Madras High Court
Mrs.G.Pravina vs Shri.Narendra Modi on 14 May, 2014
Author: S. Manikumar
Bench: S.Manikumar, T.S.Sivagnanam
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATE: 14.05.2014
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.S.SIVAGNANAM
W.P.No.13742 of 2014
Mrs.G.Pravina .. Petitioner
versus
1.Shri.Narendra Modi,
Chief Minister, Gujarat.
Off: 5th Floor, New Sachivalaya,
Gandhi Nagar, Gujarat, India.
Res: Gujarat Chief Minister Niwas,
Section 20, Gandhi Nagar,
Gujarat, India.
2. The Director General of Police,
Gujarat Police Station,
Section 18, Gandhi Nagar Head Office,
Gandhi Nagar, Gujarat 382 010. .. Respondents
Prayer: This Writ Petition has been filed, praying for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus, directing the Director General of Police, Gujarat to take action against Mr.Narendra Modi, to take back his wife, to provide dignified life to his wife, ensuring freedom of liberty, speech and expression and equal status, as the wife of Mr.Modi and direct Mr.Narendra Modi to take back his wife and provide her dignified life ensuring his wife, freedom of speech and expression, liberty and equal status as his wife in the best interest of the Nation, women and future generation as Mr.Narendra Modi is declared as Prime Ministerial Candidate of India for Lok Sabha Elections 2014 by BJP.
For Petitioner : Mrs.G.Pravina (Party-in-Person)
O R D E R
(ORDER OF THIS COURT WAS MADE BY S.MANIKUMAR, J.) The petitioner, a lawyer and stated to be a member of Bhartiya Janatha Party (BJP), has sought for a Writ of Mandamus, directing the Director General of Police, Gujarat to take action, against Mr.Narendra Modi, to take back his wife, to provide dignified life to his wife, ensuring freedom of liberty, speech and expression and equal status, as the wife of Mr.Modi and direct Mr.Narendra Modi, to take back his wife and provide her dignified life ensuring his wife freedom of speech and expression, liberty and equal status, as his wife, in the best interest of the Nation, Women and Future generation, as Mr.Narendra Modi is declared as the Prime Ministerial Candidate of India, for Lok Sabha Elections 2014, by Bhartiya Janatha Party (BJP).
2. In support of the prayer, the petitioner has averred that Mr.Narendra Modi, in his nomination papers, for Lok Sabha Elections 2014, has declared, Mrs.Jashodaben, as his wife. According to the petitioner, sofar, Mr.Narendra Modi, has not acknowledged her, as his wife. She further submitted that the said Mrs.Jashodaben has been forced to live a secluded life, by the Candidate and his henchmen, which is a violation of Fundamental Rights, enshrined in the Constitution of India.
3. It is the further case of the petitioner that Mrs.Jashodaben has been prevented by Mr.Narendra Modi, and his henchmen, from meeting anyone, and move out of Gujarat. According to the petitioner, Mrs.Jashodaben has been threatened and she is in a distressed condition. She is not able to talk to any journalist. The petitioner has also submitted that the Headmaster of the School had instructed Mrs.Jashodaben Modi, not to speak to any outsider, during school hours, and after school hours, goondas of Mr.Modi, threatened her, not to speak to the Journalist, who contacted her. Describing Mr.Modi, the petitioner has said that he is iron hearted person and acts against the upliftment of women, denied maintenance and property rights, to his wife. According to the petitioner, Mrs.Jashodaben is in great suffering. Thus, alleging violation of the marriage and women rights and contending inter alia that, a larger public interest is involved, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.
Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the materials available on record.
4. Materials on record discloses that the basis, for preferring the present writ petition, are the newspaper and Television reports and a letter, dated 23.04.2014, addressed to Mr.Narendra Modi and a Complaint, dated 23.04.2014, sent to the Director General of Police, Gujarat, to take action against him. Both the letter and complaint, stated supra, are reproduced hereunder:
Complaint letter Wednesday, 23 April, 2014 7.22. PM From : Dr.G.Pravina Narayani<Sungpravina @yahoo.com> To: [email protected] Cc: [email protected]<[email protected]> Advocate G.Pravina, M.B.B.S., B.L. 61/10, Second Main Indra Nagar, Salem.8 To Mr.Narendra Modi, Present CM, Gujarat Sir, It is unimaginable that you had wilfully deserted your wife jasjodaben modi for no fault of hers and it is still more hard to visualise that you had denied her her fundamental rights of freedom of liberty, speech and expression enshrined in our constitution, as well you don't take care of her and provide her any affection she deserves morally and legally as your wife.
