Gujarat High Court
Bhagwati Glass Containers vs State Of Gujarat & on 11 September, 2013
Author: K.M.Thaker
Bench: K.M.Thaker
BHAGWATI GLASS CONTAINERS LTDV/SSTATE OF GUJARAT R/CR.MA/1621/2010 JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION NO. 1621 of 2010 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.M.THAKER Sd/- ================================================================ 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? No 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? No 3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? No 4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ? No 5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ? No ================================================================ BHAGWATI GLASS CONTAINERS LTD & 2....Applicant(s) Versus STATE OF GUJARAT & 1....Respondent(s) ================================================================ Appearance: MR HARDIK A DAVE, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1 - 3 MR DHARMESH V SHAH, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 2 MR KP RAWAL & MS REETA CHANDARANA APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1 ================================================================ CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.M.THAKER Date : 11/09/2013 ORAL JUDGMENT
1. In this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioners have prayed, inter alia, that:-
8(a)........
(b) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to quash and set aside the FIR filed before Amraiwadi Police Station vide Ist C.R. No. 161 of 2009 along with all the subsequent proceedings thereto qua present applicants.
(c)..........
(d)..........
2. The FIR / complaint against which present petition is taken out is registered as Ist -C.R. No. 161 of 2009 dated 4.7.2009 wherein the complainant i.e. private respondent has alleged offence punishable under Sections 406, 420, 422 of Indian Penal Code.
3. The said FIR / complaint is filed with reference to the alleged offence said to have been committed on 8.5.1995.
4. The complainant is liquidation officer of the Co-operative Bank and he has lodged complaint on behalf of and as liquidator of the Co-operative Bank alleging, inter alia, that the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are Directors of the petitioner No.1 company in whose favour loan / credit facility to the tune of Rs.25 lacs came to be granted vide resolution No.4 in the meeting of the Board of Directors held on 28.4.1995 and that the said credit facility / advance as well as the said resolution No.4 came to be passed in breach of the Rules of the Bank and guidelines issued by Reserve Bank of India. The petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 had executed certain documents and after availing the said facility, the petitioner No.1 company and the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 its directors did not repay the loan amount despited notices by the company. It is further alleged that the petitioners issued Cheque No. 936701 dated 7.1.1998 drawn on Fedral Bank Limited, Ashram Road Admedabad for a sum of Rs. 25 lacs towards payment of the loan however, when the Co-operative Bank deposited the said cheque, it was dishonoured and therefore complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act came to be filed. According to the allegations made by the complainant i.e. liquidator of the co-operative bank, the petitioners have committed fraud and cheating with co-operative bank.
5. So far as the factual background is concerned, the petitioners have averred, inter alia, that:-
3.
(I) Applicants state that applicant N0.1 Public Limited Company registered under the Companies Act. Applicants further state that Applicant No.2 and 3 are Directors of the applicant No.1 company.
(II) Applicants state that respondent No.2 is authorised persons appointed by the liquidation officer of the Bhagyalaxmi Co-operative Bank Ltd. registered under the co-operative Societies Act. Applicants further state that since the year 2000 Bhagyalaxmi Co-operative Bank Ltd. is under liquidation and liquidation officer is appointed.
(III) Applicants state that in the year 1995 i.e. on 28th April 1995, applicant No.1 had applied for Bill Purchase Cash Credit facility for Rs.25,00,000/- from the respondent No.2 Bank for the purpose of enhancing its business activities. Applicants further state that at the time of availing said facility from respondent No.2 Bank, present applicants No.2 and 3 being directors of the applicant No.1 stood as Guarantors of the applicant No.1.
(IV) Applicants state that according to the terms and conditions as mentioned in the agreement executed at the time of availing said facility from the respondent No.2 Bank, present applicants were suppose to pay 20% quarterly interest and the said facility was given for one year subject to such other conditions.
(V) Applicants state that due to financial set back in the business of the present applicants, present applicants was not able to fulfill terms and conditions as mentioned in the agreement with the bank and as there was breach of agreement on the part of present applicants, respondent No. 2 Bank had initiated recovery proceedings on 12th May 1998 in form of filing Lavad Case No. 624 of 1998 before Ld. Board of Nominees for the Recovery of Rs.38,52,273/- which is pending..........
(VI) Applicants state that respondent No.2 bank had also initiated Criminal Proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act by filing Criminal Case No. 263 of 1998 for the same alleged transaction of availing Bill Purchase Cash Credit facility of Rs.25,00,000/- which is pending trial...........
