Gulzar Ahmad Dar And Ors vs Union Territory Of Jammu And Kashmir & ... on 29 August, 2025

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Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench

Gulzar Ahmad Dar And Ors vs Union Territory Of Jammu And Kashmir & ... on 29 August, 2025

1. The petitioners, through the medium of the present petition, have challenged the judgement dated 30.03.2021 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Jammu Bench (hereinafter to be referred to as 'Tribunal') to the extent it provides for fixing of seniority of the petitioners, who have been inducted/promoted against leave or training reserve vacancies, below those candidates, who have been 2 WP(C) No. 2036/2024 inducted/promoted against regular vacancies. Challenge has also been thrown to Govt. Order No. 316-JK (GAD) of 2021 dated 07.04.2021 whereby seniority of the petitioners has been re-fixed. Besides this, the petitioners have sought a direction upon the respondents to either quash all promotions that have been made on the basis of seniority list dated 07.04.2021 or in the alternative, to accord promotions to the petitioners retrospectively by treating them as senior in accordance with seniority list issued in the year 2011.

2. According to the petitioners, they were members of various feeding services of Jammu and Kashmir Administrative Service and they were appointed to these services after qualifying Jammu and Kashmir Combined Competitive Services Examination in the year 1999. The petitioners as well as the private respondents, who were also members of the various feeding services of Jammu and Kashmir Administrative Service and who also belong to the 1999 batch, were considered for promotion to time scale of Jammu and Kashmir Administrative Service (hereinafter to be referred to as 'JKAS') in the year 2008 in accordance with Jammu and Kashmir Administrative Service Rules of 1979 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'Rules of 1979') 3 WP(C) No. 2036/2024 whereafter they were inducted in the time scale of JKAS in the year 2008.

3. It has been submitted that the seniority list of the officers, promoted in the year 2008, was issued in terms of Govt. Order No. 743-GAD of 2011 dated 24.06.2011 after inviting objections and considering the same. It has been further submitted that said seniority list became a subject matter of long drawn litigation initially before this Court and ultimately before the learned Tribunal. The learned Tribunal, in terms of the impugned judgment dated 30.03.2021, upheld the seniority list dated 24.06.2011 but it was observed by the learned Tribunal that the officers appointed against leave and training vacancies cannot be placed above those who have been promoted against regular vacancies.

4. Pursuant to the aforesaid judgment of the learned Tribunal, the seniority list of 2011 came to be revised by the Government, which led to issuance of fresh seniority list dated 07.04.2021, which is under challenge in the present writ petition.

5. It has been submitted by the petitioners that they were ranking superior to the private respondents in the seniority list of 2011, which was issued on the basis of merit obtained 4 WP(C) No. 2036/2024 by the candidates during the selection process conducted in accordance with the Rules of 1979 but because of the aforesaid observations made by the learned Tribunal, the petitioners have been pushed down in the seniority list thereby affecting their rights to be promoted to higher scales of pay as also their induction in Indian Administrative Services (IAS). The petitioners are stated to have made representations to the official respondents seeking restoration of their seniority in accordance with the seniority list of 2011 but they have not taken any action, which compelled the petitioners to approach this Court by way of the present writ petition.

6. The petitioners have challenged the impugned judgment of the learned Tribunal to the extent it has resulted in re- fixation of seniority of the petitioners on the grounds that the classification made by the learned Tribunal between the vacancies falling under leave and training reserve category and those termed as regular vacancies is misplaced and without any legal basis. It has been contended that as per the Rules of 1979, leave and training vacancies are part of the cadre borne on the service to which the petitioners and the private respondents belong and all these posts have been duly sanctioned and form part of the strength of the 5 WP(C) No. 2036/2024 cadre, therefore, treating the promotion/induction of the petitioners in the time scale in a different manner has no legal basis.

