitions by the following order:
"Leave granted.
The appellants assail the order dated 19-01-2017 passed by the High Court allowing the application of the respondent under Section 482 Cr.P.C. quashing FIR and the charge sheet submitted under Sections 406, 420 and 120B, IPC and Sections 7 & 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
The allegations relate to alleged illegal allotment of plots including to the respondent as a beneficiary though he was an officer of the Authority himself.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and are satisfied that the impugned order is not sustainable for two reasons. Firstly, the High Court could not have taken upon itself to examine the question whether they were "stray plots" or not, which was more a matter for trial. Secondly, issues with regard to inadequate publication according to the rules for allotment of the plots, the allotment made before waiting for the last date of the receipt of the applications, etc. form part of the charge sheet, have not even been considered by the High Court.
The impugned order is set aside. The appeal is allowed.27
Needless to state that any application for discharge, if preferred by the respondent, will necessarily have to be considered on its own merits in accordance with law without being influenced by the present order."
(Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court observes that the High Court could not have taken upon itself to examine the question whether they were stray plots as it was more a matter for trial. Secondly, the issues with regard to inadequate publication according to the Rules for allotment of plots did form part of the charge sheet which has not been considered by the High Court. Therefore, the impugned order therein which was in favour of accused No.8 comes to be set aside. The later observation is that the accused was entitled to file an application for discharge and if such an application is preferred, it will have to be considered on its merits, in accordance with law, without being influenced by the present order. Therefore, the observations therein were diluted by the Apex Court itself leaving it open to be considered by the concerned Court, if and when an application was preferred by the accused. Therefore, all the accused including the present petitioner preferred applications seeking their 28 discharge from the array of accused in Special Case No.577 of 2021. This comes to be rejected by the concerned Court by the following order:
"ORDER The applications filed by the accused No.1 to 15, 18 to 24 under Sec.227 of Cr.P.C. are hereby dismissed. There are sufficient grounds to frame charges against accused No.1 to 15, 18 to 24 for the offences punishable under Sec. 409 and 420 R/w 120B of IPC and Sec. 13(1)(c) and (d) R/w Sec.13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988."
The Court rejects all the applications except that of accused Nos. 16 and 17 and directs framing of charges against accused Nos. 1 to 15 and 18 to 24 for the afore-quoted offences. The consideration qua the present petitioner by the concerned Court while rejecting the discharge application is found in the following paragraph:
"89. Accused No.5 Sri C.S.Puttaraju, was MLA of Melukote assembly constituency. It is alleged that he conspired with accused No.1 and other members of MUDA and allotted with MUDA site through the MUDA meeting held on 8.9.2009. It is alleged that he has concealed his marital status in the MUDA application form submitted for site allotment. He also concealed the details of MUDA site already allotted in the name of his wife with an intention to get allot the MUDA site in his name."
(Emphasis added) 29 The reasons so rendered to reject the discharge application are as follows:
"108. It is settled principle of law that the essence of a criminal conspiracy is the unlawful combination and ordinarily the offence is complete when the combination is framed and unless the statute so requires, no overt act need be done in furtherance of the conspiracy, and that the object of the combination need not be accomplished, in order to constitute an indictable offence. It is further clear that the Law making conspiracy a crime, is designed to curb immoderate power to do mischief which is gained by a combination of the means. The encouragement and support which co-conspirators give to one another rendering enterprises possible which, if left to individual effort, would have been impossible, furnish the ground for visiting conspirators and abettors with condign punishment. It is further clear that the conspiracy is held to be continued and renewed as to all its members wherever and whenever any member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance of the common design. It is clear that for an offence punishable under Section 120-B, prosecution need not necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agreed to do or cause to be done illegal act; the agreement may be proved by necessary implication. Offence of criminal conspiracy has its foundation in an agreement to commit an offence. A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and an act of each of the parties; promise against promise, actus contra actum, capable of being enforced, if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object or for use of criminal means. It is further clear that in the case of conspiracy there cannot be any direct evidence. The ingredients of offence are that there should be an agreement between persons who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing an illegal act or for doing illegal means an act which itself may not be illegal. Therefore, the allegations reveal that the accused have conspired and colluded together that they have illegally applied for sites of MUDA by concealing their personal details as well as their relation with the Members of MUDA and got allotted 30 sites fraudulently in their name and thereby made unlawful enrichment for themselves and made loss the otherwise eligible general public and thereby committed offences punishable under Section 120B of IPC.
109. On perusal of entire materials on record and the statement of witnesses and the documents relied upon by the prosecution, I am of the opinion that this is not a fit case to discharge the accused No.1 to 15, 18 to
24. Merely because, the police filed 'B' Report in another case, this Court cannot discharge the accused in this case. Therefore, there are sufficient material to frame charges against the accused No.1 to 15, 18 to 24 for the offences punishable under Sec. 409 and 420 R/w 120-B of IPC and Sec.13(1)(c) and (d) R/w Sec.13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Accordingly, I answer point No.1 in the negative."
