Bombay High Court
Shaikh Ayub Chand Alias Ayub Raje vs Maharashtra State Road Transport ... on 7 September, 1994
Equivalent citations: (1997)IIILLJ491BOM
Author: B.N. Srikrishna
Bench: B.N. Srikrishna
JUDGMENT
1. This Writ Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impugns an Order, dated January 28, 1987 made by the Industrial Court, Ahmednagar, in Complaint (ULP) No. 280 of 1986 under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act")
2. The First Respondent is a statutory corporation, which carries on the business of transport of passengers by bus. The Petitioner was employed by First Respondent in the Ahmednagar Division in 1968. He had worked as Artisan A Vehicle Examiner in Shrigonde Depot, in the Ahmednagar Division. The Divisional Controller of the First Respondent is the Competent Authority for carrying out administrative transfers of the staff within the division.
3. The different trade unions representing the workmen employed in different establishments of the First Respondent-Corporation recognised under Chapter III of the Act were given certain facilities. Although the M.S.T. Chalak Vahak Sanghatana also became a recognized union under the Act, in respect of certain establishments, it was not given facilities as were given to the other unions. The Sanghatana moved the same Industrial Court, Pune, seeking all facilities, which were extended to the other Unions. The Industrial Court, Pune, by its interim orders, dated December 7, 1984 and January 28, 1985, directed the First Respondent Corporation to extend all such facilities to the Sanghatana. Consequently, by an Administrative Order dated October 31, 1985, issued by the First Respondent, it was notified that the Sanghatana would also be extended 12 facilities as extended to the other three recognized unions. One of such facilities was "Right of consultation on the issue of transfers of office-bearers". Although, with the other recognized unions the First Respondent had entered into individual agreements for spelling out the different facilities, it appears that, as far as the Sanghatana was concerned, the facilities were referentially extended, without a specific agreement in that behalf. The facility with regard to right of consultation on the issue of transfer of office-bearers, as extended to other recognized unions, was that the number of employees, in respect of whose transfers the concerned recognized union was to be consulted, was fixed at 25 for each administrative unit. Each of the recognized unions was required to notify the names of not more than 25 office-bearers and it was these 25 office-bearers who enjoyed the protection of not being transferred without prior consultation with their unions.
4. The petitioner was elected as a Vice-Presi-dent of the Sanghatana in 1985 and Joint Secretary of the Division in the year 1986. Though there is some dispute about the communication of the Petitioner's name in respect of the year 1985, that need not detain us, as nothing really turns on that. For the year 1986, the Sanghatana had conveyed the names of 30 office-bearers in respect of whom it was claimed that there had to be prior consultation with the Sanghatana before they could be transferred. The First Respondent-Corporation objected to it and pointed out that the number could not exceed 25. Despite the objection of the Corporation, the Sanghatana failed to give a modified list of 25 names of office-bearers. In these circumstances, the First Respondent transferred the Petitioner, without prior consultation. It is this transfer which was impugned as being an unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act by the complaint filed by the Petitioner before the Industrial Court.
5. With the help of Ms. Sarnaik, learned Advocate appearing for the Petitioner, I have gone through the impugned Order of the Industrial Court, and I find myself in agreement with the reasoning of the learned Judge of the Industrial Court. It is not disputed that there was no independent agreement between the First Respondent and the Sanghatana on the issue of prior consultation before transfer of office-bearers. All that happened was that the facilities made available to the other recognized unions under their respective agreements, were extended to the Sanghatana, by virtue of the Orders of the Industrial Court and the Administrative Order, dated October 31, 1985. The learned Judge of the Industrial Court has rightly analysed in detail the agreements between the First Respondent and the other recognized unions in order to understand the mechanics of the protection to office-bearers before transfer. The Industrial Court correctly came to the conclusion that the procedure was that not more than 25 names of office-bearers had to be forwarded by each recognised union in each year, and that in respect of those 25 office-bearers whose names were conveyed, there would be prior consultation before they were transferred within the division. In these circumstances, the Industrial Court had no difficulty in holding that, because the Sanghatana did not respond to the objections raised by First Respondent and did not prune down the list of office-bearers from 30 to 25, it could not be said that the First Respondent had indulged in an unfair labour practice, by transferring the petitioned, without prior consultation with the Sanghatana. It cannot be forgotten that the Petitioner was alleging an unfair labour practice against the First Respondent-Corporation. Considering the nature of the consequences from a finding of unfair labour practice, it would be necessary to strictly construe the allegations and the terms of agreement alleged to have been breached. If, in these circumstances, the Industrial Court took the view that there was no failure to implement the terms of the agreement, so as to amount to an unfair labour practice within Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act, no fault can be found with its reasoning. There is no ground to interfere with the order. The Petition is without merits, and, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.
6. Petition dismissed. Rule discharged. Interim orders vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.