Madras High Court
The Management Of Tiruvarur Consumer vs T.Vetrithingal on 23 July, 2014
Author: D.Hariparanthaman
Bench: D.Hariparanthaman
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 23 / 07 /2014
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.HARIPARANTHAMAN
W.P.NO.29838 OF 2013
AND CONNECTED MISCELLANEOUS PETITIONS
The Management of Tiruvarur Consumer
Co-operative Wholesale Stores Ltd.,
Rep. By its Managing Director
No.39, Mela Vadambokki Street,
Tiruvarur. ... Petitioner
Vs.
1.T.Vetrithingal
2.The Presiding Officer
Labour Court
Cuddalore. ... Respondents
PRAYER: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issuance of Writ of Certiorari, to call for the records of the 2nd respondent dated 04.07.2013 passed in I.D.No.48/2003.
For Petitioner : Mr.M.Kalyanasundaram
Senior Counsel for Mr.V.Srinivasan
For Respondent-1 : Mr.N.Manoharan
O R D E R
The writ petitioner is a Co-operative Society. Its Head Office is at Thiruvarur. It has 43 Branches. It also supplies essential commodities to 575 ration shops through the branches.
2.The first respondent is the Accounts Manager in the petitioner Society, working at the Head Office. He entered into service on 01.01.1976. He earned various promotions and finally as Accounts Manager when he was dismissed from service by an order dated 26.08.2002. He was assisted by 9 assistants, at the Head Office. Misappropriation of funds took place in Velankannai Branch to the tune of Rs.3,60,000/- and at Thiruthuraipoondi Branch to the tune of Rs.7,46,391/- and admittedly, the salesman, in the respective branches, misappropriated the amounts.
3.A charge memo dated 15.05.2001 was issued to the first respondent making five allegations. The crux of the allegation is that since he failed to effectively carry out the supervisory work of looking into the accounts of the branches, the salesmen of Velankannai Branch and Thiruthuraipoondi Branch misappropriated a huge amount. The first respondent has submitted his explanation denying the charges. According to him, he cannot be held responsible for the misappropriation in the branches. In fact, according to him, he only brought out the misappropriation to light, through his report, as soon as the Clerk concerned put up the relevant files.
4.The petitioner Society decided to hold a departmental enquiry. An Enquiry Officer was appointed. In the enquiry, 151 documents were marked as Exs.M1 to M151 and 5 witnesses were examined as M.W.1 to M.W.5, on the side of the writ petitioner Society. The Enquiry Officer gave a report dated 31.05.2002, running to 100 pages, holding that the charges were not established against the first respondent.
5.However, the petitioner Society issued a show cause notice dated 30.07.2002 to the first respondent, to show cause, as to why he should not be removed from service, since the petitioner came to a different conclusion from that of the Enquiry Officer, in respect of the charges.
6.The first respondent gave his explanation dated 12.08.2002 to the show cause notice. He was also given a personal hearing. His explanation to the said show cause notice was rejected and he was dismissed from service, by an order dated 26.08.2002.
7.The first respondent took up the industrial dispute relating to his non employment before the second respondent Labour Court in I.D.No.48/2003, when his conciliatory efforts failed. Before the Labour Court, apart from raising various issues, he has also raised an issue that the Special Officer, who passed the dismissal order, has no authority to pass such order.
8.The Labour Court passed an award dated 17.04.2007 in I.D.No.48/2003, at an earlier instance, holding that the Special Officer was competent to pass the dismissal order and dismissed the industrial dispute, without going into the merits.
9.In those circumstances, the first respondent approached this Court, by filing writ petition in W.P.No.27082/2007. The writ petition was allowed by this Court on 07.02.2012 and the matter was remanded back to the Labour Court to decide the issue on merits.
10.While so, on remand, after hearing both sides, the Labour Court, exercising its power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (shortly the Act) passed the impugned award dated 04.07.2013, in I.D.No.48/2003, interfering with the order of dismissal from service, and substituting it with reduction in rank by one step and continuity of service, along with the backwages applicable to the post.
11.In the meantime, since the first respondent reached the age of superannuation on 30.06.2007, the Labour Court held that he is not entitled to reinstatement, but he is entitled to wages only upto 30.06.2007 and the terminal benefits, pursuant to the award.
12.Now, the petitioner has approached this Court seeking to quash the order dated 04.07.2013 passed by the second respondent Labour Court in I.D.No.48/2003.
13.The first respondent filed counter affidavit refuting the allegations.
14.Heard the submissions made on either side.
15.The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Labour Court committed error in interfering with the punishment of dismissal, particularly, when it came to the conclusion that the misconduct alleged against the first respondent was proved. He submitted that the Society suffered a huge loss to the tune of Rs.10,00,000/- and therefore, the Labour Court was not correct in interfering with the punishment. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in RM PARMAR VS. GUJARAT ELECTRICITY BOARD [1982 LAB LC 1031] relied on by the Labour Court has no application to the facts of this case.
16.On the other hand, the learned counsel for the first respondent workman submitted that the Labour Court exercised its power under Section 11-A of the Act judiciously and gave coherent reasons for its conclusion for its interference in the order of punishment. He further submitted that the Labour Court has categorically recorded that the salesmen alone misappropriated the sale proceeds and falsified the accounts, even as per the charge memo. The Labour Court recorded that there was no allegation against the first respondent relating to misappropriation and the allegation against him was that he was negligent. It was also not alleged that the first respondent colluded with the persons, who committed misappropriation and there was no allegation against the first respondent that he obtained wrongful gain, by his negligent conduct. He submitted that the first respondent, immediately on bringing to his notice by the concerned Assistants working under him about the irregularities, he reported the same to the petitioner and the same led to the finding of large scale misappropriation by those salesmen, in those branches and those persons were subsequently removed from service. Since there were 43 branches, the relevant records relating to 43 branches are sent to the concerned Assistants and the Assistants in turn shall peruse the records and put a note and thereafter place the same to first respondent. In this case, no action was taken against the concerned Clerks, for negligence in their duties.