(Emphasis added) The concerned Court observes that the CBI had filed a 'B' report in another case on the same set of facts, but are now wanting to file a charge sheet in the case at hand. The concerned Court discusses only about criminal conspiracy against the accused. There is no consideration worth the name with regard to the offences under the Act.
18. It is trite law that the Court while answering a discharge application cannot act as a mere post office, but has to apply its mind to the allegations and then proceed to reject the application or 31 direct framing of the charge, as the case would be. Therefore, it becomes apposite to notice Sections 227 and 228 of the Cr.P.C. which deals with discharge of an accused and framing of charges. It reads as follows:
"227. Discharge.--If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing."
Section 227 directs that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record reasons for so doing. The duty of the concerned Court answering an application under Section 227 can by no stretch of imagination be considered to be an empty formality. The words employed in Section 227 are, 'if upon consideration of the record'. Therefore, the Court has to consider the entire record and the documents submitted therewith; the Court has to look into the documents along with the record and after hearing the submissions of the 32 accused and the prosecution arrive at its decision. Therefore, the hearing of both the parties is required. Later, if the judge considers that there is no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused he can do so. Therefore, this is an important step in a proceeding whether the accused is to be discharged or put to trial. Section 228 of the Cr.P.C. assumes certain significance. It reads as follows:
"228. Framing of charge.--(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which--
(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, 139[or any other Judicial Magistrate of the first class and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate] shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report;
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused, and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried."
Section 228 deals with framing of charge. It begins, 'if after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid', as aforesaid would 33 mean the rigour of Section 227. Only if rigour of Section 227 is satisfied, the Judge can proceed on a presumption that the accused have committed the offence and, therefore, proceed to frame the charge. It thus becomes a duty cast upon the concerned Court, hearing the discharge application, to treat an application for discharge with all seriousness, as the Damocles sword hanging on the head of an accused can neither be taken away nor charge can be framed on the said accused. Not for nothing the provision cast a duty upon the concerned Court to answer an application for discharge. It is and has tremendous significance in the stage of criminal proceedings.
19. In the aforesaid circumstance, it becomes apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of KANCHAN KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR1, wherein the Apex Court holds as follows:
"11. The short question arising for consideration is whether the appellant is entitled to be discharged of the proceedings initiated against him under the PC Act.
12. Section 227CrPC relating to discharge is as under:1
(2022)9 SCC 577 34 "227. Discharge.--If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing."
13. The threshold of scrutiny required to adjudicate an application under Section 227CrPC, is to consider the broad probabilities of the case and the total effect of the material on record, including examination of any infirmities appearing in the case. In Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] it was noted that : (SCC p. 9, para 10) "10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the 35 accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial."
(emphasis supplied)
14. In Sajjan Kumar v. CBI [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371] , the Court cautioned against accepting every document produced by the prosecution on face value, and noted that it was important to sift the evidence produced before the Court. It observed that : (SCC pp. 376-77, para 21) "21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:
***
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited 36 purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case."
(emphasis supplied)
15. Summarising the principles on discharge under Section 227CrPC, in Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat [Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 361] , this Court recapitulated : (SCC p. 561, para 23) "23. At the stage of framing the charge in accordance with the principles which have been laid down by this Court, what the court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post office. The court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the sense that the court dons the mantle of the trial Judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after a full-fledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has made out the case for the conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the court must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. The material must be such as can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that the accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must be the suspicion which is premised on some material which commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that the accused has committed the offence."
(emphasis supplied) 37
16. Without getting into too many details, we consider it to be appropriate and in fact sufficient to confine our inquiry to three heads of expenditure indicated in the charge-sheet itself. This limited inquiry will also satisfy the requirements of Section 227CrPC.
17. The first objection pertains to the inclusion of an amount of Rs 55,000, recorded as the balance amount in the appellant's bank account during the check period, and accordingly counted as an expenditure in the charge-sheet. However, the bank passbook filed by the appellant, which was available to the investigating officer and the Special Judge (Vigilance), evidently records a balance amount of only Rs 11,998 during the check period. The difference in the figures was not explained by the prosecution. Accordingly, the Special Judge (Vigilance) and the High Court failed to reconcile such a simple and straightforward inconsistency in the prosecution's evidence. We are of the opinion that only an amount of Rs 11,998, recorded in the appellant's bank passbook during the check period as the balance amount, is validly admissible as expenditure under this head.
18. The second objection relates to the inclusion of an amount of Rs 53,467 as expenditure towards repayment of the loan from BSFC. However, the amount repaid towards loan instalments was already deducted from the appellant's gross salary, and the deducted figure was recorded as the total disposable income with the appellant during the check period. Hence, the loan repayment cannot be separately counted as an expenditure yet again. This is a glaring mistake. The Special Judge (Vigilance) as well as the High Court did not consider this objection on the ground that a roving inquiry is not permissible at the stage of discharge.
