Delhi District Court
In Reference vs Sushila Khanna on 28 February, 2023
IN THE COURT OF SH. PRITU RAJ: CIVIL JUDGE : NORTH
DISTRICT, ROHINI COURTS : DELHI
Suit No. 34626/16
CNR no. DLNT03-000035-2010
In reference:
Yogesh Chawla
s/o Lt. Sh. Satish Chawla
r/o B-1/56, Ashok Vihar Phase-II,
Delhi-110052 ........... Plaintiff
VERSUS
1. Sushila Khanna
w/o Sh. Inder Bhan
r/o A-14, Ambey Garden,
Libaspur, Delhi.
2. Gaon Sabha
Libaspur, Delhi. ........... Defendants
For the Plaintiff : Sh. Kanwar H.S.
For the Defendant-1 : Sh. Rakesh Beniwal
For the Defendant-2 : Sh. Alok Dev
Date of Institution : 26.06.2010
Date of reservation of Judgment : 14.02.2023
Date of Judgment : 28.02.2023
CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 1 of 19
JUDGMENT
1. Vide this judgment, I will dispose of the suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendants seeking the reliefs as contained in the prayer clause of the plaint.
FACTS AS PER THE PLAINT :
2. The case of the plaintiff as per plaint in brief is that plaintiff claims himself to be the absolute owner of part of property bearing plot no 68/69, measuring 500 Sq. yards consisting of three rooms, one servant quarter, located in KH no. 24/16, Block B, Ambe Garden Extn, Delhi [hereinafter called suit property] having bought the same from one Sh. Vikas Sharma by virtue of registered GPA and other documents. It is the further case of the plaintiff that after purchasing the suit property, he installed an iron gate in order to safeguard the property. He further claims that on 02.06.2010, he received a telephonic call that someone is trying to grab his plot consequent to which, he along with his son-in-law reached the site and saw that the lock of the main gate had been broken by some unknown person and two unknown persons were getting some work carried out by labourers. The Plaintiff claims that he called the local police who despite assurance, did not take any steps to avoid the illegal grabbing of the property and consequently, a written complaint was moved by the Plaintiff before the concerned police station upon which, the police made CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 2 of 19 an inquiry and found one lady by the name of Smt. Sushila Khanna, who claimed herself to be the owner of the property. The Plaintiff further claims that on 06.06.2010, the Defendant-1 came to the suit property along with one Rambir who threatened him with dire consequences and took the photograph of the Plaintiff and his family members. Similarly, on 08.06.2010, D- 1 and her associates again tried to grab the suit property and upon objection being raised by the Plaintiff, he was thrashed by the unscrupulous elements who warned him of dire consequences if he interfered in their work. The Plaintiff further claims that on 14.06.2010, Plaintiff contacted his counsel and narrated the whole facts, leading to the present suit.
PRAYER:
3. Following relief has been sought on behalf of the plaintiff in the plaint:
(a) That decree of permanent injunction be passed in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant / her agents / employees / servants etc. from interfering in the peaceful possession and forcibly grabbing the suit property.
(b) Relief. DEFENCE :-
4. Defendant no. 1 filed her written Statement on 03.11.2010, wherein the Defendant claimed herself to be the owner and in possession of the suit property since 19.04.1989, having bought CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 3 of 19 the same from Sh. Rajdeep Yadav, and accused the Plaintiff of projecting a false story with an intention to grab the suit property. Other objections like the non existence of cause of action and the lack of locus standi of the Plaintiff to file the suit were also taken / raised.
5. Gaon Sabha Libaspur was impleaded as the Defendant-2 on 16.08.2018. However, despite multiple opportunities, the said Defendant failed to file the WS and accordingly, its defence was struck off vide order dated 07.01.2019.
REPLICATION:-
6. In the replication filed by the plaintiff, the contentions of the defendants have been denied in toto and the averments made in the plaint have been reiterated and reaffirmed.
ISSUES:-
7. After completion of pleadings, vide order dated 01.03.2011 following issues were framed:-
(1) Whether Plaintiff is entitled for decree of permanent injunction, as prayed for? OPP.
(2) Any other relief.
DOCUMENTS & EVIDENCE:-
8. In support of his case, the Plaintiff examined four witnesses and PE was closed vide order dated 01.06.2015.CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 4 of 19
9. The Defendant examined eight witnesses in support his case and DE was closed vide order dated 15.07.2019.
10.Final arguments were not advanced by the parties despite opportunities. Accordingly, their right to lead final arguments was closed and matter was taken up for orders vide order dated 14.02.2023.