17.The learned counsel for the first respondent took me through the typed set of papers produced before this Court and submitted that the concerned Assistants were not even issued with the charge memo and hence, it is highly discriminatory. Further, taking into account his long service of over 25 years and the promotions given to him, the interference of the Labour Court in the punishment of dismissal, on the aforestated ground is perfectly valid and hence, there is no infirmity in the award, and the award could not be described as perverse one warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
18.The learned counsel for the first respondent relied on the judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court in MAVJI C. LAKUM VS. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA [2008 (12) SCC 726] and HARJINDER SINGH VS. PUNJAB STATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION [2010 (3) SCC 192] and contended that whenever the Labour Court has exercised its power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, giving valid reasons, this Court could not normally interfere under its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. According to him, since there is no perversity in the award of the Labour Court, no interference of the award is warranted.
19.Furthermore, the learned counsel for the first respondent has submitted that the dismissal order is against the principles of natural justice. He submitted that though the disciplinary authority has power to disagree with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer that the charges were not proved, the Disciplinary Authority shall record tentative reasons for his disagreement and shall hear on the disagreement and thereafter only pass the order of punishment, based on his disagreement. In this case, according to him, there are two incurable manifest error in the dismissal order. Firstly, the show cause notice dated 30.07.2002 directed the first respondent to show cause as to why he shall not be removed from service based on the differed conclusion of the Disciplinary Authority. According to him, the show cause notice was only on the punishment and was not on the disagreement. According to him, the authority recorded a categorical finding of disagreement, without hearing the first respondent, on the disagreement. The second error, according to him is that while the charge memo alleged that the petitioner was negligent in his duties, the show cause notice proceeded erroneously that he colluded with the culprits in the commission of misappropriation, which is totally a different charge. The Disciplinary Authority cannot hold, in any circumstances, that the first respondent colluded with the persons, who committed actual misappropriation, when the same allegation was not mentioned in the charge memo issued to him and the enquiry also proceeded on the allegation made in the charge memo that he was only negligent. Hence, the very finding of the disciplinary authority in the show cause notice dated 30.07.2002 that he colluded with the persons, who misappropriated the funds of the petitioner society is clearly illegal and violative of principles of natural justice, as no such charge was ever made against the first respondent.
20.I have considered the submissions made on either side and perused the materials available on record.
21.It is relevant to extract the charges that were made against the first respondent in the charge memo dated 15.05.2001 that led to his ultimate dismissal from service.
Fw;wr;rhl;L vz;;1. jpU o/btw;wpj;jp';fs;. fzf;Fnkyhsh;. ntsh';fz;zp tpw;gid fpis-1y; gzpg[hpe;j tpw;gidahsh; jpU/v!;.jkpHurd; vd;gth; tpw;gidj; bjhif U:/3/60/000/-I ifahly; bra;Js;sija[k; fz;Lgpof;f jtwpaJld; my;yhky; gz;lfrhiyf;F epjp ,Hg;g[ Vw;gl fhuzkhf ,Ue;Js;shh;.
Fw;wr;rhl;L vz;;2. jpUj;Jiwg;g{z;o etPd rpy;yiu tpw;gid epiyaj;jpd; tpw;gidahsh; jpU/tp/KUfhde;jk; vd;gth; bghJ tpepnahfj;jpl;lj;jpd; fPH; ,izg;g[r; r';f';fsplkpUe;J mj;jpahtrpa bghUl;fs; tpw;gidj; bjhifia tR{ypj;J kj;jpa Tl;Lwt[ t';fpapy; brYj;jp gz;lfrhiyapd; tpw;gidj; bjhifia brYj;jpajhf fzf;F vGjp gz;lfrhiyapd; tpw;gidj; bjhif U./7.46.391.01I ifahly; bra;Js;sij fz;Lgpof;f jtwpaJld; my;yhky; gz;lfrhiyf;F epjp ,Hg;g[ Vw;gl fhuzkhf ,Ue;Js;shh;.
Fw;wr;rhl;L vz;;3 ,izg;g[ r';f';fspd; bgahpy; cstilg;g[ \yk; Fk;gnfhzk; kj;jpa Tl;Lwt[ t';fpapy; mj;jpahtrpag; bghUl;fs; tpw;gidj; bjhifia brYj;jpajhf nghypahd bryhd;fs; jahh; bra;Jk;/ eilKiw fzf;F vz; 343f;fhd gh!;g[j;jfj;jpy; nghypahd gjpt[fis tpw;gidahsh; jpU/tp/KUfhde;jk;/ bra;Js;sij Fw;wk; rhl;lg;gl;lth; fz;Lgpof;f jtwpa[s;shh;
Fw;wr;rhl;L vz;;4 ntsh';fz;zp fpis 1#2 tpw;gidahsh; jpU.v!.jkpHurd; 5.10.2000 Kjy; 31.3.2001 njjp Koa jpdrhp tpw;gidj; bjhFg;g[ gl;oay;fis jahh; bra;J tt[r;rh;fSld; jiyik mYtyfj;jpw;F mDg;gtpy;iy. Fw;wk; rhl;lg;gl;ltuhd jpU.o.btw;wpj;jp';fs/; fzf;Fnkyhshpd;/ ftdj;Jf;F bfhz;L tug ;gl;oUe;Jk; tpw;gid fzf;Ffis bgWtjw;F eltof;if vLf;f jtwpaJld; my;yhky; gz;lfrhiyapd; tut[ bryt[ g[j;jf';fis vGj Koahj epiy Vw;gl;ljw;F ,th; fhuzkhf ,Ue;Js;shh;.
Fw;wr;rhl;L vz;;5 Fw;wr;rhl;L vz; 1 Kjy; 4 Koa cs;sitfspy; bjhptpf;fg;gl;Ls;sthW ,th; jdJ flik kw;Wk; bghWg;g[fspypUe;J jtwpa[s;shh;.