7. It has been further contended that the learned Tribunal has, without any basis, assumed that only duty posts are regular posts and the leave and training vacancies are non-regular posts. It has been contended that once the learned Tribunal had upheld the validity of seniority list of 2011, it was not open to it to make the impugned observations. It has been further contended that the impugned seniority list of 2021 has been issued without observing principles of natural justice and once final seniority list was issued by the official respondents in the year 2011, it had no jurisdiction to issue a fresh seniority list in the year 2021.

8. The writ petition has been contested by the official respondents by filing their reply. In their reply, it has been submitted that during the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, the induction of officers appointed to various departmental feeding services in the year 1999 against the slots, which had become available from the year 2004 onwards, could not be considered as a result of which none of the officers belonging to 1999 batch were inducted nor any officer from subsequent batch of 2001 could be inducted in time scale of 6 WP(C) No. 2036/2024 JKAS. It has been submitted that the Establishment cum Selection Committee had observed that in respect of certain departmental feeding services, the members of the service cannot be considered for their induction into time scale of JKAS in the normal course due to non-availability of slots, therefore, it was recommended that leave reserve/training reserve vacancies shall be utilized as an exception for ensuring induction of members of departmental feeding services, both direct and promotees appointed upto 31.12.1999.

9. It has been submitted that in view of the aforesaid decision, the committee considered the service records of 49 officers of the different feeding services of overall merit as reflected in their APRs and recommended their induction into the time scale of JKAS against leave/training reserves. Out of these 49 officers, the petitioners were also inducted in the time scale of JKAS against leave/training reserved posts. After the induction of officers in the time scale of JKAS, a tentative select list of officers was issued vide Government Order No. 485-GAD of 2010 dated 21.04.2010 and objections were invited. Upon receipt of representations against the tentative select list, a committee was constituted by the Government which submitted its report on 7 WP(C) No. 2036/2024 15.02.2011. On the basis of the recommendations of this Committee, a final seniority list of officers appointed to time scale of JKAS between 01.01.2004 to 01.12.2008 was issued by the Government in terms of Government Order No. 743- GAD of 2011 dated 24.06.2011.

10. It has been submitted that the aforesaid seniority list including Rule 15(4) of J&K Administrative Service Rules, 2008 which provided for retrospective effect of appointment on the basis of vacancies became subject matter of challenge in various writ petitions filed before the High Court, which were later on transferred to the learned Tribunal. The said petitions came to be decided by the learned Tribunal vide impugned judgment dated 30.03.2011, which contains the impugned observations with regard to promotion of officers inducted against leave reserve/training reserve posts.

11. It has been further submitted that in the light of the impugned observations made by the learned Tribunal, impugned seniority list dated 07.04.2021 was issued by the Government as it decided to implement the judgment of the learned Tribunal. Accordingly, officers promoted against leave reserve/training reserve posts including the petitioners were placed below the officers, who were promoted/inducted against regular vacancies.

8 WP(C) No. 2036/2024

12. It has been submitted that leave reserve/training reserve posts cannot be equated with regular posts and because there were no regular vacant posts available for according promotion to the petitioners, as such, in order to prevent a situation whereby a junior batch officer would have stolen a march over the petitioners, who belong to a senior batch, as a one-time exception, it was decided to utilize leave reserve/training reserve posts for according promotion/induction to them.

13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case including the record produced by the official respondents.

14. To be precise, the dispute raised in the present petition is with regard to the placement of the petitioners in the seniority list of officers inducted to time scale of JKAS in the year 2008. It is not in dispute that the petitioners were inducted to time scale of JKAS in the year 2008 against leave reserve/training reserve vacancies and not against the regular vacancies. While the petitioners claim that leave reserve/training reserve vacancies being part of the cadre of the service as defined under Rules of 1979, which govern the instant case, as such, it was not open to the learned Tribunal to take a view that leave reserve/training reserve 9 WP(C) No. 2036/2024 vacancies are not part of the cadre and, therefore, could not have been utilized for according promotion to the petitioners and that the same has been done only as a measure of administrative exigency which does not fit into the one under the rules. It has been submitted that the learned Tribunal has fallen into error by making a distinction between leave reserve/training reserve vacancies and the regular vacancies.