Hence i request you to take back your wife mrs.jashoda ben and provide her dignified life as your wife and guarantee her the fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution of our nation.
truly, advocate g.pravina M.B.B.S., B.L. Me To [email protected] Today at 4.57 PM On Wednesday, 23 April, 2014 2.46 PM Dr.G.Pravina Narayani <Sungpravina @yahoo.com> wrote; on, Dr.G.Pravina Narayani <Sungpravina @yahoo.com> wrote:
FROM Advocate G.Pravina, M.B.B.S., B.L. 61/10, Second Main Indra Nagar, Salem.8 TO The Director general of police and Respective Police station, GUJARAT 382010 Inspector of police, gandhi nagar, gujarat RESPECTED SIR, Mr.narendra modi, present CM, Gujaraj had violated the rights of his wife and fundamental rights of his wife mrs.jashoda ben modi, and is keeping her in seclusion thereby curtailing his wifes' fundamental rights of freedom of liberty and freedom of speech and expression. Further he had deserted his wife, jashoda ben for more than 40 years. hence i request you to take action against mr.narendra modi and make him to take back his wife and provide her dignified life as his wife and guarantee her the fundamental rights that are enshrined in our constitution. I request you to file F.I.R. against mr.narendra modi for curtailing the fundamental rights of his wife, jashoda ben, and keeping her in confinement and life threatening situation.
thanking you truly, advocate g.pravina M.B.B.S., B.L.
5. Before adverting to the above contentions, this Court deems it fit to consider, as to whether, newspaper reports, can be given any credence. A Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in A.S.M.Kumar v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2008 (5) MLJ 399, to which, one of us, is a party, has considered the following judgments, "8.The question of admissibility of the newspaper reports came up for consideration in Samant N.Balkrishna and another Vs.George Fernandez and other reported in 1969 (3) SCC 238 at paragraph 26, the Apex Court observed that "A newspaper item without any further proof of what had actually happened through witnesses is of no value. It is at best a second hand evidence. It is well known that reporters collect information and pass it on to the editor who edits the news item and then publish it. In this process truth might get perverted or garbled. Such news items cannot be said to prove themselves although they may be taken into account with other evidence if the other evidence is forcible."
9.As regards nature and admissibility of a newspaper report, the Supreme Court in Lakmi Raj Shetty and another Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 1988 (3) SCC 319, opined that "...We cannot take judicial notice of the facts stated in a news item being in the nature of hearsay secondary evidence, unless proved by evidence aliunde. A report in a newspaper is only hearsay evidence. A newspaper is not one of the documents referred to in Section 78(2) of the Evidence Act, 1872 by which an allegation of fact can be proved. The presumption of genuineness attached under Section 81 of the Evidence Act to a newspaper report cannot be treated as proved of the facts reported therein."
10.In Quamarul Islam Vs. S.K.Kanta reported in 1994 (1) SCC 452, the question as to whether mere production of the copy of the newspaper be treated as proof of the report of the speech (news item) contained therein came up for consideration. The Apex Court at Paragraph 48 of the judgment held that, "48.Newspaper reports by themselves are not evidence of the contents thereof. Those reports are only hearsay evidence. These have to be proved and the manner of proving a newspaper report is well settled. Since, in this case, neither the reporter who heard the speech and sent the report was examined nor even his reports produced, the production of the newspaper by the Editor and publisher, PW4 by itself cannot amount to proving the contents of the newspaper reports. Newspaper, is at the best secondary evidence of its contents and is not admissible in evidence without proper proof of the contents under the Indian Evidence Act. The learned trial Judge could not treat the newspaper reports as duly 'proved' only by the production of the copies of the newspaper. The election petitioner also examined Abrar Razi, PW5, who was the polling agent of the election petitioner and a resident of the locality in support of the correctness of the reports including advertisements and messages as published in the said newspaper. We have carefully perused his testimony and find that his evidence also falls short of proving the contents of the reports of the alleged speeches or the messages and the advertisements, which appeared in different issues of the newspaper. Since, the maker of the report which formed basis of the publications, did not appear in the court to depose about the facts as perceived by him, the facts contained in the published reports were clearly inadmissible. No evidence was led by the election petitioner to prove the contents of the messages and the advertisements as the original manuscript of the advertisements or the messages was not produced at the trial. No witness came forward to prove the receipt of the manuscript of any of the advertisements or the messages or the publication of the same in accordance with the manuscript. There is no satisfactory and reliable evidence on the record to even establish that the same were actually issued by IUML or MYL, ignoring for the time being, whether or not the appellant had any connection with IUML or MYL or that the same were published by him or with his consent by any other person or published by his election agent or by any other person with the consent of his election agent."
