Madhya Pradesh High Court
State Of M.P. vs Rajeev Jain on 20 August, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2001(4)MPHT58
ORDER N.K. Jain, J.
1. All these revisions (No. 630/1998, 18/1999 and 22/1999) arise out of the order dated 25-8-1998, passed by Special Judge, Ujjain, in Special Case No. 8/1996, discharging accused Rajeev Jain (the respondent here in Criminal Revision No. 630/1998) and two others of the charge under Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, while directing framing of charges against other co-accused persons (the applicants here in Criminal Revisional Nos. 18/1999 and 22/1999), for the said offences with the aid of Sections 109 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. For the sake of convenience all these persons shall hereafter be referred as "accused person(s)". Criminal Revision No. 630/1998 is preferred by the State challenging discharge of accused Rajeev Jain, while Criminal Revision Nos. 18/1999 and 22/1999 are preferred by other co-accused persons against the charges framed against them. All these revisions have been heard as connected matters and are being disposed of by this common order.
2. Factual matrix of the case lies in a narrow compass. Accused Rajeev Jain at the relevant time was the Collector Stamps appointed under the provision of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (for short, 'the Act'). Other accused persons are sellers and purchasers of certain immovable properties which were sold/purchased under five different sale deeds dated 27-12-1988, 16-2-1989, 5-7-1989, 12-8-1989 and 28-8-1991. All these sale deeds were registered under the Indian Registration Act at the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Ujjain. The Sub-Registrar, Ujjain, vide his orders dated 7-7-1989 and 14-9-1989, purporting to act under Section 47A (M.P. Amendment), referred all the aforesaid sale-deeds to the Collector Stamps, Ujjain, for determination of market value of the property in question and the proper duty payable thereon. Accused Rajeev Jain, the then Collector Stamps Ujjain, after giving the parties an opportunity of hearing and after holding enquiry (evidence was also taken), passed orders dated 3-3-1992 and 10-6-1992 thereby determining the market value of the said property which was slightly higher than the one disclosed in the sale-deeds but lesser than the one suggested by the Sub-Registrar. It appears that some complaint was made against accused Rajeev Jain to the Lok Ayukta, M.P., Bhopal, which led to some enquiry into the matter and ultimately a crime was registered by Special Police Establishment and after investigation charge sheet was filed against the accused persons before the Special Court, Ujjain, for trial under Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Sections 109 and 120B of IPC.
3. The Court below after hearing parties and on consideration of the evidentiary material filed with the charge sheet passed the impugned order as aforesaid thus giving rise to these revisions.
4. I have heard Sarvashri H.S. Uberoi, Mahcndra Jain & Piyush Mathur learned counsel for accused persons; and, Shri Girish Desai, learned Deputy Advocate General for State.
5. Taking the case of accused Rajeev Jain first, order for his discharge is recorded by the Trial Judge mainly on the ground that his prosecution is barred under the provisions of Judicial Officers' Protection Act, 1850 and Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Shri Girish Dcsai, learned Deputy Advocate General, however, contended that the Collector Stamps is only an Administrative Officer though entrusted to perform certain quasi judicial functions but he is not a Judicial Officer or a Judge within the meaning of the aforesaid tow Acts of 1850 and 1985.
6. The Judicial Officer's Protection Act, 1850 protects Judicial Officers against being sued in any Civil Court for official acts done or orders passed by them in good faith. Under Section 1 of the Act, not only a Judge, Magistrate or Justice of Peace, a Collector or other person acting judicially arc also protected against such civil action. The Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 goes a step ahead and provides additional protection to Judges against any civil or criminal proceeding against them for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by them when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in discharge of their official or judicial duty or function. It is relevant here to read definition of expression "Judge" given in Section 2, as follows :
2. Definition.-- In this Act, "Judge" means not only every person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also every person-
(a) who is empowered by law to give in any legal proceeding a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive; or
(b) .....
