Gujarat High Court
Jigarbhai Hasmukhbhai Shah vs State Of Gujarat on 16 January, 2017
Author: J.B.Pardiwala
Bench: J.B.Pardiwala
R/CR.MA/787/2017 ORDER
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE
FIR/ORDER) NO. 787 of 2017
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JIGARBHAI HASMUKHBHAI SHAH....Applicant(s)
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT....Respondent(s)
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Appearance:
MR SAURIN A SHAH, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1
APP for the Respondent No.1
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
Date : 16/01/2017
ORAL ORDER
1 By this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the applicant - original complainant has prayed for the following reliefs:
"4(A) That the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to quash and setaside the order dated 19122016 passed by the Ld. Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.11, Ahmedabad below Exh. 4 in inquiry case No.4 of 2016 for the offences punishable u/s. 211 r/w 383, 120B & 114 and further be pleased to direct the Mahila Police Station to hold inquiry u/s. 202 of Cr.P.C. 1973 in respect to Inquiry Case No.4 of 2016 pending before Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.11, Ahmedabad and submit the report in accordance with law.
B) that any just and proper order may be passed."
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2 The facts giving rise to this application may be summarised as
under:
2.1 A lady by name Smt. Darshnaben Dharmeshbhai Patel residing in
Ahmedabad lodged a First Information Report dated 30th September 2016 bearing C.R. No.I48 of 2016 against the applicant herein at the Mahila Police Station, Ahmedabad for the offence punishable under Sections 376, 386, 380, 120B read with 114 of the Indian Penal Code.
2.2 It is the case of the applicant herein that the First Information Report lodged by Darshnaben Patel is absolutely false, frivolous and vexatious. In such circumstances, the applicant filed a private complaint in the Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.11 at Ahmedabad against Darshnaben Patel and others for the offence punishable under Sections 211, 383, 120B read with 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The complaint came to be registered as the Criminal Inquiry No.4 of 2016.
2.3 The learned Metropolitan Magistrate thought fit to record the verification of the complainant on oath and ordered magisterial inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. In the course of the magisterial inquiry, one witness came to be examined on oath. Before the other witnesses could be examined on oath, the applicant herein preferred an application Exhibit: 4 in the Criminal Inquiry No.4 of 2016 with a prayer that instead of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate conducting the inquiry himself, let the inquiry under Section 202 of the Code be entrusted to the police officer who is also investigating into the F.I.R. lodged by Darshnaben referred to above.
3 The learned Magistrate, by order dated 19th December 2016, rejected the application. Being dissatisfied, the applicant has come up Page 2 of 13 HC-NIC Page 2 of 13 Created On Sat Aug 12 11:21:51 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/787/2017 ORDER with this application.
4 Mr. Saurin Shah, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant vehemently submitted that the learned Magistrate committed an error in rejecting the application Exhibit: 4 filed by his client. He submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be more appropriate if the inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C., as ordered by the Magistrate, is conducted by the police officer who is also investigating into the F.I.R. lodged by Darshnaben Patel. He further prays that there being merit in this application, the same be allowed and appropriate directions be issued in this regard.
5 On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by the learned A.P.P. appearing for the State respondent. A preliminary objection has been raised as regards the maintainability of this application. According to the learned A.P.P., the impugned order is a revisable order and the applicant could not have invoked the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The learned A.P.P.. further submitted that assuming for the moment that this application is maintainable, no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the learned Magistrate in passing the impugned order. It is the discretion of the learned Magistrate whether to conduct the inquiry on its own or order the police officer of the concerned police station to carry out inquiry and file an appropriate report in that regard. In such circumstances, the learned A.P.P. prays that there being no merit in this application, the same be rejected.
6 Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the learned Magistrate committed any error in passing the impugned order.