11.The Supreme Court dealing with a "pro bono publico" litigation in B.P.Singhal Vs.State of Tamil Nadu and others reported in 2004 (13) SCC 673, wherein the petitioner sought for a transfer of an investigation from Tamil Nadu State Police to the Central Bureau of Investigation, opined that:
"the petition is lacking in material particulars. All the averments made in the petition are based, by and large, on news reports and not on personal knowledge. The petition does not state that the petitioner has taken any care to verify himself the correctness of the averments made."
12.In yet another decision in Dr.B.Singh Vs. Union of India (UOI) and others reported in 2004 (3) SCC 363 dealing with a public interest litigation, challenging the propriety of the third respondent therein for being considered for appointment as a Judge, the Supreme Court while expressing its anguish found that:
"the petitioner has no where stated that he has personal knowledge of the allegations made against R3. He does not even aver that he made any effort to find out whether the allegations have any basis. He only refers to the representation of Ram Sarup and some other paper cuttings of news items. It is too much to attribute authenticity or creditability to any information or fact merely because, it found publication in a newspaper or journal or magazine or any other form of communication, as though it is gospel truth. It needs no reiteration that newspaper reports per se do not constitute legally acceptable evidence."
13. In matters relating to public interest litigation, the Supreme Court has time and again cautioned that the Court has to be satisfied about (a)the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike balance between two conflicting interests; i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the Court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature. The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. Reference can be made to the recent decision of the Apex Court in Holicow Pictures Pvt., Ltd., Vs. Prem Chandra Mishra and others reported in 2008 (1) CTC 711 (Para 20)."
6. After considering the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, at Paragraph 16, the Hon'ble Division Bench has observed as follows:
"It is now well settled that a news item published in the newspaper are only hearsay and no judicial notice can be taken unless supported by further authentic evidence. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by the Supreme Court in large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, the petitioner, without verifying the authenticity or otherwise of the news items, has chosen to resort to the extra ordinary jurisdiction. The Public Interest Litigation intended to ameliorate the grievance of the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated, should not be misused. Before maintaining a cause before the Court one should prove that there is concrete and credible basis, not withstanding the credentials claimed of the person moving the courts."
7. On the question, as to whether, print and visual media can publish any news, affecting the rights of privacy, this Court deems it fit to consider the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Article 12 of the Constitution of India, as follows:
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
8. Freedom of speech and expression, includes right not only to speak, but includes right to print, publish, distribute, receive information. But whether this right is unrestricted, unlimited and the journalists and the media are given a total freehand to publish or telecast anything they desire? Whether right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India can simply be exercised to invade into the privacy of life, which is exclusively reserved to an individual?
9. The Supreme Court in Mr.X v. Hospital Z reported in 1998 (8) SCC 296, at Paragraph 15, explained what is meant by 'right' in legal parlance and it is extracted:
"15. Right is an interest recognised and protected by moral or legal rules. It is an interest the violation of which would be a legal wrong. Respect for such interest would be a legal duty. That is how Salmond has defined right. In order, therefore, that an interest becomes the subject of a legal right, it has to have not merely legal protection but also legal recognition. The elements of a legal right are that the right is vested in a person and is available against a person who is under a corresponding obligation and duty to respect that right and has to act or forbear from acting in a manner so as to prevent the violation of the right. If, therefore, there is a legal right vested in a person, the latter can seek its protection against a person who is bound by a corresponding duty not to violate that right."
10. While dealing with the right of privacy vis-a-vis the right of the press, the Supreme Court in R.Rajagopal v. State of T.N., reported in 1994 (6) SCC 632 has held as follows:
"26. (1) The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a right to be let alone. A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. Position may, however, be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy.