19. The third objection relates to the inclusion of Rs 1,58,562 as the value of the articles found during a search conducted in the appellant's house on 21-2-2000, twelve years after the check period of 1974 to 1988. There is nothing to indicate, even prima facie, that these articles 38 found during the search in the year 2000 were acquired during the check period. In the absence of any material to link these articles as having been acquired during the check period, it is impermissible to include their value in the expenditure. We are therefore of the opinion that the appellant's objection about inclusion of this amount in the list of expenditure is fully justified. Unfortunately, even this objection, which did not require much scrutiny of the material on record, was not considered by the Special Judge (Vigilance) or the High Court.
20. The three heads of expenditure discussed hereinabove must be excluded from the appellant's total alleged expenditure during the check period. First, the appellant's actual balance amount reflected in the bank passbook i.e. Rs 11,998, as against the purported account balance of Rs 55,000, must be taken into account. Further, the second and third amounts, as indicated above, must be excluded from the appellant's total expenditure mentioned in the charge-sheet. Accordingly, the total expenditure comes only to Rs 2,69,355, and not Rs 5,24,386, which is based on certain mistakes that we have indicated hereinabove. It is this expenditure of Rs 2,69,355 which is to be contrasted with the income of Rs 3,01,561 during the check period. These facts clearly demonstrate that there is no prima facie case made out by the prosecution and therefore the appellant was entitled to be discharged.
21. The conclusions that we have drawn are based on materials placed before us, which are part of the case record. This is the same record that was available with the Special Judge (Vigilance) when the application under Section 227CrPC was taken up. Despite that, the Special Judge (Vigilance) dismissed the discharge application on the simple ground that a roving inquiry is not permitted at the stage of discharge. What we have undertaken is not a roving inquiry, but a simple and necessary inquiry for a proper adjudication of an application for discharge. The Special Judge (Vigilance) was bound to conduct 39 a similar inquiry for coming to a conclusion that a prima facie case is made out for the appellant to stand trial. Unfortunately, the High Court committed the same mistake as that of the Special Judge (Vigilance)."
(Emphasis supplied) The conclusions drawn by the Apex Court is that they have not undertaken any rowing enquiry. They are considering the very same record that was available with the concerned Court answering an application under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. The Court observes that both the concerned Court and the High Court unfortunately committed the same mistake of not examining any material.
20. The question would be, whether while answering a revision against rejection of an order of discharge this Court can look into all the material, the Apex Court in the case of SANJAY KUMAR RAI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH2 has held that in exercise of revisional power, the High Court should look into the material which has led to rejection of discharge of an accused. The Apex Court has held as follows:
".... .... ... ... 2 2021 SCC OnLine SC 367 40 13. At the outset, we may note that the High
Court has dismissed the Criminal Revision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. The High Court did not examine the issue in detail to find out whether the continuation of proceedings will amount to abuse of process of law in this case. The impugned order cites the decision of this Court in Asian Resurfacing (supra) wherein it was noted as under:--
"...Thus, we declare the law to be that order framing charge is not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 CrPC or Article 227 of the Constitution. However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered. Thus considered, the challenge to an order of charge should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction and not to re-appreciate the matter."
14. It appears to us that while limiting the scope of a criminal revision to jurisdictional errors alone, the High Court apparently under-appreciated the Judgment in Asian Resurfacing (supra). We say so at least for two reasons. First, the material facts in the above-cited case dealt with a challenge to the charges framed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ("POCA"). The cited judgment itself enlightens that not only is POCA a special legislation, but also contains a specific bar under Section 19 against routine exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Second, This Court in Asian Resurfacing (Supra) while expressing concern regarding the need to tackle rampant pendency and delays in our criminal law system, followed the ratio laid down in an earlier decision in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra as can be seen from the following extract:
"27. Thus, even though in dealing with different situations, seemingly conflicting observations may have been made while holding that the order framing charge was interlocutory order and was not liable to be interfered with 41 under Section 397(2) or even under Section 482 CrPC, the principle laid down in Madhu Limaye [Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] still holds the field. Order framing charge may not be held to be purely an interlocutory order and can in a given situation be interfered with under Section 397(2) CrPC or 482 CrPC or Article 227 of the Constitution which is a constitutional provision but the power of the High Court to interfere with an order framing charge and to grant stay is to be exercised only in a exceptional situation."
(emphasis supplied)
15. In Madhu Limaye (supra), this Court authoritatively held:
"9... Sometimes the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court has also been resorted to for the same kind of relief by challenging the order taking cognizance or issuing processes or framing charge on the grounds that the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance and proceed with the trial, that the issuance of process was wholly illegal or void, or that no charge could be framed as no offence was made out on the allegations made or the evidence adduced in Court.