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7 Let me deal with the preliminary contention raised as regards the
maintainability of this application. I have my doubt whether the impugned order could be termed as a 'final order' or an 'intermediate order' so as to make a revision under Sections 397 read with 401 of the Cr.P.C. maintainable. Be that as it may, the law in this regard is now wellsettled. The Supreme Court in the case of Prabhu Chawla vs. State of Rajasthan and another [Criminal Appeal No.842 of 2016 decided on 5th September 2016] has explained the position of law as under:
"3 While considering all these matters at the SLP stage, on 05.07.2013, a Division Bench found the impugned order of the High Court to be against the law stated in Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. And Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra [(2009) 2 SCC 370]. In that case the Division Bench concurred with the proposition of law that availability of alternative remedy of criminal revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. by itself cannot be a good ground to dismiss an application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. But it noticed that a later Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Mohit alias Sonu and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another [(2013) 7 SCC 789] apparently held to the contrary that when an order under assail is not interlocutory in nature and is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court then there should be a bar in invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. In view of such conflict, these cases were directed to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for reference to a larger Bench and that is how the matters are before this Bench for resolving the conflict.
4 The facts of these appeals need not detain us because in our considered opinion the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in the impugned order is contrary to law and therefore matters will have to be remanded back to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits within the scope of inherent powers available to the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It would suffice to note that in both these appeals, the miscellaneous petitions before the High Court arose out of an order dated 30.11.2006 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Jodhpur in the complaint no. 1669 of 2006, whereby it took cognizance against the appellants under Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code and summoned them through bailable warrants to face further proceedings in the case.
5 Mr. P.K. Goswami learned senior advocate for the appellants
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supported the view taken by this Court in the case Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. (supra). He pointed out that in paragraph 6 of this judgment Justice S. B. Sinha took note of several earlier judgments of this Court including that in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866] and Som Mittal v. Gov. of Karnataka [(2008) 3 SCC 574] for coming to the conclusion that "only because a revision petition is maintainable, the same by itself, ........., would not constitute a bar for entertaining an application under Section 482 of the Code." Mr. Goswami also placed strong reliance upon judgment of Krishna Iyer, J. in a Division Bench in the case of Raj Kapoor and Ors. v. State and Ors. [(1980) 1 SCC 43]. Relying upon judgment of a Bench of three Judges in the case of Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551] and quoting therefrom, Krishna Iyer, J. in his inimitable style made the law crystal clear in paragraph 10 which runs as follows:
"10. The first question is as to whether the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 stands repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. The opening words of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing of the Code, not even Section 397, can affect the amplitude of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language of Section 482. Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law when a specific provision is made: easy resort to inherent power is not right except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code. In Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra, this Court has exhaustively and, if I may say so with great respect, correctly discussed and delineated the law beyond mistake. While it is true that Section 482 is pervasive it should not subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code, such, for instance, in Section 397(2). Apparent conflict may arise in some situations between the two provisions and a happy solution "would be to say that the bar provided in sub section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then, if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then Page 5 of 13 HC-NIC Page 5 of 13 Created On Sat Aug 12 11:21:51 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/787/2017 ORDER nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction".
In short, there is no total ban on the exercise of inherent power where abuse of the process of the court or other extraordinary situation excites the court's jurisdiction. The limitation is self restraint, nothing more. The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the court in the face. In between is a tertium quid, as Untwalia, J. has pointed out as for example, where it is more than a purely interlocutory order and less than a final disposal. The present case falls under that category where the accused complain of harassment through the court's process. Can we state that in this third category the inherent power can be exercised? In the words of Untwalia, J.:
(SCC p. 556, para 10) "The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although not accepting, that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible."
I am, therefore clear in my mind that the inherent power is not rebuffed in the case situation before us. Counsel on both sides, sensitively responding to our allergy for legalistics, rightly agreed that the fanatical insistence on the formal filing of a copy of the order under cessation need not take up this court's time. Our conclusion concurs with the concession of counsel on both sides that merely because a copy of the order has not been produced, despite its presence in the records in the court, it is not possible for me to hold that the entire revisory power stands frustrated and the inherent power stultified."
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6 In our considered view any attempt to explain the law further as
regards the issue relating to inherent power of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is unwarranted. We would simply reiterate that Section 482 begins with a nonobstante clause to state: "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." A fortiori, there can be no total ban on the exercise of such wholesome jurisdiction where, in the words of Krishna Iyer, J. "abuse of the process of the Court or other extraordinary situation excites the court's jurisdiction. The limitation is selfrestraint, nothing more." We venture to add a further reason in support. Since Section 397 Cr.P.C. is attracted against all orders other than interlocutory, a contrary view would limit the availability of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. only to petty interlocutory orders! A situation wholly unwarranted and undesirable.