11. 'Privacy' has been defined as "the rightful claim of an individual to determine to which he wishes to share himself with others and control over the time, place and circumstances to communicate with others". It means the individuals right to control dissemination of information about himself. It is his own personal possession. It is well accepted that one person's right to know and be informed may violate another's right of privacy. In other words, disclosure of certain facts, events, actions, photographs, videotapes, in any form of media, print or celluloid, internet would cause embarrassment, agony, emotional stress, to a person of reasonable sensitiveness. 'Right of Privacy' in otherwords can be said "to be let alone". What is an information to others according to a journalist, could be a personal and sensitive information to an individual. The boundary, between freedom of press and privacy of individual is the "Lakshman Rekha" and if the media, crosses the line of boundary, the invasion starts. To Strike a balance between these two competing interests is difficult. Right of privacy, vis-a-vis right of information to be furnished to the general public, in otherwords, the right of the media, should be with reference to the kind of information, which the law permits. Constitution does not guarantee absolute freedom or absolute protection to the media.
12. We wish to add that media attention should be towards exposing corruption, nepotism, law breaking, abuse or arbitrary exercise of power, law and order, economy, health, science and technology etc., which are matters of public interest. The "Lakshman Rekha" or the "line of control", should be that the publication of comments/information should not invade into the privacy of an individual, unless, outweighed by bona fide and genuine public interest. Right of information is a facet of freedom of speech and expression, enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. Right of Information has been recognised as the Fundamental Right and the Right of Press, to furnish the information or facts or opinion should be only to foster public interest, and not to encroach upon the privacy of an individual. The public at large has no fundamental or legal right to get any information or intrude into the personal life of the other individual.
13. At this juncture, this Court deems it fit to consider few judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, on public interest litigations.
(i) In S.P.Anand v. H.D.Deve Gowda reported in 1996 (6) SCC 734, the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 18, held as follows:
"It is of utmost importance that those who invoke this Court's jurisdiction seeking a waiver of the locus standi rule must exercise restraint in moving the Court by not plunging in areas wherein they are not well-versed. Such a litigant must not succumb to spasmodic sentiments and behave like a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of issues providing publicity. He must remember that as a person seeking to espouse a public cause, he owes it to the public as well as to the court that he does not rush to court without undertaking a research, even if he is qualified or competent to raise the issue. Besides, it must be remembered that a good cause can be lost if petitions are filed on half-baked information without proper research or by persons who are not qualified and competent to raise such issues as the rejection of such a petition may affect third party rights. Lastly, it must also be borne in mind that no one has a right to the waiver of the locus standi rule and the court should permit it only when it is satisfied that the carriage of proceedings is in the competent hands of a person who is genuinely concerned in public interest and is not moved by other extraneous considerations. So also the court must be careful to ensure that the process of the Court is not sought to be abused by a person who desires to persist with his point of view, almost carrying it to the point of obstinacy, by filling a series of petitions refusing to accept the Court's earlier decisions as concluding the point. We say this because when we drew the attention of the petitioner to earlier decisions of this Court, he brushed them aside, without so much as showing willingness to deal with them and without giving them a second look, as having become stale and irrelevant by passage of time and challenged their correctness on the specious plea that they needed reconsideration. Except for saying that they needed reconsideration he had no answer to the correctness of the decisions. Such a casual approach to considered decisions of this Court even by a person well-versed in law would not be countenanced. Instead, as pointed out earlier, he referred to decisions having no bearing on the question, like the decisions on cow slaughter cases, freedom of speech and expresssion, uniform civil code, etc., we need say no more except to point out that indiscriminate of this important lever of public interest litigation would blunt the lever itself."
(ii) In Balco Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India reported in 2002 (2) SCC 333, the Supreme Court, held that, "Public interest litigation, or PIL as it is more commonly known, entered the Indian judicial process in 1970. It will not be incorrect to say that it is primarily the judges who have innovated this type of litigation as there was a dire need for it. At that stage, it was intended to vindicate public interest where fundamental and other rights of the people who were poor, ignorant or in socially or economically disadvantageous position and were unable to seek legal redress were required to be espoused. PIL was not meant to be adversial in nature and was to be a cooperative and collaborative effort of the parties and the court so as to secure justice for the poor and the weaker sections of the community who were not in a position to protect their own interests. Public interest litigation was intended to mean nothing more than what words themselves said viz. "litigation in the interest of the public."