15. The official respondents, on the other hand, claim that as per the Rules of 1979, promotions/induction into time scale of JKAS for the officers belonging to feeding cadre services can be made only against the slots available against the particular service of the feeding cadre and because these slots were not available in the feeding cadre service to which the petitioners belong, normally they could not have been inducted/promoted in the year 2008 but in order to save a situation whereby the officers of a subsequent batch would have stolen a march over the petitioners, who belonged to the 1999 batch, as a special concession, the leave reserve/training reserve vacancies were utilized and this concession given to the petitioners does not entitle them to be placed above/alongside the officers, who have been 10 WP(C) No. 2036/2024 inducted/promoted against the regular slots allotted to the respective feeding cadre services.

16. Before going into the merits of the afore-noted contentions raised by the parties, a glaring aspect of the matter, which stares at the face of the petitioners is the inordinate delay on their part to challenge the judgment of the learned Tribunal and the consequent seniority list dated 07.04.2021, is required to be addressed.

17. It is to be noted that the petitioners were parties to the proceedings before the Tribunal and their seniority was under challenge before the Tribunal. It is not a case where the petitioners were not aware about the impugned judgment passed by the learned Tribunal. The petitioners have approached this Court in September, 2024 while as the impugned judgment has been passed by the learned Tribunal on 30.03.2021 meaning thereby that the petitioners have approached this Court after a lapse of about three and half years of passing of the impugned judgment.

18. The issue that arises for determination is whether or not this Court should exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of this case having regard to inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and the established principle of law that delay defeats equity. 11 WP(C) No. 2036/2024

19. The effect of delay in filing a writ petition upon the rights of a litigant has been a subject matter of determination before the Supreme Court in a number of cases. It would be apt to refer to some of these precedents to understand the legal position on this aspect.

20. The Supreme Court has, in the case of 'State of Uttaranchal and anr Vs. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and Ors', (2013) 12 SCC 179, while dealing with the issue relating to effect of delay and laches, observed as under:

"16. We have no trace of doubt that the respondents could have challenged the ad hoc promotion conferred on the junior employee at the relevant time. They chose not to do so for six years and the junior employee held the promotional post for six years till regular promotion took place. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is that they had given representations at the relevant time but the same fell in deaf ears. It is interesting to note that when the regular selection took place, they accepted the position solely because the seniority was maintained and, thereafter, they knocked at the doors of the tribunal only in 2003. It is clear as noon day that the cause of action had arisen for assailing the order when the junior employee was promoted on ad hoc basis on 15.11.1983.

17. In C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and another a two-Judge Bench was dealing with the concept of representations and the directions issued by the court or tribunal to consider the representations and the 12 WP(C) No. 2036/2024 challenge to the said rejection thereafter. In that context, the court has expressed thus: -

"Every representation to the Government for relief, may not be replied on merits.

Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the Department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the Department or to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim."

21. In State of 'Tamil Nadu Vs. Seshachalam, (2007)10 SCC 137', the Supreme court observed as under:

"Some of the respondents might have filed representations but filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a Government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant."

13 WP(C) No. 2036/2024

22. Again in 'Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and ors Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108', the Supreme Court has observed as under:

"13. First, we shall deal with the facet of delay. In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati and others the Court referred to the principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewall, and John Kemp, which is as follows: -

"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of 14 WP(C) No. 2036/2024 justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy."

14. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, while dealing with exercise of power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court observed that power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person‟s entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct.

15. In State of M.P. and others etc. etc. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others etc. etc. the Court observed that it is well settled that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. It has been further stated therein that if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is 15 WP(C) No. 2036/2024 likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in injustice.

16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years‟ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the 16 WP(C) No. 2036/2024 cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others‟ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with „Kumbhakarna‟ or for that matter „Rip Van Winkle‟. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold."

23. The Supreme Court in the case of 'P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu', 1975 (1) SCC 152 has held that a person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the court at least within six months or at the most, within a year of such promotion. The Court further went on to observe that it is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 or is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time but it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then 17 WP(C) No. 2036/2024 approach the court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle, settled matters.