(VII) Applicants state that applicant No.3 had preferred an application for quashing of the above said Criminal Case vide Special Criminal Application No. 1834 of 2009 on the ground that to arraigned Director of the company under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, specific allegation that director is responsible and looking after day to day affairs of the company is must and as from the bare reading of the complaint and deposition of the complainant it was not coming on record that present petitioner no. 3 is concerned with the day to day affairs of the original accused No.1. Applicants further state that said application came to be withdrawn on 30th November 2009 as this Hon'ble Court was not inclined to entertain only on the ground that quashing petition is filed in the year 2009 for the complaint which was filed as back as in the year 1998.........
According to the petitioners the impugned FIR came to be filed on 4.7.2009
6. In addition to the said factual background which is narrated in the petition, it has also emerged from the submissions by learned Counsel that the complainant liquidator / co-operative bank has filed Lavad Suit for recovery of the loan amount in question and the said suit is pending and the proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act are also pending.
7. Learned advocate for the petitioners also claimed and contended that in connection with the cheque issued by the petitioner No.1 (which was allegedly dishonoured) the complainant / bank also filed Criminal Case 263 of 1998.
7.1 In the said petition the applicant has averred that the said Criminal case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act is pending and learned Counsel for the complainant also submitted that unto his information the proceedings are pending however, during the hearing learned advocate for the applicant submitted that according to the information to the petitioner No.1 the said case is disposed of and the petitioner No.1 is acquitted with the above mentioned facts.
7.2 The learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that actually any offence is not made out in the complaint and even if the allegations in the complaint / FIR are taken on its face value then also, any ingredients of the alleged offence are not borne out.
7.3 Learned advocate for the petitioners further submitted that petitioners have not committed alleged offence and the delay in lodging FIR / complaint is not explained inasmuch as the loan / cash credit facility were availed in 1995 whereas the complaint came to be filed in 2009.
7.4 Learned advocate for the petitioners also submitted that the loan facility was availed for business purpose and that therefore any dishonest intention is not made out from the bare reading of the impugned FIR.
7.5 Learned advocate for the petitioners also contended that the complainant / bank has, without any justification, given colour of criminal offence to the dispute which is purely of civil nature.
7.6 On such contentions learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that the impugned complaint may be quashed.
8. The petition is vehemently opposed by learned advocate for the respondent complainant / bank. He submitted that after availing loan / cash credit facility the petitioners did not make any payment to the bank and even the cheque which was tendered by petitioner No.1 came to be dishonoured.
8.1 Learned advocate for the respondent also submitted that the way and the manner in which the loan / credit facility came to be sanctioned and granted in favour of the petitioners and the rules and procedure of the bank and guidelines prescribed by the Reserve Bank of India were not followed and ignored in the process of sanctioning and granting loan / credit facility to the petitioners go to show that from inception there was intention to not repay the loan amount and to commit fraud with the bank.
8.2 The learned advocate for the respondent complainant relied on the observation by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case between Baldev Singh vs. State of Punjab (1995 [6] SCC 593) and submitted that every minute detail is not required to be mentioned in the FIR and only essential or broad picture need to be stated in the FIR and that the FIR need not be verbatim summary of the entire case of the prosecution. He also relied on the observations by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case between State of Bihar vs. Raj Narain Singh (AIR 1991 SC 1308) and submitted that even if there are discrepancies in FIR and statements of witnesses interference at preliminary stage is not justified.
9. I have heard Mr. Dave, learned advocate who has appeared for the petitioners accused persons and Mr. D.V. Shah, learned advocate who has appeared for the respondent complainant and learned APP for respondent No.1 State of Gujarat and have also considered the material on record.
9.1 It is not in dispute that the petitioner No.1 availed loan / cash credit facility. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners have not repaid the loan amount in question.
9.2 It is also not in dispute that the cheque issued and handed over by the petitioners towards repayment of loan has been dishonoured by the bank.
9.3 Learned advocate for the petitioners claimed that the complaint and the proceedings of the Criminal Case deserve to be quashed because of delay caused in filing the complaint.
9.4 On this count it is relevant to mention that the complainant has, prima facie, explained the cause inasmuch as it is claimed that after the loan / cash credit facility was granted to accused No.1, the concerned directors, according to complainant acted hands in gloves with accused No.1 and they did not take any action or any initiative in instituting criminal proceedings against accused no.1 and when the details came to the knowledge of the liquidator and the details about the lavad proceeding and the order therein came to the notice of the liquidator he initiated the proceedings. In view of the said submission and explanation on part of the complainant, it would be too premature for this Court to record any conclusion on this count and to quash the complaint until appropriate material related to the said issue becomes available upon completion of the investigation.
