Punjab-Haryana High Court
D.M. Kaushik vs Graduate Gas Service And Ors. on 18 November, 1977
Equivalent citations: AIR 1978 PUNJAB AND HARYANA 213, 1978 REV LR 77, ILR (1978) 1 PUNJHAR AND HAR 278, 80 PUN LR 182
ORDER
1. The controversy is centred on the true scope and ambit of S. 17 of the Court--fees Act, 1870(hereinafter called the Act). The said provision is reproduced below:
"Multifarious suits:--Where a suit embraces two or more distinct subjects, the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees to which the plaints or memoranda of appeal in suits embracing separately each of such subjects would be liable under this Act.
Nothing in the former part of this section shall be deemed to affect the power conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure, S. 9."
It is conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that if the suit filed by the petitioner is covered by S. 17, the impugned order by the learned subordinate Judge dated Oct. 10, 1974, has to be upheld. In order to appreciate the contention, the facts, in brief, may be adverted to.
2. D. M. Kaushik, petitioner and his wife, respondent No. 6, Shrimati Samyukta Kaushik, his mother (now deceased) and Shrimati Ram Piari, respondent No. 7, his aunt, were living in his house at Amritsar. On May 6, 1972, respondent No. 1 supplied them a gas cylinder was defective and was leaking before the same was installed by Ajit Ram. As a result of mishandling by Ajit Ram, gas from the same got leaked and caught fire and set the whole room ablaze. As a consequence, the petitioner, his wife, mother and the aunt suffered serious burns and the mother Samyukta Kaushik died in the hospital as a result of those burns. The suit for damages out of which this revision petition has arisen, was filed for a total sum of Rs. 55,200/-. The petitioner himself claimed Rs. 22,000/-, his wife respondent No. 6, claimed Rs. 10,700/-and his aunt Ram Piari, respondent No. 7, claimed Rs. 12,000/-. Two sons and four daughters of Samyukta Kaushik, the mother of the petitioner, claimed Rs. 10,500/-on account of expenses incurred for the deceased and mental injury and torture suffered by her. The suit was filed against the gas distributor, defendant No. 1, defendants Nos. 2 to 4 as partners and defendant No. 5 as the gas manufacturer. The defendants-respondents in their written statements raised a number of preliminary objections. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:
1. Whether the suit is properly valued for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction?
2. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of parties and causes of action?
3. Whether the plaint does not show any cause of action?
Issues Nos. 2 and 3 were decided in favour of the plaintiffs. On issue NO. 1, it has been held that the suit is covered by S. 17 of the Act inasmuch as the different plaintiffs have claimed different amounts of damages on account of the injuries sustained by some of the plaintiffs themselves as well as on account of the injuries sustained by the mother. It was held that the separate claims were "distinct subjects" as envisaged under S. 17 of the Act, and arose out of different causes of action and, therefore Court--fee should have been paid at different amounts of claims as prayed for by the several plaintiffs and not on the total claim of Rs. 55,000/-. As a consequence, it was held that the plaint had been undervalued for the purpose of Court--fee and more Court--fee was payable. In this revision petition, this finding and the interpretation of S. 17, has been challenged.
3. A close perusal of S. 17 shows that if in a particular suit two or more "distinct subjects" are included, then Court fee has to be assessed and paid on each subject separately and the total amount of Court fee will be equivalent to the aggregate of the amount of fees for each such subject. The expression "subject" in this provision has not been defined in this Act. However, as the right to file a suit is intimately connected with the accrual of the cause of action, obviously, the word "subjects" in S. 17 has to be interpreted in the background of the cause of action. In S. 7 of the Act, where principles of court fee have been laid for various categories of suits, the expression "subjects", has not been used. Therefore, the contention that Ss. 7 and 17 should be read together will not be a proper approach to interpret the provisions of S. 17.
4. In Nauratan Lal v. Wilford Joseph Stephenson, AIR 1922 Pat 359, a suit for the recovery of possession of land, for malikana as well as for mesne profits was filed. The plaintiff computed the Court fee on the total amount of the three items. The trial Court held that three items. The trial Court held that S. 17 was applicable and Court fee should be paid on three items separately. The Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the said case after considering all the previous decisions held that the word "subjects" in S. 17 meant "cause of action" and that the Court fee as paid by the plaintiff had been correctly assessed.
5. In Ramadhin Singh v. Bainjath Prasad Singh, AIR 1943 Pat 355, a contrary view was taken. Therein, a suit was filed by several plaintiffs for the recovery of malikana from a number of defendants. According to the averments in the plaint, there was specific mention of shares amounts different plaintiffs. Plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 10 formed one set, plaintiff No. 11 formed another set by himself and plaintiffs Nos. 12 and 13 formed third set, but in the prayer clause, a total amount was claimed on behalf of all the 13 plaintiffs. The learned single judge held (at p. 355):--
"I have no doubt the Court of the first instance was correct in accepting the Court fee of Rs. 28.5 as sufficient." At a subsequent stage, however, one of the co--sharers in the malikana who had been impleaded as a pro forma defendant was transposed as plaintiff No. 14, and consequently, the claim was amended and prayer was made for a larger amount. The learned Judge while holding the above view with regard to the claim of plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 13, held that the claim of plaintiff No. 14 was a separate and a distinct subject and, therefore, separate court--fee had to be paid. With due respect, it has not been possible for me to appreciate the reasoning adopted in the said decisions.
