Gujarat High Court
Nanjibhai Vitthalbhai Rathod ... vs Nanubhai Devjibhai on 1 October, 2013
Author: Abhilasha Kumari
Bench: Abhilasha Kumari
NANJIBHAI VITTHALBHAI RATHOD (KUMBHAR)....Petitioner(s)V/SNANUBHAI DEVJIBHAI GOHIL....Respondent(s) C/SCA/12928/2013 JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12928 of 2013 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE ABHILASHA KUMARI ================================================================ 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? 3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? 4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ? 5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ? ================================================================ NANJIBHAI VITTHALBHAI RATHOD (KUMBHAR)....Petitioner(s) Versus NANUBHAI DEVJIBHAI GOHIL....Respondent(s) ================================================================ Appearance: MR JIGAR G GADHAVI, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1 ================================================================ CORAM: HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE ABHILASHA KUMARI Date : 01/10/2013 ORAL JUDGMENT
This petition under Articles-226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 20.11.2012, passed by the learned 4th Additional District Judge, Bhavnagar, Camp at Mahuva, in Misc. Civil Application No.34/2012, whereby, the said application for condonation of delay, has been rejected.
Briefly stated, the relevant factual background of the case, as emerging from the petition, is that the petitioner had preferred a suit, being Regular Civil Suit No.103/1995, before the learned Civil Judge (J.D.), Mahuva, for declaration and permanent injunction, on 31.07.1995. After full-fledged trial and hearing on merits, the suit was dismissed by judgment and decree dated 03.01.2003. Instead of filing an appeal, the petitioner chose to make representations to various authorities such as the Collector, Gandhinagar, and others. He also approached the Government Secretariat. In the process, there occurred a delay of 9 years, 2 months and 3 days, before the petitioner finally decided to file an appeal against the judgment and decree of the Civil Court. Accordingly, the petitioner made an application for condonation of delay in filing an appeal, that has been rejected by the impugned order. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present petition.
Mr.Jigar Gadhavi, learned advocate for the petitioner has strenuously submitted that the petitioner is a poor man and is not conversant with law. After the dismissal of the suit, he was bonafidely making representations to various authorities, which has resulted in the delay. That the District Court ought to have condoned the delay and granted the petitioner an opportunity to challenge the judgment and decree of the Civil Court, instead of rejecting the application of the petitioner on technical grounds. The petitioner was representing before wrong forums under a bonafide belief that his grievances would be redressed, therefore, the Court below ought to have taken a lenient view in order to do substantial justice. Lastly, it is submitted that the impugned order is unjust and unreasonable. The District Court has not given any cogent reasons for rejecting the application. That the impugned order, being unjust and arbitrary, deserves to be quashed and set aside.
This Court has heard learned counsel for the petitioner, perused the material on record and bestowed thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced at the Bar.
It is a well-settled principle of law that the standard required to be applied for condonation of delay under Section-5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is that of sufficient cause . In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. Mst.Katiji and others, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353, the Supreme Court has held that this test should be applied in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice as, normally, no litigant would benefit from the delay in the late filing of an appeal. It has further been held that a pedantic approach, such as every day s delay must be explained ought not to be adopted and technical considerations should not override the cause of substantial justice.
This judgment lays down guidelines for the Courts to elucidate the perspective and approach that should be adopted while dealing with cases for condonation of delay. Having held so, the test for condoning the delay, as stated in the opening paragraph of the judgment is that of sufficient cause .
What constitutes sufficient cause has been expounded by the Supreme Court in a number of judgments.
In Parimal Vs. Veena, reported in AIR 2011 SC 1150, the Supreme Court has explained this term in the following terms :
9. "Sufficient Cause" is an expression which has been used in large number of Statutes. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inas-much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case and duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that party had not acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or the party cannot be alleged to have been "not acting diligently"
or "remaining inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously.(Vide: Ramlal and Ors. v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361; Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi and Anr., AIR 1968 SC 222; Surinder Singh Sibia v. Vijay Kumar Sood, AIR 1992 SC 1540; and Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another, (2010) 5 SCC 459) : (2010 AIR SCW 1788).