FINDINGS OF THE COURT:-
11.Before embarking to decide the present case, it would be appro-
priate to reiterate the burden of proof required to be discharged in civil proceedings. As laid down in Postgraduate Institute of Medical Education and Research v. Jaspal Singh, (2009) 7 SCC 330, the burden which ought to be discharged in civil pro- ceedings in not as strict as in criminal cases and in order for any party to succeed, he/it is required to prove his/its case on the preponderance of probabilities. The relevant portion of the aforesaid pronouncement is hereby produced here for the sake of brevity:
It has been held that there is a marked difference as to the effect of evidence, namely, the proof, in civil and criminal proceedings. In civil proceedings, a mere pre- ponderance of probability is sufficient, and the defendant is not necessarily entitled to the benefit of every reason- able doubt; but in criminal proceedings, the persuasion of guilt must amount to such a moral certainty as con-CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 5 of 19
vinces the mind of the court, as a reasonable man, be- yond all reasonable doubt."
12.Further, Section 101 of the Evidence Act, 1872 [hereinafter called 'IEA'] defines " burden of proof" and laid down that the burden of proving a fact always lying upon the person who as-
serts the facts. Until such burden is discharged, the other party is not required to be called upon to prove his case. The court has to examine as to whether the person upon whom the burden lies has been able to discharge his burden. Until he arrives at such conclusion, he cannot proceed on the basis of weakness of other party. In view of Section 103 of IEA, the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lied on any particular person. Further, Section 58 of the IEA states that no fact need to be proved in any proceedings which parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the herein, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands or which by any rule of pleadings enforce at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings.
13.Having determined the burden of proof required to be dis-
charged in civil cases, this court will now proceed to give an is- sue wise findings as per the issues framed on 01.13.2011, as fol- lows:-
CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 6 of 19Issue no. 1 (1) Whether Plaintiff is entitled for a decree of permanent injunction, as prayed for? OPP.
14.Only one issue was framed in the present case. The burden of proving this issue was placed upon the Plaintiff.
IDENTITY OF THE SUIT PROPERTY:
15. Before proceeding any further, this Court deems it appropriate to deal with the identification of the suit property for which, the present suit has been filed. It is settled law that in suits pertaining to immovable properties, it is mandatory upon the Plaintiff to include in his plaint a description of the suit property sufficient to identify it, as reiterated in Order VII R 3 CPC. The failure of the Plaintiff to include description sufficient to identify the suit property would be fatal for his case, as reiterated in Bandhu Das Vs. Uttam Chand Patnaik AIR 2007 ORI 24. The relevant portion is being reproduced below for the sake of brevity:
"A bare reading of the above provision makes it is crystal clear that what exactly the land or the area over which the dispute exists is a question which goes into the root of the matter relating to subsistence of the case. In absence of such description in the plaint or supply of the map by an- nexing the same to the plaint and the evidence to the above effect, no Court would pass a decree, as such a decree would be in executable or would be rendered otiose. Even if the Court finds that the plaintiff had title and possession in CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 7 of 19 respect of the suit land, in absence of proper description, as mentioned in Order 7 Rule 3, C.P.C., the decree cannot be executed."
16. Further, as regards description of the suit property, it is also a trite law that the suit property can be identified not only by survey numbers, but has to be looked into is whether the description of the immovable property given by the Plaintiff is sufficient to identify the same. The said proposition of law has been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in Subhaga and Ors. Vs. Shobha and Ors (2006) 5SCC 466 and reiterated by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Azad Singh Vs. Priya Vart Tyagi 2022 SCC Online DEL 3311. The relevant portion is being reproduced below for the sake of brevity:
23. Order VII Rule 3 of the CPC does not require, any particular plot number to be provided in a plaint, with re-
spect to the property forming subject matter thereof. Pro- viding of a no. with respect to the suit property is needed only where the property can be identified by boundaries or numbers in a record of settlement or survey. In respect of property which cannot be so identified, there is no re- quirement, in Order VII Rule 3, for the property to be identified by boundaries or numbers. The only mandate of Order VII Rule 3 is that the plaint should contain a de- scription of the property sufficient to identify it.