6. However, in subsequent decisions in Salahuddin Hyder Khan v. Dhanoo Lal, AIR 1945 Pat 421, Kaulasan Singh v. Ramdut Singh, AIR 1951 Pat 633 and Bansidhar Aggarwal v. Rameshwar Lal Agarwalla, AIR 1972 Pat 221, the ratio of the decision in Nauratan Lal's case (AIR 1922 Pat 359)(supra), was agreed to.
7. In Bansidhar Aggarwal's case (AIR 1972 Pat 221)(supra) Untwalia, J., held that where the main cause of action as partition and the plaintiff asks for displacement of title of different sets of defendants who were transferees from coparceners, the various properties in respect of which the displacement of title is sought cannot be considered as different subject--matter as envisaged under S. 17.
8. In Haru Bepari v. Kshitish Bhusan Roy, AIR 1935 Cal 573, it was held that one cause of action may embrace more than one subject within the meaning of S. 17 of the Act. In the said case 73 persons had filed a suit for a declaration to the effect that each plaintiff had a raiyati--jot interest in one out of 73 plots of land, and for a declaration that certain compromise decree was void and inoperative and it was held that the prayer in the suit, in fact, was for 73 distinct declarations affecting 73 separate titles which were distinct subjects within the meaning of S. 17.
9. However, in Kapil Charan Nayak v. Gitanjali, AIR 1951 Cal 509, Haru Bepari's case (AIR 1935 Cal 573)(supra) was distinguished. In the said case, the plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration of title with regard to several properties which had been purchased by the plaintiff on the basis of different documents. It was held (at p. 510),--
"We are of the opinion, however, that S. 17 Court--fees Act, does not apply to the present case because apart from anything else, the plaintiff has not asked for separate and distinct reliefs in respect of different causes of action. The relief asked for is only one and that is a declaration of his title in respect of the properties which are the subject--matter of the suit. It may be that the property was purchased by the plaintiff on the basis of different documents of title, but that is no part of the real relief which is asked by the plaintiff."
10. In Rajah of Vizianagaram v. Government, AIR 1932 Mad 667, where the landholder had filed a suit for enhancement of rent against a number of raiyats, it was held that S. 17 of the Act was not applicable.
11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents, has relied upon Ramadhin Singh's case (AIR 1943 Pat 355)(supra), Haru Bepari's case (AIR 1935 Cal 573)(supra) and T. S. Venkatanarayana Iyer v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 Mad 888. The first two decisions of the Calcutta and Patna High Courts have already been discussed by me above. In T. S. Venkatanarayana Iyer's case, the ratio of the aforesaid two decisions was followed.
12. After carefully perusing the decisions of the various High Court as discussed above, I am of the opinion that in cases where the relief claimed whether in the form of a single item or separate items arises out of the same cause of action and the prayer is for an aggregate amount, S. 17 of the Act cannot be applicable. 'Distinct subjects' in S. 17 is intimately connected with the cause of action. Where in a suit more than one causes of action are combined, S. 17 will be clearly attracted, but it will be stretching the language of the section a little too far to bring suits based on one cause of action within the ambit of this provision. The use of the qualifying adjective 'distinct' with the word 'subjects' in S. 17 is with a purpose and is quite significant and material. "Distinct subjects" clearly mean such subjects which are quite independent of each other and do not arise out of or relate to the same set of facts or circumstances. The subjects arising out of the same cause of action, that is, the same bundle of facts will be obviously inter--connected and intimately allied. Therefore 'distinct subjects' must arise out of different cause of action. In any case, when two interpretations of a provision in a taxing statute are reasonably possible, the salutary and well--established principle of interpretation is that the interpretation in favour of the subject has to be adopted and not the one in favour of the Revenue. Reference may be made to Bhura Mal Dan Dayal v. Imperial Flour Mills Ltd., AIR 1959 Punj 629, wherein it was held that the Courts should put a liberal interpretation on fiscal statutes like the Court--fees Act so as to lesson and not add to the burden of litigation.
13. It has been clearly conceded by the learned counsel for the respondents that the claims of damages by the different sets of plaintiffs in the present case have arisen out of the same cause of action inasmuch as the burn injuries were sustained by different persons resulting in the death of one woman as a result in the death of one woman as a result of the mishandling and leakage of the gas cylinder at the same place. Even if the different claimants had filed separate suits, they were likely to be consolidated because the same questions of law and fact would arise.
14. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order is set aside, the revision petition is allowed with costs and it is held that S. 17 of the Act was not applicable to the facts of the present case and the court--fee was correctly paid by the plaintiffs.
15. Revision allowed.