(iii) In Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B., reported in 2004 (3) SCC 349, the Apex Court, after considering few decisions, on the aspect of public interest litigation, observed as follows:
"4. When there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, said petition is to be thrown out. Before we grapple with the issue involved in the present case, we feel it necessary to consider the issue regarding public interest aspect. Public Interest Litigation which has now come to occupy an important field in the administration of law should not be "publicity interest litigation" or "private interest litigation" or "politics interest litigation" or the latest trend "paise income litigation". If not properly regulated and abuse averted it becomes also a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreck vengeance, as well. There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of knight errant or poke ones into for a probe. It cannot also be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. Courts of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by resorting to the extraordinary jurisdiction. A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in The Janta Dal v. H.S.Chowdhary [1992 (4) SCC 305] and Kazi Lhendup Dorji vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (1994 Supp (2) SCC 116). A writ petitioner who comes to the Court for relief in public interest must come not only with clean hands like any other writ petitioner but also with a clean heart, clean mind and clean objective. See Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India (AIR 1993 SC 852) and K.R.Srinivas v. R.M.Premchand (1994 (6) SCC 620).
5. It is necessary to take note of the meaning of expression 'public interest litigation'. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Volume 4 (IV Edition), 'Public Interest' is defined thus:
"Public Interest (1) a matter of public or general interest does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected."
6. In Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), "public interest" is defined as follows :
"Public Interest something in which the public, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by national government...."
7. In Janata Dal case (supra) this Court considered the scope of public interest litigation. In para 52 of the said judgment, after considering what is public interest, has laid down as follows :
"The expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceedings therein initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, lexically the expression "PIL" means the legal action initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected."
8. In paras 60, 61 and 62 of the said judgment, it was pointed out as follows:
"Be that as it may, it is needless to emphasis that the requirement of locus standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory, because the legal capacity of the party to any litigation whether in private or public action in relation to any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained at the threshold."
9. In para 96 of the said judgment, it has further been pointed out as follows:
"While this Court has laid down a chain of notable decisions with all emphasis at their command about the importance and significance of this newly developed doctrine of PIL, it has also hastened to sound a red alert and a note of severe warning that Courts should not allow its process to be abused by a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper or wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern except for personal gain or private profit or other oblique consideration."
10. In subsequent paras of the said judgment, it was observed as follows:
"109. It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have as locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL, brought before the Court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold".
11. It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievance go unnoticed, un-represented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay in service matters - government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu expecting their release from the detention orders etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the Courts and having their grievances redressed, the busy bodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffing their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into the Courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the court never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they loose faith in the administration of our judicial system.
12. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, Court must be careful to see that a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busy bodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.
13. The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford Foundation in USA defined the "public interest litigation" in its report of Public Interest Law, USA, 1976 as follows:
"Public Interest Law is the name that has recently been given to efforts provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken in the recognition that ordinary market place for legal services fails to provide such services to significant segments of the population and to significant interests. Such groups and interests include the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others."
14. The Court has to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike balance between two conflicting interests; (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the Court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature. The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect.
15. Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good. (See State of Maharastra v. Prabhu [(1994 (2) SCC 481)] and Andra Pradesh State Financial Corporation v. M/s.GAR Re-Rolling Mills and Another [AIR 1994 SC 2151]. No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. [See Buddhi Kota Subbarao (Dr.) v. K.Parasaran, (1996) 7 JT 265]. Today people rush to Courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name of public interest. They must inspire confidence in Courts and among the public.
16. As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to note that Courts are flooded with large number of so called public interest litigations where even a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called as public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, Courts are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Dr.Duryodhan Sahu and Ors., v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Ors., (AIR 1999 SC 114), this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of so- called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in the Courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision. The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them. In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official documents. Whenever such frivolous pleas are taken to explain possession, the Court should do well not only to dismiss the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would be desirable for the Courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs as afore-stated so that the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the Courts.
17. ..........
18. In S.P.Gupta v. Union of India [1981 Supp. SCC 87], it was emphatically pointed out that the relaxation of the rule of locus standi in the field of PIL does not give any right to a busybody or meddlesome interloper to approach the Court under the guise of a public interest litigant. He has also left the following note of caution: (SCC p.219, para 24) "But we must be careful to see that the member of the public, who approaches the court in cases of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political objective."
19. In State of H.P. vs. A Parent of a Student of Medical College, Simla and Ors. (1985 (3) SCC 169), it has been said that public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection.