7 As a sequel, we are constrained to hold that the Division Bench, particularly in paragraph 28, in the case of Mohit alias Sonu and another (supra) in respect of inherent power of the High Court in Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. does not state the law correctly. We record our respectful disagreement.
8 In our considered opinion the learned Single Judge of the High Court should have followed the law laid down by this Court in the case of Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. (supra) and other earlier cases which were cited but wrongly ignored them in preference to a judgment of that Court in the case of Sanjay Bhandari (supra) passed by another learned Single Judge on 05.02.2009 in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 289 of 2006 which is impugned in the connected Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition No. 4744 of 2009. As a result, both the appeals, one preferred by Prabhu Chawla and the other by Jagdish Upasane & Ors. are allowed. The impugned common order dated 02.04.2009 passed by the High Court of Rajasthan is set aside and the matters are remitted back to the High Court for fresh hearing of the petitions under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the light of law explained above and for disposal in accordance with law. Since the matters have remained pending for long, the High Court is requested to hear and decide the matters expeditiously, preferably within six months."
8 The above takes me to consider the main issue.
9 It is true that when the Court orders inquiry under Section 202 of Page 7 of 13 HC-NIC Page 7 of 13 Created On Sat Aug 12 11:21:51 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/787/2017 ORDER the Cr.P.C. upon a complaint, it is the discretion of the concerned Court whether to conduct the inquiry on its own or direct the police officer of the concerned police station to undertake the inquiry and file a report in that regard. In the case at hand, the learned Magistrate thought fit to conduct the inquiry on its own and also examined one witness produced by the complainant on oath. However, the complainant felt that it would be more appropriate if the inquiry is conducted by the police officer who is also conducting the investigation as regards the F.I.R. which has been lodged against him. I am of the view that the inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C., as ordered by the learned Magistrate, should be carried out by the police who is also looking into the F.I.R. in question.
10 Mr. Shah, the learned counsel places reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagat Ram vs. Surinder Kumar [2004 (11) SCC 622], in which the Supreme Court held as under:
"[4] It is clear from a perusal of the order made by the learned Magistrate that he has not done anything other than to comply with the provisions of S. 202 (1) proviso (b) of the Cr.P.C., that after examining the complainant and his witnesses he found that it was necessary to further probe into the matter and, therefore, directed investigation to be done by the police and after the investigation was done by the police and on report being filed by them, he heard the matter afresh and directed issue of summons. We find that the procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate is perfectly in order. However, Shri S.B. Wad, learned Senior Advocate who appears for Respondent 1 drew our attention to the decision of this Court in Suresh Chand Jain v. State of M.P. and contended that the learned Magistrate had already taken cognizance in the matter before directing the investigation/inquiry by the police and such a course was not permissible. But on the facts in the said case the question that fell for consideration is that whether a Magistrate can direct investigation of the matter before taking cognizance of an offence and without examining the complainant on facts. It was held that he could direct the police to register an FIR and investigate the matter. Even if the scope of investigation is limited as noticed in the said decision, the Magistrate has powers under S. 202(1) of the CPC to direct investigation and in the meanwhile he may postpone issue of process against the accused by adopting any one of the courses Page 8 of 13 HC-NIC Page 8 of 13 Created On Sat Aug 12 11:21:51 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/787/2017 ORDER mentioned in S. 202 (1). As to when cognizance of an offence is taken will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it is not possible to state the same with precision. Obviously, it is only when the Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under S. 202 Cr.P.C. and subsequent sections that it can positively be stated that he has taken cognizance. To derive this inference we rely upon the decision in Narayandas Bahgwandas Madhavdas v. State of W.B. and Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy. In the instant case the learned Magistrate has called for an investigation before proceeding further even after examining the complainant and his witnesses on oath. Hence the observation therein would not be of assistance to the respondents in this case. Therefore, we set aside the order made by the High Court and restore the proceedings before the learned Magistrate. The appeal is allowed accordingly."
11 Mr. Shah also invited my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M.L. Sethi vs. R.P. Kapur and another [AIR 1967 SC 528], in which the Supreme Court considered two questions: (1) whether a criminal complaint under Section 211 of Indian Penal Code can be filed a private person when the First Information Report is under investigation and relates to a cognizable offence, and (2) whether the bar of Section 195 (1) (b) of the Cr.P.C. would be attracted or not.