22.Though five charges were made, the fifth charge is a consequential one and therefore, only four charges are relevant. Two among the four charges relates to misappropriation in Velankanni Branch and the other two relates to misappropriation in Thiruthuraipoondi Branch.
23.The report of the Enquiry Officer is a detailed one running to 100 pages and he recorded a finding that none of the charges were established. No one can dispute the power of the disciplinary authority to disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and to come to a different conclusion. But before coming to such a different conclusion, which is adverse to the workman, the disciplinary authority shall hear the workman on the disagreement and only after hearing the workman on the disagreement, the disciplinary authority shall come to a conclusion on the disagreement and pass the order of punishment, based on the disagreement. That is, the Disciplinary Authority could come to tentative conclusion with regard to disagreement and could state reasons for such tentative conclusion and the workman shall be heard on the tentative conclusion. After hearing the delinquent workman concerned, the Disciplinary Authority could pass an order of punishment, based on his differed findings.
24.In this case, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the first respondent, the show cause notice dated 30.07.2002 was issued to the first respondent to show cause as to why he shall not be removed from service based on the different conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority. The show cause notice is very clear that it was not a tentative conclusion on the different finding. But the disciplinary authority came to a different conclusion and decided to impose the punishment and the first respondent was heard on the punishment, based on the differed conclusion that was reached, without hearing the first respondent. It is therefore relevant to extract the conclusion of the disciplinary authority, on each of the charges, which reads as follows:
Fw;wr;rhl;L vz; 1 eph;thfj;jug;g[ ghprPyid fzf;F nkyhsh; vd;w gzpapy; ,Ue;Js;s ,th; gz;lfrhiyapy; fzf;fuhf jdJ gzpia Jtf;fp gzp Mw;wp te;Js;shh;. ,tUf;F gz;lfrhiyapd; xt;bthU gphptpYk; eilbgWk; vy;yh mirt[k; mwpa jdJ ePz;l gzp mDgtj;jhy; tha;g;g[ cs;sJ. nkYk; gz;lfrhiyapd; epjp Mjhu';fs;/ epjp gad;ghLfs; epjpKlf;fk; epjpbjhlh;g[ila ,d';fis fz;L epjp nkyhz;ik bra;ant ,th; fzf;F nkyhsh; gzpepiyapy; itf;fg;gl;L Cjpak; bgw;W te;Js;shh;. xU kdpjdpd; ehoj;Jog;ig nrhjpj;J mtdJ clw;Tw;iw Twty;y xU kUj;Jtiug; nghd;nw ,th; gz;lfrhiyapd; fzf;FfSf;F kUj;Jtuhf bray;gl ntz;oa flika[k; bghWg;g[Ks;s ,tUf;F eph;zapf;fg;gl;l flikfSk;/ bghWg;g[k;/ gz;lfrhiy mYtyf Miz 1/99 ehs;1.12.98 go xt;bthU ehSk; fpisfspypUe;J tug;bgWk; jpdrhp tpw;gid mwpf;iffis rhpghh;j;jYk;/ ,j;Jld; tUk; bryt[r;rhd;Wfis rhpghh;j;J bryt[ rhd;WfSf;F njitahd rhpahd fzf;F jiyg;gpl;Lk;/ chpa ngnuhLfis jhkjkpd;wp fzf;Fg; gphpt[ cjtpahsh;fs; vGj Mtd bra;tJk;/ rhpghh;g;gJk;/ tpw;gid mwpf;if kw;Wk; bryt[r;rhd;Wfs; bjhlh;ghf Fiwfs; ,Ug;gpd; mt;tYtyf nkyhz;ik ,af;FdUf;F bjhptpj;J clDf;Fld; eltof;if vLf;f ntz;oaJk; cs;sJ. jpU.v!;. jkpHurd; gz;lfrhiyapd; epjp U.3/60/000/-I ifahly; bra;a cle;ijahf ,Ue;J Fw;wr;braiy kiwj;Js;shh;. 6.7.2000 Kjy; 1.10.2000 tiu ntsh';fz;zp 1&2 fpisapypUe;J tpw;gid bjhFg;g[ gl;oaYk;/ bryt[ rhd;WfSk; 2.2.2001y; jhd; jiyik mYtyfk; tug;bgw;Ws;sJ. ,t;thW fhyjhkjkhf tug;bgw;Ws;sJ vd;gij ,th; fz;fhzpf;fhky; gphpt[ vGj;jh;fisa[k;/ ,ju gzpahsh;fisa[k; mjw;F bghWg;ghf;FtJ jtwhFk;. ntz;Lbkd;W jpl;lkpl;L jpU v!;.jkpHurd;/ eltof;iffSf;F cle;ijahf ,Ue;J Fw;wj;ij kiwj;jjhfnt eph;thfk;; ,e;j braiy nehf;fp/ jpU.v!;.jkpHurd;/ vt;tpjk; Fw;wthspnah mt;tpjnk Fw;wj;jpw;F Jizepd;W gz;lfrhiyf;F bgUj;j epjpapHg;ig cz;lhf;fpa ,tiua[k; Fw;wk; g[hpe;Js;stuhfnt Kot[ nkw;bfhs;fpwJ.