20. Khalid, J. in his separate supplementing judgment in Sachidanand Pandey vs. State of W.B., (1987 (2) SCC 295, 331) said:
"Today public spirited litigants rush to courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name. They must inspire confidence in courts and among the public. They must be above suspicion. (SCC p. 331, para 46) * * * Public interest litigation has now come to stay. But one is led to think that it poses a threat to courts and public alike. Such cases are now filed without any rhyme or reason. It is, therefore, necessary to lay down clear guidelines and to outline the correct parameters for entertainment of such petitions. If courts do not restrict the free flow of such cases in the name of public interest litigations, the traditional litigation will suffer and the courts of law, instead of dispensing justice, will have to take upon themselves administrative and executive functions. (SCC p.334, para 59) * * * I will be second to none in extending help when such help is required. But this does not mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some self- imposed restraint on public interest litigants." (SCC p.335, para 61)
21. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench in ramsharan Autyanuprasi v. Union of India (1989 Supp (1) SCC 251), was in full agreement with the view expressed by Khalid, J. in Sachidanand Pandey's case (supra) and added that 'public interest litigation' is an instrument of the administration of justice to be used properly in proper cases. [See also separate judgment by Pathak, J. (as he then was) in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984 (3) SCC 161).
22. Sarkaria, J. in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar (1976 (1) SCC 671) expressed his view that the application of the busybody should be rejected at the threshold in the following terms: (SCC p. 683, para 37) "It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories : (i) 'person aggrieved'; (ii) 'stranger'; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold."
23. Krishna Iyer, J. in Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India (1981 (1) SCC 568) in stronger terms stated: (SCC p.589, para 48) "48. If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern beyond what belongs to any one of the 660 million people of this country, the door of the court will not be ajar for him."
24. In Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharash Samiti v. State of U.P., (1990 (4) SCC 449), Sabyasachi Mukharji, C.J. observed: (SCC p.452, para 8) "While it is the duty of this Court to enforce fundamental rights, it is also the duty of this Court to ensure that this weapon under Article 32 should not be misused or permitted to be misused creating a bottleneck in the superior court preventing other genuine violation of fundamental rights being considered by the court."
25. In Union Carbid Corporation v. Union of India (1991 (4) SCC 584, 610), Ranganath Mishra, C.J. in his separate judgment while concurring with the conclusions of the majority judgment has said thus: (SCC p.610, para 21) "I am prepared to assume, nay, concede, that public activists should also be permitted to espouse the cause of the poor citizens but there must be a limit set to such activity and nothing perhaps should be done which would affect the dignity of the Court and bring down the serviceability of the institution to the people at large. Those who are acquainted with jurisprudence and enjoy social privilege as men educated in law owe an obligation to the community of educating it properly and allowing the judicial process to continue unsoiled."
26 In Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991 (1) SCC 598) it was observed as follows:
"Public interest litigation cannot be invoked by a person or body of persons to satisfy his or its personal grudge and enmity. If such petitions under Article 32, are entertained it would amount to abuse of process of the court, preventing speedy remedy to other genuine petitioners from this Court. Personal interest cannot be enforced through the process of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution in the garb of a public interest litigation. Public interest litigation contemplates legal proceeding for vindication or enforcement of fundamental rights of a group of persons or community which are not able to enforce their fundamental rights on account of their incapacity, poverty or ignorance of law. A person invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 must approach this Court for the vindication of the fundamental rights of affected persons and not for the purpose of vindication of his personal grudge or enmity. It is the duty of this Court to discourage such petitions and to ensure that the course of justice is not obstructed or polluted by unscrupulous litigants by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for personal matters under the garb of the public interest litigation".
27. In the words of Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) "the courts must be careful in entertaining public interest litigations" or in the words of Sarkaria, J. "the applications of the busybodies should be rejected at the threshold itself" and as Krishna Iyer, J. has pointed out, "the doors of the courts should not be ajar for such vexatious litigants"."
(iv) In Vikas Vashishth v. Allahabad High Court reported in 2004 (13) SCC 485, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"At the very outset, we put it to the petitioner that a bare perusal of the petition shows that it is based entirely on newspaper reports and asked him whether before filing the petition he has taken care to verify the facts personally. His answer is in the negative. In the writ petition all the 21 High Courts have been included as respondents and Union of India has also been impleaded as the 22nd respondent. We asked the petitioner what has provoked him to implead all the High Courts as respondents and he states that it is his apprehension that similar incidents may occur in other High Courts though there is no factual foundation for such appreciation.
5. After affording the full opportunity of hearing, we are satisfied that what purports to have been filed as a public interest litigation is nothing more than a "publicity interest litigation". It is writ large that it has been filed without any effort at verifying the facts by the petitioner personally."