7. It will be thus seen that every person who is required by law to give in any legal proceeding a judgment is a Judge notwithstanding whether or not he is officially designated as a Judge. The legal position on the point is made luculent by the Supreme Court in S.P. God, (1996) 1 SCC 573, wherein the Apex Court dealing with the provisions of the Judicial Officers' (Protection) Act, 1850, vis-a-vis the Collector Stamps, clearly held :
"Since 'Collector' has been specifically mentioned along with Judges, Magistrates and Justices of Peace in the Judicial Officers' (Protection) Act, 1850, it is obvious that immunity from legal action contemplated by this Act will also be available to him."
High Court of Kerala in C.V. Sankara Pillai, 1991 (1) Kerala Law Journal 418 has held that provisions of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 arc applicable to the Assessing Authority acting under the Kerala Building Tax Act.
8. In the instant case the basis for prosecution of the accused persons are the two Orders dated 3-3-1992 and 10-6-1992 passed by accused Rajcev Jain in his capacity as the Collector Stamps whereby he has passed a definitive judgment as to the market value of the properties covered by the said five sale deeds. It is significant to note here that no appeal was preferred by the Department against those Orders as provided under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 47-A. The orders, therefore, attained finality as provided under sub-section (8). The case against accused Rajeev Jain, therefore, squarely fell within the purview of the Act of 1850 and Act of 1985 and no civil or criminal action could be maintained against him in view of the bar contained in these statutes. Under the common law also, ever since 1613, if not before, it has been accepted that no action is maintainable against a Judge for anything said or done by him in exercise of a jurisdiction which belongs to him. The words he speaks arc protected by an absolute privileges. It was well stated by Lord Tcntcrden C.J. in Gamett Vs. Ferrand, (1827) 6 B & C 611 :
"This freedom from action and question at the suit of an individual is given by the law to the Judges, not so much for their own sake as for the sake of the public, and for the advancement of justice, that being free from actions, they may be free in thought and inde-
pendent in judgment, as all who are to administer justice ought to be." (Excerpts from "The Due Process of Law' by Lord Denning).
Needless to say that these words apply not only to Judges of the superior Courts but to Judges of all ranks high or low, as provided under the aforesaid two Acts of 1850 and 1985.
9. Of course, it" the Judge has accepted bribes or been in the least degree corrupt, or has perverted the course of justice, he can certainly be prosecuted and punished in Criminal Courts. However, in the instant case, there is not even an iota of evidence beyond the said two Orders passed by accused Collector to show that he accepted any bribe or been in the least degree corrupt. The prosecuting agency cannot be allowed to sit in judgment over the orders passed on judicial or quasi-judicial side by a Judge. May be that the accused Collector has mistaken even grossly mistaken, yet he acted judicially and for that reason no action shall lie against him. The wrong, if any, committed by him could be corrected in appeal. That cannot always form a basis for initiating criminal proceedings against him while he is acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial authority. It must be kept in mind that he being a quasi-judicial authority he is always subjected to judicial supervision in appeal or by the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution [see : Zunjarrao, (1999) 7 SCC 409]. The prosecution against him should, therefore, fail on merit also.
10. As regards other accused persons, since no prosecution is maintainable against principal accused Rajeev Jain, these other accused persons cannot be prosecuted by taking recourse to Section 109 or 120B of IPC (see : B.H. Narasimha Rao, AIR 1996 SC 64). These other accused persons arc non-public servants. They can be prosecuted for abetment of the offence under Section 13 of the Act only along with the public servant concerned, [sec : (1999) 6 SCC 559], The charges framed against them are also, therefore, liable to be quashed.
11. In the result while I dismiss State's revision (No. 630/1998), allow revisions (No. 18/1999 and 22/1999) filed by other accused persons and set aside the order framing charges against them. They along with co-accused Rajeev Jain shall stand discharged.
12. This order be retained in Criminal Revision No. 630/1998 and a copy each be placed in Criminal Revision Nos. 18/1999 and 22/1999.
13. Criminal Revision No. 630/98 dismissed. Criminal Revision Nos. 18 & 22 of 99 allowed.