17.Having reiterated the law regarding identification of suit property in cases involving immovable property, this Court will now proceed to look into the description of the suit property in the present suit, as furnished by the Plaintiff, and whether the Defendants have sought to defend the suit qua the same CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 8 of 19 immovable property. While the Plaintiff has claimed himself to be the owner and in possession of plot no. 68 and 69, measuring 500 sq. yds, consisting of three rooms, one servant quarter located at Khasra no. 24/16, block B, Ambe Garden Extn, Delhi within the area of village Libaspur and has also stated that the said property is surrounded on four sides, as per the description contained in para 1 of the plaint, the Defendant-1 in her WS has claimed herself to be the owner and in possession of property bearing no. A-14, Ambe Garden, Libaspur, Delhi-42, measuring 700 sq. yds (out of total measurement 1000 sq yds) located in khasra no. 24/15-16, located in Aabadi of colony known as Ambe Garden (Village Libaspur), Delhi-42, as stated in para 2 and para 4 of her written statement. What emerges from the above situation is that even though the Defendant-1 has denied the claims of the Plaintiff, the said denial is not as regards the suit property mentioned by the Plaintiff in his plaint but the denial is as regards to some totally different property. The said variance becomes more accentuated in light of the fact that while the area of the property for which the Plaintiff has filed the present suit is 500 sq yds, the property qua which Defendant-1 is defending the suit is 700 sq yds. Moreover, while the property stated by the Plaintiff, in his plaint, lies in khasra no. 24/16, the property for which the Defendant has filed the WS is located in Khasra no. 24/15-16. To this effect, no evidence whatsoever, was adduced by the Defendant-1. Moreover, no site plan was filed by her to dispute the identity of CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 9 of 19 the suit property as stated by the Plaintiff. The perusal of the documents relied upon by D-1 to show and claim ownership of the property, which according to her belongs to her, shows that the boundaries of the said property are totally different to the one claimed by the Plaintiff by way of the impugned suit.
18.Even otherwise, a perusal of the cross examination of DW-1, i.e., D-1, shows that D-1 has admitted that some of the properties located in the locality are having the same identification numbers. In light of the clear admission of the Defendant-1, she was required to lead evidence or produced material in support of her contentions that the suit property for which the present suit has been filed is the same property for on which she claims ownership. However, no such evidence or material was adduced by D-1. In fact, D-2, Mr. Gulshan, also categorically admitted in his cross examination that he being the son of D-1, has nothing to do with plot no. 68/69, located in khasra no. 24/16, which is the suit property claimed by the Plaintiff. Hence, it becomes apparently clear, in light of the aforesaid discussion, that the property for which the present suit has been filed is not the one qua which the Defendant-1 is claiming ownership. Therefore, the axiomatic conclusion which follows is that the defence of the Defendant-1 raised in the present suit in the present suit is not in any way beneficial to her since the conclusion which follows from the pleadings of both the parties is that the averments of the Plaintiff in the plaint CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 10 of 19 have effectively gone unrebutted since the same has not been denied by D-1 in her WS on account of the fact that the suit property for which the present suit has been filed by the Plaintiff is not the same for which the Defendant has presented her defence and the suit is liable to be decreed on this ground alone.
19.What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is the irrefutable conclusion that the property for which the present suit has been filed by the Plaintiff is different from the property qua which, WS has been filed by Defendant-1. It is settled law that the Plaintiff is the dominus litius of the suit and the Defendant has to defend the suit filed by the Plaintiff except certain instances wherein a counter claim or set off has been claimed by the Defendant, something which has not been done in the present case.
20.Now coming to the relief of permanent injunction which has been sought by the Plaintiff by way of present suit qua the suit property as mentioned in para 1 of his plaint on the basis that he is the absolute owner as well as in possession of the same, this Court will now proceed to examine the aforesaid twin bases on which the Plaintiff has brought the present suit one by one.
21.As regards the first bases of ownership of the suit property, the Plaintiff has stated that he had bought the suit property through CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 11 of 19 a chain of documents starting from Indraj, who sold it to Nathan Singh and who subsequently sold it to Motia Devi, who subsequently sold it to Daulat Ram, who subsequently sold it to Mohan Lal, who subsequently sold it to Vikas Sharma and who ultimately sold it to the Plaintiff and hence, the Plaintiff has claimed ownership of the suit property. While the aforesaid chain of documents does seem to be genuine in the first place, a closer scrutiny of the chain of documents shows that the transaction from the alleged erstwhile owner Daulat Ram to Mohan Lal by way of agreement to sell, undertaking, affidavit etc. was done on 21.04.2001, the stamp papers for the same were bought on 23.04.2001. The said fact has also been admitted by the Plaintiff, i.e., PW-1 in his cross examination dated 03.11.2011 wherein he had sought to justify the same on the basis that the draft might have been prepared two or three days in advance, a situation which is clearly untennable for it fails to appeal to reason that a draft can be prepared in the past on a stamp paper which is bought in the future. Even otherwise, it is settled law that documents like agreement to sell / undertaking affidavit etc. do not confer ownership. Reliance in this regard is placed on the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in Suraj Lamp's wherein it was held as follows:
"Scope of an Agreement of sale
11. Section 54 of TP Act makes it clear that a contract of sale, that is, an agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam and Anr. (1977) 3 SCC 247, observed:CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 12 of 19
A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in, or charge on, the property. This is expressly declared in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. See Rambaran Prosad v. Ram Mohit Hazra [1967]1 SCR
293. The fiduciary character of the personal obligation created by a contract for sale is recognised in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal obligation created by a contract of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Prop-
erty Act as an obligation arising out of contract and an- nexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein." In India, the word `trans- fer' is defined with reference to the word `convey'. The word `conveys' in section 5 of Transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying ownership... ...that only on execution of conveyance ownership passes from one party to another...."