(v) In R & M.Trust v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group reported in 2005 (3) SCC 91, the Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 23 and 24, observed as follows:
"23. Next question is whether such Public Interest Litigation should at all be entertained & laches thereon. This sacrosanct jurisdiction of Public Interest Litigation should be invoked very sparingly and in favour of vigilant litigant and not for the persons who invoke this jurisdiction for the sake of publicity or for the purpose of serving their private ends.
24. Public Interest Litigation is no doubt a very useful handle for redressing the grievances of the people but unfortunately lately it has been abused by some interested persons and it has brought very bad name. Courts should be very very slow in entertaining petitions involving public interest in a very rare cases where public at large stand to suffer. This jurisdiction is meant for the purpose of coming to the rescue of the down trodden and not for the purpose of serving private ends. It has now become common for unscrupulous people to serve their private ends and jeopardize the rights of innocent people so as to wreak vengeance for their personal ends. This has become very handy to the developers and in matters of public contracts. In order to serve their professional rivalry they utilize the service of the innocent people or organization in filing public interest litigation. The Courts are sometimes persuaded to issue certain directions without understanding implication and giving a handle in the hands of the authorities to misuse it. Therefore, the courts should not exercise this jurisdiction lightly but should exercise in a very rare and few cases involving public interest of large number of people who cannot afford litigation and are made to suffer at the hands of the authorities."
(vi) In Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 2005 (5) SCC 136, the Supreme Court, while considering the scope of a petition styled as a public interest litigation, held as follows:
"5. The scope of entertaining a petition styled as a public interest litigation, locus standi of the petitioner particularly in matters involving service of an employee has been examined by this court in various cases. The Court has to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike balance between two conflicting interests; (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the Court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature. The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect.
6. .....
7. As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to note that Courts are flooded with large number of so called public interest litigations where even a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called as public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, High Courts are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Ors. (AIR 1999 SC 114), this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of so-called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in the Courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision. The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them. In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official documents. Whenever such frivolous pleas are taken to explain possession, the Court should do well not only to dismiss the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would be desirable for the Courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs as afore-stated so that the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the Courts.
8. ......
9. It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievance go unnoticed, un-represented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and substantial rights and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay in service matters - government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of tax cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu expecting their release from the detention orders etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the Courts and having their grievances redressed, the busy bodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no real public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffing their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into the Courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions of luxury litigants who have nothing to loose but trying to gain for nothing and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the court never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants.
10. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be allowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, Court must be careful to see that a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations by masked phantoms who monitor at times from behind. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives and try to bargain for a good deal as well to enrich themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busy bodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs."
(vii) In Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v. Union of India reported in 2008 (5) SCC 511, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Markandey Katju (as he then was), held as follows:
"59. Unfortunately, the truth is that PILs are being entertained by many courts as a routine and the result is that the dockets of most of the superior courts are flooded with PILs, most of which are frivolous or for which the judiciary has no remedy. As stated in Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharastra reported in AIR 2005 SC 540, public interest litigation has nowadays largely become 'publicity interest litigation', 'private interest litigation', or 'politics interest litigation' or the latest trend 'paise income litigation'. Much of P.I.L. is really blackmail.
60. Thus, Public Interest Litigation which was initially created as a useful judicial tool to help the poor and weaker section of society who could not afford to come to courts, has, in course of time, largely developed into an uncontrollable Frankenstein and a nuisance which is threatening to choke the dockets of the superior courts obstructing the hearing of the genuine and regular cases which have been waiting to be taken up for years together."
In the same judgment, concurring with the view of his Brother Judge, Hon'ble Mr. Justice H.K.Sema (as he then was), further added, as follows:
"69. Therefore, whether to entertain the petition in the form of Public Interest Litigation either represented by public-spirited person; or private interest litigation in the guise of public interest litigation; or publicity interest litigation; or political interest litigation is to be examined in the facts and circumstances recited in the petition itself. I am also of the view that if there is a buffer zone unoccupied by the legislature or executive which is detrimental to the public interest, judiciary must occupy the field to subserve public interest. Therefore, each case has to be examined on its own facts."