Fw;wr;rhl;L vz; 2 eph;thfj;jug;g[ ghprPyid gz;lfrhiyapd; midj;J tut[ bryt[ fzf;Ffisa[k; fz;fhzpj;J md;whl epjpepiyikia cWjp bra;tjw;fhfnt jpU.o.btw;wpj;jp';fs; fzf;F nkyhsh; gzpahw;wp te;Js;shh;. ,jw;fhfnt ,th; gz;lfrhiyapy; Cjpak; bgw;Ws;shh;. ,tUf;fhd flik kw;Wk; bghWg;g[fspy; ,J bjspthf ,tUf;F Twg;gl;Ls;sJ. gz;lfrhiy mYtyf Miz e.f.1/99 ehs; 1.12.98go ,J cWjpgLj;jg;gLfpwJ. jhd;bra;a ntz;oa ntiyfis gpwh; bra;ahjjhy; Vw;gl;ljhf Fw;wk; Rkj;jg;gl;lth; TWtij Vw;f ,ayhJ. Rkhh; ,uz;L Mz;L fhyk; xU fpisapypUe;J gz;lfrhiyf;F bjhif brYj;jg;gl;ljhft[k; ,izg;g[ r';f';fSf;Fk; mnj nghy urPJfs; (bryhd;fs;) tH';fpa[k; jdp xU eguhf jpU.tp.KUfhde;jk; jhnk bray;gl;oUf;f ,ayhJ vd;gJld; fzf;F nkyhsh; vDk; Kiwapy; ,t;tst[ bghpa bjhif btspnaWtJ ve;j tHpahf vd;gij fz;lwpahJ gz;lfrhiyapd; tpw;gidahsuhy; bra;ag;gl;l epjpf;ifahlYf;F ,th; cle;ijahf ,Ue;J jpl;lkpl;L tpw;gidahsh; jpU.tp.KUfhde;jj;jpd; Fw;w braiy kiwj;J eph;thfj;ij Vkhw;wp ,tUk; Fw;wkpiHj;Js;sjhfnt eph;thfk; Kot[ bra;fpwJ.
Fw;wr;rhl;L vz; 3 eph;thfj;jug;g[ ghprPyid jpU.tp.KUfhde;jk;/ tpw;gidahsh; jpUj;Jiwg;g{z;oapy; cs;s Fk;gnfhzk; kj;jpa Tl;Lwt[ t';fp fpisapy; 99-2000 kw;Wk; 2000-2001 Tl;Lwt[ Mz;Lfspy; U.2/28/001/- mst[f;F ,izg;g[ r';f';fspy; ,Ue;J cstil \yk; bjhif bgw;W brYj;jpajhf nghyp bryhd;fs; jahhpj;Jk;/ nghyp gh!;g[j;jf gjpt[fs; bra;Js;sija[k;/ fzf;F nkyhsh; vd;w Kiwapy; Muk;gj;jpnyna fz;Lgpoj;J jLj;J chpa eltof;if nkw;bfhs;shky; ,sepiy vGj;jUf;F nkyhsh; cjtpahshf ,Ue;jjhf TWtJ/ jd; flikiaa[k;/ bghWg;iga[k; gpwh;njhs;kPJ Rkj;jp jg;gpf;f epidg;gjhFk;. nkYk; jzpf;if Kof;f fhyjhkjkhdJ vd;gJk; mjdhnyna jtW fhyj;jpy; fz;Lgpof;fg;gltpy;iy vd;gJk; Kw;wpYk; Vw;g[ila thjkpy;iy. jdf;F rk;ge;jkpy;yhjJnghy jdf;F fPH; ntiyghh;g;gth;fs; kPJk; jd;bdhj;j ,ju mYtyh;fs; kPJk; Fiw Tw ,th; fzf;Fnkyhsh; vd;w bghWg;gpypUe;J Cjpak; bgw;wJ vt;tpjj;jpYk; Vw;g[ilajhfhJ. nkw;ghh;itg;gzp vd;gnj bghWg;g[ TLjyhd gzp vd;gija[k; gz;lfrhiyapy; xl;Lbkhj;j epjp MjhuKk; fzf;Fnkyhsuhy; fhzg;gLtija[k; czuhJ gy tHpfspy; epjp Mjhuk; btspnaw ,th; cle;ijahft[k; Fw;wj;ij kiwj;J Fw;wkpiHj;Jk; cs;shh; vd;gjhfnt eph;thfk; Kot[ bra;fpwJ.
Fw;wr;rhl;L vz; 4 eph;thfj;jug;g[ ghprPyid xU bghpa tpahghu epWtdj;jpd; fzf;Fnkyhsh; vd;gth; fpisfs; \yk; eilbgWk; tpw;gidia mjpfhpg;gJ kw;Wk; eilbgw;w tpw;gid bjhif epWtdj;jpy; Kiwahf tut[ tUtij fz;fhzpg;gJ/ epWtd tsh;r;rpf;F bjhiy nehf;Fld; jpl;lkpLtJ epjpepiyikia eph;thfj;jpd; ftdj;Jf;F md;whlk; bfhz;L bry;tJ nghd;wtw;Wf;fhfnt gzp Mw;w jhh;kPf mog;gilapYk; mYtyf eilKiwg;goa[k; flika[k; bghWg;g[Kilatuhf cs;shh;. mt;tifapy; ,th; Tl;Lwt[ gz;lfrhiy fzf;Ffis md;whlk; mwpe;jpl VJthf (getting uptodate knowledge) nkyhz;ik fzf;F jpl;lk; (Management Accounts System) vd;w rpwg;g[ fzf;F gapw;rpia gz;lfrhiy brytpy; bgw;W gy fhyk; ,nj epiyapy; brayhw;wp ,jw;fhfnt gz;lfrhiyapypUe;J Cjpak; bgw;wtuhthh;. Mdhy; 6.7.2000 Kjy; 4.10.2000 tiu Vwf;Fiwa \d;Wkhj fhyj;jpw;F xU bghpa tpw;gid fpisapypUe;J tpw;gid eilbgw;w fhyk; mg;gFjpapy; kpfg;bghpa jpUtpHh fhyk; vd;gJ/ nkYk; Kf;fpaj;Jtk; bgWk; epiyapy; jiyik mYtyfj;jpw;F tutpy;iy vd;gij jd; fPH; ntiyghh;f;Fk; xU fPH;epiy mYtyh; bjhptpj;j gpwnf eltof;if nkw;bfhz;ljhf bjhptpg;gJ vd;gJ ,th; jhd; Cjpak; bgWk; epWtdj;jpd;ghy; bfhzl tpRthrkpd;ikiana (Not loyal to the Institution where from he earns his daily bread) fhl;LfpwJ. ,uz;L Mz;L fhyk; jiyik r';fk; kw;Wk; ,izg;g[ r';f';fspd; fzf;Ffis xj;jpirt[ bra;anth epYitfis r';f';fsplk; cWjp bra;jplnth ,th; ve;j Kaw;rpa[k; nkw;bfhs;stpy;iy vd;gJk;/ ,th; tpw;gidahsh;fs; bra;j ifahly;fSf;F Jiz epd;W mtw;iw jpl;lkpl;L kiwj;J/ fzf;Ffis ntz;Lbkd;nw fhyjhkjkhf vGjpl bra;J mjd; \yk; cz;ik epiyikia eph;thfj;jpw;F mwpe;J bfhs;s ,ayhJ itj;J Fw;wkpiHj;Js;sjhfnt eph;thfk; Kot[ bra;fpwJ.