The first question came to be answered by the Supreme Court as under:
"30. In support of his proposition that no criminal complaint under S. 211, I. P. C., can be filed by a private person if the First Information Report is under investigation and relates to a cognizable offence, Mr. Anthony urged that we should examine the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to investigation contained in Ss. 154 to 173 of that Code and should hold that this scheme itself envisages that invariably, the proceedings of investigation will terminate in a judicial order by a Magistrate, and while such proceedings are pending, it should not be permissible for a private person to file the Complaint on the ground that the report under investigation was a false one. It is perfectly correct that when a report of a cognizable offence is made, a duty is cast on the Police Officer in charge of the station to investigate that case, and in certain cases of serious offences, immediate report has to be sent to the Magistrate who has power to take cognizance of the offences. There is, however, Page 9 of 13 HC-NIC Page 9 of 13 Created On Sat Aug 12 11:21:51 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/787/2017 ORDER nothing in these sections to indicate that the Magistrate is required to intervene in the investigation until the investigation is completed and the investigating officer arrives at some conclusion in accordance with S. 169 or S. 170, Cr. P. C. After arriving at his conclusion under either of those two sections, he has to submit a report to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence under S. 173. If his conclusion is covered by the provisions of S. 170, Cr. P. C., the report submitted by the investigating officer will necessarily show that a cognizable offence has been committed and such a report will satisfy the requirements of S. 190 (1) (b), Cr. P. C. On that report, therefore, the Magistrate concerned can take cognizance and proceed with the trial of the case. On the other hand, if the report is based on conclusions envisaged in S. 169, Cr. P. C., the report will contain facts found by the Police Officer, and would normally indicate that no such offence was committed of which he could recommend a trial by the Magistrate. Even on the receipt of such a report, the Magistrate is, of course, competent to take cognizance under S. 190 (1)
(b) if he is of the opinion that the facts stated in the report of the Police constitute an offence. On the other hand, if those facts do not constitute an offence, no cognizance of the case can be taken by the Magistrate, though he can order further investigation. If he does not choose to order further investigation, all that the Magistrate has to do is to make an order under subs. (3) of S. 173, Cr. P. C., discharging the bond if the accused has been released by the Police on his bond."
The second question came be answered by the Supreme court as contained in para 31:
"31. This scheme of investigation and its termination contained in these sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure came up for consideration in several cases. In Appa Ragho Bhogle v. Emperor, (1915) 16 Cri LJ 161 (Bom) it was held that a case which was investigated by the police under authority of a Magistrate under S. 155, Cr. P. C., could not be disposed of without the order of the Magistrate in some form or another after a report was submitted to him. In State v. Vipra Khimji AIR 1952 Sau 67 it was held that where information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence is given to an officer in charge of a Police Station under S. 154, Cr.
P. C., and is followed by investigation by him, he is bound under S. 173(1) to forward his final report to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report. This Court also, in H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, (1955) I SCR 1150: (AIR 1955 SC 196) examined the scheme of these provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and held that upon the completion of investigation, the investigating officer has to submit a report to the Magistrate under S. 173, Cr. P. C., in the prescribed form, furnishing various details, whether it appears to him that there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground, or whether he Page 10 of 13 HC-NIC Page 10 of 13 Created On Sat Aug 12 11:21:51 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/787/2017 ORDER finds that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground to place the accused on trial. Similar observations were made by the Bombay High Court in State v. Murlidhar Govardhan. AIR 1960 Bom 240. In two of these cases, viz., AIR 1952 Sau 67 and AIR 1960 Bom 240 (supra), the Courts further held that when a Magistrate passes an order on the proceedings under S. 173, Cr. P. C'., that order is a judicial order made by him. For purposes of considering the effect of these cases in the case before us, it is not at all necessary to express any opinion on the correctness of the view that the order passed under S. 173, Cr. P. C., by the Magistrate is a judicial order when he either discharges the bond under subs. (3) of S. 173, or takes cognizance under S. 190 (1) (b), Cr. P. C. Even if it be accepted that the final orders to be made by the Magistrate are judicial orders, the only conclusion that follows is that at the last stage, on receipt of the report under S. 173, the Magistrate has to act in his judicial capacity. Until that stage is reached, there is no intervention by the Magistrate in his judicial capacity or as a Court. Consequently, until some occasion arises for a Magistrate to make a judicial order in connection with an investigation of a cognizable offence by the police no question can arise of the Magistrate having the power of filing a complaint under S. 195 (1) (b), Cr. P. C. In such circumstances, if a private person, aggrieved by the information given to the police. files a complaint for commission of an offence under S 211, I. P. C., at any stage before a Judicial order has been made by a Magistrate, there can be no question, on the date on which cognizance of that complaint is taken by the Court, of the provisions of S. 195 (1) (b) being attracted, because on that date, there would be no proceeding in any Court in existence in relation to which the offence under S. 211, I. P. C., can be said to have been committed. The mere fact that on a report being made to the police of a cognizable offence, the proceedings must, at some later stage, and in a judicial order by a Magistrate, cannot therefore, stand in the way of a private complaint being filed and of cognizance being taken by the Court on its basis."