24. Applying the aforesaid legal position with regard to effect of delay and laches on the part of the petitioners in approaching the Court to the facts of the instant case, it is clear that the petitioners have slept over their rights for about three and a half years and have approached this Court belatedly. Their only explanation for this delay is that they made representations with the official respondents, which were not considered. Copies of a couple of representations have been annexed with the petition. There is nothing on record to suggest that these representations were actually received by the official respondents. In fact, these representations do not even bear the date on which the same were made and even in the petition it has not been mentioned as to on which date these representations were delivered by the petitioners with the official respondents.

25. The Supreme Court in 'State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Seshachalam', (2007) 10 SCC 137, has clearly held that filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Again the Supreme 18 WP(C) No. 2036/2024 Court in the case of 'Union of India and ors Vs. Chaman Rana & Anr, 2018(5) SCC 798 has held that merely repeated filing of representations could not be sufficient explanation for delay in approaching the court for grant of relief.

26. In the face of aforesaid legal position, even it is assumed that representations were made by the petitioners to the official respondents, the same would not save the situation from them particularly when the official respondents have not even responded to these representations. Even otherwise, making of representations by the petitioners in the facts and circumstances of the instant case was an unnecessary exercise because the official respondents had issued the impugned seniority list on the basis of the judgment passed by the learned Tribunal and once the official respondents decided to accept the said judgment, they had no option but to comply with the same and issue the impugned seniority list. The representations of the petitioners could not in any case have made any difference. The only option available with the petitioners to avoid the consequences of judgment of the learned Tribunal was to challenge the said judgment by way of appropriate 19 WP(C) No. 2036/2024 proceedings which the petitioners did only after three and a half years without there being explanation for the delay.

27. Although there is no limitation period prescribed for filing writ proceedings, yet the High Court generally refuses to exercise its writ jurisdiction if the proceedings are not filed within a reasonable time. What should be the reasonable time would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Generally speaking reasonable time for challenging a judgment of Central Administrative Tribunal would be the period of limitation prescribed for filing a Letters Patent Appeal. Thus, reasonable period for the petitioners to approach this Court to invoke writ jurisdiction against the impugned judgment of Central Administrative Tribunal would have been sixty days or at the most within a period of six months from the date of passing of judgment by the Tribunal, but the petitioners have invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court after a lapse of about three and half years. Having regard to the fact that the petitioners were party to the proceedings before the Tribunal before which their seniority was under challenge there is no justification for them to have consumed so much of time in approaching this Court.

20 WP(C) No. 2036/2024

28. As per the own case of the petitioners during the interregnum not only fresh seniority list on the basis of the impugned judgment passed by the learned Tribunal has been issued by the official respondents in April, 2021 but official respondents have also made promotions to Super Time Scale of Service and have further initiated the process of inducting the officers in Indian Administrative Services (IAS) on the basis of seniority list of 2011. Thus, the petitioners have allowed the situation to change inasmuch as the officers have been promoted to higher scales of pay on the basis of the judgment of the learned Tribunal. In view of this altered situation, it can be safely inferred that the petitioners have waived their rights by their conduct as a result whereof the private respondents have been put in a position that if they are reverted back to the earlier seniority, it would work harshly against them. The petitioners, by their lethargic conduct, have allowed the subsequent developments to take place and this is an important factor which would weigh with this court in deciding whether or not to exercise writ jurisdiction.

29. For what has been discussed hereinbefore, this Court refuses to exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction on account of inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of 21 WP(C) No. 2036/2024 the petitioners in approaching this Court. Thus, without going into the merits of the rival contentions raised by the parties, this writ petition is dismissed on the grounds of delay and laches.




                                         (SANJAY DHAR) (VINOD CHATTERJI KOUL)
                                               JUDGE           JUDGE
             JAMMU
             29.08.2025
             Naresh/Secy.


                                       Whether order is speaking: Yes

                                       Whether order is reportable: Yes
                                                     ...




Naresh Kumar
2025.08.29 16:48
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

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Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench