Kerala High Court
M.Shibu vs State Of Kerala on 27 October, 2023
Author: C.S.Dias
Bench: C.S.Dias
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS
FRIDAY, THE 27TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2023 / 5TH KARTHIKA, 1945
CRL.REV.PET NO. 815 OF 2013
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 03.02.2007 IN ST NO.1697/2000 OF
JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS-III, PUNALUR
CRA NO.91/2007 OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS COURT (ADHOC)-II, KOLLAM
REVISION PETITIONERS/APPELLANTS/ACCUSED:
1 M.SHIBU,
AGED 42 YEARS,
S/O. I.K.MEHAROOF, SHIBU MANZIL,
MANCHALLOOR, PATHANAPURAM P.O.
2 I.K.MEHAROOF,
AGED 62 YEARS,
SHIBU MANZIL, MANCHALLOR, PATHANAPURAM P.O.,
KOLLAM DISTRICT.
BY ADVS. SRI.S.RAJEEV
SRI.K.K.DHEERENDRAKRISHNAN
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/COMPLAINANT/STATE:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REP.BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA,
ERNAKULAM-682 031.
2 FOOD INSPECTOR
PUNALUR CIRCLE,
KOLLAM DISTRICT-691 001.
OTHER PRESENT:
SR PP SMT SEETHA S
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR
ADMISSION ON 27.10.2023, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
Crl.R.P.No.815/2013
-:2:-
Dated this the 27th day of October,2023
ORDER
The revision petition is filed questioning the legality and correctness of the judgments in Crl.A.No.91/2007 of the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, (Adhoc-II), Kollam (Appellate Court) and S.T. No.1697/2000 of the Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate-III, Punalur(Trial Court), holding the revision petitioners guilty for the offences under Section 16(1)(A) read with Sections (2)(ia)(j) & 7 (1) & Section 16(1) proviso (1) read with Sections (2)(ix)(K) & 7(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (in short, 'Act'). The revision petitioners were the accused and the second respondent was the complainant before the Trial Court. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their status before the Trial Court.
Crl.R.P.No.815/2013-:3:-
Brief facts:
2. The prosecution case is that, on 17.08.1999, the second respondent - the food inspector - inspected the bakery and restaurant situated in Pathanapuram, which was owned by the second accused and managed by his son - the first accused. The food inspector purchased 600 grams of banana chips from the first accused. In one of the samples that was sent for analysis to the Public Analyst, by Ext P13 Form III report, it was found that the sample was adulterated, as there was presence of water soluble synthetic colour tartazine, which is in violation of Rule 29 of the PFA Rules. Thus, the accused have committed the above offences.
3. The accused pleaded not guilty to the substance of accusation read over to them.
4. In the trial, the prosecution examined PWs 1 Crl.R.P.No.815/2013 -:4:- & 2 and marked Exts P1 to P25 in evidence. The accused examined DWs 1 & 2 and marked Exts D1 to D3 in evidence.
5. The learned Magistrate, after analysing the materials placed on record, found the accused guilty and convicted and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- for the offences under Sections 16(1)(A)(1) read with (2)(ia)(j) & 7(1) of the Act and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months. They have also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months and pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- under Section 16(1) proviso (1) read with (2) (ix)(K) & 7(1) of the Act and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of two months. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
6. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the accused Crl.R.P.No.815/2013 -:5:- preferred Crl.A. No.91/2007 before the Appellate Court.
7. The Appellate Court, after re-appreciating the materials placed on record, by the impugned judgment confirmed the conviction; but modified the substantive sentence by reducing it to rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months.
8. It is challenging the concurrent judgments of the courts below, the revision petition is filed.
9. Heard; Sri. S. Rajeev, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner and Smt. Seetha S., the learned Senior Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents.
10. The learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner placed reliance on the judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court in Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd v. Food Inspector and Another [2010 (4) KHC 767] and the Division Bench of this Crl.R.P.No.815/2013 -:6:- Court in Rasheed v. Food Inspector [2016 (2) KLT 390] and argued that since the sample was analysed in a laboratory not recognised by the Central Government as provided under Section 23(1-A)(ee) of the Act, the prosecution has to fail and the revision petitioner is to be acquitted. He submitted that without even going into merits of the other grounds urged, the revision petition is to be allowed.
11. The learned Public Prosecutor on the contrary contended that the decision in Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd. (supra) needs to be reconsidered, particularly because Section 8 of the Act enables the Central Government and the State Government to appoint a Public Analyst for the local areas as assigned by the Central Government and State Government. In the State of Kerala, Public Analysists have been Crl.R.P.No.815/2013 -:7:- appointed invoking the above provision. Therefore, the decision in Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd.
(supra) has no application to the case on hand. Hence, the revision petition may be dismissed.
12. Is there any illegality, impropriety or irregularity in the impugned judgments.
13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered the judgment in Pepsico India Holdings Private Ltd. (supra) on 18.11.2010. Subsequent to the pronouncement of the judgment, there were several cases filed before this Court to quash the proceedings initiated under the Act.
14. There was cleavage of opinion and divergent views taken by three learned Single Judges of this Court in interpreting the ratio decidendi in Pepsico India Holdings Private Ltd.(supra). Crl.R.P.No.815/2013 -:8:-
15. Due to cleavage of opinion in interpreting the above judgment, a bunch of cases were referred to a Division Bench of this Court for an authoritative pronouncement.
16. Accordingly, in Rasheed v. Food Inspector (supra), a Division Bench of this Court, on a threadbare analysis of the law laid down in Pepsico India Holdings Private Ltd. (supra), has answered the reference in the following manner:
"18. Bearing in mind the fact that the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pepsico's case (supra) held that the provisions under S.23(1A)(ee) and (hh) are not directory and that this Court has erred in holding that they are only enabling provisions we will proceed further to answer the referred questions. For answering the terms of reference a broad understanding of the said declaration is necessary. When once the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the said provisions are not directory and the failure to adhere to the provisions cannot be said to be not fatal to the prosecution it has to be understood and applied in all cases where a public analyst was to carry out an analysis and to give a report to form the basis for launching the prosecution. Thus, evidently, for that purpose the Crl.R.P.No.815/2013 -:9:- report should be one made after conducting an analysis in a laboratory defined under S. 23(1A)(ee). It is to be noted that after the decision in Pepsico's case (supra) by the Hon'ble Apex Court a notification was followed whereby Rule in relation to S.23(1A)(hh) was framed as R. 4(9) of the PFA Rules. Thus, in the light of Pepsico's case (supra) in order to be reliable and to be taken the basis for the purpose of launching prosecution a report by a public analyst must be one made after conducting an analysis in a laboratory defined under S.23(1A)(ee) of the Act. In that context the indisputable common case is that till the repealing of 1954 Act no laboratory was defined in terms of the provision under S.23(1A)(ee). If that be so, there could not have been any question of conducting an analysis by a public analyst under the PFA Act in a laboratory defined under S. 23(1A)(ee) of the PFA Act. In view of the above findings and conclusions we will answer the questions referred. First question referred is as follows: (1) Could all the prosecutions under the Act of 1954 be stifled by raising a contention that the laboratories or methods of analysis were not defined? In the light of what we have held herein before the said it can only be answered in the following manner: Wherever an analysis has to be conducted from a laboratory to find whether the particular sample of item of the particular food article is adulterated, to form the basis for initiation of prosecution under the PFA Act the report of the analyst in relation to that sample must be one conducted in a laboratory defined under S.23(1A) Crl.R.P.No.815/2013 -:10:- (ee). Since no such laboratory was defined till the repealing of the PFA Act wherever an analysis from a laboratory was inevitable for making a report regarding item concerned as adulterated there cannot be any successful prosecution in the absence of such a report. In such circumstances the prosecution proceedings have to be terminated for the failure to define laboratories in terms of S. 23(1A)(ee) and the consequential failure to conduct an analysis of the particular sample by the public analyst from such a laboratory. In other words taking note of the nature of the food article involved and the method to be employed to find out the adulteration if an analysis from a laboratory is not at all required in such circumstances the prosecution cannot be stifled on the ground that the laboratories in terms of provisions under S.23(1A)(ee) were not defined. It cannot be said that all the prosecutions under the 1954 Act should be stifled owing to the failure to define laboratories in terms of S.23(1A)(ee) as there may be cases registered against persons for contravention of the provisions under S.16(1)(c), S.16(1)(d) and S.14A (Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954). So also a case where the Article in food was lifted and sent for analysis prior to the introduction of the provisions under S.23(1A)(ee) viz. 01/04/1976 cannot be stifled as anything previously done could not be invalidated owing to the failure to define laboratory in terms of S.23(1A)(ee) in view of the provisions under S.23(2). In the context of the term of reference No. 1 it is to be noted that subsequent to Pepsico's case (supra) the method of analysis was, in fact, defined and it was Crl.R.P.No.815/2013 -:11:- brought into by incorporating R.9(4) in the PFA Rules with effect from 25/03/2008.
19. The second question referred is as hereunder: (2) Is it proper to hold that since Central Government has not taken steps to effectuate S.23(1A)(ee) and (hh) of the Act of 1954, no prosecution will lie under the Act of 1954 even if it is established that the standards prescribed for various food items have been flouted? In respect of items of food articles where, for holding that the standard prescribed for the same was flouted or it was not maintained if an analysis from a laboratory is inevitable in such cases also if the analysis was conducted by the public analyst under the PFA Act in a laboratory not defined in terms of S.23(1A)(ee), in the light of Pepsico's decision, no prosecution will lie based a report made after such an analysis. The last question referred is follows: (3) Whether the ratio in Pepsico's case (supra) can be applied to all cases of alleged food adulteration under the Act of 1954 irrespective of the fact whether or not standards have been prescribed for food items? In cases where standard is prescribed or in respect of a food item to say that the said item of food is adulterated and to launch the prosecution, if an analysis from a laboratory by a public analyst is inevitable in such circumstances also the ratio in Pepsico's case (supra) will be applicable. In the light of the answers to the referred questions it has become absolutely unnecessary to go into the question referred herein before based on the decision in Narayana Reddiar's case which was declined to be referred.Crl.R.P.No.815/2013 -:12:-
20. Having answered the reference as above, we are of the view that the fate of the criminal revision petitions and the Crl MCs depend upon the question whether in respect the item of food involved in individual cases, the sample of which was collected, an analysis from a laboratory is required or not for holding the same as adulterated. If the answer is in the affirmative necessarily in the absence of a report made after an analysis from a laboratory defined in terms of the provisions under S.23(1A)(ee) there can be no successful prosecution. We will therefore, consider the individual cases in the aforesaid manner and in the light of the answers to the referred questions. Needless to say that if the answer to the aforesaid question in respect of a particular case is in the negative there can be no legal impediment in continuing with the prosecution. In view of the fact that till the repealing of the said Act no laboratories were defined in terms of S.23(1A)(ee) all those cases have to be decided based on a consideration as aforesaid."
(emphasis given by me)
17. The exposition of law in Rasheed v. Food Inspector (supra), following the declaration in Pepsico India Holdings Private Ltd (supra) leaves no room for any further interpretation on the question that, if an allegedly adulterated food sample is not Crl.R.P.No.815/2013 -:13:- analysed in a laboratory under Section 23(1-A)(ee) of the Act, the same is fatal to the prosecution and the prosecution has to necessarily fail.
18. In the instant case, the prosecution case was launched on the basis of Ext P13 Form III report of the Public Analyst holding that the food sample was adulterated. Admittedly, the sample was not tested in a laboratory notified by the Central Government under Section 23(1-A) (ee) of the Act. Thus, the ratio decidendi in Pepsico India Holdings Private Ltd and Rasheed vs. Food Inspector (supra) stands attracted and prosecution fails. Consequentially, the revision petitioners/accused are found not guilty and have to be acquitted.
19. In the result, Crl.R.P.No.815/2013 -:14:-
(i) The revision petition is allowed;
(ii) The impugned judgments in Crl.Appeal No.91/2007 and in S.T.No.1697/2000 of the courts below are set aside.
(iii) The revision petitioners are held not guilty and are acquitted, and are set at liberty.
(iv)The bail bonds executed by the revision petitioners and their sureties are hereby cancelled.
Sd/-
C.S.DIAS,JUDGE
DST/27.10.23 //True copy//
P.A. To Judge