Fw;wr;rhl;L vz; 5 eph;thfj;jug;g[ ghprPyid fzf;F nkyhsuhf cs;s xUth; xd;gJ gphpt[fSf;F nkw;ghh;it bra;a[k; epiyapy; gzp Mw;wpa nky;epiy mYtyh; 5.10.2000 Kjy; tpw;gidj; bjhFg;g[fs; mDg;ghj fpisnkyhsh; Fwpj;J jdf;F vJt[k; bjhpahJ vdt[k; 25.1.01-y; gphpt[ cjtpahsh; Fwpg;g[ mDg;gpa gpwnf jdf;F bjhpa[k; vdt[k; bjhptpj;Js;sJ. ,th; cs;nehf;fj;Jld; brayhw;wp te;Js;sijna g[yg;gLj;JfpwJ. midj;J fpis nkyhsh;fsplkpUe;Jk;/ tpw;gid bjhFg;g[fs; te;Js;sitfis ,Jehs;tiu te;Js;sJ tutpy;iy vd;why; Vd;tutpy;iy vJtiu tpw;gidf; fzf;Ffs; vGjg;gl;Ls;sJ? vd;gd nghd;wtw;Wf;F fzf;Fnkyhsh; kl;Lnk flika[k; bghWg;g[Kilath; vd;gij kwe;Jtpl;L ,th; tpsf;fkspg;gJ Vw;g[ilajhfhJ. ,t;tpd';fis ,tnu Ma;t[ bra;a flika[ilath;. 5.10.2000 Kjy; 25.1.01 tiu ,tw;iw fz;L bfhs;shkypUe;Jtpl;L/ gpwF bghJnkyhsh; je;jp mDg;gpl Fwpg;bgGjpathW j';jp mDg;gptpl;L thshtpUe;Js;shh;. mjd; gpwFk; fpisnkyhsh; tpw;gidj; bjhFg;gpfis ntz;Lbkd;nw mDg;ghJ ,Ue;J tUfpwhh; vd;gij ,th; mwpe;jpUe;Jk;/ jpl;lkpl;L ,e;j ifahlYf;F cle;ijahft[k;/ eph;thfj;jpw;F Fw;w braiy bjhptpf;fhkYk;/ ,Ue;J Fw;wkpiHj;Js;sJ bey;ypf;fdpahFk;. ,e;j fpisapd; bjhFg;g[ gy khj';fs; bjhlh;e;J tuhj epiyapy; xl;Lbkhj;j fzf;Fg;gjpt[k; bra;a ,ayhJ eph;thf rPh;nfl;ow;F tHptFj;J/ fzf;Ffis fhyjhkjhf vGJtjd; \yk; M';fh';F elf;Fk; jtWfis fz;fhzpf;f ,ayhJ. xU FHg;g epiyia cUthf;fp Fw;wk; g[hpe;Js;shh;.
ehsJ njjptiu fzf;Ffs; gjpag;glh epiyia Vw;gLj;jp (wantonly making a chaos in accounts by not writing up of accounts upto date and thereby giving chances to culprits for pilferages.) Fw;wthspfSf;F tha;g;g[fis cUthf;fp mth;fSf;F ghJfhg;ghf ,Ue;J bray;gl;ljd; thapyhf gz;lfrhiyf;F bgUk; epjpapHg;iga[k;/ gz;lfrhiyapd; ew;bgaUf;F khwh fs';fKk; Vw;gLj;j jtW ,iHj;Js;shh;.
,e;epiyapy; gz;lfrhiyg; gzpapy; ck;ik bjhlur; bra;tJ gz;lfrhiy eyDf;F cfe;jjy;y vd;gjhy;/ Vd; ck;ik epue;ju gzpePf;fk; bra;af;TlhJ vd;gjw;F ckJ vGj;J \ykhf rkhjhdj;ij ,e;j mwptpg;g[ fpilj;j VG jpd';fSf;Fs; gz;lfrhiy eph;thfj;jpw;F mspf;f ,jd;\yk; ckf;F bjhptpf;fg;gLfpwJ. ,f;Fwpg;gpl;l fhyf;bfLtpw;Fs; ck;khy; rkhjhdk; mspf;fg;gltpy;iy vd;why; rkhjhdk; ju ckf;F Kfhe;jpuk; VJkpy;iy vdf;bfhz;L chpa bjhlh; eltof;if nkw;bfhs;sg;gLbkd;gJk; ,jd;\yk; mwptpf;fg;gLfpwJ.