12 The Supreme Court in M.L. Sethi (supra) also considered the submission made on behalf of the appellant therein that a very anomalous position may arise if a private person is allowed to file a complaint that the report to the police against him is false before the investigation is completed. The Supreme Court answered the contention in the negative observing as under:
"32. The last submission made on behalf of the appellant was that a very anomalous position can arise if a private person is allowed to file a complaint that the report to the police against him is false before investigation is completed. It was urged that there can be cases where a Page 11 of 13 HC-NIC Page 11 of 13 Created On Sat Aug 12 11:21:51 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/787/2017 ORDER report may be lodged against a person for commission of a serious offence like murder. and while investigation is still going on, the accused may file a complaint against the person, who lodged the report, under S. 211, I. P. C., for making a false report. Subsequently, when the police prosecute that accused, there would, simultaneously, be two trials in one of which the person accused of the murder would be under trial. while in the other case the person, who lodged the First Information Report, would appear as the accused. It was suggested that a person accused of a serious crime should not be given the advantage of putting his complainant in jeopardy by instituting a case against him for the offence under S. 211. I. P. C. We are unable to hold that it is necessary to interpret the law in such a way as to necessarily avoid such a situation. There appears to be no difficulty in both cases being tried together in the same Court or one after the other by different Courts In fact, even if we were to accept the submission made on behalf of the appellant a similar situation can still arise. There may be a case where the police may report to the Magistrate that the First Information Report was false, and in such a case, according to the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant, the Magistrate receiving the report under S. 173 Cr. P. C., would be competent to file a complaint against the information for the under offence S. 211, I. P. C., in exercise of his power under S. 195 (1) (b), Cr. P C. At the same time there would he no bar to that informant filing a complaint direct in the Court of the Magistrate on the basis of his F. I. R. so that, again, there can be two trials in the Court in one of which the informant would be the accused, and in the other, the person charged in the First Information Report would be the accused. The situation will not, therefore, differ whether we accept the submission made on behalf of the appellant, or do not do so, this aspect is, therefore, not at all helpful in interpreting the scope of S. 195 (1) (b), Cr. P. C. We, consequently, hold that in this case, the complaint, which was filed by the' respondent, was competent and the Judicial Magistrate at Chandigarh, in taking cognizance of the offence, only exercised Jurisdiction rightly vested in him. He was not barred from taking cognizance of the complaint by the provisions of S. 195 (1) (b), Cr. P. C."
13 In view of the above, the impugned order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.11, Ahmedabad is hereby quashed. The learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.11, Ahmedabad shall pass an appropriate order directing the police officer of the concerned police station who is also incharge of the investigation of the F.I.R. bearing C.R. No.I48 of 2016 registered with the Mahila Police Station, Ahmedabad to conduct the inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. and file an appropriate report in that regard in accordance with Page 12 of 13 HC-NIC Page 12 of 13 Created On Sat Aug 12 11:21:51 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/787/2017 ORDER law. Let this exercise be undertaken at the earliest.
14 With the above, this application is disposed of. Direct service is permitted.
(J.B.PARDIWALA, J.) chandresh Page 13 of 13 HC-NIC Page 13 of 13 Created On Sat Aug 12 11:21:51 IST 2017