9.5 Moreover, it is also relevant to mention that from the rival contentions it has emerged that rules and procedure of the co-operative bank and the guidelines prescribed by Reserve Bank of India were allegedly violated while sanctioning and granting loan / credit facility to the petitioners and such allegations by liquidation officer also suggest / allege that with intention to commit fraud with the bank a conspiracy was hatched and any action, at the relevant time, was not taken by the Directors / officer of the bank for long time and even after filing Lavad Suit, any action for the offence was not instituted. The respondent complainant / bank seems to have alleged that the accused persons acted by way of conspiracy and have committed fraud with the bank.
9.6 In view of such allegations the Court is also of the view that when question of public money and interest is involved then delay should not stand in way of investigation and on ground of delay the complaint and investigation should not be quashed at this stage and the said aspect would be considered at appropriate stage by the learned Trial Court.
9.7 At this stage the Court would not be inclined to allow the petition and quash the complaint merely on the ground of delay when prima facie the complainant has tendered plausible explanation.
9.8 Another contention raised by present petitioners is that the details in the chargesheet bring out that the complainant has tried to give colour of criminal offence to the dispute which is essentially of civil nature and that therefore the complaint should be quashed.
9.9 In light of the allegations, it prima facie appears at this stage that the allegations contain traits and ingredients of criminal offence and elements of offence coexist with the dispute which also appears to be of civil nature.
9.10 However, a complete factual picture can become clear only after the investigation is carried out and completed and the investigation officer collects relevant and necessary material. Before that it would be premature to record any conclusion.
9.11 From the allegations in the impugned complaint and the material available on record, it has emerged that the complainant has alleged financial irregularities and breach of guidelines issued by Reserve Bank of India and violation of instructions rules of the co-operative bank. It is also alleged that fraud with a co-operative bank is perpetrated.
9.12 When the complaint by a statutory authority alleging offence in nature of, or which amounts to, fraud with a nationalized or co-operative bank is filed and the case involves public money and interest, in such cases Court would not readily or quickly quash the complaint on ground of delay in lodging the complaint / FIR and/or on the ground that subject matter of the complaint is in nature of civil dispute and that allegations do not make out any offence.
9.13 The possibility that during investigation sufficient material, which may make out case for trial against the accused person, may become available to the I.O. cannot be ruled out at threshold of the investigation.
9.14 Therefore in such cases it would neither be just nor proper to scuttle and stiffle the investigation at its threshold.
10. In light of the allegation that the loan / cash credit facility came to be granted without diligently following the procedure and without fulfilling the prescribed requirements would, ordinarily justify the banks doubt and therefore the complainant's allegation that from initial stage the accused persons acted with intent to commit fraud with the bank.
10.1 In this view of the matter, it is clear that whether there is any base for and whether there is any substance in the said allegation is matter of investigation.
10.2 Unless the investigation officer records statements of the concerned persons and unless he collects relevant document and material, at this stage Court cannot pronounce any conclusion and / or Court cannot mechanically accept the petitioner's defence that there was no intention nor can the Court accept and that too even before the investigation, the bank's submission that the accused acted with intention and by way of conspiracy.
10.3 The facts before the Court, at this stage, are hazy and that therefore it would not be proper or justified to terminate the investigation at its threshold.
10.4 When the subject of the FIR / investigation is related to fraud with co-operative bank, ordinarily the Court would be loath to interfere at the stage of investigation so as to not allow the investigation to commence and / or continue.
11. In this context it would relevant to take into account the observations made by Hon'ble Apex Court in case between State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan & Ors. [(1988) 4 SCC 655], wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that:
15. It is trite jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, which saves the inherent power of the High Court, to make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. In exercising that jurisdiction the High Court should not embark upon and enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate when the evidence comes before him. Though it is neither possible nor advisable to lay down any inflexible rules to regulate that jurisdiction, one thing, however, appears clear and it is that when the High Court is called upon to exercise this jurisdiction to quash a proceeding at the stage of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence the High Court is guided by the allegations, whether those allegations, set out in the complaint or the charge-sheet, do not in law constitute or spell out any offence and that resort to criminal proceedings would, in the circumstances, amount to an abuse of the process of the court or not.
16. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. R.K. Rohtagi, it is reiterated:
[SCC p.6: SCC (Cri) p.120, para 10] It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.
17. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. P.D. Jhunjunwala, it was further made clear: [SCC p.10: SCC (Cri) p.124, para 5] As to what would be the evidence against the respondents is not a matter to be considered at this stage and would have to be proved at the trial. We have already held that for the purpose of quashing the proceedings only the allegations set forth in the complaint have to be seen and nothing further.
11.1 Similarly, on the decision in the case of Dr.Monika Kumar and Anr. v. State of U.P. And Ors. [AIR 2008 SC 2781], the Honble Apex Court has observed that:
30.
We may reiterate and emphasise that the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata Dal v.H.S. Chowdhury (1992) 4 SCC 305; Raghubir Saran Dr. v.State of Bihar 1964 (2) SCR 336; Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 451; and Zhandu Pharmaceuticals Works Limited and Others v.Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Another 2005 (1) SCC 122].
In fact, the question of mala fides in a case like the present is not at all relevant. If the complaint which is made is correct and offence has been committed which will have to be established in a court of law, it is of no significance that the complainant is a person who is inimical or that he is guilty of mala fides. If the ingredients which establish the commission of the offence or misconduct exist then, the prosecution cannot fail merely because there was an animus of the complainant or the prosecution against the accused. Allegations of mala fides may be relevant while judging the correctness of the allegations or while examining the evidence. But the mere fact that the complainant is guilty of mala fides, would be no ground for quashing the proceedings. [See State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri (1996) 1 SCC 542; Zhandu Pharmaceuticals Works Limited and Others v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Another 2005 (1) SCC 122; State of Bihar & Anr. v. J.A.C. Saldanah (1980) 1 SCC 544; State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo 2005 (13) SCC 540]. There may be some exceptions to the said rule but we are not concerned with such a case.
11.2 On the decision in the case of State of Orissa and Ors. v. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan [2012 (1) GLH 875], the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that:
7.
It is true that the inherent powers vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide. Nevertheless, inherent powers do not confer arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whims or caprice. This extra-ordinary power has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and as far as possible, for extra-ordinary cases, where allegations in the complaint or the first information report, taken on its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. It needs little emphasis that unless a case of gross abuse of power is made out against those incharge of investigation, the High Court should be loath to interfere at the early/premature stage of investigation.
8. In State of West Bengal and Ors. Vs. Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors.(1982) 1 SCC 561: 1982 SCC (Cri) 283, emphasising that the Court will not normally interfere with an investigation and will permit the inquiry into the alleged offence, to be completed, this Court highlighted the necessity of a proper investigation observing thus:-
An investigation is carried on for the purpose of gathering necessary materials for establishing and proving an offence which is disclosed. When an offence is disclosed, a proper investigation in the interests of justice becomes necessary to collect materials for establishing the offence, and for bringing the offender to book. In the absence of a proper investigation in a case where an offence is disclosed, the offender may succeed in escaping from the consequences and the offender may go unpunished to the detriment of the cause of justice and the society at large. Justice requires that a person who commits an offence has to be brought to book and must be punished for the same. If the Court interferes with the proper investigation in a case where an offence has been disclosed, the offence will go unpunished to the serious detriment of the welfare of the society and the cause of the justice suffers. It is on the basis of this principle that the Court normally does not interfere with the investigation of a case where an offence has been disclosed....Whether an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.... If on a consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the Court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation into the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence.
12.
Having regard to the allegations and details mentioned in the FIR / complaint and the facts and circumstances of the case and the foregoing discussions and upon applying above quoted principles and observations by the Hon'ble Apex Court this Court is not inclined to and not convinced to entertain present petition and / or to accept the request of the petitioners.
13. The Court is neither convinced nor inclined to interfere with the investigation and to quash the FIR before the investigation at this stage i.e. even before it is commenced and concluded. The petition therefore fails and is rejected. Rule is discharged.
Sd/-
(K.M.THAKER, J.) Suresh* At this stage, Mr. Dave, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that interim relief which was granted in February 2010 and has remained in operation until now, may be extended for some time. Ms. Reeta Chandarana learned APP submitted that so far as the said request is concerned, appropriate order may be passed. Mr. Shah, learned advocate for the respondent is not present. Mr. Ankit Mehta, learned advocate for Mr. D.V. Shah, learned advocate for the respondent, is present. However, he has not raised any objection with reference to the said request. Therefore, interim relief which is in operation until today, stands extended to and shall continue on same terms until 8.10.2013.
Sd/-
(K.M.THAKER, J.) Suresh* 14