25.After coming to such a different conclusion from that of the enquiry officer, without hearing the workman, the disciplinary authority came to the tentative conclusion to dismiss him from service and the first respondent was asked to show cause, on such proposed punishment. The relevant passage in the show cause notice is extracted hereunder:
,e;epiyapy; gz;lfrhiyg; gzpapy; ck;ik bjhlur; bra;tJ gz;lfrhiy eyDf;F cfe;jjy;y vd;gjhy;/ Vd; ck;ik epue;ju gzpePf;fk; bra;af;TlhJ vd;gjw;F ckJ vGj;J \ykhf rkhjhdj;ij ,e;j mwptpg;g[ fpilj;j VG jpd';fSf;Fs; gz;lfrhiy eph;thfj;jpw;F mspf;f ,jd;\yk; ckf;F bjhptpf;fg;gLfpwJ. ,f;Fwpg;gpl;l fhyf;bfLtpw;Fs; ck;khy; rkhjhdk; mspf;fg;gltpy;iy vd;why; rkhjhdk; ju ckf;F Kfhe;jpuk; VJkpy;iy vdf;bfhz;L chpa bjhlh; eltof;if nkw;bfhs;sg;gLbkd;gJk; ,jd;\yk; mwptpf;fg;gLfpwJ.
26.Therefore, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the first respondent, firstly, the disciplinary authority came to the conclusion that the first respondent was actually involved in the commission of misappropriation by colluding with the persons who committed misappropriation, while no such allegation was made in the charge memo and the departmental action also confined to the allegation made in the charge memo. Though the disciplinary authority has power to come to a different conclusion from that of the Enquiry Officer, he could not come to such conclusion, which was not alleged in the charge memo. When the first respondent was not called upon to answer such allegations, the disciplinary authority, could not come to such conclusion that the first respondent colluded in the commission of misappropriation by other employees. Such a conclusion of the disciplinary authority is violative of principles of natural justice, as the first respondent was not heard on those allegations, in the departmental enquiry. Further, since the charge against the first respondent was negligence alone, the allegation made by the Disciplinary Authority for removing the first respondent that he colluded with the persons, who misappropriated the funds, could not be accepted as both the charges could not go together and the one would exclude the other.
27.Furthermore, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the first respondent, the Disciplinary Authority also committed grave error of coming to such conclusion, without hearing the first respondent workman. According to him, as stated above, he should have heard on the tentative conclusion and after hearing only, the disciplinary authority could pass the punishment order, if the explanation given by the first respondent on the tentative conclusion was not acceptable. Such a procedure was not followed. The show cause notice dated 30.07.2002 makes it very amply clear that the disciplinary authority came to a different conclusion from that of the Enquiry Officer, on his own, without hearing the first respondent and there was no tentative differed conclusion on the charges.
28.The Honourable Supreme Court in MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL, HYDERABAD VS. B.KARUNAKAR [1993 (4) SCC 727] has categorically held that even a private employer shall hear the workman, before coming to such a different findings, before imposing punishment.
29.The aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the first respondent is purely a legal submission. I am in entire agreement with the said submission. In my view, the dismissal order of the disciplinary authority is totally illegal, as it is opposed to the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court.
30.Further, the disciplinary authority cannot record a finding of guilt of charges that are different from the charges made in the charge memo, as held by the Supreme Court in paras 6, 7 and 15 of the judgment in BIJLANI M.V. VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [2006 (II) LLJ 800] and those paras are extracted hereunder:
6.From a perusal of the enquiry report, it appears to us that the disciplinary authorities proceeded on a wrong premise. The appellant was principally charged for non-maintenance of ACE-8 Register. He was not charged for theft or misappropriation of 4000 kg of telegraph copper wire or misutilisation thereof. If he was to be proceeded against for misutilisation or misappropriation of the said amount of copper wire, it was necessary for the disciplinary authority to frame appropriate charges in that behalf. Charges were said to have been framed after receipt of a report from CBI (Anti-Corruption Bureau). It was, therefore, expected that definite charges of misutilisation/misappropriation of copper wire by the appellant would have been framed. The appellant, therefore, should have been charged for defalcation or misutilisation of the stores he had handled if he was to be departmentally proceeded against on that basis. The second charge shows that he had merely failed to supervise the working of the line. There was no charge that he failed to account for the copper wire over which he had physical control.
7.It will bear repetition to state that the charges which were framed related to only non-maintenance of ACE-8 Register and non-supervision of working of the line. In the absence of any charge that he had in fact misappropriated copper wire for his own benefit out of the disposal thereof, the question as regards purported misconduct by way of misutilisation of 4000 kg of copper wire could not have been gone into. Furthermore, it has not been shown that ACE-8 Register was required to be maintained in an appropriate form or in a particular manner i.e. in bound form or in loose sheets.
15.Evidently, the evidences recorded by the enquiry officer and inferences drawn by him were not commensurate with the charges. If it was a case of misutilisation or misappropriation, the appellant should have been told thereabout specifically. Such a serious charge could not have been enquired without framing appropriate charges. The charges are otherwise vague. We have noticed hereinbefore that the High Court also proceeded on the basis that the non-maintenance of diary amounted to misutilisation of copper wire.
31.The award can also be sustained on the reasons other than the reasons that are given by the Labour Court, as per the judgment of this Court in C.UMAPATHY VS. THE MANAGER (MARKETING) TAMIL NADU DAIRY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION [1984 (I) LLJ 248] and the judgment of the Supreme Court in ANIL KUMAR GUPTA VS. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI [2000 (1) SCC 128].
32.In my view, the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner proceeded on the basis that due to the negligence of the first respondent, misappropriation took place and therefore, the punishment imposed on him was justified. The learned Senior Counsel failed to see that the Disciplinary Authority came to the conclusion to dismiss the first respondent from service, on the conclusion that he also colluded in the commission of misappropriation.
33.At this juncture, it is relevant to extract the following passage from the award of the Labour Court.