In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra [2004 (8) SCC 614] this Court held:
"Protection provided under Section 53A of the Act to the proposed transferee is a shield only against the transferor. It disentitles the transferor from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferee who is put in possession in pur- suance to such an agreement. It has nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed transferor who remains full owner of the property till it is legally conveyed by execut- ing a registered sale deed in favour of the transferee. Such a right to protect possession against the proposed vendor cannot be pressed in service against a third party."
It is thus clear that a transfer of immoveable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immoveable property can be transferred.
12. Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of sections 54 and 55 of TP Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited right granted CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 13 of 19 under section 53A of TP Act). According to TP Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of TP Act en- acts that sale of immoveable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale does not create any interest or charge on its subject matter.
Scope of Power of Attorney
13. A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable prop- erty. The power of attorney is creation of an agency whereby the grantor authorizes the grantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor, which when exe- cuted will be binding on the grantor as if done by him (see section 1A and section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882). It is revocable or terminable at any time unless it is made irrevocable in a manner known to law. Even an ir- revocable attorney does not have the effect of transferring title to the grantee. In State of Rajasthan vs. Basant Ne- hata - 2005 (12) SCC 77, this Court held :
"A grant of power of attorney is essentially governed by Chapter X of the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of power of attorney, an agent is formally appointed to act for the principal in one transaction or a series of transac- tions or to manage the affairs of the principal generally conferring necessary authority upon another person. A deed of power of attorney is executed by the principal in favour of the agent. The agent derives a right to use his name and all acts, deeds and things done by him and sub- ject to the limitations contained in the said deed, the same shall be read as if done by the donor. A power of attorney is, as is well known, a document of convenience. Execution of a power of attorney in terms of the provisions of the Contract Act as also the Powers-of-Attorney Act is valid. A power of attorney, we have noticed hereinbefore, is executed by the donor so as to enable the donee to act on his behalf. Except in cases where power of attorney is coupled with interest, it is revocable. The donee in exer- cise of his power under such power of attorney only acts CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 14 of 19 in place of the donor subject of course to the powers granted to him by reason thereof. He cannot use the power of attorney for his own benefit. He acts in a fiduciary ca- pacity. Any act of infidelity or breach of trust is a matter between the donor and the donee."
An attorney holder may however execute a deed of con- veyance in exercise of the power granted under the power of attorney and convey title on behalf of the grantor.
Scope of Will
14. A will is the testament of the testator. It is a posthu- mous disposition of the estate of the testator directing dis- tribution of his estate upon his death. It is not a transfer inter vivos. The two essential characteristics of a will are that it is intended to come into effect only after the death of the testator and is revocable at any time during the life time of the testator. It is said that so long as the testator is alive, a will is not be worth the paper on which it is writ- ten, as the testator can at any time revoke it. If the testator, who is not married, marries after making the will, by op- eration of law, the will stands revoked. (see sections 69 and 70 of Indian Succession Act, 1925).
Registration of a will does not make it any more effec- tive."
22.Therefore, in light of the above stated observations, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Plaintiffs claim to injunction on the basis of ownership of the suit property cannot be sustained.