10. ... Even assuming, although we shall presently show that it is not so, that in such a case an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing processes is an interlocutory order, does it stand to reason to say that inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercises for stopping the criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing the accused up to the end? The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial.
(emphasis supplied)
16. The correct position of law as laid down in Madhu Limaye (supra), thus, is that orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither interlocutory nor final in nature and are therefore not affected by the bar of Section 397 (2) of CrPC. That apart, this Court in the above-cited cases has unequivocally 42 acknowledged that the High Court is imbued with inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process or to secure ends of justice having regard to the facts and circumstance of individual cases. As a caveat it may be stated that the High Court, while exercising its afore- stated jurisdiction ought to be circumspect. The discretion vested in the High Court is to be invoked carefully and judiciously for effective and timely administration of criminal justice system. This Court, nonetheless, does not recommend a complete hands off approach. Albeit, there should be interference, may be, in exceptional cases, failing which there is likelihood of serious prejudice to the rights of a citizen. For example, when the contents of a complaint or the other purported material on record is a brazen attempt to persecute an innocent person, it becomes imperative upon the Court to prevent the abuse of process of law.
17. Further, it is well settled that the trial court while considering the discharge application is not to act as a mere post office. The Court has to sift through the evidence in order to find out whether there are sufficient grounds to try the suspect. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, total effect of evidence and documents produced and the basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal5]. Likewise, the Court has sufficient discretion to order further investigation in appropriate cases, if need be.
18. This brings us to the present case wherein the High Court has not gone into the merits of the case and did not analyze the case in light of the settled law referred to above.
19. The High Court has committed jurisdictional error by not entertaining the revision petition on merits and overlooking the fact that 'discharge' is a valuable right provided to the accused. In line with the 43 fact that the High Court and the court below have not examined the fairness of criminal investigation in this case and other related aspects concerning improvement of witness statements, it is necessary for the High Court to reconsider the entire matter and decide the revision petition afresh. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order dated 28.11.2018 and remand the case back to the High Court for its reconsideration in accordance with law."
(Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court observes that the High Court had committed a jurisdictional error by not entertaining the revision petition on merits and overlooking the effect that discharge is an available right provided to the accused. The Apex Court further observes that the trial Court while considering the discharge application cannot act as a mere post office. The Court has to sift through the evidence in order to find out whether there are sufficient grounds to try the suspect. The Court has to consider broad probabilities, total effect of evidence and if the trial Court fails, the High Court should consider it.
21. In the light of the judgments of the Apex Court in KANCHAN KUMAR and SANJAY KUMAR RAI (supra), what becomes unmistakably clear is, that the trial Court has a duty cast 44 upon it to consider the discharge application on its merits by looking into the entire records till that stage. I would deem it appropriate to add the fact that rejection of discharge leads to framing of charge under Section 228 of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, it becomes all the more imperative for the trial Court to consider the application for discharge, as to whether there are sufficient grounds to frame the charge against the accused and not act as a mere post office.
22. If the order of the Court is considered on the bedrock of the principles laid down by the Apex Court supra, what would unmistakably emerge is, blatant non-applicatiion of mind on the part of the concerned Court, as there is not even a whisper of consideration while there are facts absolutely loud in favour of the petitioner. If at all the charge is to be answered, it is to be answered by the Members of the Board who had participated in the proceedings which has led to registration of crime. The admitted fact is that the petitioner has not participated in any of the meetings; the petitioner has not suppressed any of the facts, as the answer given by the petitioner is in accordance with the question 45 and the application is in tune with the notification. There is no abuse of power by the petitioner and as observed hereinabove, he has not participated in any of the proceedings. The allotment of one stray site cannot become an offence of enriching the petitioner with disproportionate assets that he cannot explain or it becomes an abuse of power of the office. All these factors would lead to one unmistakable conclusion that further trial against the petitioner in particular, would become an abuse of the process of law. Though the matter is at the stage of framing of charges and the Apex Court had left all the contentions open in the event the petitioner would prefer an application for discharge, the further proceedings if permitted to continue would result in miscarriage of justice and become an abuse of the process of law.
23. For the aforesaid reasons, I pass the following:
ORDER
(i) Writ Petition is allowed and the order dated 17-01-
2023 passed by the LXXXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge at Bengaluru in Special Case No.577 46 of 2021 stands quashed qua accused No.5, the petitioner herein.
(ii) The application filed by the petitioner under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. for discharge in Spl.C.No.577 of 2021 stands allowed.
(iii) It is made clear that the findings recorded in the present petition are only concerning the petitioner/ accused No.5 and it would not become applicable or binding to any other accused facing trial in the impugned proceedings.
Sd/-
JUDGE bkp CT:SS