11.The Petitioner was examined as a witness. He has not stated in the his testimony that two salesmen working under him committed acts of misappropriation and falsification of accounts and passbook. The inquiry officer has also held that these salesmen misappropriated the sales proceeds and falsified accounts. The inquiry officer has only stated that the petitioner could be held personally liable for that,The petitioner in his evidence has not contended that no embezzlement took place as alleged. So I can only conclude that he admits that two salesmen named in the charged memo committed embezzlement and falsification of accounts. The petitioner in his evidence has not denied that he had rich experience as an accountant and he was the accounts manager at the time when the misappropriation took place. As the accounts Manager he ought to have verified the statement of accounts and scrutinized all the reasoned that it was his duty to do proper inspection. I am of the opinion that Special Officer had a good reason to differ from the report of the inquiry officer who totally exonerated the petitioner. I am of the opinion that negligence of the petitioner is apparent on the face of the record. No further proof is required. He was the accounts manager and employees working under him committed acts of misappropriation and falsification of accounts. But the petitioner was blissfully not aware of the happenings. This shows that he was certainly negligent and was derelict in his duties and the Special Officer came to the correct conclusion. These Points are answered accordingly.
12.Points 3 to 5:-
I have held that the Petitioner was negligent and derelict in this duties.But there is no allegation held that the petitioner was negligent for any dishonest. It is not alleged that the petitioner also colluded with the staff who actually committed the acts of misappropriation. It is not alleged the petitioner obtained any wrongful gain by being negligent. So I am of the opinion capital punishment in a disciplinary proceeding is not appropriate punishment.
34.The Labour Court while coming to the conclusion that the first respondent was negligent, has come to the following conclusion for interference in the punishment.
I have held that the Petitioner was negligent and derelict in this duties. But there is no allegation held that the petitioner was negligent for any dishonest. It is not alleged that the petitioner also colluded with the staff who actually committed the acts of misappropriation. It is not alleged the petitioner obtained any wrongful gain by being negligent. So I am of the opinion capital punishment in a disciplinary proceeding is not appropriate punishment.
For negligent act without any dishonest motive. Dismissal is not the appropriate punishment. Hence I am of the opinion that the punishment can be substituted with reduction in rank by one step and continuity of service along with back wages applicable to that post. The petitioner has reached superannuation abe and hence he is not entitled to reinstatement in any post. These points are answered accordingly. Recording such a finding, the Labour Court interfered in the punishment of dismissal in para 16 of its award. Para 16 of the award of the Labour Court is extracted hereunder:
16.In the result, the dismissal of the petitioner is set aside and reduction in rank by one step is to be imposed as punishment on the petitioner and he is also granted continuity of service and backwages as applicable to the post. The industrial dispute is ordered accordingly.
35.In my view, the above said reasonings of the Labour Court for interfering with the punishment cannot be faulted. It is a different matter, if the Labour Court, without giving any valid reasons, interfered with the punishment. In this case, the Labour Court judiciously applied its mind under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and came to the conclusion that it is a fit case to interfere in the order of punishment.
36.It is true that the Labour Court in para 13 of its award has relied on the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in RM PARMAR VS. GUJARAT ELECTRICITY BOARD [1982 Lab LC 1031]. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the said judgment has no relevance to the facts of this issue. However, I am not in agreement with the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. In that case, the Labour Court award confirming the order of dismissal was reversed by the Gujarat High Court, on finding that the Labour Court failed to exercise its power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Further, it was a case of theft of scrap materials valued less than Rs.50/-. The Gujarat High Court found that the Labour Court proceeded as if it has no power to reduce the punishment, unless the workman pleaded guilty and sought mercy. The Gujarat High Court found that after introduction of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, in 1971, the Labour Court shall exercise its jurisdiction under Section 11-A of the Act as an appellate Court on the punishment also. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the Gujarat High Court thought to interfere with the award and accordingly, remanded the matter back to the Labour Court to decide the matter afresh by exercising its power under Section 11-A of the Act.
37.In this case also, this Court, in the earlier writ petition filed by the first respondent in W.P.No.27082 of 2007 found that the Labour Court failed to exercise its power under Section 11-A of the Act on merits, as an appellate authority, and hence, vide order dated dated 07.02.2012 set aside the earlier award dated 17.04.2007 in I.D.No.48/2003.
38.Now, the Labour Court has passed the impugned award giving valid reasons, as noted above. In fact, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the first respondent, this Court has only limited power in interfering with the award of the Labour Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction, as held by the Supreme Court in HARJINDER SINGH VS. PUNJAB STATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION [2010 (3) SCC 192], which has in turn followed its earlier decision in SYED YAKOOB VS. K.S.RADHAKRISHNAN [AIR 1964 SC 477] on the jurisdication of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in para 12 of the judgment. Para 12 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder:
12.In Syed Yakoob's case, this Court delineated the scope of the writ of certiorari in the following words:
"7.The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque 1955 (1) SCR 1104, Nagandra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam 1958 SCR 1240 and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh AIR 1960 SC 1168).
39.Therefore, this Court is not an appellate Court like the Labour Court, while dealing with the award. After introduction of Section 11-A of the Act, the Labour Court is vested with the power of an Appellate Court, to come to a different conclusion from that of the Enquiry Officer and also to interfere in the matter of punishment of dismissal and to award a lesser punishment in lieu of dismissal. Before introduction of Section 11-A of the Act, the Labour Court did not have such appellate power.
40.Section 11-A of the Act was introduced by Section 3 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1971, pursuant to the recommendation of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) that the neutral body should be empowered to examine the reasons for the termination and to alter the punishment in appropriate cases. The statement of objects and reasons for introducing Section 11-A of the Act is as follows:
2.The International Labour Organisation, in its recommendation (No.119) concerning 'termination of employment at the initiative of the employer' adopted in June, 1963, has recommended that a worker aggrieved by the termination of his employment should be entitled to appeal against the termination, amongst others, to a neutral body such as an arbitrator, a court, an arbitration committee or a similar body and that the neutral body concerned should be empowered to examine the reasons given in the termination of employment and the other circumstances realting to the case and to render a decision on the justification of the termination. The International Labour Organisation has further recommended that the neutral body should be empowered (if it finds that the termination of employment was unjustified) to order that the worker concerned, unless reinstated with unpaid wages, should be paid adequate compensation or afforded some other relief.