(viii) In Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya v. Subhash Rahangdale reported in 2012 (2) SCC 425, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
"57. In the light of the above, we shall first consider whether the High Court committed an error by entertaining the writ petition filed by Subhash Rahangdale as public interest litigation. This Court has, time and again, laid down guiding principles for entertaining petitions filed in public interest. However, for the purpose of deciding the appellants' objection it is not necessary to advert to the plethora of precedents on the subject because in State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) 3 SCC 402, a two-Judge Bench discussed the development of law relating to public interest litigation and reiterated that before entertaining such petitions, the Court must feel satisfied that the petitioner has genuinely come forward to espouse public cause and his litigious venture is not guided by any ulterior motive or is not a publicity gimmick.
58. In paragraphs 96 to 104, the Bench discussed Phase-III of the public interest litigation in the context of transparency and probity in governance, referred to the judgments in Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226, Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 532, Rajiv Ranjan Singh "Lalan" (VIII) v. Union of India (2006) 6 SCC 613, M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2007) 1 SCC 110, M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2008) 1 SCC 407 and observed:
"These are some of the cases where the Supreme Court and the High Courts broadened the scope of public interest litigation and also entertained petitions to ensure that in governance of the State, there is transparency and no extraneous considerations are taken into consideration except the public interest. These cases regarding probity in governance or corruption in public life dealt with by the courts can be placed in the third phase of public interest litigation."
59. Reference also deserves to be made to the judgment of the three-Judge Bench in Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi (1987) 1 SCC 227 in which a new dimension was given to the power of the Superior Courts to make investigation into the issues of public importance even though the petitioner may have moved the Court for vindication of a private interest. In that case the High Court had entertained a writ petition filed by Assistant Medical Officer of K.E.M. Hospital, Bombay questioning the assessment of answer sheets of the Post Graduate Medical Examinations held by the Bombay University in October 1985. He alleged malpractices in the evaluation of the answer sheets of the daughter of the appellant who, at the relevant time, was Chief Minister of the State. The learned Single Judge held that altering and tampering of the grade sheets was done by Dr. Rawal at the behest of the Chief Minister. The Division Bench affirmed the order of the learned Single Judge with some modification.
60. While rejecting the objection raised on behalf of the appellant that the writ petition filed by the respondent cannot be treated as a petition filed in public interest, this Court observed:
"The allegations made in the petition disclose a lamentable state of affairs in one of the premier universities of India. The petitioner might have moved in his private interest but enquiry into the conduct of the examiners of the Bombay University in one of the highest medical degrees was a matter of public interest. Such state of affairs having been brought to the notice of the Court, it was the duty of the Court to the public that the truth and the validity of the allegations made be inquired into. It was in furtherance of public interest that an enquiry into the state of affairs of public institution becomes necessary and private litigation assumes the character of public interest litigation and such an enquiry cannot be avoided if it is necessary and essential for the administration of justice." (emphasis supplied)
14. Newspaper reports, without any basis has no value at all. The report is only a hearsay. It is not one of the documents, referred to in Section 78(2) of the Evidence Act, by which, an allegation can be proved. Averments made in the supporting affidavit are made, as if, the petitioner had personal knowledge and spoke to Mrs.Jashodaben.
15. As stated supra, "Right of Privacy" means, "to be left alone". A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his/her own, family, marriage. No one has a right to publish anything concerning the above matter, whether truthful or otherwise, and whether laudable or critical. If anybody does so, he/she would be violating the right of privacy of the person concerned and liable, in an action for damages.
16. The basis for this writ petition, rests on, (1) the letter, dated 23.04.2014, written by the petitioner to Mr.Narendra Modi, (2) a complaint, dated 23.04.2014, addressed to the Director General of Police, State of Gujarat, to file FIR, (3) Newspaper and Visual Media. Whatever be the relationship between the spouses, factum and animus deserendi are purely personal, and inter-se.
17. In this case, a complaint of desertion has been made by a third party, claiming herself to be probono litigant. Under the guise of public interest litigation, she has no right to invade into the privacy of any individual, make wild allegations, as if, an offence relating to marriage, has been committed.
S. MANIKUMAR, J.
AND T.S.SIVAGNANAM, J.
skm
18. The averments made in the supporting affidavit, are baseless and without any proof. The writ petition is nothing but a publicity oriented writ petition. For the reasons, stated supra, this Court is not inclined to entertain the petition.
19. Hence, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is also closed.
(S.M.K., J.) (T.S.S., J.) 14.05.2014 Index: Yes Internet: Yes skm To The Director General of Police, Gujarat Police Station, Section 18, Gandhi Nagar Head Office, Gandhi Nagar, Gujarat 382 010.W.P.No.13742 of 2014