23. However, the Plaintiff has also claimed himself to be in possession of the suit property. It is settled law that possession is nine/tenths of ownership and it is equally settled law that possession of anyone, even a tresspasser, has to be protected CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 15 of 19 unless a better title is shown by the competing / objecting party. Reliance in this regard is placed on decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in P. Subramanium Vs. R. Pannerselvam (2021) 3SCC 675 wherein it was held as follows:
"23. The High Court was also right in its view that it is a common principle of law that even trespasser, who is in es- tablished possession of the property could obtain injunction. However, the matter would be different, if the plaintiff him- self elaborates in the plaint about title dispute and fails to make a prayer for declaration of title along with injunction relief. The High Court has rightly observed that a bare pe- rusal of the plaint would demonstrate that the plaintiff has not narrated anything about the title dispute obviously be- cause of the fact that in the previous litigation, DW 1 failed to obtain any relief. The High Court has rightly observed that the principle that the plaintiff cannot seek for a bare permanent injunction without seeking a prayer for declara- tion is not applicable to the facts of the present case.
24. We may also refer to judgment of this Court in Nair Ser- vice Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander [Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165] , where a three- Judge Bench of this Court presided by Hidayatullah, J. has reiterated the principle that possession is good against all but the true owner. The principle enumerated in judgment of Judicial Committee in Perry v. Clissold [Perry v. Clissold, 1907 AC 73 (PC)] , was noticed in para 17 to the following effect : (Nair Service Society Ltd. case [Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165] , AIR pp. 1173-
174) "17. In our judgment this involves an incorrect approach to our problem. To express our meaning we may begin by reading Perry v. Clissold [Perry v. Clissold, 1907 AC 73 (PC)] , to discover if the principle that possession is good against all but the true owner has in any way been departed from. Perry v. Clissold [Perry v. Clissold, 1907 AC 73 (PC)] reaffirmed the principle by stating quite clearly : (AC p. 79) 'It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 16 of 19 the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the right-
ful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provi- sions of the Statute of Limitations applicable to the case, his right is for ever extinguished, and the possessory owner ac- quires an absolute title."
24. In the present case, as discussed above, the Defendant-1 is fundamentally at variance with the Plaintiff regarding the identity of the suit property and no evidence whatsoever, has been adduced by her to prove that the identity of the suit property as claimed by the Plaintiff and the Defendant are the same. To the contrary, while the Plaintiff has alleged to be in possession of the suit property and has produced corroborating evidence by way of an electricity bill, i.e., Ex. PW-1/4 wherein he has been shown to be in possession of the suit property, i.e., plot no. 68/69, Block B, Khasra no. 24/16, Libaspur, Delhi-42. No evidence to rebut the same has been adduced by the Defendant. Accordingly, this Court has no hesitancy in holding that the Plaintiff has been able to prove possession of the suit property. Hence, as discussed above, a person who is in possession of a suit property is liable to succeed against anyone who is unable to show a better title than such person and since the Defendant has failed to prove a better title than that of the Plaintiff, the suit of the Plaintiff succeeds on the ground that he has been in possession of the suit property, albeit not on the ground of ownership, as discussed above.
CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 17 of 1925. At this stage, it would be prudent to point out that D-2, though impleaded as a party on 16.08.2018, failed to file any written statement which led to its defence being struck off, as stated in order dated 07.01.2019. Therefore, effectively, no defence whatsoever, was put forward by D-2 in the present case despite multiple opportunities nor was any application filed on its behalf for the cross examination of the witnesses of the Plaintiff. It is settled law that in cases where the Defendant is either proceeded ex parte or no written statement has been filed by him, it can be presumed that the said Defendant did not have any effective defence to put forth. The said position of law has been duly laid down in Order VIII R 5 (2) CPC which expressly states that in cases where the Defendant has not filed any pleading, it would be lawful to pronounce judgment on the basis of facts averred in the plaint, except the exceptions as mentioned therein, which in the considered opinion of this Court is not attracted in the present case. Therefore, the mere filing of written arguments on behalf of the defendant-2, sans any WS, would not in any way further the version sought to be advanced by Defendant-2.
Relief :-
26. In view of the aforesaid observations, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Plaintiff has been able to prove his possession qua the suit property and the Defendant-1 has not been able to prove a better title upon the suit property, as CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 18 of 19 mentioned by the Plaintiff in para 1 of his plaint. The suit is accordingly decreed in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants and the Defendants are hereby permanently injuncted / restrained from interfering in the peaceful possession of the Plaintiff as regards the suit property or grabbing the suit property.
27.In view of the factual matrix of the case, no order as to costs is being made.
28.Decree Sheet be prepared accordingly.
29. File be consigned to the record room after necessary compliance.
ANNOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 28.02.2023 (PRITU RAJ) CIVIL JUDGE (NORTH) ROHINI/DELHI/28.02.2023 CSJ 34626/16 Yogesh Chawla Vs. Sushila Khanna and Anr. Page 19 of 19