41.When the validity of Section 11-A of the Act was considered by the Supreme Court in its judgment in Workmen VS. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. [1973 (1) SCC 813], the Supreme Court has considered the aforesaid statement of objects and reasons and upheld the validity of Section 11-A.
42.The judgment of the Supreme Court in MAVJI C.LAKUM VS. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA [2008 (12) SCC 726] relied on by the learned counsel for the first respondent squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of this case. In that case, the appellant therein was an employee of the Bank. He was discharged from service based on certain allegation after a domestic enquiry. The dispute relating to non-employment was taken to the Industrial Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that the enquiry was properly held, but the charges were not serious enough to warrant extreme penalty of discharge from service. The Tribunal substituted the punishment of discharge with the punishment of withholding of one increment. In the meanwhile, the appellant retired from service in September 1994. The Bank questioned the award before the Gujarat High Court. A learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition holding that the Tribunal should not have interfered with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The writ appeal preferred by the workman was dismissed. When the matter was taken to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court examined the power of Section 11-A of the Act, and restored the award. Paras 23, 24, 25 and 27 of the judgment are extracted hereunder in this regard:
23. In this backdrop when we see unusually long judgment of the learned Single Judge, it comes out that the learned Single Judge held firstly that the Tribunal had exceeded its powers vested in it under the provisions of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Judge, as regards, Section 11-A, after quoting the same, observed:
"Though the Tribunal was equipped with the power to come to its own conclusion whether in a given case the imposition of punishment of discharge or dismissal from the service is justified. It is for that purpose that the Tribunal is authorized to go into the evidence that has been adduced before the Inquiry Officer in details and find out whether the punishment of discharge or dismissal is commensurate with the nature of charges proved against the delinquent."
So far the finding of the learned Single Judge appears to be correct. However, the whole thrust of the judgment has changed merely because the Industrial Tribunal had found the inquiry to be fair and proper. The learned Judge seems to be of the opinion that if the inquiry is held to be fair and proper, then the Industrial Tribunal cannot go into the question of evidence or the quantum of punishment. We are afraid that is not the correct law. Even if the inquiry is found to be fair, that would be only a finding certifying that all possible opportunities were given to the delinquent and the principles of natural justice and fair play were observed. That does not mean that the findings arrived at were essentially the correct findings. If the Industrial Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the findings could not be supported on the basis of the evidence given or further comes to the conclusion that the punishment given is shockingly disproportionate, the Industrial Tribunal would still be justified in re-appreciating the evidence and/or interfering with the quantum of punishment. There can be no dispute that power under Section 11-A has to be exercised judiciously and the interference is possible only when the Tribunal is not satisfied with the findings and further concludes that punishment imposed by the Management is highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. Besides, the Tribunal has to give reasons as to why it is not satisfied either with the findings or with the quantum of punishment and that such reason should not be fanciful or whimsical but there should be good reasons.
24.In our opinion the reasons given by the Tribunal were correct and the treatment given by the Tribunal to the evidence was perfectly justified. The Tribunal committed no error in observing that for good long 30 years there was no complaint against the work of the appellant and that such a complaint suddenly surfaced only in the year 1982. The Tribunal was justified in appreciating the fact that the charges were not only trivial and were not so serious as to entail the extreme punishment of discharge. Here was the typical example where the evidence was of a most general nature and the charges were also not such as would have invited the extreme punishment. It was not as if the appellant had abused or had done any physical altercation with his superiors or colleagues. What was complained was of his absence on some days and his argumentative nature.
25.Though the learned Judge had discussed all the principles regarding the exercise of powers under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act as also the doctrine of proportionality and the Wednesbury's principles, we are afraid the learned Judge has not applied all these principles properly to the present case. The learned Judge has quoted extensively from the celebrated decision of M/s.Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India P. Ltd. V. The Management [AIR 1973 SC 1227], however, the learned Judges seems to have ignored the observations made in para 32 of that decision where it is observed that:
"........The words "in the course of adjudication proceeds, the Tribunal is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified" clearly indicate that the Tribunal is now clothed with the power of re-appraise the evidence in the domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the said evidence relied on by an employer establishes the misconduct alleged against a workman. What was originally a plausible conclusion that could be drawn by an employer from the evidence, has now given place to a satisfaction being arrived at by the Tribunal that the finding of misconduct is correct.. The Tribunal is at liberty to consider not only whether the finding of misconduct recorded by an employer is correct but also to differ from the said finding if a proper case is made out"
26..........
27.On the other hand the Tribunal, in our opinion has correctly appreciated the evidence and has also correctly substituted the punishment. In whole of the judgment, the learned Single Judge has not referred to any of the factual findings recorded by the Tribunal. In our opinion the judgment of the learned Single Judge was wholly incorrect in so far as it dubbed the Tribunal's judgment as wrong. We approve of the judgment of the Tribunal and set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
43.The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has stated that pursuant to the award, the liability of the Management is around Rs.2,00,000/- towards backwages. The first respondent served for more than 26 years at the time of dismissal. There was no other allegation in his career as per the records. Further, the Labour Court gave coherent reasons for interfering in the matter of punishment for the charges since it came to the conclusion that the first respondent was nothing to do with the misappropriation and the act of negligence did not warrant extreme penalty of dismissal, in the facts and circumstances of the case. The award cannot be termed as a perverse one. In view of my aforesaid conclusion, I am not inclined to interfere with the award of the Labour Court.
44.For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. Since the first respondent is a senior citizen and he retired from service on 30.06.2007, the petitioner is directed to pay the benefits of the award, as well as the terminal benefits, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed 23 / 07 / 2014 Index : Yes Internet : Yes Note : Issue order copy on 24.07.2014 TK To The Presiding Officer Labour Court Cuddalore.
D.HARIPARANTHAMAN, J.
TK PRE-DELIVERY ORDER MADE IN W.P.NO.29838 OF 2013 23 / 07 / 2014