To ascertain whether the case of the petitioner satisfies the standard test of sufficient cause or not, it would be necessary to reiterate a few relevant facts. The suit of the petitioner was dismissed by judgment and decree dated 31.07.1995. The petitioner filed the application for condonation of delay in filing an appeal on 06.03.2012. In between, there is a delay of 9 years, 2 months and 3 days, which is an admitted fact. The explanation rendered by the petitioner in the application for condonation of delay is that the petitioner is a poor person, having no knowledge of law. He kept on making representations to various Government authorities, which has resulted in the delay. It is further stated in the application that the petitioner is not at fault for the delay and that his appeal should not be thrown out on technical grounds.
It is seen from the copy of the judgment and decree of the Civil Court dated 31.07.1995, annexed as Annexure- B to the petition, that the petitioner was represented by an advocate in the suit. Therefore, the ground put forth by the petitioner that he has no knowledge of law, is meaningless. The petitioner had availed of the services of a legally-trained professional, who would have informed him regarding the requirement of filing an appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. However, the petitioner chose another route, that is, of making representations to various Government authorities. By no stretch of imagination can it be said that by representing before such authorities, the petitioner was bonafidely pursuing his remedy before the wrong forum and ought to be granted the benefit of Section-14 of the Limitation Act. The representations made by the petitioner were to Government authorities who are not over and above the Civil Court. He did not institute any proceedings before a Court of law against the judgment of the Trial Court. Government authorities cannot be said to be a Forum to challenge a decree of a Civil Court. It is obvious that the petitioner had accepted the judgment and decree of the Civil Court but was trying to approach Government authorities to get his matter settled somehow. This course of action cannot be termed to be a remedy before a wrong forum. The petitioner deliberately chose this method rather than filing an appeal and, in the process, whiled away 9 years, 2 months and 3 days before he suddenly woke up and decided to approach the Appellate Court.
The above conduct of the petitioner shows his negligent and careless approach rather than sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Lack of financial resources does not constitute sufficient cause, as a party can always avail of legal aid, as has already been granted to the petitioner.
Moreover, the petitioner has failed to produce a single representation to any authority, purportedly made by him, on the record of the case. His case that he had repeatedly represented to Government authorities appears to be a lame excuse which is not substantiated by any material on record. Under such circumstances, it is not possible to show any leniency or adopt a liberal approach towards the case of the petitioner as, to do so, would result in injustice to the party in whose favour certain rights have accrued from the decree and who has been enjoying such rights for 9 years, 2 months and 3 days before the filing of the application.
The cause of substantial justice can only be furthered if justice is meted out even-handedly to both parties. It does not mean that the Court should be liberal at the cost of abridging the substantive law of limitation.
In Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by L.Rs. v. State of A. P. and Ors., reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363, the Supreme Court has held that :
The courts in this country, including the Supreme Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, the concepts such as liberal approach , justice oriented approach , substantial justice , cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. (Paras 19, 28, 29 and 23) Though this Court has discretionary powers to condone the delay, such powers cannot be exercised in a case where the litigant has failed to explain the delay in a proper or reasonable manner, such as in the present case. The record of the present case clearly reveals that the petitioner has not been at all diligent, in pursuing his case. Neither does it reveal that the petitioner was prevented by any event, beyond his control, from pursuing his remedy of filing an appeal, within the prescribed period of limitation.
The impugned judgment and order of the District Court is a well-reasoned one, wherein all the above aspects have been noticed. Nowhere is it revealed in the impugned judgment that a technical approach, as opposed to one that furthers the cause of substantial justice, has been adopted by the learned Judge. The said judgment does not suffer from any perversity, illegality or jurisdictional error so as to persuade this Court to exercise its supervisory powers.
As the petitioner has failed to show sufficient cause for the gross delay of 9 years, 2 months and 3 days in filing the appeal, in the view of this Court, no illegality has been committed by the District Court by rejecting the application for condonation of delay.
The petition lacks merit and deserves to be rejected. It is, accordingly, rejected.
(SMT. ABHILASHA KUMARI, J.) Gaurav+ Page 12 of 12